2026:JHHC:17289 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 2430 of 2023 ….….. Dr. (Mrs.) Shamshun Nehar, aged about 55 years, wife of Dr. Shams Tabrez, Resident of Officer’s Colony, Deendayal Nagar, P.O.-Kanke Road, P.S. Lalpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand State. ..… Petitioner (s) Versus 1. Ranchi University, Ranchi through its Registrar, having office at Ranchi University Campus, Shaheed Chowk, P.O./G.P.O./P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand State. 2. Vice Chancellor, Ranchi University, Ranchi having office at Ranchi University Campus, Shaheed Chowk, P.O./GPO/P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand State. 3. Officer on Special Duty (Judicial) to the Chancellor of the Universities of Jharkhand, having office at Chancellor's Secretariat, Ranchi, P.O./GPO/P.S.- Kotwali, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand State. ..... Respondent(s) ….….. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ….… For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Adv Mr. Saket Upadhyay, Adv Mr. Akash Ajit Kumar, Adv Mrs. Satakchhi Priya Verma, Adv For the Respondents : Mr. Prashant Pallav, ASGI C.A.V. ON: 11/05/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:15/06/2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs:- (a) For issuance of an appropriate Order 'quashing' the Suspension Order issued by the Chancellor's Secretariat, contained in Letter No.-6-101/10/2021-UNI(RU- 05/2021)133/G.S., dated-16.01.2023 (Annexure-8 hereto), wherein the Petitioner is illegally suspended by the Order of the then Chancellor of the Universities of Jharkhand without Jurisdiction; (b) For issuance of an appropriate Order 'quashing' the Suspension Notification issued by Ranchi University, Ranchi contained in Memo No. B/31/23, dated-18.01.2023 (Annexure-6 hereto), which is in 2026:JHHC:17289 2 contravention to the Judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in "Joint Action Committee of Airline Pilots Association of India (ALPAI) and Others versus Director General of Civil Aviation and Others" reported in (2011) 5 SCC 435, wherein it is held that 'if any decision is taken by a Statutory Authority at the behest or on suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal'; (c) For issuance of an appropriate order 'quashing' the Charge Memo, contained in Memo No.-B/218/23, dated-23.03.2023 (Annexure-11 here to) issued by the Registrar, Ranchi University (Respondent No.-1), wherein the Vice Chancellor, Ranchi University has practically abdicated his statutory function and mechanically implemented the Order issued by the then Chancellor; (d) For issuance of an appropriate order to quash and set aside the entire proceedings against the Petitioner in connection with the Charge Memo contained in Memo No.-B/218/23, dated-23.03.2023 (Annexure-11 hereto), which is against the settled proposition of Law that 'an authority cannot issue Order in contravention of statutory rules', as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Union of India and Another versus Ashok Kumar Aggarwal" reported in (2013) 16 SCC 147; (e) For an appropriate interim order staying the operation, execution, implementation and effect of the aforesaid Suspension Order dated-16.01.2023, Suspension Notification dated-18.01.2023 and Charge Memo dated-23.03.2023 (Annexure-8, 6 & 11 respectively hereto); (f) Upon quashing the aforesaid Suspension Order & Suspension Notification (Annexures-8 & 6 hereto), for a direction upon the Respondents to forthwith 'reinstate' the Petitioner on the post of the Principal, Ranchi Women's College, Ranchi with all consequential benefits; AND/OR For issuance of any other appropriate Writ(s) or Direction(s) or Order(s) as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in view of the facts & circumstances of the case for doing conscionable justice to the petitioner. Brief Facts 3. The petitioner has claimed to be a senior academician having an unblemished service record of about 26 years. She was initially appointed as Lecturer in the year 1996 and was thereafter promoted as Associate Professor in the year 2010. Upon due recommendation of the Jharkhand Public Service 2026:JHHC:17289 3 Commission, she was appointed as Principal of S.S. Memorial College, Ranchi vide notification dated 29.11.2017, and thereafter transferred as Principal, Ranchi Women's College, Ranchi vide notification dated 01.02.2021, where she assumed charge on 02.02.2021. 4. As per the petitioner, she discharged her duties as Principal, Ranchi Women’s College, with due diligence and commitment; however, in October 2022 certain complaints were made against her before the higher authorities and Professor (Dr.) Kamini Kumar, the then Pro-Vice Chancellor, Ranchi University, was directed to conduct an enquiry into the affairs of the College on the direction of the Chancellor’s office. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that neither any information regarding the basis of such enquiry; nor the complaint, enquiry report or relied-upon material was served upon her. Thereafter, in December 2022, another four-member committee was constituted by Ranchi University, again purportedly on the order of the Chancellor’s office, to conduct an enquiry on almost the same subject matter, but even in the said enquiry the petitioner was kept isolated and no copy of the complaint, enquiry report, material documents or findings of the committee was ever supplied to her. Despite the aforesaid procedural lapses, on 15.01.2023, a news item was published in Prabhat Khabar stating that the then Chancellor has 2026:JHHC:17289 4 ordered suspension of the petitioner on allegations of financial and administrative irregularities, even before the formal suspension order was served upon her. 6. The petitioner was then served with a notification contained in Memo No. B/31/23 dated 18.01.2023, issued by order of the Vice-Chancellor, whereby she was suspended with immediate effect. The said suspension was issued in compliance of the order of the then Chancellor communicated vide letter dated 16.01.2023. The said letter was also not supplied to the petitioner along with the suspension notification and was made available only after repeated requests and after a delay of more than two months. 7. The petitioner submitted representations dated 18.01.2023 and 17.03.2023 seeking reconsideration/review of the suspension order under Section 9(7)(iii) read with Section 9(4)(Ka) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000. However, no effective decision was taken. Thereafter, a charge memo contained in Memo No. B/218/23 dated 23.03.2023 was served upon the petitioner, without supplying the so-called enquiry reports, complaint, relied upon documents, minutes of enquiry, statements of witnesses or any material forming the foundation of the charges. The petitioner repeatedly requested for the said documents, but the same were not supplied. 8. During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court vide 2026:JHHC:17289 5 order dated 23.11.2023 directed the petitioner to file a fresh representation before the office of the Chancellor and further granted liberty to the petitioner to move an application before the enquiry officer for keeping the proceedings in abeyance. In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted a fresh representation dated 24.11.2023 before the Chancellor, specifically invoking the review jurisdiction under Section 9(7)(iii) read with Section 9(4)(Ka) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000. 9. However, instead of awaiting proper adjudication of the representation under the statutory review jurisdiction of the Chancellor, the respondent University proceeded in haste and issued Notification contained in Memo No. RU/R/7255/2023 dated 22.11.2023, whereby punishment of reduction of two increments with non-cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner and her suspension was revoked. On the same date, by a separate Notification contained vide Memo No. RU/R/7256/2023 dated 22.11.2023, the petitioner was transferred from her then headquarter at Doranda College, Ranchi to Women's College, Gumla on so-called administrative grounds. 10. In view of the subsequent revocation of suspension, the original prayer in the writ petition challenging suspension has become infructuous. However, since the charge memo, 2026:JHHC:17289 6 disciplinary proceedings, punishment order and the consequential transfer order are all alleged to be part of the same chain of action, the petitioner has filed I.A. No. 10811 of 2023 seeking amendment of the prayer and challenge to the punishment order dated 22.11.2023 and transfer order dated 22.11.2023. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner 11. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently submitted that the proceedings from the very inception, i.e., from the suspension order dated 18.01.2023 till the punishment order dated 22.11.2023; stand vitiated by institutional prejudice and non-application of mind, as the entire process was initiated on the instructions of the Chancellor who also happens to be the appellate authority and his instructions have been thereafter mechanically carried forward by the Vice-Chancellor without any independent satisfaction. 12. It has been argued that the order of suspension dated 18.01.2023 (Annexure-6) clearly shows that the actions were taken in compliance of the order of the Chancellor of the universities and the basis for such actions had been that several complaints/allegations were received at Raj Bhawan whereupon enquiry committees were constituted. 13. While taking reference of the memo of charge (Annexure- 2026:JHHC:17289 7 11), it has been argued that in the said document the complaints are said to have been received at the Ranchi University which is in contradiction to the earlier stand; however, serving of the copy of memo again to the Principal Secretary Raj Bhawan makes it amply clear that the said action was also in the same row and under the instructions of the office of Chancellor. 14. It was submitted that even though the suspension has subsequently been revoked, the foundational illegality has not disappeared. The charge memo also suffers from the same illegality and is itself is dehors the law, vague, unsupported by relied upon documents and founded upon enquiry reports and materials which were never served upon the petitioner. Therefore, the entire disciplinary proceeding, including the charge sheet, deserves to be quashed in toto. 15. Learned Senior Counsel had submitted that the Vice- Chancellor, being the competent disciplinary authority, was required to apply his own mind independently and act strictly in accordance with law, instead, the Vice-Chancellor acted mechanically and in undue haste, merely giving effect to the instructions flowing from the Chancellor's office, thereby abdicating his statutory function. 16. While relying upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in (2003) 3 JLJR 7 (HC): 2003 SCC OnLine 2026:JHHC:17289 8 Jhar 48, Sunil Kumar Sinha v. Hon’ble Chancelor of Universities & Ors., LPA No. 498 of 2002, Ld. Sr. Counsel argued that Section 9 (7)(ii) of the Universities Act even though does vest in the Chancellor of the Universities power to issue directions to the universities in the administrative or academic interests of the universities and also contains a stipulation that the universities shall implement such directions, such power of the Chancellor to issue directions and such obligation of the universities to implement these directions cannot extend to such areas or cases where the direction of the Chancellor may affect or tend to effect adversely or prejudicially the rights or interest of a third party. In the legislative intent, one cannot read the power of Chancellor to issue directions which may adversely or prejudicially affect the right or interest of third parties like the petitioner as has happened in the present case. 17. Learned Senior Counsel has heavily relied upon paragraph 12 and 13 of the said judgment which is quoted herein below: “12. Section 9 (7)(ii) of the Universities Act, even though does vest in the Chancellor of the Universities power to issue directions to the Universities in the administrative or academic interests of the Universities and also contains a stipulation that the Universities shall implement such directions, such power of the Chancellor to issue directions and such obligation of the Universities to implement these directions cannot extend to such areas or cases where the directions of the Chancellor may affect or tend to affect adversely or prejudically the rights or interests of a third party. The legislative intent behind vesting of such powers in the Chacenllor in the aforesaid provision of law clearly was to empower the Chancellor to issue directions in the academic or administrative interests of the Universities. In the legislative intent, we cannot read the power of the Chancellor to issue directions which may adversely or prejudicially affect the rights or 2026:JHHC:17289 9 interests of third parties. 13. If third parties such as employees of the Universities or the Officials of the Universities or the Teachers of the Universities have vested interests, constitutional, statutory, legal, contractual or other rights which also, therefore, created in them protections and safeguards, the aforesaid powers of the Chancellor to issue directions cannot be construed to take away, curtail or abridge the aforesaid rights vested in third parties. Our reading of the aforesaid Section, therefore, is that the power of the Chancellor to issue directions can be exercised so long as it does not affect the rights or interests of third parties, adverse or prejudice to them. In other words, this power can be exercised in the academic or administrative interests as long as it is unconnected with or not linked with the interests or rights of a third party. For example, the Chancellor can issue directions to the Universities to improve the academic or administrative set up, to expand or improve the infrastructure, to improve the library or laboratories, to create more posts, to provide infrastructure facilities, to create conducive conditions for the teachers, to create supporting facilities to the students, to improve the conditions in the hostels, in the class rooms, to extend the scope of lecturers, to improve the examination systems and so on so forth. The list is endless. The power to issue directions cannot, therefore, include the power to affect the service conditions of employees or take away the rights vested in them. If despite the aforesaid, the Chancellor wittingly or unwittingly, by inadvertence or otherwise, or even deliberately or purposely or intentionally issues any direction which affects or tends to affect prejudicially or adversely the interests of third parties or their rights, such directions being without jurisdiction, the University is not bound to implement or follow them. At best, these can be termed as ‘suggestion’ from the Chancellor and it could be up to the University to take note of the suggestions or not to take note of the suggestions, but even if the suggestions are taken note of, the consequential action has to be taken in accordance with law.” 18. While placing the aforesaid dictum, Ld. Sr. Counsel seeks to emphasize that even if the Chancellor had issued instructions or directions, the Vice-Chancellor was duty bound to act within his jurisdiction and domain as a disciplinary authority of the petitioner and he ought to have applied his independent mind but in the case of the petitioner it clearly appears that the Vice Chancellor simply complied the formalities of implicating and penalizing the petitioner only on account of the instructions and direction issued by the Chancellor. 19. It was further argued that the petitioner was never supplied the enquiry reports of Professor (Dr.) Kamini Kumar or the four-member committee; nor was she supplied the complaint, relied upon documents, minutes of enquiry, statements of witnesses or any material on the basis of which the charge memo and punishment order were founded. 20. He further contended that no second show-cause notice 2026:JHHC:17289 10 was issued before imposition of punishment and the petitioner was deprived of an effective opportunity to meet the findings of the Inquiry officer. It has also been argued that no punishment of forfeiture of salary for the suspension period has been imposed upon the petitioner, thus the respondents are bound to pay the balance salary to the petitioner over and above the subsistence allowance which remained withheld during the period of her suspension. 21. It was also submitted that the transfer order dated 22.11.2023 is not a routine administrative transfer but is punitive in substance. The transfer was passed simultaneously with the punishment order and immediately after revocation of suspension. Therefore, the transfer forms part of the same punitive chain and amounts to double punishment. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents 22. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the writ petition has substantially become infructuous in view of the subsequent developments. It was submitted that the Chancellor of the universities is well empowered under section 9 (7)(ii) of the Universities Act, to issue directions upon the universities to take action against an officer or employee of the universities and thus the actions taken cannot be complained. 23. It has also been argued that under the provisions of Section 7(iii) of the said Act, the petitioner could approach the Chancellor for modification or rescinding of the orders which actually the petitioner also did but on account of final order of punishment having been passed, the office of the Chancellor declined to decide the representation on merit. 24. Learned Counsel appearing for the university has argued that even if the concerned order of suspension or final order of 2026:JHHC:17289 11 punishment take reference of the orders or instructions issued by the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor has applied his independent mind and the final order of punishment has been passed after a due enquiry and the petitioner must not have any complaint regarding the decision-making process. It has been argued that the Inquiry officer submitted his report on 22.11.2023 and the Vice-Chancellor, after due consideration of the enquiry report, concurred with the finding only with respect to Charge No. 3 and imposed a minor penalty of reduction of two increments with non-cumulative effect. 25. It was further submitted that since only minor penalty was imposed, the suspension order contained in Memo No. B/31/23 dated 18.01.2023 was revoked vide Memo No. RU/R/7255/2023 dated 22.11.2023. The respondents therefore contended that the original grievance against suspension does not survive. 26. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the petitioner was transferred vide Memo No. RU/R/7256/2023 dated 22.11.2023 from Doranda College, Ranchi to Women's College, Gumla purely on administrative grounds and that the petitioner had submitted her joining at Women's College, Gumla on 07.12.2023. It was therefore argued that no interference is called for either with the punishment order or with the transfer order. Findings 27. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that the original prayer made in the writ petition with regard to suspension has become infructuous in view of the revocation of the suspension vide Memo No. RU/R/7255/2023 dated 22.11.2023. 2026:JHHC:17289 12 28. However, the challenge raised through I.A. No. 10811 of 2023 survives, since the petitioner has challenged the very foundation of the proceeding, the charge memo, the punishment order and the consequential transfer order. 29. This Court is conscious of the dictum given in the case of Sunil Kumar Sinha (Supra) as also relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner but in the special facts and circumstances of this case, particularly when the suspension of the petitioner has already been revoked and final order of minor punishment has been imposed against her; is refraining from entering deep into the aspects of scope of power of the Chancellor under section 7(ii) of the Universities Act. 30. For the purpose of looking into the other grievances of the petitioner and also with respect to her challenge against the order of punishment dated 22.11.2023, this Court has carefully examined the entire decision making process and is of the view that from the facts appearing on record, it is evident that the entire sequence, starting from suspension, constitution of enquiry, issuance of charge memo, continuation of proceedings, revocation of suspension and imposition of punishment, was carried out in undue haste and without due compliance of the principles of natural justice. 31. The materials on record show that the petitioner was never supplied the preliminary-enquiry report of Professor (Dr.) Kamini Kumar, the report of the four-member committee, the complaint, relied upon documents, minutes of enquiry or the depositions of witnesses. The charge memo (Annexure-11) also does not indicate any reference of list of witnesses or documents to be relied upon against the petitioner and further it appears from the continuous representations given by the petitioner (Annexure-12 Series, 13 Series & Annexure-14) that 2026:JHHC:17289 13 the petitioner demanded the documents but the same appears to have not been supplied. 32. Apparently when the charge memo was not referring to the list of documents or list of witnesses which is the foundation to enable the petitioner to submit an effective defense, there appears a basic flaw. A disciplinary proceeding which is founded upon materials not supplied to the delinquent employee cannot be sustained in law. 33. It further appears that the Vice-Chancellor, being the competent disciplinary authority, was required to act independently and in accordance with the statutory scheme. Although the Chancellor in his administrative capacity may recommend or communicate any action, the Vice-Chancellor was not relieved of his statutory obligation to independently apply his mind and proceed strictly in accordance with law. 34. In the present case, the impugned actions demonstrate that the Vice-Chancellor mechanically carried forward the proceedings; rather than forming an independent satisfaction on the necessity of suspension, initiation of departmental proceeding, framing of charges, consideration of material and imposition of punishment. Such mechanical exercise of statutory power is impermissible. 35. It also appears that this Court, by order dated 23.11.2023, directed the petitioner to file a fresh representation before the Chancellor and granted liberty to seek abeyance of the enquiry proceeding. The petitioner filed her representation on 24.11.2023. The matter was therefore required to be considered in the statutory framework of review jurisdiction under Section 9(7)(iii) read with Section 9(4)(Ka) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000. However, the University had already proceeded to impose punishment and revoke suspension vide Memo No. RU/R/7255/2023 dated 2026:JHHC:17289 14 22.11.2023, thereby rendering the subsequent representation and review process illusory. 36. The Court further finds that the order of punishment dated 22.11.2023 does not reflect the enquiry having conducted with examination of necessary witnesses or proving or even citing the documentary evidences. Above all, the claim of the petitioner that neither any witnesses were examined; nor she was given opportunity to cross-examine the complainants or witnesses, if any, has not been denied by the Respondents. 37. Further the claim of the Petitioner that enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner and no second show-cause opportunity was granted to her before imposition of penalty; has also not been disputed and denied. The punishment order dated 22.11.2023 has been thus passed in breach of natural justice and is liable to be quashed. 38. The order of punishment dated 22.11.2023 also does not speak of withholding of salary of the petitioner for the suspension period, thus the petitioner cannot be imposed a punishment which has in-effect not been imposed upon her and the Respondents are thus bound to release the balance salary of the petitioner from which she was deprived of over and above the subsistence allowance if any paid to her during her suspension period. 39. With respect to the transfer order, it is true that transfer is ordinarily an incidence of service and an administrative order with which Courts do not normally interfere. In the present matter; though it has been argued that the order of transfer was issued by way of punishment and thus liable to be interfered but during the course of arguments it has also been informed by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that initially the petitioner was transferred to 2026:JHHC:17289 15 Gumla, but later on she has been posted at J.N. College, Dhurwa, Ranchi, which order or notification is not under challenge; thus, this Court is not interfering with the order of transfer. Conclusion 40. In view of the above, the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner as well as the punishment order contained in Memo No. RU/R/7255/2023 dated 22.11.2023 imposing reduction of two increments with non-cumulative effect, are hereby, quashed and set aside. 41. The Respondents are directed to release the withheld increments, arrears and all other consequential benefits from which the petitioner has been deprived of by virtue of the order of punishment dated 22.11.2023. 42. The Respondents are also directed to release the unpaid salary of the petitioner over and above the subsistence allowance, if any, paid to her during the suspension period as the entire proceeding was illegal. 43. The Respondents are directed to pay the aforesaid benefits to the petitioner within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 44. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Dated:15/06/2026 Amardeep/ N.A.F.R Uploaded on 16.06.2026