JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present petition, prayer has been made by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 275 of 2024, dated 6.9.2024, registered under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, at Police Station Una Sadar, District Una, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent court of law. 2. For having bird’s eye view, facts relevant for adjudication of the case at hand, are that FIR sought to be quashed came to be lodged at the behest of the complainant namely Rahul Kumar and his wife Smt. Sonali Thakur, who had been living in ward No.10, Mohalla Behli, Una Town, Tehsil and District Una, Himachal Pradesh, for the last nine years. Complainant Rahul Kumar, who is in the business of property dealing and construction of building, saw an advertisement of M/s Harnidh Overseas Pathway Education (in short “HOPE”), having its office at SCO 33, 2nd Floor, Chhotti Baradari Part-2, Jalandhar, Punjab, whereby it came to be claimed that its office at Jalandhar is a branch of HOPE for providing services of Visa and employment in United Kingdom (herein after referred to as “UK”). The complainant with a view to provide job to his wife namely Sonali Thakur and education to his daughter namely Yashika, contacted the afore office of the accused through social media phone number (7743000860) and asked for the details of the services provided by the Company. One Mr. Rajat picked up the phone and identified himself as authorized representative of the HOPE, who apprised the complainant that HOPE is having collaboration with companies in UK. Above named Rajat after having inquired the qualification of the complainant assured that HOPE will arrange for the work permit and job to Ms. Sonali Thakur as skilled worker. He also assured that in order to get Permanent Residency (PR) in UK, complainant will be inducted as partner in one of their ventures in UK to the extent of 10% share of the first year and after one year, his share will be raised to 25%. Allegedly, afore person further promised complainant and his family members that they will get PR status after three years. Representative of the accused Company Mr. Gagandeep Singh asked for payment of total consideration of Rs. Allegedly, afore person further promised complainant and his family members that they will get PR status after three years. Representative of the accused Company Mr. Gagandeep Singh asked for payment of total consideration of Rs. 30.00 lakh plus expenses of Visa and Air Tickets in advance for providing these services, however complainant negotiated the amount and sum of Rs.27.00 lakh plus Visa fee and tickets on actual basis was agreed to be paid. Accused provided bank account number of Sh. Hardeep Singh, Managing Director of HOPE and his associates namely Sh. Gagandeep Singh, Ms. Kiran HOPE and Ms. Rhythm Verma, for transfer of funds. Complainant transferred the agreed amount through electronic transfer and RTGS to the bank accounts provided by the above named persons. Initially, amount was transferred to the G-Pay account of Hardeep Singh, Managing Director of HOPE, who asked for copies of passport and other documents, which was also provided. Accused named in the FIR allegedly created email account of their own and filed the applications for Visa and other purposes without there being authority and also used incorrect information. The Visa issued by UK Government showed the complainant Rahul Kumar as partner in business but fact remains that company detailed herein above, never inducted him as such. The email ID and password created and used by accused persons was disclosed to complainant on 30.08.2023. Accused charged the amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- as Visa fee and Embassy charges and Rs. 2,40,000/- as Airfare. Foreign currency worth Rs. 5,00,000/- was provided for the sum of Rs. 5,39,900/-. Accused provided Air tickets from Delhi to London of Turkmenistan Airlines for 13.09.2023. Though complainant along with his family members boarded flight to London, but none came to receive them there. Despite complainant’s having made number of calls, no response was received by him and had to arrange hotel room at his own. Lastly, call was answered by the accused on 15.09.2023, wherein they were asked to go to Luton i.e. another town at a distance of one hour journey through taxi from London. Though it was promised that at Luton, agent of accused will provide the promised service, but again at Luton, nobody came to pick up them, as such, they had to make their own arrangement for stay. Complainant again contacted Sh. Hardeep Singh and asked for the promised services, however, Sh. Though it was promised that at Luton, agent of accused will provide the promised service, but again at Luton, nobody came to pick up them, as such, they had to make their own arrangement for stay. Complainant again contacted Sh. Hardeep Singh and asked for the promised services, however, Sh. Hardeep Singh told the complainant to collect the BRP of Mrs. Sonali Thakur from post office at Luton and report for job. However, Mrs. Sonali Thakur was informed that there is no vacancy. Since no appropriate arrangements were ever made by the accused named in the FIR and no job was provided, complainant along with his family members was compelled to come back to India. His family friends in India arranged three tickets for them by spending Rs. 95,000/-. Besides above, complainant spent Rs. 2,50,000/-from own pocket for taxi, hotel and other miscellaneous expenses. In the afore background, complainant alleged that he has been defrauded and cheated by the accused. 3. After filing of the complaint as detailed herein above, accused named in the FIR entered into compromise on 7.2.2024 with the complainant, but failed to adhere to the terms and conditions of the compromise. Complainant alleged that even after having entered into compromise, accused demanded Rs. 20.00 lakh for providing Visa services and employment in UK. Since complainant and his family had to suffer mentaly and economically due to act and conduct of the accused, they prayed for registration of case against the accused named in the FIR. In the afore background, FIR sought to be quashed came to be registered against the petitioner Hardeep Singh, who is proprietor of HOPE having its office at Jalandhar. 4. In nutshell, case of the petitioner as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Dr. Bhupinder Gupta and Mr. Vivek Thakur, Advocates, is that no case much less under Section 420 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. While fairly admitting factum with regard to complainants’ having approached the petitioner for providing Visa and employment in UK, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that as per compromise, petitioner not only arranged for their travel in UK, but also provided Visa. While fairly admitting factum with regard to complainants’ having approached the petitioner for providing Visa and employment in UK, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that as per compromise, petitioner not only arranged for their travel in UK, but also provided Visa. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though complainant and his family members were provided job as promised, but since they were unable to adjust themselves in UK, they of their own came back to India and as such, no case under the aforesaid provision of law is made out against the petitioner. While referring to Section 420 of IPC, learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that there is nothing on record to suggest that petitioner being proprietor of HOPE ever cheated or dishonestly induced the complainant to deliver any property to any person or to make, alter or destroy any part of the valuable security, rather petitioner not only arranged for travel but also provided Visa, but before steps, if any, for providing PR could be taken by the petitioner through his office, complainant and his family came back to India. He submitted that there is no dishonest intention of the petitioner, which otherwise sine qua non to hold the petitioner guilty of commission of offence under Section 420 of IPC. He submitted that even if, allegations made by the complainant are accepted to be true and correct, petitioner cannot be said to have committed offence of cheating for the reason that as per promise, all services assured to be made available were provided at UK. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that when averments contained in the FIR nowhere discloses commission of offence, if any, punishable under Section 420 of IPC, continuation of proceedings, if any, pursuant to FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, would amount to sheer abuse of process of law, which this Court while exercising power under Section 528 of the BNSS can always prevent by quashing the FIR. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that material adduced on record nowhere connects the petitioner with commission of offence, if any, committed by him under Section 420 of IPC and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served by putting the petitioner to ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail on account of lack of evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that material adduced on record nowhere connects the petitioner with commission of offence, if any, committed by him under Section 420 of IPC and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served by putting the petitioner to ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail on account of lack of evidence. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that otherwise, prior to lodging of FIR, petitioner had entered into compromise with the accused named in the FIR, whereby sum of Rs. 8.00 lakh, agreed to be paid by the accused, was duly received by him and as such, there was no occasion, if any, for him to continue with the criminal proceedings initiated at his behest. 5. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General vehemently argued that bare perusal of allegation contained in the FIR clearly discloses commission of offence under Section 420 of IPC. He submitted that firstly, petitioner being proprietor of HOPE induced the petitioner to shell out huge amount for providing Visa of UK and employment to the wife of the complainant and thereafter, left them alone in other country, where there was none to take care of them. He submitted that factum with regard to receipt of Rs. 27.00 lakh by the petitioner stands duly established on record and as such, refund, if any, of Rs. 8.00 lakh by the petitioner is of no consequence, rather such fact, if any, amounts to the admission on the part of the petitioner that he dishonestly induced the petitioner to shell out some money for providing Visa and job in UK, but thereafter, neither job was provided nor steps, if any, were taken to provide PR to the complainant. Mr. Kahol, further submitted that otherwise also, petitioner being proprietor of HOPE had no authority, whatsoever, to assure complainant as well as similarly situate persons to provide job and PR in foreign country, which otherwise could have been issued strictly in terms of immigration laws of the country concerned. 6. Mr. Lokender Paul Thakur, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 though categorically denied factum of compromise, if any, arrived inter-se petitioner and complainant, but he admitted that even as per compromise, sum of Rs. 8.00 lakh was agreed to be paid, however in the instant case, one cheque amounting to Rs. 4.00 lakh was dishonoured. 6. Mr. Lokender Paul Thakur, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 though categorically denied factum of compromise, if any, arrived inter-se petitioner and complainant, but he admitted that even as per compromise, sum of Rs. 8.00 lakh was agreed to be paid, however in the instant case, one cheque amounting to Rs. 4.00 lakh was dishonoured. He submitted that as per agreement placed on record by the petitioner, in case cheque of Rs. 4.00 lakh was dishonoured, complainant was very much eligible/entitled to sum of Rs. 35.00 lakh. He submitted that since in the case at hand, petitioner failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the compromise, no illegality can be said to have been committed by police authorities while lodging FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings. He also submitted that bare perusal of allegations contained in the FIR sought to be quashed clearly suggests that case under Section 420 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 8. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC (now Section 528 of BNSS). 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of BNSS). Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 10. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. 10. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings. 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC. (now Section 528 of BNSS), to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of BNSS), the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 528 of BNSS to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 12. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259 , has held as under: “12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified 9 by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736 , according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no 10 prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". 15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.” 13. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.” 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 of BNSS). 14. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that while exercising its inherent power under Section 528 of BNSS, High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law. 15. Now being guided by the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time, this court would make an endeavour to find out “whether FIR sought to be quashed discloses offence, if any, punishable under the aforesaid provision of law and evidentiary material collected on record by the prosecution is sufficient to connect the accused named in the FIR with the alleged commission of offence or not? 16. Having perused pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that no case much less under Section 420 of the IPC is made out against the petitioner. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 420 of IPC, which reads as under: “420. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 420 of IPC, which reads as under: “420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 17. As per aforesaid provision of law, whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any party of a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. To invoke aforesaid provision of law, prosecution is always under obligation to prove that there was a dishonest intention of the person charged with aforesaid provision of law from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence (Joseph Salvaraj v. State of Gujarat, 2011 (7) SCC 59 ). 18. Offence of cheating is established when the accused thereby induced that person to deliver any property or to do or to omit to do something which he would otherwise not have done or omitted. (Mahadeo Prasad v. State of Bengal ( AIR 1954 SC 724 ). 19. At this stage, it would be also apt to take note of 415 of IPC, which defines cheating, which reads as under: “415 Cheating- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.” 20. As per aforesaid provision of law, whoever by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived shall be deemed to have committed cheating. 21. If the allegations contained in the FIR are read in entirety, it cannot be said that no case is made out against the petitioner. Admittedly, petitioner, who is proprietor of HOPE, issued advertisement claiming therein that HOPE provides services of Visa and employment in UK. Taking note of aforesaid advertisement, complainant telephonically contacted representative of the company, who after having inquired about the qualification of complainant and his family members, assured that HOPE will arrange for the work permit and job to Ms. Sonali Thakur, wife of the complainant, as skilled worker. Representative of the company also assured that in order to get PR in UK, complainant will be inducted as partner in one of their ventures in UK to the extent of 10% share of the first year and after one year, his share will be raised to 25%. Representative of the company also promised that complainant and his family members will get PR status after three years. After being assured of afore services by representative of the accused Company, Mr. Gagandeep Singh asked for payment of total consideration of Rs. 30.00 lakh, which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 27.00 lakh after negotiations. Admittedly, in the case at hand, afore sum was transferred in the G-Pay account of Hardeep Singh, Managing Director of HOPE as well as other persons. No doubt, at the first instance, accused named in the FIR arranged for Air Tickets as well as Visa, but for that purpose, sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- plus Rs. 2,40,000/- was taken from the complainant. Similarly, foreign currency worth Rs. 5,00,000/- was also provided in lieu of Rs. 5,39,900/-. Though complainant along with his family reached London on 13.9.2023, but none came there to receive them, as a result of which, he had to make his own arrangements. 1,50,000/- plus Rs. 2,40,000/- was taken from the complainant. Similarly, foreign currency worth Rs. 5,00,000/- was also provided in lieu of Rs. 5,39,900/-. Though complainant along with his family reached London on 13.9.2023, but none came there to receive them, as a result of which, he had to make his own arrangements. Though on 15.9.2023, representative of the company asked them to go to Luton i.e. another town at a distance of one hour journey from London, but even at that station, none came to meet them, due to which, he was compelled to live in a Gurudwara for few days. Though petitioner told the complainant to collect the BRP of Ms. Sonali Thakur from post office at Luton and report for job, but fact remains that here was no vacancy. Since none of the afore services promised to the complainant were ever provided, he along with family had no option but to return to India on 30.9.2023 that too by spending Rs. 95,000/- for booking flight ticket. In addition to Rs 27.00 lakh, which was deposited in the bank account of the accused, complainant was made to spend Rs. 2,50,000/- from his own pocket for taxi, hotel and other miscellaneous expenses. 22. It is apparent that petitioner being proprietor of HOPE fraudulently and dishonestly, induced the complainant to deposit huge money with the assurance that he shall arrange job for his wife at London and would also arrange for study Visa to his daughter, but as has been taken note herein above, none of the services as agreed to be provided, were provided to the complainant. 23. Though at this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that there is nothing on record to prove that petitioner had dishonest intention from the very beginning which is otherwise sine qua non to hold the petitioner guilty of commission of offence, but this Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, for the reason that from day one, petitioner was aware of the fact that he being immigration agent can only arrange for Visa as well as Air Tickets, but yet he fraudulently with dishonest intention induced the petitioner to shell out huge money with an assurance that he shall not only provide Visa and Air Tickets, but would also provide job and PR in UK. Offence of cheating is established when the accused thereby induced a person to deliver any property or to do or to omit to do something which he would otherwise not have done or omitted. In the case at hand, admittedly, offence of cheating is established when petitioner fraudulently induced the complainant and his family to deliver huge amount or to do something which otherwise accused would not have done on account of his not authorized to do such act. 24. No doubt, while exercising power under Section 528 of the BNSS, this Court can proceed to quash FIR if it prima-facie does not disclose offence person seeking quashment is charged with, but in this case, bare reading of contents of FIR discloses prima-facie case under Section 420 of IPC against the petitioner. 25. Whether petitioner after his having received money as detailed herein above had provided adequate services or he had an authority to make such tall claims are the questions to be decided in totality of evidence led on record by the prosecution, but certainly, it is not a case, where this Court while exercising power under Section 528 of BNSS can proceed to quash the FIR. 26. There is another aspect of the matter that as per own case of the accused, complainant after his having lodged complaint with police entered into compromise, whereby both the parties resolved to settle their dispute amicably. In terms of the compromise, accused agreed to pay Rs 8.00 lakh to the petitioner (Annexure P-1) by way of two cheques dated 16.3.2024 and 13.4.2024 amounting to Rs. 4.00 lakh each. As per afore agreement, in case cheques are dishonoured, complainant Rahul Kumar would be entitled to Rs. 35.00 lakh and in case, cheques are honoured and sum of Rs. 8.00 lakh is received by the complainant, he shall not file any complaint. Admittedly, in the case at hand, one cheque of Rs. 4.00 lakh was encashed, however another cheque of Rs. 4.00 lakh was dishonoured, as a result of which, complainant instituted proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is pending adjudication before the competent authority. Though at this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that sum of Rs. 8.00 lakh was subsequently paid to the petitioner by various transactions. 4.00 lakh was dishonoured, as a result of which, complainant instituted proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is pending adjudication before the competent authority. Though at this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that sum of Rs. 8.00 lakh was subsequently paid to the petitioner by various transactions. To substantiate his aforesaid claim, he invited attention of this court to Annexure P3 (Colly.), which suggests that amount of Rs. 4.00 lakh was transferred, but “whether such amount was in lieu of cheque issued towards amicable settlement is a question to be decided by the court below in totality of evidence?”. Once petitioner himself agreed that in case cheque of Rs.4.00 lakh is dishonoured, complainant would be entitled to Rs. 35.00 lakh. Factum of compromise, if any, arrived inter-se petitioner as well as complainant is of no consequence as far as the instant proceedings are concerned. Moreover, this court is of the view that by pleading aforesaid facts with regard to compromise, petitioner has virtually admitted factum of his having received money as has been claimed to be deposited by the petitioner. Had petitioner provided adequate services as were promised to be provided, there was no occasion, if any, for him to offer Rs. 8.00 lakh to the complainant. It appears that he with a view to buy peace and get rid of criminal proceedings lodged at the behest of the petitioner, came forward to pay Rs. 8.00 lakh, but since one cheque issued by him was dishonoured, complainant became entitled to claim Rs. 35.00 lakh as has been mentioned in the agreement (Annexure P-1). 27. Having scanned the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that FIR sought to be quashed if permitted to sustain would amount to abuse of process of law, rather this court is of the view that FIR sought to be quashed prima-facie discloses offence under Section 420 of IPC alleged to be committed by the petitioner. 28. At this cost of repetition, it is reiterated that whether in lieu of money deposited by the complainant adequate services were provided or not? 28. At this cost of repetition, it is reiterated that whether in lieu of money deposited by the complainant adequate services were provided or not? Or whether in terms of compromise, entire money was paid or not?, are the questions to be decided by the court below in totality of evidence, but certainly, those being disputed facts cannot be gone into instant proceedings initiated by the petitioner for quashing of FIR. 29. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this court is of the view that this case is not a fit case where power under Section 528 of BNSS can be exercised to quash the FIR. As such, present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Any observations made hereinabove shall not be construed to be a reflection on the merits of the case and shall remain confined to the disposal of this case alone. All pending applications shall stand disposed of accordingly.