JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 09/2016, dated 03.04.2016, under Sections 411 and 120-B of IPC, registered at police Station, State CID Bharari, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings i.e. Corruption Case No.11 of 2019, titled State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Vinay Sharma and others, having CNR No. HPS1010033292019, pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh insofar as it relates to the petitioner. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, are that the case, as detailed hereinabove, was registered at police Station, State CID, Bharari, Shimla, on the inquiry report of Sub-Inspector Rupinder Kumar, In-charge CID, Crime Unit Nahan, District Sirmour, Himachal Pradesh, having title as “Report regarding criminal involvement/conspiracy of the Officers/officials and management of Indian Technomac Company Limited, Jagatpur, Paonta Sahib, Sirmour and officials of Electricity, Industries and Excise, whereby it came to be recommended that FIR be registered against the persons, named in the FIR. Inquiry report has reference of two letters written by ASI Raghubir Singh, In-charge State CID, sub unit, Paonta Sahib, wherein it is mentioned that the Indian Technomac Company Limited, Jagatpur, Paonta Sahib, was seized by the Excise and Taxation Department, Sirmour, for default in payment of VAT amounting to Rs. 2100 crores and the management of the company had also connived with the employees of the Excise & Taxation Department posted in District Sirmour and illegally removed material and scrap weighing 40 tons, valuing Rs.50.00 lakh from the company premises during period of attachment. It also came to be alleged that company management had sold machinery worth Rs.10/15 lakh during the attachment period with the connivance of the officers/officials of Excise and Taxation Department. On 07.03.2015, a truck bearing registration No. HP-17-B-6824, loaded with scrap and cut pieces belonging to Indian Technomac Company Limited, was caught at Jamniwala nakka by the State CID Sub Unit, Paonta Sahib. On 07.03.2015, a truck bearing registration No. HP-17-B-6824, loaded with scrap and cut pieces belonging to Indian Technomac Company Limited, was caught at Jamniwala nakka by the State CID Sub Unit, Paonta Sahib. Since driver of the truck could not produce any documents of loaded material, ETI, Deepak was deputed at the spot by the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner (AETC), Sirmour, but he failed to take any legal action in the matter till date. 3. It also came to be alleged that electric motors of different capacities, worth lakhs, have already been sold from the company. Copper cables of three furnaces weighing 50/60 tons, had been sold for Rs.2.5 crores against its actual cost of Rs.25-30 crores and only 100-120 Kgs of aluminium scrap was left in the company in place of 40 tons of aluminium scrap. In the aforesaid background, FIR, as detailed hereinabove, came to be lodged against the petitioner as well as other accused. 4. Precisely, the case against the petitioner, as detailed in the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.(available at page 50 of the paper book) reads as under:- “During the course of investigation, witness Rajinder Kumar, the then Supervisor ITCOL has disclosed removal of 6 Trucks of Copper/Scrap from company premises to the scrap yard of Suleman in his statement recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C, however evidence related to movement/removal of only three trucks of Ms Scrap/Copper is established so far. These trucks were company owned trucks and were driven by the company driver. The statement of driver u/s 161 Cr.P.C and recovery of bills from the scrap dealer has established the movement of the scrap. The movement of these trucks was in the active knowledge of Director Vinay Sharma, GM(P) Trilochan Biswal, Deputy General Manager(Account) Vivek Gupta and Excise Authorities as Excise Peons were deputed round the clock at the company gate under the closed supervision of ETO concerned. These trucks were unloaded at the yard of Scrap dealer Suleman. One such truck loaded with scrap out of these three trucks was caught by the CID Unit Paonta on 07.03.15. Payment in lieu of sale of these trucks was given in the form of cheques. The details of the Bills, cheques indicate transaction dates after the attachment of the company with Excise & Taxation department and as such no permission was taken from the senior Excise authorities before movement of these trucks. Payment in lieu of sale of these trucks was given in the form of cheques. The details of the Bills, cheques indicate transaction dates after the attachment of the company with Excise & Taxation department and as such no permission was taken from the senior Excise authorities before movement of these trucks. The local Excise authorities also failed in lodging any complaint against the company on the instance of removal of truck loaded with scrap without due permission. Accused Suleman s/O Furkan Ahmed, R/o Mirzapur pole, District Saharanpur, UP at present scrap dealer, Jamniwala road, Paonta Sahib, HP was arrested on 17.11.18 for the offences under Sections 411, 120-B IPC. As per the disclosure of the accused Suleman, final receivers of the scrap have been identified and their statements have also been recorded.” 5. One witness, Sh. Rajinder Kumar, the then Supervisor of the company, disclosed removal of six trucks of copper/scrap from the company premises to the scrap yard of petitioner Suleman, in his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. However, evidences related to movement/removal of only three trucks of MS Scrap/Copper has been established so far. The movement of the trucks was in the active knowledge of the Director, Vinay Sharma, GM (P), Trilochan Biswal, Deputy General Manager (Account), Vivek Gupta and Excise authorities as Excise Peons were deputed round the clock at the company gate under the closed supervision of ETO concerned. The trucks were unloaded in the yard of scrap dealer Suleman. The payment in lieu of sale of these trucks, was given in the form of cheques. The details of the bills, cheques indicate transaction dates after the attachment of the company with Excise & Taxation Department as such, no permission was taken from the Senior Excise authorities before movement of these trucks. Though, it is evident from prosecution case that petitioner, being a scrap dealer, made payment qua the scrap purchased by him through cheques, but since scrap was sold after attachment of the company, he has been also made an accused under Section 411 and 120-B IPC. 6. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior counsel representing the petitioner, is that no case, much less under Sections 411 and 120-B of IPC, is made out against the petitioner. 6. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior counsel representing the petitioner, is that no case, much less under Sections 411 and 120-B of IPC, is made out against the petitioner. Learned Senior counsel representing the petitioner vehemently argued that when it is apparent from the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C that there was no connivance, if any, of the petitioner with the officials of Excise Department and in lieu of purchase of scrap, he had issued cheques in the name of the company, there was no occasion, if any, to implicate the petitioner in the FIR, as detailed hereinabove. 7. While referring to the role of Sh. R.D. Janartha, AETC, Sirmour( as detailed in final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C), learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that afore Officer himself granted permission vide letter dated 07.07.2014 to sell the scrap, whereafter petitioner, being a scrap dealer, purchased the scrap and made due payment to the company. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that once there is no charge of theft under Section 378 IPC, there is no occasion, if any, to register a case under Section 411 IPC. He submitted that once scrap was purchased pursuant to permission granted by the competent authority, petitioner cannot be said to have purchased stolen property within the meaning of Section 411 IPC. He stated that since no case is made out under Section 411 IPC, no case otherwise could have been registered under Section 120-B IPC i.e. criminal conspiracy. 8. Per contra, Mr. Anish Banshtu, learned Deputy Advocate General, though fairly admitted factum with regard to issuance of letter dated 07.07.2014 by AETC, Sirmour, whereby he gave permission regarding sale/ removal of scrap out of the company, but submitted that afore officer had connived with the petitioner as well as other officers and sold scrap at throwaway price. He submitted that letter dated 07.07.2014 passed by AETC, Sirmaur was against the directions issued by the Commissioner, Excise & Taxation Department, Shimla, whereby entire property of the company was ordered to be attached. However, learned Deputy Advocate General was unable to produce copy of the order of attachment, if any issued by the Commissioner, Excise and Taxation. He submitted that letter dated 07.07.2014 passed by AETC, Sirmaur was against the directions issued by the Commissioner, Excise & Taxation Department, Shimla, whereby entire property of the company was ordered to be attached. However, learned Deputy Advocate General was unable to produce copy of the order of attachment, if any issued by the Commissioner, Excise and Taxation. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submitted that once property, which came to be sold as scrap, was under the entrustment of AETC, Sirmour and fraudulently he in connivance of the petitioner and other persons sold the same at throwaway prices, a case under Section 409 and 410 of IPC is made out against the Excise Officials. While referring to Sections 409 and 410 of IPC, learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that any misappropriation of property entrusted to official amounts to “stolen property”, hence no illegality can be said to have been committed by the investigating agency, while booking petitioner under Sections 411 and 120-B of IPC. He further submitted that otherwise also, present petition is not maintainable because prima facie FIR discloses offences under aforesaid provisions of law and at this stage, Court, while exercising power under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, cannot go into the evidentiary value of the evidence proposed to be led on record. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 10. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it necessary to discuss /elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. 11. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC (now Section 528 of BNSS) is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 12. 12. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC( now Section 528 of BNSS) laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC ( now Section 528 of BNSS), again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , relying upon its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , reiterated that High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC ( now Section 528 of BNSS), to quash the proceedings against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC( now Section 528 of BNSS), Court exercising such power must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. Besides above, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held that material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. Besides above, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held that material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C ( now Section 528 of BNSS) to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330 , paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 14. It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC( now Section 528 of BNSS) can proceed to quash the proceedings. 15. Hon’ble Apex Court in case tilted Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210 , has held that abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation and as such, the abuse of law or miscarriage of justice can be rectified by the court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC( now Section 528 of BNSS). The relevant paras of the judgment are as under: 16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 Cr. P.C and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as follows:- “482. The relevant paras of the judgment are as under: 16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 Cr. P.C and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as follows:- “482. Saving of inherent power of the High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court ( G. Sagar Suri and Anr. V. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 (para 7), Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 (para 20). Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.” 16. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 SCC 608 , has elaborated the scope of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, the relevant para whereof reads as under:- “7. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal5, this Court observed. “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.” 8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court’s extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court’s hands in the face of future injustices. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court’s extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court’s hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal6 conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted that quashing may be appropriate where, (2007) 12 SCC 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 “102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). …….… (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC3100 (“Dhruvaram Sonar”) : “13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.” 17. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.” 17. Aforesaid law, clearly stipulates that court can exercise power under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( now Section 528 of BNSS), to quash criminal proceedings, in cases, where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 18. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case. 19. Admittedly, in the case at hand, petitioner, namely Suleman, is a scrap dealer and he had been purchasing scrap from Technomac Company in past also. It is not in dispute, rather clearly emerges from the final report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C that vide letter dated 07.07.2014, Sh. R.D. Janartha, AETC, Sirmour granted permission regarding sale/ removal of the scrap out of the company and pursuant to afore permission, allegedly three trucks of copper/scrap from the company premises were sent to the scrap yard of Suleman. The movement of aforesaid trucks was in the active knowledge of the Director, Vinay Sharma, GM(P) Trilochan Biswal, Deputy General Manager(Accounts) Vivek Gupta and Excise authorities as Excise Peons were deputed around the clock at the Company Gate under the closed supervision of ETO concerned. Aforesaid trucks were unloaded at the yard of scrap dealer Suleman. One truck loaded with scrap, out of these three trucks, was caught by the CID unit Paonta on 07.03.2015. It is admitted case of the prosecution that payment, in lieu of sale of these trucks, was given in the form of cheques. Allegedly, details of the bills, cheques indicate transaction dates after the attachment of the company with the Excise & Taxation Department. In nutshell, the case of the prosecution is that no permission was taken from the Senior Excise authority before movement of these trucks. Allegedly, details of the bills, cheques indicate transaction dates after the attachment of the company with the Excise & Taxation Department. In nutshell, the case of the prosecution is that no permission was taken from the Senior Excise authority before movement of these trucks. Local Excise authorities failed in lodging any complaint against the company qua the instance of removal of truck loaded with scrap without due permission. 20. As has been taken note hereinabove, Sh. R.D. Janartha, who at the relevant time remained posted as AETC, Sirmour w.e.f. 06.06.2012 to 15.06.2015, issued communication dated 07.07.2014, thereby granting permission regarding sale/removal of scrap out of the company. The case of the prosecution is that Commissioner, Excise and Taxation, Shimla had issued direction to the office of AETC, Sirmour vide correspondence dated 05.07.2014 to stop movement of material and machinery out of the company premises till the VAT liability was cleared by the company. However, afore officer disclosed to the police during interrogation that directions of the Commissioner (Excise) were with respect to only machinery of the company, whereas permission granted by him relates to sale of scarp. 21. It is quite apparent from the statement of aforesaid Officer, namely R.D. Janartha that he had actually issued permission regarding sale/removal of scrap out of the company and pursuant to such permission trucks were sent to the yard of scrap dealer i.e. petitioner. Since petitioner, being a scrap dealer, purchased scrap pursuant to permission granted by AETC, Sirmour, which fact has been fairly admitted by AETC, Sirmour, coupled with the fact that petitioner made full payment qua the same to the company. Non- compliance of directions, if any, issued by Commissioner(Excise) to stop movement of material and machinery out of the company premises till the VAT liability is cleared by the company may not be sufficient to conclude guilt, if any, of the petitioner under Sections 411 and 120-B IPC. 22. Since during arguments, learned Deputy Advocate General vehemently argued that entire property including scrap was ordered to be attached by the Commissioner(Excise), but yet vide communication dated 07.07.2014, AETC, Sirmour proceeded to grant permission for sale of the scrap to the petitioner, this Court with a view to ascertain correctness of aforesaid claim put forth by learned Deputy Advocate General, directed him to make available copy of order of attachment, if any, issued by the Commissioner (Excise). Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned Deputy Advocate General fairly admitted that no such document is available on record. 23. Though, correspondence dated 05.07.2014 sent by the Commissioner(Excise), Shimla to AETC, Sirmour calling upon him to stop the movement of material and machinery out of the company premises has also not seen light of the day, but even if it is presumed that aforesaid direction was issued, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that AETC, Sirmour was called upon not to make movement of material and machinery out of the company, whereas he proceeded to grant permission with regard to movement of scrap. 24. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 411 IPC, which reads as under:- “ Section 411: Dishonestly receiving Stolen property: Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 25. As per aforesaid provision of law, whosoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both. To invoke aforesaid provisions of law, prosecution is under obligation to prove that person, who charged with aforesaid provision of law, dishonestly received the stolen property and he had reason to believe the same to be stolen property. 26. Admittedly, in the case at hand, petitioner purchased scrap pursuant to permission granted by AETC, Sirmour vide letter dated 07.07.2014 and thereafter trucks of scrap were loaded under the supervision of officials of Excise Department. Moreover, in lieu of scrap sent pursuant to letter dated 07.07.2014, petitioner, being a scrap dealer, made entire payment by cheques. There is nothing to suggests that petitioner, being a scrap dealer, had any knowledge that AETC, Sirmour has no authority to sell scrap, if it is so, petitioner could not have been prosecuted under the aforesaid provision of law. 27. There is nothing to suggests that petitioner, being a scrap dealer, had any knowledge that AETC, Sirmour has no authority to sell scrap, if it is so, petitioner could not have been prosecuted under the aforesaid provision of law. 27. Though, at this stage, learned Deputy Advocate General invited attention of this Court to Section 405 IPC, wherein criminal breach of trust has been defined, to state that whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, shall be deemed to have been committed criminal breach of trust. He submitted that since officials of Excise Department were entrusted with property with the scrap alongwith other machinery and they without there being any authority sold the same to the petitioner that property is deemed to be stolen property, if it is so, petitioner herein rightly came to be booked under Section 411 of IPC. Though, aforesaid argument raised by learned Deputy Advocate General appears to be correct and attractive, but may not be applicable in the case at hand for the reason that AETC, Sirmour was guardian of the property, but he himself vide letter dated 07.07.2014 authorized sale of the scrap pursuant to which, six trucks of scrap came to be sent to the scrap yard of the petitioner, who thereafter made full payment qua the same by way of cheques. Whether above named Sh. R.D. Janartha, the then AETC, Sirmour had any authority to sell scrap to the scrap dealer, is a question to be decided in totality of evidence collected on record against aforesaid officer, but certainly having noticed letter dated 07.07.2014, coupled with the statement of aforesaid officer that the Commissioner(Exercise) had only issued direction with regard to material and machinery of the company and there was no direction with regard to scrap, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that no case muchless under Sections 411 of IPC is made out against the petitioner, who otherwise in bona fide belief that orders with regard to sale of scrap has been made by AETC, Sirmour, proceeded to purchase the scrap and thereafter, made entire payment through cheques. 28. 28. Similarly, a case under Section 120-B IPC is not made out against the petitioner. Criminal conspiracy has been defined under Section 120-A IPC, which provides that when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy. However, in the instant case, no material, worth credence, has been led on record to suggests agreement, if any, interse petitioner as well as co-accused to do an illegal act or an act which is not legal by illegal means, rather petitioner pursuant to permission granted by AETC, Sirmour, purchased the scrap and made full payment. Once there is no evidence with regard to agreement to do an illegal act interse petitioner and AETC, Sirmour, no case can be said to be made out against the petitioner under Section 120-B of IPC. 29. In view of the discussion made hereinabove as well as material adduced on record alongwith the challan filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that no case much less under Sections 411and 120-B of IPC is made out against the petitioner and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in continuation of trial against the petitioner under the aforesaid provisions of law, rather continuation of the same besides causing mental agony to the petitioner would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. 30. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No. 09/2016, dated 03.04.2016, under Sections 411, 120-B of IPC, registered at police Station, State CID Bharari, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings i.e. Corruption Case No.11 of 2019, titled State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Vinay Sharma and others having CNR No. HPS1010033292019, pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh, are quashed and set aside qua the petitioner-accused and he is acquitted of the offences alleged in the FIR. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.