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2026 DAILYLAW 16670 (HP)

G. Haneef v. State of H. P.

2026-03-09

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 64 of 2023, dated 31.3.2023, registered at Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondent No.3/informant was running a business of sale and purchase of apples at Parala, Sabji Mandi, Tehsil Theog. SFC Karnatka, PSP Puducherry, FF Shaik Sadik Tirupati, YNC Noshad (V) Warangal and EFC Najmal Kerala had purchased apples from him, but had not paid him the money. They cheated the informant and deprived him of an amount of Rs. 2,54,83,017/-. Hence, the informant filed a complaint before the police, praying that an action be taken against the merchants as per the law. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the accused/petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the quashing of the FIR. It has been asserted that the contents of the FIR do not satisfy the requirement Section 420 of the IPC. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct discloses a civil dispute related to the business transaction, and there is no criminality involved in the present case. A mere breach of contract or non-payment of dues does not amount to cheating. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed qua the petitioner. 4. The petition is opposed by respondents No.1 and 2 by filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of maintainability and locus standi. The contents of the petition were admitted regarding the filing of the FIR. It was asserted that the petitioner had been absconding since 2019 and had not paid an amount of Rs. 1,04,28,946/- to the informant. The allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet is to be filed against the petitioner. It was specifically denied that the dispute between the parties pertained to a commercial dispute and did not involve any criminality. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. The allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet is to be filed against the petitioner. It was specifically denied that the dispute between the parties pertained to a commercial dispute and did not involve any criminality. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A separate reply was filed by respondent No.3/informant admitting that an FIR was registered by respondent No.3/informant against the petitioner and other apple traders. It was asserted that the apple traders had defaulted in paying the money to the informant, and he was left with no other option but to register the FIR. The petitioner remained absconded for 2 years and did not join the investigation. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have heard Mr S.C. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate with M/s Jyotirmay Bhatt and Sushmit Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 2, and Mr Narender Singh Thakur, learned counsel, for respondent No.3. 7. Mr S.C. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not disclose the commission of any offence. False allegations were made against him. The contents of the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of Kunti and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2023) 6 SCC 109 , Sarabjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab and another 2023 STPL 3358 SC, Rikhab Birani and Anr versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr 2025 INSC 512 in support of his submission. 8. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents No.1 and 2/State submitted that the petitioner had taken the apples from the informant after promising to pay the money to him. However, he failed to do so, which shows that his intention was fraudulent to begin with. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet is to be filed before this Court. This Court should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it under Section 528 of BNSS. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. However, he failed to do so, which shows that his intention was fraudulent to begin with. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet is to be filed before this Court. This Court should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it under Section 528 of BNSS. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr Narender Singh Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.3, adopted the submissions of Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 2 and prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any oflence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any oflence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable oflence but constitute only a non-cognizable oflence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4), and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The FIR was registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 , as under: “10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in HridayaRanjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [ (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15) “15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct is not the sole test. In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings. 13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [ (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp. 696-97) “7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in JaswantraiManilalAkhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must be established. As observed by this Court in JaswantraiManilalAkhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1954 SC 724 : 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the oflence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was oflered.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [ (1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence. 15. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 , as under: “4. Cheating” is defined in Section 415 of the Penal Code, 1860, which provides as under: “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 5. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860, deals with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the definition relates to property, the second part does not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below: “415. … intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.” 6. This part speaks of intentional deception which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such an act or omission should have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or property. 7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483 ], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483 ], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1954 SC 724 : 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered. 8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237], it was held by Mahmood, J.: “That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the preceding Section 415.” 16. In the present case, there are no averments in the FIR that any representation was made by the petitioner to the informant, which led the informant to supply the apple to the petitioner. The informant’s simple case is that he had supplied the apple to the petitioner and other apple traders, and they had not made the payment to him. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioner that this was a dispute regarding the payment of money and does not involve any criminality. 17. The informant’s simple case is that he had supplied the apple to the petitioner and other apple traders, and they had not made the payment to him. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioner that this was a dispute regarding the payment of money and does not involve any criminality. 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anukul Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060, that criminal proceedings cannot be used for enforcing civil rights. It was observed: - 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 , it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. xxxxx 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time-consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes, also leading to an irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 : AIR 2008 SC 251 , it was emphasised that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam (2015) 9 SCC 647 , this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of a civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 19. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam (2015) 9 SCC 647 , this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of a civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 869 , this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement, and it may be that the appellant, herein, owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However, the question is whether, prima facie, any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times are the High Courts to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, (2024) 10 SCC 690 . In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust, respectively, has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such an exercise. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such an exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition, saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition, saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused? It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court, as the case may be, to look into a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for the recovery of money to date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. We could have said many things, but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse to criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. He cannot be permitted to take recourse to criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That's not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR, along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. 18. In the present case, an attempt is being made to convert a civil dispute regarding the payment of money into a criminal case, which is impermissible. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Kapil Agarwal vs. Sanjay Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 524 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 154 that criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment. It was observed: “18.1. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to achieve a salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapons of harassment. When the Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it amounts to bringing pressure upon the accused, in the exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be quashed.” 20. It was submitted that the petitioner had failed to pay the money to the informant, which shows that his intention was fraudulent to begin with. This submission cannot be accepted. It was submitted that the petitioner had failed to pay the money to the informant, which shows that his intention was fraudulent to begin with. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 9 SCC 148 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 697: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 196 that mere inability to return the amount cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, as it is this mens rea which is the crux of the offence. This position was reiterated in Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 998, and it was held that the fraudulent intention cannot be inferred by mere failure to honour the contract. A similar view was taken in Kunti (supra), Sarabjit Kaur (supra) and Rikhan Birani (supra). The informant has filed the party’s ledger (Annexure R-1), which shows that the money was being paid by the petitioner to the informant on various dates, and in the absence of any evidence regarding the fraudulent intention of the petitioner at the beginning, he cannot be held liable for cheating simply because he was unable to fulfil the terms and conditions of the contract. 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the continuation of the proceedings qua the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of the law. Hence, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 64 of 2023, dated 31.3.2023, registered at Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. is ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner. 23. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 24. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy, but if required, may verify passing of the order from the Website of the High Court.