Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 16600 (HP)

Ayush Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2026-03-24

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 02 of 2026, dated 05.01.2026, registered at Police Station Sainj, District Kullu, H.P, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 103(1), 115 (2) and 117(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant Rajesh Sharma had attended a Bhandara in the Kutiya of Chetan Giri Baba on 04.01.2026. Ayush @ Vishisht Giri Baba (the petitioner) pushed the informant, who fell and sustained injuries to his head. The victim was taken to AIIMS Bilaspur, where he died on 10.01.2026. The allegations against the petitioner are false. As per the report of the post-mortem examination, the death was caused by the head injury and the complications consequent upon blunt force impact. The allegations, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103(1) of the BNS. The prosecution asserted that there was a dispute between the petitioner’s grandmother, Tara Devi and the Sainj Valley Taxi Union. The petitioner has no concern with any dispute, as he has renounced the world in the year 2020 and has become a monk. The petitioner has no criminal antecedents. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim, Rajesh Sharma, made a complaint to the police that he and Ayush @ Vishisht Giri Baba (the petitioner) had attended a Bhandara in the Kutiya of Chetan Giri Baba at Sainj on 04.01.2026. The petitioner pushed the victim, and he sustained an injury to the head. An action should be taken against the petitioner. The medical examination of the victim was conducted, and grievous injury was found. The police investigated the matter. The victim subsequently succumbed to his injuries on 10.01.2026. As per the report of post-mortem examination, the death was caused by a head injury and complications consequent upon blunt force impact. No other FIR was registered against the petitioner. The experts from RFSL visited the spot but did not find any blood stains or other evidence on the spot. The petitioner subsequently identified the spot where the incident had taken place. No other FIR was registered against the petitioner. The experts from RFSL visited the spot but did not find any blood stains or other evidence on the spot. The petitioner subsequently identified the spot where the incident had taken place. He also produced the clothes worn by him at the time of the incident. The petitioner’s DNA was not found on the clothes of the deceased. The victim was an advisor of the Sainj Valley Taxi Union. The petitioners' grandmother, Tara Devi and the Sainj Valley Taxi Union had a dispute over the land. FIR’s were registered in the year 2020 at the instance of Sainj Valley Taxi Union and Tara Devi. A civil dispute was also pending before the learned Civil Judge, Banjaar. The petitioner had deliberately attacked the victim. The petitioner has become a monk, and he would not attend the hearing if released on bail. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. Even if the allegations of the FIR are considered to be correct, no case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103(2) of BNS is made out. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgments of this Court in State of H.P. vs. ABC 2026:HHC:32 and Jitender Kumar etc vs. State of H.P. 2024:HHC:687 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner’s grandmother and Sainj Valley Taxi Union had a dispute over the land. The petitioner had pushed the victim due to this dispute. The petitioner would not attend the trial if released on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner had pushed the informant, and he fell. He was taken to the hospital, and the doctor found that he had sustained grievous injuries. In Jani Gulab Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 1970 SCC (Cri) 532, the accused abused the deceased, who was intoxicated. The deceased fell with his face towards the sky. He became unconscious and subsequently died. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the accused cannot be posted with the knowledge that death was likely to result in the circumstances, because it is very rare that a person falling on the road dies. It was observed at page 535: “6. He became unconscious and subsequently died. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the accused cannot be posted with the knowledge that death was likely to result in the circumstances, because it is very rare that a person falling on the road dies. It was observed at page 535: “6. We are unable to agree with the High Court that the ac- cused must be posted with the knowledge that death was likely to result in the circumstances in which the injuries were caused by him to the deceased. It is very rare that if a man is pushed and he falls on the road, the occipital bone gets fractured. Here, it is perhaps due to the drunken con- dition of the deceased that while falling, he could not avoid his skull falling on the road. At any rate, in our opinion, it is difficult to impute knowledge to the accused that death was likely to result from the push he is alleged to have given. 7. If he is not guilty under Section 304, Part II, he cannot be convicted under Section 325, because no grievous injury has been inflicted by the accused. There is no evidence to show that Injury (iii) in Column 19 was grievous.” 12. This judgment was followed in ABC (supra). 13. Therefore, even if the allegations in the FIR are taken to be correct, they do not prima facie show the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103(1) of BNS. The police have also added Section 115(2) and 117(2), both of which are bailable in nature. Thus, the further detention of the petitioner is not justified. 14. It was submitted that the petitioner’s grandmother and the Sainj Valley Taxi Union had a dispute over the land, and the petitioner had pushed the informant because of the dispute. This submission will not help the State. The offence would not be made out because of the enmity when knowledge cannot be prima facie attributed to the petitioner. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner has renounced the world, and he would not attend the trial. This apprehension can be removed by imposing the condition, and it is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner. 16. The offence would not be made out because of the enmity when knowledge cannot be prima facie attributed to the petitioner. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner has renounced the world, and he would not attend the trial. This apprehension can be removed by imposing the condition, and it is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner. 16. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 17. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 18. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of District Jail Kullu, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 19. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.