1 2026:CGHC:5336 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 427 of 2025 1 - Tilaso Bai Wd/o Late Sahdev Singh Aged About 47 Years, Occupation - Housewife, R/o Village Khond, Post Pandopara, P.S. Patna Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - Vanshgopal Singh S/o Shankar Lal Singh Aged About 47 Years, Caste Kshatriya, R/o House No. 285 Virat Nagar Pandopara Permanent Address Village Tendua Post Bhadiwar P.S. Shankargarh District - Prayagraj (U.P.) 2 - Kamlesh Singh S/o Vanshgopal Aged About 45 Years, Caste Kshatriya, R/o House No. 285 Virat Nagar Pandopara Permanent Address Village Tendua Post Bhadiwar P.S. Shankargarh District - Prayagraj (U.P.) 3 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribe Welfare Police Station Baikunthpur, District - Koriya (C.G.) ---- Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Vikas Ghritlahre, Advocate. For State : Mr. Jai Prakash Tiwari, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 30-01-2026 1. The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the complainant against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 04.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act) Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh in Special Criminal (SC/ST Act) Case No.21/2022 whereby the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons have been acquitted from the offence under Section 420, 294, 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.02.16 19:46:11 +0530 2 the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short ‘the SC/ST Act’). 2. The case of the prosecution was that an offence has been registered against the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons on the complaint made by the complainant with the allegation that the accused persons induced the complainant to deliver the amount on the pretext that the said amount would be invested in the insurance policy and she would get the monthly pension. On their assurance given to the complaint Rs.4,00,000/- have been taken by the accused persons from the complainant, but subsequently she came to know that there was no insurance policy issued in the name of the complainant and she was cheated by them and then she gave an application before the learned trial Court under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and after registration of the FIR the investigation was carried out and after completion of the investigation charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court. The accused persons have been prosecuted in Special Criminal (SC/ST Act) Case No.21/2022. 3. During the course of the trial the victim/complainant (PW-6) has entered into compromise with the accused persons and she made an application for acquittal of the accused persons under Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C./359(2) of B.N.S.S. and Section 320(8) of the Cr.P.C./359(8) of B.N.S.S. Considering the allegation made in the complaint as well as the fact that the parties have entered in compromise the learned trial Court permitted the parties to compound their offence for the offence under Section 420, 294 and 506 Part II of the IPC, however, the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act was not compoundable, therefore, the learned trial Court proceeded with the trial of the case vide its order dated 01.09.2025 and the accused persons have been acquitted from offence of Section 420, 294 and 506 Part II of the IPC. Thereafter, the opportunity to lead evidence of the prosecution witnesses were closed and the learned trial Court has passed its judgment 3 on 04.09.2025 by which the accused persons have been acquitted form the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which is under challenge in the present acquittal appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the complainant was cheated by the accused persons and huge money was taken from her by them. When the complainant demanded her money back she was harassed and tortured by the accused persons for which she made complaint to the learned trial Court under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. on which the FIR was registered and the trial was proceeded. There are sufficient material and evidence on record to hold that respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons have abused the complainant in the name of her caste and intentionally insulted and intimidated her in the public place. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal may be set aside and the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons may be convicted for the alleged offence. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record of the trial Court. 6. It is not in dispute that on 01.09.2025 the complainant made an application under Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C./359(2) of B.N.S.S. and another application under Section 320(8) of the Cr.P.C./359(8) of B.N.S.S. for taking the compromise between the parties on record and to acquit the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons from the alleged offence. They have been duly identified by the counsel and after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the allegations in the case the learned trial Court permitted them to compound the offence of Section 420, 294 and 506 part II of the IPC and acquitted them from the said offences vide order dated 01.09.2025. Since the offence of Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act was not compoundable, the learned trial Court proceeded with trial of the case for that offence of the SC/ST Act. However, the complainant could not produce any other witness in support of her case and then the opportunity of 4 prosecution witnesses were closed and the judgment has been passed by the learned trial Court on 04.09.2025. 7. Since the parties have entered into compromise and settled their dispute, now the appellant cannot take the plea that she was cheated and huge amount has been taken by the accused persons from her. Once the complainant had lodged the complaint against the act of the accused persons in which they were being prosecuted and during the course of the trial they entered into compromise and settled their dispute it amounts that the dispute with respect to all the grievance have been settled between the parties. Merely on the basis of the fact that the offence under the SC/ST Act is not compoundable the learned trial Court has not permitted them to compound the offence of the SC/ST Act. However, on the merits the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents No.1 and 2 from the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act by holding that there is no sufficient evidence to convict the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons for the said offence. The learned trial Court has also considered that the prosecution witnesses PW-1 and PW-4 have also not duly supported the prosecution’s case and PW-6, the complainant has also not supported her case that on the date of incident the accused persons have abused her in the name of her caste. Considering the entire material available on record the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons from the offence of Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and Ors Vs. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440, has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at Para 25 which reads as under; "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C., the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The 5 reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 9. Recently, applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 10. The Trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence led by the prosecution and after analyzing the entire evidence led by the prosecution, acquitted the accused persons after giving them the benefit of doubt. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant and the statements made by the prosecution witnesses in their court evidence makes the prosecution case suspicious and is not credible. 11. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment passed by the Court below and being very much conscious of the 6 existing legal position as held in case of Jafarudheen (supra) and Kistoora Ram (supra) that in an appeal against acquittal, if two views are possible on the basis by the evidence laid by the prosecution and the trial court taking one view favoured the accused, reversion on the finding of acquittal by the appellate court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law. 12. From careful perusal of the record, this Court does not find any perversity in the consideration of the learned trial Court while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. I am therefore of the considered opinion that the judgment impugned, acquitting the respondents No.1 and 2/accused persons is just and proper and does not call for any interference. Accordingly the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant against the acquittal of respondents No.1 and 2 from the aforesaid offence is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil