JUDGMENT : Romesh Verma, J. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree, dated 20.07.2005, as passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant/plaintiff has been ordered to be dismissed and the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Sub Judge-II, Dharamshala dated 31.07.1999 have been affirmed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant/plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of learned Sub Judge-II Dharamshala for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction to the effect that orders dated 25.09.1989 and 29.06.1991 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, whereby defendants No. 1 to 6 were appointed as members of the Managing Committee and an application for cancellation of order dated 25.09.1989 was dismissed, be declared as null and void. 3. It was submitted that the land comprised in Khata No. 247, Khatauni Nos. 587 and 588, Khasra Nos. 2558 to 2562, 2566 & 2567, Plots No.7, measuring 0-54-58 hectares, situated at Mohal Lidbar, Mauza Nagrota, Tehsil and District Kangra, owned by Mandir Balak Rupi under the management of Shankar Gir, Chela Kailash Gir, Chela Ranbir Gir, resident of local place is possessed and cultivated by Mohtmim vide jamabandi for the year 1982-83. It was averred that in fact Balak Rupi is not a Temple and it is a place of ‘Samadhi’ of Gossain Sect. There are 12-13 ‘Samadhi’ and one of ‘Samadhi’ was covered by lintel roof. Neither there is a temple nor there is ‘Charrahat’ of Gossain community at the spot. The general public have no access to this place and the same is exclusively a religious and sacred place of Gossain sect. which is a religious sect. The plaintiff is Chela of Shankar Gir Mohtmim and said Shankar Gir had nominated the plaintiff as Chela during his life time. Said Shankar Gir, Guru of Math, Balak Rupi, died on 07.03.1989 and on his death, the plaintiff stepped into the shoes of his Guru Shankar Gir as Mohtmim of Balak Rupi according to custom and plaintiff’s succession as Mohtmim was also confirmed by the Gossain brotherhood. 4. It was further averred that the defendants/respondents are strangers to the Gossain community. On 06.04.1989 the defendants gathered together and held meeting in which the defendants decided to do something for betterment of the Mandir Balak Rupi. 4. It was further averred that the defendants/respondents are strangers to the Gossain community. On 06.04.1989 the defendants gathered together and held meeting in which the defendants decided to do something for betterment of the Mandir Balak Rupi. On 13.04.1989, the defendants preferred an application to the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, with the averments that they were the Sewaks and public of Nagrota Bagwan, Tehsil & District Kangra and Mohtmim, Shankar Gir of Temple Balak Rupi, died on 07.03.1989 and after his death there was none to perform ‘Puja’ in the Temple and manage the land in question. 5. The Sewaks and public of Nagrota vide its resolution decided to approach the Government that Committee for management of land attached to the Temple may be constituted as the Mahant did not do any development work and was only concerned with the income of the Temple. The Deputy Commissioner Kangra forwarded the application to the Sub Divisional Magistrate (Civil) Kangra for enquiry and report. The SDM (Civil) Kangra after holding enquiry submitted his report with the recommendations of names of Managing Committee. It was further averred that the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra without issuing any notice and without affording any opportunity to the plaintiff passed an ex parte order dated 25.09.1989 vide which defendants No. 1 to 6 were appointed as members of the Managing Committee of the Temple for its management and land attached to it. It was also averred that Gossain community is a religious sect and in the matter of succession to the Gaddi or Mahant or Mohtmim the successionship is not governed by rule of hereditary but it is governed by old aged custom, which is that after the death of Guru i.e. Mohtmim or Mahant, the Chela accepted by Guru during his life time would succeed to the Gaddi and would take the place of Guru and become Mohtmim subject to confirmation of fraternity by performance of religious rites and ceremonies. 6. It was also averred that on the death of Shankar Gir Guru on 7.3.1989, the fraternity of Gossain community appointed the plaintiff as Mohtmim. 6. It was also averred that on the death of Shankar Gir Guru on 7.3.1989, the fraternity of Gossain community appointed the plaintiff as Mohtmim. The Deputy Commissioner Kangra on 25.09.1989 on the recommendations of the SDM (Civil) Kangra constituted a managing committee by nominating defendants No. 1 to 6 as its members in absence of the plaintiff, therefore, it was averred that the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra on 25.09.1989 and 29.06.1991, whereby application for cancellation of order dated 25.09.1989 was dismissed, are wrong, illegal and void. As such, the decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the suit land and declaration was also sought that impugned orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, are without jurisdiction and non operative qua rights of the plaintiff and that the appointment of the plaintiff was confirmed by Gossain fraternity by performance of rites and ceremonies according to customs. 7. The suit filed by the plaintiff was contested by the defendants and preliminary objections with respect to locus standi, acquiescence, suit being bad for non joinder, valuation, jurisdiction etc. were raised. On merits, it was submitted that the plaintiff has no concern with the suit property and after the death of Shankar Gir, the suit property is being looked after and managed by the Managing Committee duly constituted by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra. It was averred that the ‘Kulaj’ of the community ‘Kaisthas’ of village Nagrota Bagwan is created in the land in suit and they worship at this place after the marriage of their children and on other occasions as per religious custom of the community. The general public also pay its visit and worship the Mata Balakrupi. The land in question is attached to the idol Balakrupi. Therefore, the Gossain sect has nothing to do with the said Balakrupi Temple or with its property in any manner whatsoever. It is a public place and people including the defendants undertake worship and have faith in it. They offer ‘Puja’ regularly. 8. It was further averred that the plaintiff is a government employee and working as teacher in a far flung ‘Changar’ region of Nagrota Bagwan Block and legally and factually he cannot leave his station of posting daily and it is beyond the prescribed limit of distance fixed for the government employees. The plaintiff out of greed wants to grab the property. The plaintiff out of greed wants to grab the property. Even otherwise, the plaintiff allegedly procured and got executed an illegal will from Shankar Gir in favour of his own wife. Intention of the plaintiff was to grab the valuable property under the cover of the illegal will, but when he found that he may not succeed, then he resiled from his stand and put his own case as a nominated ‘Chela’. As a matter of fact neither he was ever nominated as Chela nor he could legally be as such. Mohtmim or Manager is appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned. When the administration found that the plaintiff was acting in an illegal manner, the Collector, Kangra, appointed Managing Committee with Block Development Officer Nagrota Block as its Ex-Officio President and even prominent persons of the area were included in the Managing Committee. Members of the Committee discharge their function without any charge or remuneration or interest. The plaintiff has grabbed the property of the Temple without any locus standi and now he wants to grab the property of Mata Balakrupi. It was submitted that the committee had been constituted under the lawful orders of Deputy Commissioner Kangra, which included people of prominence and repute. The Collector, Kangra had passed valid orders under powers vested in him in order to see the public welfare and public interest. It was specifically submitted that there is no alleged custom nor it has been detailed as required under the law. Therefore, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit as preferred by the plaintiff. 9. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement filed by the defendants and the averments as made in the plaint were reiterated. 10. The learned trial court on 22.11.2025 framed the following issues:- 1. Whether orders dated 25.9.89 and 26.6.91 of the D.C. Kangra appointing the defendants 1 to 6 as members of Managing Committee of temple of Baba Balak Rupi are wrong, null void, and not binding on the plaintiff, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff belongs to Gossain Community and in accordance with custom succeeded to Gaddi, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the orders of D.C. Kangra are contrary to the custom of Gossain Community. as alleged? OPP. 5. OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff belongs to Gossain Community and in accordance with custom succeeded to Gaddi, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the orders of D.C. Kangra are contrary to the custom of Gossain Community. as alleged? OPP. 5. Whether the plaintiff was appointed as Chela' and his appointment was confirmed by the Gosain Community, as alleged? OPP. 6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus stand? OPD 7. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD. 8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his.. act and conduct from filing the suit? OPD. 9. Whether the suit has been instituted against dead persons, If so, Its effect? OPD. 10. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis- joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 11. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD. 12. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD. 13. Whether the Deity is a 'Kulj of Kaisthan' of Nagrota Bagwan and the general public as per custom has right to worship there, as alleged by the defendants in para No.3 of written Statement ? OPD. 14. Whether there is deity over the suit land, as alleged by the defendants, if so, its effect ? OPD. 15. Whether 10 Kanal of suit land isagriculture land and over 3 kanal is Samadhi, as alleged, If so, its effect ? OPP. 16. Relief. 11. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial court dismissed the suit as filed by the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 31.07.1999 and the appeal preferred against the said judgment and decree before the learned first appellate court also came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 20.07.2005 whereby judgment and decree as passed by the learned trial court was affirmed. 12. Feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned Courts below, the plaintiff has preferred the instant regular second appeal, which was admitted on 29.05.2007 by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the findings of the courts below are totally against the evidence on record and the courts below have failed to appreciate oral as well as documentary evidence specially the Ex. Whether the findings of the courts below are totally against the evidence on record and the courts below have failed to appreciate oral as well as documentary evidence specially the Ex. PW-3/A and as such, the findings of the courts below are totally perverse to the evidence on record? 2. Whether the courts below have failed to give proper findings on legally issues involved in the present matter, specially regarding the custom and also regarding the jurisdiction of the collector passing orders dated 25.9.89 and 26.6.91 which are under challenge? 13. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on record. 14. It is contended by Mr. R. K. Gautam, learned Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate, appearing for the appellant that the judgments and decrees as passed by the learned courts below against the present appellant are perverse and liable to be quashed and set aside and the same are based on no evidence and the suit filed by the appellant has been wrongly dismissed. He has further contended that the substantial questions of law, as framed by this Court, would primarily persuade this Court to accept the instant appeal. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Pranjal Munjal, Advocate, appearing for the respondents, has defended the judgments and decrees as passed by the courts below and he has categorically stated that the judgments and decrees are perfectly valid, legal and sustainable. He has urged that no interference is required in the impugned judgments and decrees that too in second appeal when the learned courts below after thrashing the entire oral as well as documentary evidence have rightly rejected the claim of the appellant. 16. Since both substantial questions of law, as quoted hereinabove, are intrinsically interlinked and interconnected, therefore, they are taken up together for consideration and are being answered by common reasoning. 17. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that in order to prove its case, the plaintiff/appellant has placed on record very material document i.e. Ext. PW3/A, which corroborates and establishes his case that he was appointed as Mohtmim on the death of Shankar Gir. 17. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that in order to prove its case, the plaintiff/appellant has placed on record very material document i.e. Ext. PW3/A, which corroborates and establishes his case that he was appointed as Mohtmim on the death of Shankar Gir. He has urged that this document was prepared on the death of Shankar Gir on 07.03.1989, and the said congregation, by virtue of religious rites, was attended by various persons of Gossain fraternity including five Gurus and entire community, which is substantiated by the entries and leads to an inference that the appellant was appointed as Mohtmim. It is contended that Ext. PW3/A clearly establishes the case of the appellant that on the death of Shankar Gir on 07.03.1989 he inherited the Mohtmimship and the same was confirmed vide Ext. PW3/A and was accepted by the entire Gossain community. 18. Both the learned courts below have discussed the execution and relevance of document, Ext. PW3/A in detail. 19. The learned trial court in paras 13 and 14 of its judgment has discussed and disbelieved the document, Ext. PW3/A by assigning authentic and cogent reasons. The learned first appellate court has also rendered its findings in para 11 of its judgment at length affirming findings of the learned trial court. Both the learned courts below have disbelieved the aforesaid document. 20. The appellant has heavily relied upon document, Ext. PW3/A in order to prove his case that he was appointed as Mohtmim by Gossain community after the death of Shankar Gir as per wish and will of the deceased Shankar Gir and his entire community, however perusal of the document, Ext. PW3/A, would go to show that it is shrouded by suspicion and on the face it, Ext. PW3/A itself demolishes the case of the appellant on account of infirmities in it. 21. It emanates from the perusal of the document, Ext. PW3/A that the same was prepared on 19.03.1989 i.e. after the death of Shankar Gir, who was stated to have expired on 07.03.1989. The court fees affixed upon this document is dated 17.03.1989. Page 3 of this document reveals very interesting position, whereby signatory of this document had appended his signature on 04.03.1989, which is prior to the death of Shankar Gir. Signatures, which are appearing at Sr. No. 40 is dated 09.04.1989 and signature at Sr. The court fees affixed upon this document is dated 17.03.1989. Page 3 of this document reveals very interesting position, whereby signatory of this document had appended his signature on 04.03.1989, which is prior to the death of Shankar Gir. Signatures, which are appearing at Sr. No. 40 is dated 09.04.1989 and signature at Sr. No. 43 appears to be that of dated 07.04.1989. 22. Even though it is the case of the appellant and his witnesses that all the signatures were appended by the witnesses on the date of execution of the document, Ext. PW3/A, however, perusal of the document casts a serious doubt on the preparation of the said document. In case said document was prepared on 19.03.1989, then, as observed above, under what circumstance, signatures at Sr. Nos. 38 and 39 are of dated 04.03.1989 and 09.04.1989. It has also not been clarified therein that when Shankar Gir died on 07.03.1989, then how signature at Sr. No.38 is dated 04.03.1989 i.e. prior to the death of Shankar Gir. Even while appearing in the witness box as PW1, the appellant/plaintiff, in his deposition has stated that he obtained signatures of Namberdar after 2-3 days. 23. Insertion of different dates on this document clearly establishes that this document is full of inconsistencies, infirmities and rather the same is forged and fabricated and, thus no reliance can be placed upon the same. 24. The learned Courts below have dealt with this issue in detail and have passed speaking orders on the veracity of the document, Ext. PW3/A, which are legal, valid and sustainable in the eyes of law. 25. Perusal of the record reveals that in the plaint, it has been stated by the plaintiff/appellant that after death of his Guru, who died on 07.03.1989, he stepped into his shoes as Mohtmim according to custom and the same was confirmed by Gossain community. While entering in the witness box in his deposition as PW1, the appellant has stated that Shankar Gir expired on 07.03.1989 and he had appointed him as his Chela in the year 1968. The stand as taken in the plaint and in the statement recorded before the learned trial court is conflicting and self-contradictory. 26. While entering in the witness box in his deposition as PW1, the appellant has stated that Shankar Gir expired on 07.03.1989 and he had appointed him as his Chela in the year 1968. The stand as taken in the plaint and in the statement recorded before the learned trial court is conflicting and self-contradictory. 26. In the plaint, it has been submitted by the plaintiff that Gossain community is using suit land for their worship and there is no temple on the spot, however perusal of the records clearly depicts that the suit land is owned by Mandir Balakrupi and Shankar Gir was appointed as manager of the Temple. 27. It has come on record that the suit land is owned by Temple Balakrupi and it is being used by general public for their belief and faith. The case, as set up by the plaintiff that the defendants are interfering in his ownership without any right, title or interest is dehors the record. 28. The record further reveals that the plaintiff is using the suit land for his own personal use and on the strength of Ext. PW3/A, he has tried to set up the case that after death of Shankar Gir, he was appointed as Mohtmim and he is looking after the affairs of the suit property, however, the plaintiff has failed to corroborate his case by proving Ext. PW3/A, rather, it has come on record that the plaintiff in order to grab and usurp the suit land has instituted the present proceedings after procuring Ext. PW3/A. 29. The learned senior counsel for the respondents has taken this Court to the order dated 29.06.1991, Ext. D6, as passed by the Deputy Commissioner, exercising powers of Collector Kangra, wherein para 3 thereof, it reveals that the plaintiff is a school teacher and is in government service which place is away from the Mandir near about 7/8 kms. It has been observed by the Collector that plaintiff had set up a will in favour of his wife on behalf of Shankar Gir and had requested the authorities that his wife be appointed as Mohtmim of the temple and the property attached with it. It has been observed by the Collector that plaintiff had set up a will in favour of his wife on behalf of Shankar Gir and had requested the authorities that his wife be appointed as Mohtmim of the temple and the property attached with it. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that this shows the conduct of the appellant, who on one pretext or the other wanted to grab the suit property for his own purpose, which is being used by the general public by properly constituted committee by the District Administration. 30. On the one hand, before the revenue authorities, stand was taken by the appellant that Shankar Gir executed a will in favour of his wife, who happens to be daughter of Shankar Gir and in those proceedings, he had requested the authorities that she should be appointed as Mohtmim of the temple and the property attached to it, and on the other hand, surprisingly, in the civil suit he has taken a somersault. He has admitted while making deposition that Shankar Gir was not his real father-in-law rather his wife is daughter of brother of Shankar Gir. Such conflicting claims have rightly been taken care of by the learned courts below and it reveals that on one pretext or other, the plaintiff wants to grab the suit property which is being used by the general public for their worship and religious affairs. 31. The learned courts below have rightly disbelieved document, Ext. PW3/A, therefore, findings as returned by the courts below on this aspect are legal, valid and sustainable. The learned courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that since after the death of Shankar Gir there was no one to worship at the temple, therefore, local people of the area vide their resolution made request to the Collector, Kangra, to constitute an appropriate committee for running day to day affairs of the temple and such request was considered by the Collector and the SDM (Civil) Kangra after holding enquiry submitted his report with the recommendations of names of Managing Committee to the Collector, Kangra. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out as to how and under what circumstances said orders are bad in the eyes of law. On a pointed query, learned counsel for the appellant has failed to answer as to which provision of law has been violated. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out as to how and under what circumstances said orders are bad in the eyes of law. On a pointed query, learned counsel for the appellant has failed to answer as to which provision of law has been violated. 33. The oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties would go to show that the plaintiff/appellant has halfheartedly taken the plea of custom in the proceedings and even perusal of the plaint also shows that ingredients of custom have not been made out therein. 34. The Hon’ble Supreme court has repeatedly held that the custom has to be specifically pleaded and proved and it is well known that a custom commands legitimacy not by an authority of law formed by the State rather from the public acceptance and acknowledgement. A custom, in order to be binding, must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law, but the English rule that "a custom in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary" should not be strictly applied to Indian condition. All that is necessary to prove is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of a particular locality". 35. As per the settled law, under Section 3(a) the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 Act, the following ingredients are necessary for establishing a valid custom- a. Continuity. b. Certainty. c. Long usage. d. And reasonability. 36. As customs, when pleaded are mostly at variance with the general law, they should be strictly proved. Generally, there is a presumption that law prevails and when the claim of custom is against such general presumption, then, whoever sets up the plea of existence of any custom has to discharge the onus of proving it, with all its requisites to the satisfaction of the Court in a most clear and unambiguous manner. It must be shown that the alleged custom has the characteristics of a genuine custom viz., that it is accepted willfully as having force of law, and is not a mere practice more or less common. It must be shown that the alleged custom has the characteristics of a genuine custom viz., that it is accepted willfully as having force of law, and is not a mere practice more or less common. The acts required for the establishment of customary law ought to be plural, uniform and constant. 37. Custom evolves by conduct, and it is therefore a mistake to measure its validity solely by the element of express sanction accorded by courts of law. The characteristic of the great majority of customs is that they are essentially non- litigious in origin. They arise not from any conflict of rights adjusted, but from practices prompted by the convenience of society. A judicial decision recognizing a custom may be relevant, but these are not indispensable for its establishment. When a custom is to be proved by judicial notice, the relevant test would be to see if the custom has been acted upon by a court of superior or coordinate jurisdiction in the same jurisdiction to the extent that justifies the court, which is asked to apply it. In the instant case at hand, there is no pleading or proof which could justify the standards as required. 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ratanlal alias Babulal Chunilal Samsuka vs. Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka (dead) through legal representatives, (2018) 11 SCC 119 has held as under:- “16. It would not be out of context to observe certain judicial decisions which throw some light on the issue raised in this case instant. In Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad, ILR (1910) 32 AII 247, the Privy Council held that- "The custom alleged in the pleading was this: "Among the Jains Adoption is no religious ceremony. and under the law or custom there is no restriction of age or marriage among them." And that appears to be the custom found by the High Court to exist. But upon the agreement before their Lordships it was strenuously contended that the evidence in the present case, limited as it is to a comparatively small number of centers of Jain population, was insufficient to establish a custom so wide as this, and that no narrower custom was either alleged or proved. In their Lordships' opinion there is great weight in these criticisms, enough to make the present case an unsatisfactory precedent if in any future instance fuller evidence regarding the alleged custom should be forthcoming". 17. In their Lordships' opinion there is great weight in these criticisms, enough to make the present case an unsatisfactory precedent if in any future instance fuller evidence regarding the alleged custom should be forthcoming". 17. In Sheokuarbai vs. Jeoraj, AIR 1921 PC 77 , Privy Council observed that, among the Sitambari Jains the widow of a son less Jain can legally adopt to him a son without any express or implied authority from her deceased husband to make an adoption, and the adopted son may at the time of his adoption be a grown-up and married man. The only ceremony to the validity of such an adoption is the giving and taking of the adopted son. 18. It is very much evident that the appellant in this case has failed to produce any evidence to prove that such practice has attained the status of general custom prevalent among the concerned community. Custom, on which the appellant is relying, is a matter of proof and cannot be based on a priori reasoning or logical and analogical deductions, as sought to be canvassed by the appellant herein. Hence the issue is answered against the appellant.” 39. In Civil Appeal No. 9537/2025, titled as Ram Charan vs. Sukhram, decided on 17.07.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 13. Since the Hindu Law has no application, the next possibility to be considered is that of the application of the custom. For the application of a custom to be shown, it has to be proved, but it was not in the present case. In fact, the Courts below proceeded, in our view, with an assumption in mind and that assumption was misplaced. The point of inception regarding the discussion of customs was at the exclusion stage, meaning thereby that they assumed there to be an exclusionary custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to any inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove otherwise. An alternate scenario was also possible where not exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the defendants then could have been asked to show that women were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law, which has no place in the present case. 40. An alternate scenario was also possible where not exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the defendants then could have been asked to show that women were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law, which has no place in the present case. 40. As observed above, perusal of the material available on record does not substantiate and corroborate the case of the plaintiff because neither in the pleadings there is any elaboration of custom nor in the evidence any concrete evidence has been led to demonstrate that there was custom, as alleged, thus the plaintiff has failed to plead or prove plea of custom in view of the parameters as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the pronouncements (supra). 41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on limited grounds such as - (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not case in hand and thus suffice it to refer to one of the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh vs. Lehna Singh, 2019 (7) SCC 641 , wherein it was held as under: “13.1. The suspicious circumstances which were considered by the learned Trial Court are narrated/stated hereinabove. On reappreciation of evidence on record and after dealing with each alleged suspicious circumstances, which were dealt with by the learned Trial Court, the First Appellate Court by giving cogent reasons held the Will genuine and consequently did not agree with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. However, in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court, by impugned judgment and order has interfered with the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and not first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal. 14. xxx xxx xxx 15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in re- appreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 14. xxx xxx xxx 15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in re- appreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which were on re appreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the First Appellate Court in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the First Appellate Court. First Appellate Court dealt with, in detail, the socalled suspicious circumstance which weighed with the learned Trial Court and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the Will, which as such was a registered Will, was genuine and do not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC. 15.1 As observed hereinabove and as held by this Court in a catena of decisions and even as per Section 100 CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the second appeal under Section 100 CPC is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law. On going through the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the High Court while deciding the second appeal, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. The substantial questions of law framed by the High Court are as under : “(i) Whether the Appellate Court can reverse the findings recorded by the learned trial court without adverting to the specific finding of the trial Court? (ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence?” The aforesaid cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. (ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence?” The aforesaid cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, decision of this Court in the case of Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , is required to be referred to. 16. xxx xxx xxx 17. Therefore, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, as, as observed hereinabove, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction, while allowing the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 18. xxx xxx xxx 19. Before parting with the present judgment, we remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below and/or the First Appellate Court and if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in the case of Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini, (2009) 5 SCC 264 , despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Courts under Section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law. 20. Therefore, we are constrained to observe as above and remind the High Courts the limitations under Section 100 of the CPC and again hope that High Courts would keep in mind the legal position before interfering in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 42. 20. Therefore, we are constrained to observe as above and remind the High Courts the limitations under Section 100 of the CPC and again hope that High Courts would keep in mind the legal position before interfering in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 42. On perusal of the impugned judgments and decrees, this court is of the opinion that the same are valid, legal and sustainable in the eyes of law and no interference of any kind is required in the same. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 43. In view of aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated hereinabove, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.