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2026 DAILYLAW 16625 (HP)

Guddu Ram v. State of HP

2026-03-12

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 157 of 2023, dated 10.12.2023, registered at Police Station Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 324 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant Narinder Kumar had visited Village Kaluga to attend the wedding ceremony of Ashu Kumar on 9.12.2023. At about 9.40 PM, he, Ashok Kumar alias Ravi, Anil Kumar and Rakesh Kumar were standing on the road. A car bearing registration No. HP-01-3486, being driven by Guddu Ram (the petitioner), came to the spot. Sunil Kumar was sitting with him. Sunil Kumar got out of the car and inquired about Ravi. Ravi identified himself. Sunil Kumar stabbed Ravi in the neck. Informant shouted that Ravi had been killed. When the informant, Narinder Kumar, tried to pick up Ravi, Sunil Kumar also stabbed him. Guddu Ram and Sunil Kumar fled away from the spot in the vehicle, but they were stopped by the people. The injured were carried in the vehicle to the hospital. The Medical Officer declared Ravi as brought dead. The police registered the FIR and filed the charge sheet before the Court. The prosecution has cited 34 witnesses, out of whom 17 have been examined. 07 more witnesses have been cited in the supplementary charge sheet. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner had no knowledge that Sunil Kumar was carrying a sharp-edged weapon. Informant Narinder Kumar and eyewitnesses Anil Kumar and Rakesh Kumar have already been examined. They did not attribute any overt act to the petitioner. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by a filing status report asserting that the informant made a statement to the police that he had visited Village Kaloga on 9.12.2023, at about 3.30 PM to attend Ashu’s marriage. He, Ashok Kumar, Anil Kumar and Rakesh Kumar were standing on the road, preparing for their departure. The informant told the other persons that he would drop them off on a motorcycle one by one. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01M-3486 came to the spot. He, Ashok Kumar, Anil Kumar and Rakesh Kumar were standing on the road, preparing for their departure. The informant told the other persons that he would drop them off on a motorcycle one by one. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01M-3486 came to the spot. Petitioner Guddu Ram was driving the vehicle. Bablu alias Sunil Kumar was sitting in the vehicle. He got out of the vehicle and inquired about Ravi. Ravi identified himself, and Bablu stabbed him in the neck. He fell. The informant tried to pick him up, but Bablu stabbed him in the back. Petitioner and Bablu tried to speed away in their vehicle, but they were stopped, and the injured were taken to the hospital. Ravi Kumar was declared dead. Informant Narinder Kumar had sustained sharp injuries. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police arrested the petitioner and the co-accused Sunil Kumar alias Bablu and seized various articles. Bablu alias Sunil Kumar got a blood-stained knife recovered. The cause of death was a stab wound, causing profuse blood loss from a major blood vessel of neck. The charge sheet was filed before the Court. The prosecution has cited 35 witnesses, out of whom the statements of 17 witnesses have been recorded, and the statements of 18 witnesses are to be recorded. The matter was listed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, HP, on 28.2.2026. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Vinod Kumar Soni, learned counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Vinod Kumar Soni, learned counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The FIR does not mention any specific role for the petitioner. The status report filed by the State cannot be considered as a reply to the bail petition. The witnesses have also not attributed any specific role to the petitioner in their statements recorded before the learned Trial Court. There is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. There is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the co-accused had stabbed two persons, out of whom one has died, and the other was seriously wounded. The petitioner had brought the co-accused to the spot in his vehicle. He had attempted to speed away from the spot after the incident. This shows the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime. The trial is continuing, and there is no delay in its progress. The bail Court is not to appreciate the statements of the witnesses, and this jurisdiction is vested with the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. InGudikantiNarasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious oflences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the oflence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the oflence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the oflence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the oflence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It was specifically stated in the FIR that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in which the co-accused Bablu alias Sunil Kumar came to the spot. He stabbed Ravi and boarded the vehicle. The petitioner sped away from the spot with Bablu alias Sunil Kumar, but the vehicle was stopped by the people. 11. It was specifically stated in the FIR that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in which the co-accused Bablu alias Sunil Kumar came to the spot. He stabbed Ravi and boarded the vehicle. The petitioner sped away from the spot with Bablu alias Sunil Kumar, but the vehicle was stopped by the people. Bringing the co-accused to the spot and taking him from the spot after the commission of the offence prima facie shows that the petitioner shared the common intention with the co-accused. 12. It was laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council about a Century ago in Barendra Kumar Ghosh versus Emperor, AIR 1925 (PC) 1 , that in crimes as in other things, "they also serve who only stand and wait." It was observed: “[23] As soon, however, as the other sections of this part of the Code are looked at, it becomes plain that the words of Section 31 are not to be eviscerated by reading them in this exceedingly limited sense. By Section 33, a criminal act in Section 34 includes a series of acts and, further, "act" includes omission to act, for example, an omission to interfere to prevent a murder being done before one's very eyes. By Section 37, when any offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence. Even if the appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in crimes as in other things, "they also serve who only stand and wait." By Section 38, when several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act. Read together, these sections are reasonably plain. Section 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for "that act" and "the act" in the latter part of the section must include the whole action covered by "a criminal act" in the first part because they refer to it. Section 37 provides that when several acts are done so as to result together in the commission of an offence, the doing of any one of them, with an intention to cooperate in the offence (which may not be the same as an intention common to all), makes the actor liable to be punished for the commission of the offence. Section 38 provides for different punishments for different offences as an alternative to one punishment for one offence, whether the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act are set in motion by one intention or by the other.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 7 SCC 723 that when the accused went to the house of the deceased armed with deadly weapons, their common intention was duly proved. It was observed: “42. In Ram Tahal and others v. The State of U.P. AIR 1972 SC 254 , while dealing with the applicability of Section 34 of the IPC, a two-judge Bench observed: “There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the commission of the crime, showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert, and though it is difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual, yet it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference can be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence, for instance, that all of them had left the scene of the incident together, and other acts which all or some may have done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted.” 43. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted.” 43. In Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 160 , a two-judge Bench has held that: “The existence of common intention can be inferred from the attending circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties. No direct evidence of common intention is necessary. For the purpose of common intention, even the participation in the commission of the offence need not be proved in all cases.” 44. In Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato and others v. State of West Bengal AIR 2006 SC 302 , it has been held that for the purpose of attracting Section 34 of the IPC, a specific overt act on the part of the accused is not necessary. He may even wait and watch. Inaction on the part of an accused may sometimes go a long way to achieving a common intention or an object with others. 45. In Manik Das and others v. State of Assam AIR 2007 SC 2274 , it has been held as follows:- “The Section does not say ‘the common intention of all’, nor does it say an intention common to all” Under the provisions of Section 34, the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused, leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law, it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused the death of the deceased in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all, or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1993 SC 1899 ). Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1993 SC 1899 ). Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34, it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.” 46. Coming to the case at hand, the appellant had an inimical relationship with the deceased and his family, as the previous occurrences would show. Despite a consensus being arrived at that there would be a panchayat on 26.9.2002, they, armed with deadly weapons, went to the house of the deceased and dragged the deceased. The previous meeting of minds with a pre-arranged plan or prior concert, as has been held by a number of authorities, is difficult to establish by way of direct evidence. They are to be inferred from the conduct and circumstances. As is evident, the weapons they carried were lethal in nature. The deceased was absolutely helpless and not armed with any weapon. It was most unexpected on their part, as normally it was expected that there would be a panchayat on the next day.” 14. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner is involved in the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 324, read with Section 34 of the IPC. 15. The offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is punishable with capital punishment. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 16. Considering the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. 17. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 16. Considering the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. 17. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner. Considering the gravity of the offence, the nature of the crime and the severity of the punishment, the delay by itself is not sufficient to grant bail to the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141: “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 18. A heavy reliance was placed upon the statements of the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the bail Court cannot appreciate the statements of witnesses. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.” 19. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercising bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence. It was observed: 10. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercising bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence. It was observed: 10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge, in support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal of these statements, reasonable grounds can be entertained for concluding prima facie innocence of the petitioner. The arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner deserve to be rejected for the reason that this Court, while dealing with the bail application, will not appreciate the evidence being recorded during the trial. Undisputedly, only some of the witnesses out of the entire list of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution have been examined. In these circumstances, it is not prudent to form any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the petitioner on the basis of such partial evidence. 20. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be granted bail because of some discrepancies in the statements recorded before the learned Trial Court. 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 23. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.