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2026 DAILYLAW 16642 (HP)

Rita Kumari v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2026-03-12

Jiya Lal Bhardwaj

body2026
JUDGMENT : Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, J. By way of present petition, the petitioners have claimed to allow them pay scale at par with their counterparts in the Department of Technical Education, Vocational & Industrial Training, on the post of Junior Tailoring Mistresses, as also on the post of Head Tailoring Mistresses, with all consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment, along with interest @ 15% per annum from the due date till payment. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the petitioners were initially appointed as Junior Tailoring Mistresses (wrongly mentioned as Junior Tailoring Teachers) with the respondent-Department on 08.10.1991, 14.10.1991 and 01.11.1991, respectively. When the petitioners were appointed as Junior Tailoring Mistresses, they were granted pay scale of Rs.1350-2400, which was later on restructured to Rs.1365-2410. Later on, the said scale was revised w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and fixed on Rs.4400-7000, as per the recommendations of 5th Pay Commission. On implementation of 6th Pay Commission, the pay scale of Rs.5910-20200 + Grade Pay Rs.2800/- was fixed and after completion of 08 years of service, pay scale of Rs.5910-2022 + GP Rs.3000/-. The petitioners were later on promoted to the post of Head Tailoring Mistresses w.e.f. 19.08.2010, 13.08.2010 and 09.08.2010 respectively, and were granted pay scale of Rs.10300-34800+Rs.3200 Grade pay. 3. It has been averred in the petition that the counterparts of the petitioners who were appointed in the Department of Technical Education, Vocational & Industrial Training, though performing the same and similar duties as were performed by the petitioners, but their pay scale was of Rs.1410-2540 w.e.f. 01.01.1986 and w.e.f. 13.05.1991, 50% of Junior Tailoring Masters/Mistresses were allowed the pay scale of Rs.1800-3200 and the remaining 50% were allowed pay scale of Rs.1640-2940, which was later on restructured to Rs.1650-2925. After revision of the pay scale and after the implementations of 5th Pay Commission, their pay scale was fixed on Rs.5480-8925 and Rs.5800-9200 on 50:50 basis w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and thereafter they have been allowed the pay scale of Rs.10,300-34,800 + GP Rs.3600/-, w.e.f. 01.01.2006. 4. It has been averred in the petition that after revision of the pay scale w.e.f. 01.01.2006, in the petitioner’s Department, the pay scale of Rs.10,300-34,800 + GP Rs.3200 and Grade Pay of Rs.3,600 on completion of 08 years of service on the post, whereas in the Department of Technical Education, a Grade Pay of Rs.4,200 was fixed. 4. It has been averred in the petition that after revision of the pay scale w.e.f. 01.01.2006, in the petitioner’s Department, the pay scale of Rs.10,300-34,800 + GP Rs.3200 and Grade Pay of Rs.3,600 on completion of 08 years of service on the post, whereas in the Department of Technical Education, a Grade Pay of Rs.4,200 was fixed. It has been pleaded that there is no difference in the education qualification, experience and other eligibility criteria for appointment to the post of Junior Tailoring Master/Mistress as also to the post of Head Tailoring Master/Mistresses and, therefore the action to fix the different pay scale with respect to the same categories in two Departments is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. The respondents filed reply to the petition and have taken objections that the petitioners were appointed as Junior Tailoring Mistresses as per the provisions of the H.P. Rural Development Department Class-III services (Junior Tailoring Mistresses) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1989, which provide pay scale of Rs.1350-2400 later on restructured to Rs. 1365-2410/- and subsequently revised. The post of Junior Tailoring Masters/Mistresses were also created under the Department of Industries which were subsequently, transferred to the Rural Development Department in the year 1983 in the existing pay scale of Rs.510-940, which was applicable at that time. 6. It has been averred that the posts sanctioned in the respondent-Department are for practical training, whereas, the posts sanctioned in the Technical Education Department are meant for teaching as per the National Council Vocational Training (NCVT) norms. Therefore, the assertion made by the petitioners that there exists a complete similarity between these posts in these two Departments is completely false. It has also been averred that the matter regarding anomaly in the grant of the pay scale of Junior Training Mistress and Head Tailoring Mistress was taken with the Finance Department, however, vide letter dated 29.03.1993, those Junior Tailoring Mistresses whose services along with the posts had been transferred from the Department of Industries to Rural Development Department were given the scale of Rs. 1640-2925/-, as a measure personal to them. Since the petitioners were appointed directly through H.P. Public Service Commission in the year 1991 on the post of Junior Tailoring Mistress as per the amended Recruitment & Promotion Rules on the pay scale prescribed and, the petitioners are not entitled for the pay scale of Rs. 1640-2925/-, as a measure personal to them. Since the petitioners were appointed directly through H.P. Public Service Commission in the year 1991 on the post of Junior Tailoring Mistress as per the amended Recruitment & Promotion Rules on the pay scale prescribed and, the petitioners are not entitled for the pay scale of Rs. 1640-2925/-, which was sanctioned to those Junior Tailoring Mistresses, whose services along with the posts were transferred from the Department of Industries to the Rural Development Office. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Amit Kumar Chaudhary, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents and also gone through the record carefully. 8. No doubt, the Junior Tailoring Masters/Mistresses, working in the Industries Department, were drawing higher pay scale when their services were transferred to the respondent-Department, where the petitioners were already working on the same posts and further the scale which they were receiving at that time were granted to them as personal measures, but it is admitted fact that after transfer to the respondent-Department, they had also performed the same duties, responsibilities, control etc., as being performed by the petitioners. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that fixation of pay scale, avenue of promotion, qualifications etc. is within the domain of the executive and the role of the Courts is very limited, but at the same time it is not an absolute rule and the Court can examine the same if the employee is unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. However, such powers can be exercised, if the action is irritational, arbitrary or unjust, and it is open for the Court to intervene as held in Union of India & Ors. versus D.G.O.F. Employees Association and another, 2023 (15) Scale 293. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under: “9. The learned senior counsel for the respondents on the other hand has referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Dineshan K.K. (2008) 1 SCC 586 wherein it is held that though the equation of posts and equation of pay structure being complex matters are generally left to the executive and expert bodies like the Pay Commission etc. and the carefully evolved pay structure ought not to be ordinarily disturbed by the Court as it may upset the balance and cause avoidable ripples in other cadres as well, nevertheless, it will not be correct to lay down as an absolute rule that merely because determination and granting of pay scales is the prerogative of the executive, the Court has no jurisdiction to examine any pay structure and an aggrieved employee cannot be left with no remedy if he is unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction, except to go on knocking at the doors of the executive or the legislature. It is further held therein that undoubtedly, when there is no dispute with regard to the qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the persons holding identical posts or ranks but they are treated differently merely because they belong to different departments or the basis for classification or post is ex facie irrational, arbitrary or unjust it is open to the Court to intervene. 10. A cumulative perusal of the opinion expressed by this Court would indicate that though the Courts would not undertake the exercise of determining the pay scale keeping in view the nature of the work by comparing employees who are not similarly placed in cases where the exercise of determining such complex issues would arise, at the same time, relief cannot be denied to the employees when the entitlement is denied due to irrational consideration without application of mind to the facts involved in the case by the employer, thereby denying the benefits to the employees. If this aspect of the matter is kept in view, a perusal of the consideration made by the High Court as seen from the portion reproduced above from the judgment of the High Court, it would disclose that the High Court has not undertaken the exercise regarding which restraint has been expressed by this Court. However, on the admitted facts and the earlier situation which existed, a consideration has been made keeping in view the very recommendation of the Pay Commission in reckoning the appropriate application of the pay scale. However, on the admitted facts and the earlier situation which existed, a consideration has been made keeping in view the very recommendation of the Pay Commission in reckoning the appropriate application of the pay scale. In that regard, all that has been adverted to by the High Court is as to whether the employees who are the members of the respondent and are employed in the headquarters are similarly placed as that of the employees of CSS/CSSS and in that regard has considered the matter further to ensure that the members of the respondent are not discriminated upon. 11. In that view of the matter what is to be taken into consideration is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the High Court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the provision contained in para 3.1.9 of the Sixth CPC would apply to the fact situation and in that regard whether it had rightly rejected the contention of the appellant herein that it ought to have been guided by para 3.1.14 of the recommendations. The contention as noted by the High Court is what was urged before us. In that regard, at the outset it is necessary to clarify that the conclusion as reached with regard to the parity in pay scale in the case of the employees who are members of the first respondent is basically due to the fact that they are employees in the headquarters of the Ordnance Factory and therefore they are similarly placed as that of the Assistants in CSS/CSSS Army Headquarters as well as such other similarly placed organisations referred to in the recommendations. If that be the position, the conclusion as reached by the High Court is unexceptionable. 12. If that be the position, the conclusion as reached by the High Court is unexceptionable. 12. However, the learned senior counsel for the appellant in order to buttress his contention that para 3.1.14 of the recommendations would apply has sought to rely on the decision of this Court in Union of India and Others vs. Manoj Kumar and Others Civil Appeal Nos.913-914 of 2021 disposed of on 31.08.2021 wherein this court while examining the very same provision as contained in paras 3.1.9 and 3.1.14 had arrived at the conclusion that the benefit of equal pay in the said case cannot be extended and had held that the Pay Commission, which is a specialised body set up with the objective of resolving anomalies had made its recommendation, which would not call for interference. The decision would indicate that this Court though had referred to the very paragraph as contained in the Sixth CPC recommendations, what had however arisen for consideration therein was with regard to disparity between Secretariat and Field Officers. What was noted in that case was the claim made by Private Secretaries Grade II employed in Eastern Central Railways (Field Office/Zonal Railways) for parity in pay with their counterparts working in the Central Secretariat Stenographers Service/Railway Boards Secretariat Stenographers Service/Central Administrative Tribunal. In that view, this Court was of the view that though there is an observation that the recommendations shall apply mutatis mutandis to Private Secretaries and posts equivalent thereto in the service under para 3.1.9; the subsequent para 3.1.14 has specifically dealt with the aspect of parity between the Field and Secretariat Offices which was really the subject matter of the claim therein. The said observation, though emphasised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant would indicate that it is not a consideration akin to the consideration herein. As seen from the highlighted portion of the reproduced paragraphs from the impugned order passed by the High Court hereinabove, it would disclose that in the instant facts the reliance placed by the High Court on para 3.1.9 is based on the fact that there was similarity inasmuch as the pay scale as sought for implementation is the one which was provided to the employees of the headquarters as they were similarly placed as the employees of the headquarters in CSS/CSSS. 13. 13. Further, what was also taken into consideration by the High Court is the historical similarity in pay scales which existed prior to the recommendations in the Sixth CPC. Such historical similarity which had existed was taken note and, in that light, the pay scale which was applicable was taken into consideration and had accordingly arrived at the conclusion that the employees in the headquarters of the Ordnance Factories being similarly placed cannot be discriminated. Therefore, such consideration in the instant case would fall within the parameters as permitted by this Court. Also, in the present circumstance, the High Court has adverted to the fact situation and has thereby rectified the pay anomaly. In fact, the question of parity with regard to the pay scale to the Assistants in the lower formations in the Indian Navy with that of the Assistants in CSS was held as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by this Court in the case of All India Naval Clerks Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.29204 of 2019 dated 27.07.2022. 14. As noted by the High Court, it is evident that parity of pay scales vis-à-vis LDCs, UDCs, Assistants/PAs and Stenographers, was maintained even prior to 01.01.1986 under the Third Central Pay Commission recommendations (for the period of 01.01.1973 to 31.03.1985). This parity was continued in the Fourth Central Pay Commission recommendations (with effect from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.1995) and the Fifth Central Pay Commission recommendations (for the period 01.01.1996 to 14.09.2006). The post of Assistants, PAs and Stenographers is governed by Director General Ordnance Factories Headquarters Civil Service Rules, 1977. 15. Be that as it may, in the present facts the perusal of the judgment passed by the High Court impugned herein would indicate that the High Court having kept in view the legal, as well as the factual aspects, has not proceeded in a manner so as to equate two sets of employees in different organizations. But, keeping in view the recommendation of the Pay Commission and the applicability of the pay scales recommended to similarly placed employees employed in the headquarters and on noticing discrimination despite historical similarity has merely rectified the error, which does not call for interference.” 10. But, keeping in view the recommendation of the Pay Commission and the applicability of the pay scales recommended to similarly placed employees employed in the headquarters and on noticing discrimination despite historical similarity has merely rectified the error, which does not call for interference.” 10. The Hon’ble three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Randhir Singh versus Union of India and others, (1982) 1 SSC 618 had observed that principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not a mere demagogic slogan but a constitutional goal, capable of being attained through constitutional remedies and held that this principle had to be read under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution after considering the Constitution Bench judgment in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India and granted same pay scale to the Drivers -Constables as granted to the Drivers of the Railway Protection Force. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan vs. Rajesh Mohan Shukla and others, (2007) 6 SCC 9 , wherein it has been held that that when the nature of duties being discharged by the persons, who have come on deputations and have been absorbed as such in Department and those who were directly recruited on fixed term are discharging the same duties, they are held entitled to the same pay scale. The relevant para of the judgment reads as under :- “9. Now, these appeals have come up for hearing. We find that the nature of duties being discharged by the Youth Coordinators who have come on deputation and have been absorbed as such and those who were directly recruited on fixed terms are discharging the same duties. The only difference is their source of recruitment. Once the deputationists are discharging the same duties and are being paid salary and other allowances then there is no reason to deny the same benefits (sic to those) who are discharging the same duties and functions. Those deputationists now absorbed obtained the order from this Court but the direct recruits did not approach this Court, they were treated as a class apart because of their source of recruitment. Once these persons are already working for more than two decades discharging the same functions and duties then we see no reason why the same benefit should not be given to the respondents. Once these persons are already working for more than two decades discharging the same functions and duties then we see no reason why the same benefit should not be given to the respondents. Looking to the nature and duties of these respondents we are of opinion that there is no reason to treat them differently. However, at the time of admission this Court on 1-5-2000 confined the relief from the date of filing of the writ petition before the High Court. In fact, these directly recruited Youth Coordinators approached the Court in earlier point of time but they were advised to approach the Government and they did approach the Government but the Government denied them the same relief as was given to the deputationists. Therefore, there is no reason not to grant them the same scale of pay and as such this Court at the time of admission has confined the relief that why it should not be granted from the date of the filing of the writ petition in the High Court. Accordingly, we dispose of these civil appeals with a direction that the same benefits as were being given to the Youth Coordinators who were initially on deputation and were absorbed, should be given to the respondents from the date of filing of the writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad. Hence, the order of the High Court of Allahabad is affirmed with minor modification as indicated above. There would be no order as to costs.” 12. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586 , by holding that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a mere demagogic slogan but a constitutional goal, capable of being attained through constitutional remedies and held that this principle had to be read under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced hereinunder:- “12. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has been considered, explained and applied in a catena of decisions of this Court. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" was originally propounded as part of the directive principles of the State policy in Article 39(d) of the Constitution. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced hereinunder:- “12. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has been considered, explained and applied in a catena of decisions of this Court. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" was originally propounded as part of the directive principles of the State policy in Article 39(d) of the Constitution. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had observed that principle of equal pay for equal work is not a mere demagogic slogan but a constitutional goal, capable of being attained through constitutional remedies and held that this principle had to be read under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This decision was affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India. Thus, having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality and inhibition against discrimination in Articles 14 and 16, in service jurisprudence, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" has assumed status of a fundamental right.” 13. On the other hand learned counsel representing the respondents has vehemently argued that since there are different set of Rules for the purpose of appointment to the post in two different departments, this Court may not like to venture into equate the pay scales, since it is the domain of the State to prescribe the pay scales as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.U. Joshi and others vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 632. No doubt, it is not the job of the Courts to fix the pay scale, but where there is dis-similarity with the same set of employees discharging the same duties, responsibilities, powers etc., the Court may pass orders to grant the same pay scale on the principle of equal pay for equal work. 14. If the ibid judgments are perused in its entirety, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has culled out circumstances, under which the Court can go into factum of granting the same pay scale, if granted in other Department, provided the employee is able to make out a case that the duties performed by him is same to the duties being discharged in other department viz-a-viz other responsibilities and qualifications etc. Admittedly, in the present case the persons, who were working in the Industrial Department, after transfer to the respondent-Department, where the petitioners were also discharging their duties, have been granted the scale claimed by the petitioners. Thus, parity demands that the similar benefits may be given to them and non-consideration of their claim by the respondents is definitely violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Since the petitioners had also been discharging the same and similar duties, responsibilities, powers in the same Department, they are entitled to the same pay scale on the principle of equal work for equal pay. 15. Learned Deputy Advocates General for the respondents also placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others vs. Jagjit Singh and others, (2017) 1 SCC 148 , and submitted that since the persons holding the same rank/designation in different departments, but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of equal pay for equal work. 16. No doubt, it is not within the realm of the Court to equate the pay scales as held by various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, if it emerges from the facts that the persons are performing the same and similar duties and having same responsibilities, as well as the powers, then the Court can definitely venture into that arena and order to remove anomaly and grant the same pay scale. 17. Learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents also placed heavy reliance upon the judgment in Union of India vs. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Associate and another, (2023) 19 SCC 482 , and laid emphasis that the power of judicial review of this Court in the matter of classification of posts and determination of pay scale is very limited and it is the job of the expert bodies. However, if this judgment is perused in its entirety, it has been held that though the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. The equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. 18. However, if this judgment is perused in its entirety, it has been held that though the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. The equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. 18. In the present case, this Court could not have embarked upon to equate the pay scales in two departments, but since the persons, who were discharging their duties in the Industry Department, once having been transferred with the respondent-Department have been paid the scale drawn by them in that Department, parity demands that the petitioners, who were also discharging the same and similar duties, are held entitled to the same scale and this Court cannot ignore the fact that two set of employees working in the same department are being treated unequally and differently, though they are discharging the same duties, responsibilities, functions and powers. 19. Further, the persons who were transferred to the respondent-Department were denied the same pay scale as sought by the petitioners had approached this Court by way of writ petition and this Court vide judgment dated 18.03.2015, passed in CWP No. 1669 of 2015, titled, Soma Kumari and others vs. State of H.P. and another, wherein this Court had returned the findings that the duties discharged by the petitioners and the Tailoring Mistresses posted in the Directorate of Technical, Vocational and Industrial Training, Sundernagar are same and the parent cadre of the petitioners and Tailoring Mistresses posted in the Directorate of Technical, Vocational and Industrial Training, Sundernagar, was the same and thus, the petitioners being similarly situated vis-a-vis Tailoring Mistresses posted in the Directorate of Technical, Vocational and Industrial Training, Sundernagar, were held entitled to the Grade pay of Rs.4200/-. It has been categorically held that the equals cannot be treated unequal. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the judgment passed in CWP No. 1669 of 2015, by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has been implemented by the respondents and since the Division Bench of this Court had already held that the petitioners who were earlier posted in the Industries Department, after transfer to the respondent-Department had been discharging the same and similar duties, this Court is bound to follow the said judgment and thus, the petition preferred by the petitioners deserves to be allowed. 21. 21. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and respondents are directed to grant pay scale to the petitioners at par with their counterparts in the Department of Technical Education, Vocational Industrial Training, on the post of Junior Tailoring Mistresses as also on the post of Head Tailoring Mistresses, with all consequential benefits. However, it is made clear that the financial benefits shall be paid to the petitioners only from the date of institution of the petition. No order as to cost. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.