JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 51 of 2018, dated 01.05.2018, registered at Police Station, Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 353, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act. 2. It has been asserted that, according to the prosecution, the petitioner had fired upon government officials while they were discharging their official duties. The police arrested the petitioner and investigated the matter. They filed the main charge sheet before the Court on 26.07.2018, and supplementary charge sheets on 23.10.2019 and 13.01.2020. The matter was listed for final argument when the prosecution moved an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), read with Section 348 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking the recall of Dr Sangeet Dhillon (PW17) and Naseeb Singh Patiyal (PW41). The learned Trial Court allowed the application and recalled the witnesses for further examination. The matter was scheduled for the examination of witnesses on 08.01.2026, but they failed to appear, and the case was adjourned to 20.02.2026. The prosecution is unable to complete the evidence despite the lapse of seven years and eight months. The petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The undue delay in completing the trial violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The prosecution, and not the petitioner, has caused the delay. The petitioner was previously granted interim bail,  and  he did not  violate the conditions imposed upon him. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Therefore, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the National Green Tribunal (NGT) had directed the demolition of all illegal constructions. Informant Shivender Pal, Ranjan Gupta, Sanjay Negi, Rajeev Mishra, Smt. Shail Bala, N.C. Mahajan, Rahul Sharma, police officials and PWD officials were deputed to comply with the orders of the NGT. Petitioner Vijay Singh is the owner of Narayani Guest House. He was present at the reception. He shot at Smt. Shail Bala and Gulab Singh, who sustained multiple injuries. Shail Bala and Gulab Singh were taken to the hospital, however, Smt. Shail Bala succumbed to her injuries. Petitioner Vijay Singh is the owner of Narayani Guest House. He was present at the reception. He shot at Smt. Shail Bala and Gulab Singh, who sustained multiple injuries. Shail Bala and Gulab Singh were taken to the hospital, however, Smt. Shail Bala succumbed to her injuries. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police seized the material objects on the spot. As per the autopsy report, Smt. Shail Bala had died as a result of hemorrhagic shock and injury to vital structures caused by a rifled firearm. The police seized the empty cartridges from the guest house. The police arrested the petitioner, and he got a revolver and cartridges recovered. Subsequently, Gulab Singh also died because of septicemia secondary to gunshot injury. As per the report of analysis, human blood was detected on the blood recovered from the body of Shail Bala, the nose pin of Shail Bala and the hair clip of Shail Bala, which was insufficient for blood grouping. Human blood of blood group (A) was detected in the blood sample of Shail Bala, her shirt, pyjama, vest and a piece of mat. Human blood was also detected on the underwear, brassiere, dupatta, blood-stained soil, stone and artificial teeth of Shail Bala. Blood was detected on the vest, pants, shirt and jacket of Gulab Singh, but it was inconclusive in respect of the blood group. The police filed the charge sheet after the completion of the investigation. The statements of two witnesses are to be recorded, and the matter was listed on 20.02.2026 for recording their statements. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Yuyutsu Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was arrested in the year 2018. The prosecution has been unable to complete the evidence despite the lapse of more than 7 years and 8 months from the date of the petitioner’s arrest. The prosecution filed an application for the recall of the witnesses at the stage of arguments. The application was allowed, but the prosecution failed to examine the witnesses. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated, and the petitioner is entitled to bail. The prosecution filed an application for the recall of the witnesses at the stage of arguments. The application was allowed, but the prosecution failed to examine the witnesses. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated, and the petitioner is entitled to bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indrani Pratim Mukerjea vs Central Bureau of Investigation and another. Crl. No. 1627 of 2022 decided on 18.05.2022 Tapas Kumar Palit versus State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 738 of 2025 decided on 14.02.2025, Anoop Singh vs U.T. of J and K. Cr.l No. 1398 of 2026 decided on 03.02.2026 and this Court in Shariq Rehman vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 2293 of 2023 decided on 05.01.2024 in support of his submissions. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had shot Shail Bala and Gulab Singh, who were discharging their duties  and  were  complying  with  the  orders  passed  by  the National Green Tribunal. They subsequently succumbed to their injuries. The petitioner has committed heinous offences which are punishable with capital punishment. The statements of only two witnesses are to be recorded. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:- (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elabo-rating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be consid-ered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of jus-tice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Mod-ern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant inter-fering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the an-tecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious oflences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of crimi-nological history that a thoughtless bail order has en-abled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict fur-ther crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex-tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evi-dence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibil-ity of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tam-pered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same ju-diciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do al-ways vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the oflence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that al-though it is established that a court considering a bail ap-plication cannot undertake a detailed examination of evi-dence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court ob-served that where a High Court has granted bail mechani-cally, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the fac-tors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, in-terfere with an order passed by the High Court grant-ing or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in com-pliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the fac-tors to be borne in mind while considering an appli-cation for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reason-able ground to believe that the accused had committed the oflence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the oflence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis sup-plied) xxxxxxx 2. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts can-not lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclu-sion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due con-sideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na-ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would fol-low a conviction vis-à-vis the oflence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report mentions that the petitioner was arrested on 03.05.2018 and the charge sheet was filed before the Court on 26.07.2018. Supplementary charge sheets were filed on 23.10.2019 and 13.01.2020. The copies of the order sheets show that the charges were framed on 06.09.2018, and the matter was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on different dates; however, the prosecution did not produce the witnesses summoned by the Court, and the Court had to adjourn the matter repeatedly because of the absence of the summoned witnesses. When the matter was listed for arguments on 13.08.2025, an application under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. was filed, which was allowed on 07.11.2025. The witnesses were ordered to be recalled for further examination, however, the witnesses were not produced. Therefore, the petitioner's plea that the prosecution failed to complete the evidence within a reasonable time has some merit. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. CBI, (2012) 4 SCC 134 , that detaining under-trial prisoners in custody for an indefinite period violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the petitioner's plea that the prosecution failed to complete the evidence within a reasonable time has some merit. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. CBI, (2012) 4 SCC 134 , that detaining under-trial prisoners in custody for an indefinite period violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 559: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 254 that keeping a person inside the prison for 5-6 years for an offence which is alternatively found not to have been committed by him is a travesty of justice. It was observed at page 292: “2…. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a per-son in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarcer-ation, which is found to be unjustified?... Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or, at any rate, a major part of it?” 11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It was observed at page 820: 17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however stringent the penal law may be. 19. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however stringent the penal law may be. 19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 12. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127 that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. It was observed at page 298: “13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, assures that: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” And in its second sub-article, that: “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)]. 16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp. 638-39, paras 86-87) “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. 638-39, paras 86-87) “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5) ‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such a trial would constitute a violation of his fundamental right under Article 21?” 17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it.” 13. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.” 14. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335: “40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It was observed at page 335: “40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 , paras 15 and 17] ).” 15. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: - 13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discre-tion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Ra-jasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369 ] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have com-mitted a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, up-held on the condition that the trial is concluded expedi-tiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375 ] made observations to this effect. In the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provi-sions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ], SCC p. 624, para 17) “17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the leg-islature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal lib-erty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities harmful to soci-ety, it is all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate num-ber of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can be protected against harmful activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.” 16. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178: “23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often than not, are ap-palling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India ]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials. 24. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India ]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials. 24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13) “13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal rela-tionships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [ Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “The Prison Community” published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Commu-nity (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's Concept of Pris-onisation”, available at: (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has further deleterious ef-fects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an ac-quittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speed-ily.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It was observed at page 817: - “10. It was observed at page 817: - “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5) “5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.” 11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again,  in  several  judgments,  such  as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84) “84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.” 18. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed: 7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines while being incarcerated: “I know not whether Laws be right, Or whether Laws be wrong; All that we know who be in jail Is that the wall is strong; And that each day is like a year, A year whose days are long.” 19. It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024) 20 SCC 57 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail. It was observed at page 63: 19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the trial being completed in the near future have also been taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Ar-ticle 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees trial be concluded within a reasonable time. It was observed at page 63: 19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the trial being completed in the near future have also been taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Ar-ticle 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees trial be concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the trial would justify such invocation, leading to a conclusion of violation of Part III of the Con-stitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to re-lease an undertrial on bail. ***** 21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the statutory provisions in mind, but with the passage of time, the effect of that statutory provision would, in fact, have to be diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of the Constitution, where the accused, as of now, is not a convict and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of speedy trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be made the sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the pe-riod of incarceration of an accused could also be a rele-vant factor to be considered by the constitutional courts, not to be merely governed by the statutory provisions. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 that the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was observed: 10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear that howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. 21. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the inability to conclude the trial expeditiously. 22. It was submitted on behalf of the State that the offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous. He had shot at two officials who were obeying the orders of the NGT. There is no dispute that the petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of a heinous offence, but this cannot be a reason to detain the petitioner indefinitely. It was submitted on behalf of the State that the offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous. He had shot at two officials who were obeying the orders of the NGT. There is no dispute that the petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of a heinous offence, but this cannot be a reason to detain the petitioner indefinitely. The State has an obligation to ensure the conviction of the guilty by expeditious trial, and it cannot keep a person behind bars for an indefinite period without proving his guilt simply because the allegations against him are heinous. In Tapas Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person cannot be detained indefinitely awaiting the outcome of the trial. In Indrani Pratim Mukerjea (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a person was kept behind bars for 6½ years, and there was no prospect of the early conclusion of the trial, his further detention was not justified. Similarly, in Anoop Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when the prosecution was unable to complete the evidence within 7 years, the petitioner cannot be detained in custody. In Shariq Rehman (supra), a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court enlarged the accused on bail when the prosecution was unable to complete the evidence for about 6 years and one month. Therefore, the delay in the trial would override the gravity of the offence. 23. Keeping in view the delay in the trial, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of RS. 1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 24. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 25. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of Sub Jail Solan, District Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 26. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.