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2026 DAILYLAW 166 (ALL)

UNION OF INDIA AND 3 OTHERS v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ALLAHABAD BENCH AND ANOTHER

WRIA/3601/2026 · 2026-03-23

Arun Bhansali, Kshitij Shailendra

body2026

Judgment text

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT - A No. - 3601 of 2026 Chief Justice's Court HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J. 1. This petition is directed against the order dated 12.12.2025 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad whereby the Original Application ('OA') filed by the respondent has been allowed and order impugned dated 12.03.2020 has been quashed, all the withdrawals of promotions and re-fixation of pay were set aside and the petitioners have been directed to refund the recovered amount with admissible interest, to release all the withheld retiral dues within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. 2. The OA was filed aggrieved of the orders dated 12.03.2020, 16.07.2020 and 01.10.2020 and seeking a direction to refund the recovered amount of Rs. 17,92,741/- along with interest, to restore the promotions and pass such other order as may be deemed fit. 3. It was averred in the application that the respondent was recruited on 20.08.1982 to the post of Hindi Translator. On 02.05.1997, the respondent, on her request, was transferred from Bhopal to Gwalior in another cadre, i.e., Telecom Office Assistant ('TOA') in lower pay scale. The respondent was transferred with the condition that she would complete training at her own cost and period of training shall be covered by her permissible leave, then fixation of pay will be done. It was alleged that the respondent was not sent for the aforesaid training and was sent for one month training on 14.10.1998 before confirmation on the post of TOA and was promoted as Senior TOA on officiating basis. She was confirmed in terms of DPC held on 16.03.2020 Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Anjali Upadhya, Eshita Sand Counsel for Respondent(s) : Nitin Pant, Satya Prakash Pandey Union of India and 3 others .....Petitioner(s) Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench and another .....Respondent(s) and later on, she was permanently absorbed in cadre of TOA (General) by order dated 16.12.2001. Subsequently, the respondent was transferred from Gwalior to Jhansi on 11.11.2005 on bottom seniority. She was granted two promotions/upgradation on completion of 16 years and 26 years of regular service by office orders dated 02.03.2009 and 16.03.2019. The BSNL introduced Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019, wherein the respondent applied on 11.11.2019. The Assistant General Manager (Admn.) required proof of training in the year 1997 from the respondent and as she was never sent for training, she could not submit any document in this regard. 4. The respondent was voluntarily retired on 31.01.2020. Whereafter on 12.03.2020 a letter was issued on behalf of General Manger withdrawing all promotions since 1997 and recovery was ordered for the alleged over payment made since 1997 up to the date of retirement. The respondent sent a reply to the letter, which was replied on 26.05.2020. It was indicated that the petitioners have not paid a single penny after voluntary retirement and they have recovered the alleged over payment from the ex-gratia and leave encashment and have required the respondent to deposit Rs. 3,89,690/- over and above the said amount. It was prayed that the orders be set aside. 5. The petitioners filed reply, inter alia, indicating that the respondent was transferred from the cadre of Hindi Translator to TOA on the condition that she would undergo 90 days' mandatory training at her own cost and by taking permissible leave but she never completed or requested for this training and concealed this fact from the controlling officers. It was submitted that the said aspect was detected by the verification team during the VRS, 2019 scrutiny wherein in writing the respondent admitted the fact of not undergoing mandatory training, consequently, her last pay was re- fixed, leading to an over payment of Rs. 21,82,431/- of which Rs. 17,92,741/- was recovered from her VRS benefits. 6. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the action of the petitioners qua the respondent, who belonged to a Class-III cadre and has retired under duly accepted VRS scheme was arbitrary, illegal and hit by law laid down in State of Punjab and others Vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others : (2015) 4 SCC 334 and, consequently, passed the order as noticed hereinbefore. WRIA No. 3601 of 2026 2 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners made vehement submissions that case of the respondent was not governed by judgment in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra) and in fact was governed by the judgment in the case of High Court of Punjab and Haryana and others Vs. Jagdev Singh : (2016) 14 SCC 267 and, therefore, the order impugned deserves to be set aside. Submissions were made that when the respondent was transferred from cadre of Hindi Translator to cadre of TOA, specific stipulation was made whereby she was required to undergo training and that she would seek leave for that purpose. Admittedly, she did not undergo any training and once the training was not undertaken, as required, all the consequential promotions given to her were rightly withdrawn and, therefore, the order impugned deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. Counsel for respondent supported the order impugned. Submissions were made that the case is squarely covered by the judgment in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra) and the judgment in the case of Jagdev Singh (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case, as in the said case, a specific undertaking was filed permitting recovery of amount. Submissions were made that for over 23 years, the lack of training was not noticed by the petitioners and at no stage, the respondent has either misrepresented or asserted that she has undergone training and therefore, the action of the petitioners has rightly been quashed by the Tribunal and does not call for any interference. 9. We have considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 10. A specific query was put to the counsel for the petitioners as to whether it is the case of the petitioners that the respondent, despite not undergoing the training as stipulated, ever represented that she has undergone training and/or refused to undergo training if the same was offered to her as admittedly the training was to be imparted by the department, to which learned counsel fairly indicated that the same was not the case, neither any suppression was made nor a wrong assertion regarding undergoing training was made and that there was no material to indicate that she refused to undergo the training. 11. It is surprising to notice that the fact that the training was required to be WRIA No. 3601 of 2026 3 imparted/undertaken was known to the petitioners all through and at various stages the respondent's case was dealt with while confirming her as TOA, granting her promotion as Senior TOA and thereafter granting her ACPs at the completion of 16 and 26 years of service, however no objection about lack of training was raised and it is only at the stage of granting her retiral benefits under VRS Scheme, 2019 after accepting her prayer for voluntary retirement that the purported lack of training was realized and apparently without caring for the law, as it exists, the benefits granted for over a period of 23 years were withdrawn and instead of granting retiral benefits to the respondent, forfeiting all dues, a recovery was ordered. 12. The law in this regard is well settled as in Rafiq Masih (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while it is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship where payments have mistakenly been made by an employer, in the following situations, a recovery by the employer would be impermissible in law: “(i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group C and Group D service). (ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.” 13. Clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) would squarely apply to the present case wherein respondent is a Class-III employee, the recovery is sought to be made from a retired employee, the alleged excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years and the respondent allegedly has wrongly been required to discharge duties of a higher post and has been paid accordingly, even though she was required to work against an inferior post. 14. So far as the judgment in the case of Jagdev Singh (supra) is WRIA No. 3601 of 2026 4 concerned, a perusal of the said judgment reveals that in the said case, the pay fixation was granted under the Rules, wherein each officer was required to submit an undertaking that any excess which may be found to have been paid will be refunded to the Government either by adjustment against future payments due or otherwise, based on which undertaking, Hon'ble Supreme Court distinguished the judgment in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra) and came to the conclusion that as the officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale, he was bound by the said undertaking. 15. However, in the present case, it is not the case of the petitioners that any undertaking at any stage was given by the respondent and, therefore, the said judgment, apparently, has no application. 16. In view of the above discussion, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the action of the petitioners was not justified and was contrary to the law, which finding cannot be faulted. 17. Consequently, there is no substance in the writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. 18. As the Tribunal has ordered for refund of the recovered amount with admissible interest and release all withheld retiral dues within three months from the date of receipt of the order, the requisite may now be done within a period of two months from the date of this order. March 24, 2026 P.Sri. WRIA No. 3601 of 2026 5 (Kshitij Shailendra,J.) (Arun Bhansali,CJ.) Digitally signed by :- PUNEET SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad