JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.07.2022, passed by learned Special Judge, Chamba, HP (learned Trial Court) in Sessions Trial No. 673 of 2018, vide which the appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1984 (NDPS Act) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight years, pay a fine of Rs. 80,000/- (Rs. Eighty Thouand only), and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act. It was asserted that S.I. Babu Ram (PW-5), HHC Manohar Lal (PW-2), Constable Sunila Kumar (PW-3) and Constable Dalip Kumar (not examined) had set up a naka near Dunali on Chamba-Bharmour road on 03.04.2017 at about 4.00 P.M. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-73-6672 came from Chamba, which was signalled to stop. The driver identified himself as Ramesh Kumar (PW-1). When the police were checking the documents of the vehicle the accused came from Dunali towards Chamba carrying a backpack. The accused returned after seeing the police. The police became suspicious. He fell while running, and the police apprehended him. He identified himself as Paras Ram. The police checked the carry bag and recovered a purple carry bag containing 800 grams of charas. The police put the charas in a cloth parcel, and sealed the parcel with six impressions of seal ‘SB’. NCB-I form (Ex. PW5/A) was filled in triplicate, and the seal impression ‘SB’ was put on the NCB-I form. The specimen of seal impression (Ex.PW1/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The seal, after its use, was handed over to Ramesh Kumar. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B), and a copy of the seizure memo was supplied to the accused free of cost. Rukka (Ex.PW3/A) was prepared and sent to the police station, where FIR (Ex.PW14/A) was registered. S.I. Babu Ram (PW5) investigated the matter. The seal, after its use, was handed over to Ramesh Kumar. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B), and a copy of the seizure memo was supplied to the accused free of cost. Rukka (Ex.PW3/A) was prepared and sent to the police station, where FIR (Ex.PW14/A) was registered. S.I. Babu Ram (PW5) investigated the matter. He prepared a spot map (Ex.PW5/B). ASI Mohinder Singh (PW13) further investigated the matter. The documents and the accused were handed over to him vide memo (Ex.PW2/A). ASI Mohinder Singh recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version and arrested the accused. He produced the accused and the cloth parcel before Inspector/SHO Dharam Singh (PW-14), who checked the seals and resealed the parcel with five impressions of seal “BH”. He obtained the specimen of seal ‘BH’ (Ex.PW14/C) on a separate piece of cloth and the NCB-I form. He handed over the seal to H.C. Chaman Lal (PW-15) after its use. He prepared the resealing memo (Ex.PW 6/A) and handed over the case property and the documents to H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW- 6), who made the entry in the malkhana register at serial No. 64 (Ex.PW6/B) and deposited the parcel in the malkhana. On 05.04.2017, he handed over the cloth parcel, a sample of seal and NCB-I forms to HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-12) with directions to carry them to SFSL, Junga vide R.C. No. 28/2017 (Ex.PW6/C). HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-12) deposited all the articles in safe condition with SFSL, Junga and handed over the receipt to H.C. Lucky Kumar on his return. Special report (Ex.PW8/A) was prepared and was handed over to Dy. Superintendent of Police Beer Bahadur, who made the endorsement on the special report and handed it over to HHC Joginder (PW-8), his Reader, who made an entry at serial No. 22 in the receipt register (Ex.PW8/C) and retained the special report on record. The result of the analysis (Ex. PX) was issued, in which it was opined that the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas, which contained 10.88 % w/w purified resin in it. HHC Padam Nath (PW-9) brought the result of the analysis and case property and handed them over to MHC Lucky Kumar, who deposited the case property in Malkhana. He handed over the case property to ASI Ashwani Kumar (PW-11) for certifying the correctness of the inventory. HHC Padam Nath (PW-9) brought the result of the analysis and case property and handed them over to MHC Lucky Kumar, who deposited the case property in Malkhana. He handed over the case property to ASI Ashwani Kumar (PW-11) for certifying the correctness of the inventory. Ashwani Kumar produced the case property and the certificate before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, on 13.10.2017, along with the application (Ex. PW11/A) for drawing the samples of 25 grams each of the case property. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order (Ex.PW11/B) and separated two samples of charas weighing 25 grams each. He sealed the parcel and sample parcel with three seals of impression, CJM Cba, and issued a certificate (Ex.PW11/C). Photographs (Ex.PW11/D-1 to PW11/D-4) of the proceedings were taken. Certificate (Ex. PW11/E) was issued, and a sample of seal (Ex.PW11/F) was prepared on a separate piece of cloth. The case property was deposited with H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6). He handed over the case property to SHO Dharam Singh on 09.02.2018 for destroying the case property. He deposited the empty parcel of the bulk parcel and two sealed parcels with Lucky Kumar, which were sent by him to District Malkhana Chamba vide R.C. No. 137 of 2018 through H.C. Kishan Chand. The statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their version. After completion of the investigation challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 (b) (ii) (B) of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses to prove its case. Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) is the independent witness who has not supported the prosecution’s case. HHC Manohar Lal (PW-2), Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3), Inspector Babu Ram (PW-5), and ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-13) were the members of the police party that had effected the recovery. Constable Raj Kumar (PW4) handed over the special report to Dy. Superintendent of Police, Chamba. H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. H.C. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-7) was working as a Reader to whom the rukka was handed over. HHC Joginder (PW-8) was posted as Reader to Dy. Constable Raj Kumar (PW4) handed over the special report to Dy. Superintendent of Police, Chamba. H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. H.C. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-7) was working as a Reader to whom the rukka was handed over. HHC Joginder (PW-8) was posted as Reader to Dy. Superintendent of Police Headquarters, to whom the special report was handed over. HHC Padam Nath (PW-9) brought the case property and the result from the SFSL, Junga. LHC Upinder Chona (PW10) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Ashwani Kumar (PW-11) produced the case property before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, for certification and taking the samples. Constable Mohinder Singh (PW-12) carried the case property and other articles to SFSL, Junga. Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-14) was posted as SHO, who signed the FIR and resealed the parcel. H.C. Chaman (PW- 15) is the witness to the resealing proceedings. Daleep Kumar (PW-16) was a member of the raiding party. ASI Ashwani Kumar (PW-17) was associated during the process of certification. Joginder Singh (PW-18) developed the photographs of the Court proceedings. Sher Khan (PW-19) developed the photographs and the C.D. H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW- 20) proved the entries in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the witnesses to the recovery were consistent. The statement of an independent witness could not be discarded simply because he was declared hostile. The police had effected a chance recovery, and the non-association of other independent witnesses was not possible. The minor contradictions in the statements of the official witnesses were not sufficient to discredit the prosecution’s case. The statements of the official witnesses could not be discarded because of their status. The procedure as required under the law was followed. Provisions of Sections 52, 55 and 57 were duly complied with. Integrity of the case property was duly established. The report of the analysis proved that the substance recovered on the spot was charas. The defence taken by the accused regarding the false implication was not believable. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 7. Provisions of Sections 52, 55 and 57 were duly complied with. Integrity of the case property was duly established. The report of the analysis proved that the substance recovered on the spot was charas. The defence taken by the accused regarding the false implication was not believable. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal asserting that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony  of  Ramesh  Kumar  (PW-1)  discredited  the prosecution’s case. Arrest memo (Ex. PW13/D) suggests that Payar Singh, the younger brother of the accused, was present on the spot, but he was not associated. Statements of official witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, which made their testimonies doubtful. Statements of Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-14) and MHC Lucky Kumar (PW20) regarding the deposit of the case property were contradicted by malkhana register. There was overwriting in the names of investigating officers in the arrest memo (Ex.PW13/D) and personal search memo (Ex.PW13/C), which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set-aside. 8. I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Karanveer Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 9. Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant/accused, submitted that the statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The prosecution had not complied with the requirements of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act, which is fatal to the prosecution’s case. The abstract of malkhana register made the prosecution’s case doubtful. There was no entry of taking the case property to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for certification of the inventory. The Inventory proceedings were also not conducted properly by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The independent witness had also not supported the prosecution’s case. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful, and the learned Trial Court had erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. The independent witness had also not supported the prosecution’s case. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful, and the learned Trial Court had erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The plea taken by the accused regarding false implication was not believable and was rightly discarded by the learned Trial Court. The mere fact that independent persons had not supported the prosecution’s case was not material. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) stated that nothing had happened in his presence, nor did he know anything about this case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted in his cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor that he was driving a pickup bearing registration No. HP-73- 6672 from Dharwala to Kuner on 3.07.2017. He admitted that he had arrived at Dunali at about 4.00 P.M., where a nakka was set up by the police. He admitted that he was stopped by the police. He denied that the police were checking documents when the accused came from Dunali carrying a backpack in his right hand. He denied that the accused got perplexed after seeing the police, and he ran away. He denied that the accused had fallen and sustained injuries. He denied that the accused had identified himself as Paras Ram. He denied that the search of the carry bag was conducted, and a purple carry bag containing charas was recovered during the search. He denied that charas was weighed, and its weight was found to be 800 grams. He admitted his signature on the specimen of seal (Ex. PW1/A). He also identified his signature on the seizure memo (Ex.PW1/B). He volunteered to say that he was made to sign blank papers. He admitted that he was visible in photographs (Ex P-1 and Ex P-2). He admitted his signature on the empty parcel (Ex. P-1). He stated that he does not put signatures on blank papers. PW1/A). He also identified his signature on the seizure memo (Ex.PW1/B). He volunteered to say that he was made to sign blank papers. He admitted that he was visible in photographs (Ex P-1 and Ex P-2). He admitted his signature on the empty parcel (Ex. P-1). He stated that he does not put signatures on blank papers. He volunteered to say that he was told by the police that his vehicle would be challaned. He had not made any complaint to anyone regarding signatures on blank papers. He admitted that he was visible in photographs but stated that no proceedings took place in his presence. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 13. Mohinder Singh (PW-13) stated that he had recorded Ramesh Kumar’s statement (Ex.PW13/B) as per his version. This part of his testimony was not challenged in the cross- examination, and no question was asked about the statement of Ramesh Kumar recorded by him. Hence, this part of his testimony is to be accepted as correct. Therefore, Ramesh Kumar is shown to have made two inconsistent statements on two different occasions, one before the police that the recovery was effected in his presence and all the formalities were conducted in his presence, and the other before the Court that no recovery was effected in his presence and no proceedings after recovery were conducted in his presence. Thus, his credit has been impeached under Section 155 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 14. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. 15. Thus, the testimony of Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) will not discredit the prosecution’s case. 16. It was laid down by this Court in Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123 , that independent witnesses turning hostile is no reason to discard the prosecution version. 15. Thus, the testimony of Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) will not discredit the prosecution’s case. 16. It was laid down by this Court in Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123 , that independent witnesses turning hostile is no reason to discard the prosecution version. It was observed: "The seizure witness turning hostile may not be very significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon phenomenon in criminal trial particularly in cases relating to the NDPS Act.” 17. Therefore, the accused cannot be acquitted merely because the independent witness has turned hostile. 18. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that this witness admitted his signature on the documents and the bulk parcel. He has not provided any explanation for the same. He admitted that he does not put signatures on blank papers, and he had not made any complaint to the police. It was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 , that where a witness admitted his signature on the spot, his oral testimony to the contrary could not be believed. It was observed at page 566: “21. Although declared hostile by the prosecution, Nam Singh (PW 1) admits to being literate and having signed his statement on the spot. During cross-examination, he admits to having duly perused the contents of these doc- uments before having signed them, and of not being un- der any form of police pressure, thus seriously under- mining any oral statement to the contrary. His deposition independently establishes that the Maruti van of the ap- pellant had indeed been stopped, the appellant's consent was taken, a search had been conducted, certain items were seized, and some substance had been weighed and sealed. Although PW 1 claimed not to have specifically witnessed the seizure of the charas, but he has not denied so either. He submits that he had gone back to his shop to attend to some customers at that stage of the search. However, he admits to having been shown the extracted sample of charas, which he identified before the trial court. Thus, far from undermining the prosecution ver- sion, PW 1's statement broadly corroborates and strengthens the seizure of contraband substance from the possession of the appellant.” 19. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded because Ramesh Kumar has not supported the prosecution’s case. 20. Thus, far from undermining the prosecution ver- sion, PW 1's statement broadly corroborates and strengthens the seizure of contraband substance from the possession of the appellant.” 19. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded because Ramesh Kumar has not supported the prosecution’s case. 20. The police officials have consistently deposed about their visit on the spot and apprehension of the accused based on suspicion and recovery from him. It was submitted that there are various contradictions in the prosecution’s case, which made it highly doubtful. The following contradictions were highlighted: (i) The police officials stated that they had a mega light with them. Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated in his cross-examination that the proceedings were conducted in the headlights of the private vehicle. (ii) Inspector Babu Ram (PW-5) stated in his cross- examination that the personal search of the accused was not conducted. However, Constable Daleep Kumar (PW-16) deposed in his cross-examination that Babu Ram had conducted the personal search of the accused. (iii) Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated in his cross- examination that he had taken photographs of the proceedings through the mobile phone of Babu Ram, whereas Inspector Babu Ram (PW-5) stated in his examination-in-chief that Sunil Kumar had taken the photographs from a private camera. (iv) HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-12) stated in his examination-in-chief that he had deposited the case property in the FSL on 06.04.2017, whereas the case property was received on 07.04.2017 as per the report of the analysis. (v) H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6) stated in his cross- examination that the case property was deposited with Him by SHO Dharam Singh (PW14); however, the abstract of malkhana register (Ex.PW6/B) mentions the name of depositor as ASI Mohinder Singh in column No.3. 21. Before adverting to these contradictions, it is to be noticed that the recovery was effected on 03.04.2017, statements of HHC Manohar Lal (PW-2) and Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) were recorded on 12.12.2018, statement of Inspector Babu Ram (PW-5) was recorded on 07.03.2019, statement of ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-13) was recorded on 31.07.2019, and the statement of Daleep Kumar (PW-16) was recorded on 14.12.2020. Thus, a considerable time had elapsed between the date of the incident and the recording of the statements. Human memory fades with time, and minor contradictions are bound to come with the passage of time. Thus, a considerable time had elapsed between the date of the incident and the recording of the statements. Human memory fades with time, and minor contradictions are bound to come with the passage of time. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation difler from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 Cri LJ 1096: ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 : AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )” 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 23. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was observed: - “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 24. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies. The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core of the case rather than the details. 25. Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated that there was no source of light on the spot at the time of his return. He volunteered to say that the proceedings were conducted in the light of a private vehicle. Thus, he was deposing about the proceedings conducted after his return. The recovery was effected at about 4.00 P.M. Rukka (Ex. 25. Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated that there was no source of light on the spot at the time of his return. He volunteered to say that the proceedings were conducted in the light of a private vehicle. Thus, he was deposing about the proceedings conducted after his return. The recovery was effected at about 4.00 P.M. Rukka (Ex. PW3/A) was sent to the police station at about 6.20 P.M. Constable Sunil Kumar returned to the spot at 10.20 P.M. Battery of the mega light would not have survived for such a long time and the statement of Constable Sunil Kumar that there was no light at 10.20 P.M. and the proceedings were conducted in the light of private vehicle will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. 26. Daleep Kumar (PW-16) stated in his cross- examination that the personal search of the accused was conducted by SI Babu Ram, and an option was given to him whether he wanted to be searched by the police or a Gazetted Officer. He did not remember whether any document was prepared by the investigating officer or not. Babu Ram (PW-5), stated in his cross-examination, that he had not conducted the personal search of the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that this contradiction can occur because of the failure of memory with time. Further, no recovery was effected from the personal search, and any contradictions regarding the personal search will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. 27. Contradictions regarding taking the photographs and use of a mobile phone are contradictions related to the detail, which can occur with the passage of time, and will not make the prosecution’s case susceptible. Similarly, the contradiction regarding the date of deposit of the case property is also relatable to the failure of memory because of the passage of time and will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful, especially when the report of analysis shows that seals were intact. 28. The contradictions regarding the name of the officer, who had deposited the case property with the MHC is also not material because the integrity of the case property was established by the fact that the seals were found intact in the laboratory. Further, the statement of H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6) shows that Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-14), H.C. Chaman (PW15), ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-13) and H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW6) were present during the resealing proceedings. Further, the statement of H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6) shows that Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-14), H.C. Chaman (PW15), ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-13) and H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW6) were present during the resealing proceedings. The case property was handed over after the resealing process was over. Thus, any discrepancy regarding the name of the person who had handed over the case property to the MHC will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. 29. The testimonies of the police officials corroborated each other on material aspects. Nothing was suggested in their cross-examination that they had any motive to falsely depose against the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the statements of official witnesses cannot be discarded because they happened to be police officials. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC 646 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 207 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be ignored because they are police officials. It was observed at page 656: “21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that recovery has not been proved by any independent witness is of no substance for the reason that, in the absence of an independent witness to support the recovery, in substance cannot be ignored unless proved to the contrary. There is no such legal proposition that the evidence of police officials, unless supported by an independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or that the evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.” 30. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was observed: “11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony of the police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule of law, which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. There is also no rule of law, which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of a conviction, and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.” 31. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State, AIR 2003 S.C 3011 , wherein it was held: “The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness, and there is no principle of law that without corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies, as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no principle of general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied) 32. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed: 22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of such a police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588 , after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [ 1988 Supp SCC 686 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588 , after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [ 1988 Supp SCC 686 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [ (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 6 SCC 595 : AIR 2013 SCW 3102 ] that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large shows their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that the quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence. 23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652 , in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 674 , this court held that: — “23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses have not been examined when, on the perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their evidence.” 24. We must note that in the former it was observed: — “21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. We must note that in the former it was observed: — “21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.” 25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of independent witnesses. 26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official witnesses cannot be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined. The correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason” which, quite apparently, is missing from the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW - 1 and PW - 2, which the courts below have found absolutely to be inspiring in confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on the basis of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.” 33. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the statements of the police officials corroborated each other and they were to be accepted as correct. 34. It was submitted that no independent witness was joined, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Reliance was placed on the arrest information, (ExPW13/D), in which the endorsement was made by Payar Singh that he was informed of the arrest of his brother, Paras Ram, in support of this submission. This submission will not help the accused. 34. It was submitted that no independent witness was joined, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Reliance was placed on the arrest information, (ExPW13/D), in which the endorsement was made by Payar Singh that he was informed of the arrest of his brother, Paras Ram, in support of this submission. This submission will not help the accused. The arrest memo mentions in the handwriting of the accused that he wanted to inform his brother Payar Singh about the arrest on his mobile No. xxxx-xx007. It clearly shows that Payar Singh was not present on the spot, which is why the accused had expressed his desire to inform his brother telephonically. There was no need to telephonically inform Payar Singh had he been present on the spot. Thus, the contents of the arrest memo do not show that Payar Singh was present on the spot. 35. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the police did not have any prior information regarding the transportation of the charas. They saw the accused on the spot, who ran away after seeing the police, which made the police suspicious. 36. It was submitted that no efforts were made to associate any independent witness, and it is fatal to the prosecution’s case. This submission is not acceptable. The statements of prosecution witnesses show that the police were checking the vehicles and the people. The accused ran away after seeing the police, and the police apprehended him based on suspicion. A search of the backpack was conducted, during which one carry bag containing cannabis was found. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130 that the police party is under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. It was observed: “3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence recorded by the prosecution, as also the judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that the prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by any independent witness, no other comment against the prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any value since the police party was on patrolling duty, and they were not required to take along independent witnesses to support recovery if and when made. Except for the comment that the prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by any independent witness, no other comment against the prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any value since the police party was on patrolling duty, and they were not required to take along independent witnesses to support recovery if and when made. It has come in the evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that after the recovery had been effected, some people had passed by. Even so, obtaining their counter-signatures on the documents already prepared would not have lent any further credence to the prosecution’s version.” 37. In similar circumstances, it was laid down by this Court in Chet Ram Vs State Criminal Appeal No. 151/2006, decided on 25.7.2018, that when the accused was apprehended after he tried to flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to associate any person from the nearby village. It was observed:- “(A)appellant was intercepted, and a search of his bag was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not have any prior information, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was carrying any contraband. They overpowered him when he tried to run away and suspected that he might be carrying some contraband in his bag. Therefore, the bag was searched, and Charas was recovered. After the recovery of Charas, there was hardly any need to associate any person from the nearby village because there was nothing to be witnessed. It is by  now well  settled that non-association of independent witnesses or non-support  of the prosecution’s version by independent witnesses where they are associated, by itself, is not a ground to acquit an accused. It is also well-settled that the testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of official witnesses, in a case where  independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of official witnesses, in a case where  independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. Of course, it is only the material contradictions and not the trivial ones, which assume significance.” (Emphasis supplied) 38. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinise the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed at page 566: “(C) Need for independent witnesses 19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. [Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998 SC 201 , para 9] However, such omissions cast an added duty on courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which, if found reliable, can form the basis of a successful conviction.” 39. This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730, wherein it was observed at page 633: “12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official witnesses cannot be rejected on the grounds of non- corroboration by independent witnesses. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420]]. 13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767], while considering somewhat similar submission of non-examination of independent witnesses, while dealing with the offence under the NDPS Act, in paras 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under: (SCC p. 568) “15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191], relied on by the counsel for the respondent State, also supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved merely on account of their official status. 16. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248], it was held as under: (SCC p. 655) ‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust in the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.’” 40. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder Singh & Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684, wherein it was held: - “3. (iii) Learned defence counsel contended that in the instant case, no independent witness was associated by the Investigating Officer; therefore, the prosecution case cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance with provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in support of his contention, relied upon the titled Krishan Chand versus State of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531. 3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that a prosecution case cannot be disbelieved only because the independent witnesses were not associated.” 41. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, wherein it was held at page 204: - “17. 3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that a prosecution case cannot be disbelieved only because the independent witnesses were not associated.” 41. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, wherein it was held at page 204: - “17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying upon the testimony of police witnesses, without procuring any independent witness, recorded by the two courts, has also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because independent witnesses were not examined, the conclusion could not be drawn that the accused was falsely implicated. Therefore, the said issue is also well settled and in particular, looking at the facts of the present case, when the conduct of the accused was found suspicious, and a chance recovery from the vehicle used by him is made from a public place and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any benefit on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of the courts do not call for interference.” 42. A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825, wherein it was observed: 16. As regards non-association of the independent witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of the independent witnesses or non-supporting of the prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not a ground for acquittal of Appellants/accused. It is also well-settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses, including police officials, carry the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. However, the contradiction must be a material and not trivial one, which alone would assume significance. 17. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. However, the contradiction must be a material and not trivial one, which alone would assume significance. 17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery; therefore, the police party was under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. Xxxx 19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Avtar @ Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP 345, wherein it was observed as under: — “24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be of much relevance in the given facts of the case. The fact situation was that the police party had laid the ‘nakka’ and immediately thereafter had spotted the appellant at some distance, who got perplexed and started walking back. The conduct of the appellant was sufficient to raise suspicion in the minds of police officials. At that stage, had the appellant not been apprehended immediately, the police could have lost the opportunity to recover the contraband. Looking from another angle, the relevance of independent witnesses could be there when such witnesses were immediately available or had already been associated at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are not mandatory conditions and will always depend on the fact situation of each and every case. The reason is that once the person is apprehended and is with the police, a subsequent association of independent witnesses may not be of much help. In such events, the manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.” Xxxx 22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. A. No. 202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on 27.03.2024.” 43. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal, and the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses. A. No. 202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on 27.03.2024.” 43. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal, and the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses. However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinise the testimonies of the police officials. 44. The case property was produced along with the accused before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 04.04.2017. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found that the parcel was sealed with six seals of the Investigating Officer, having seal impression ‘SB’, and five reseal impressions having seal impression ‘BH’. The seals were intact. The Investigating Officer had shown his intention to take the entire case property for analysis, and there was no need to take samples. The case property was weighed with a weighing machine, and photographs were taken, and the case property was handed over to the Investigating Officer. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had not opened the case property and weighed the parcel to determine the weight of the charas. It was submitted that this violated Section 52A of the NDPS Act. This submission will not help the accused because the whole of the case property was sent to FSL. It was laid down by this Court in Narayan Singh Vs. State of H.P. 2023 HHC 9715 that the provisions of Section 52- A of the NDPS Act will not apply when the samples were not drawn, and the entire contraband was sent to the FSL for analysis. It was observed:- 19. After going through the aforesaid judgments, we are of the considered view that the same does not apply to the facts of the instant case. It would be noticed that in all the earlier judgments, the Hon’ble Court was dealing with cases where samples had been drawn from the bulk and then samples had been sent for chemical analysis, and the residue or bulk sample remained with the investigating agency. However, this is not the fact obtaining situation in the instant case. Here, the entire contraband had been sent for chemical analysis, and that too on the very next date of its recovery. In such circumstances, there could be no better and primary evidence for the purpose of the trial. 45. However, this is not the fact obtaining situation in the instant case. Here, the entire contraband had been sent for chemical analysis, and that too on the very next date of its recovery. In such circumstances, there could be no better and primary evidence for the purpose of the trial. 45. Similarly, it was laid down in Sandeep Kumar Vs State of H.P., 2022 Law Suits (HP) 149, that the provisions of Section 52A of the NDPS Act is not mandatory and non-compliance with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed: - “24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the appellants that the investigating agency had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and thus cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the rules framed for investigations under the NDPS Act are mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Neither the required sample was taken on the spot, nor were the samples preserved by complying with Section 52-A of the Act. It has been argued that compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is mandatory….. xxxxxx 27. The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants, however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution’s case under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of Punjab vs. Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of the effect of non-compliance of Section 52-A, has held as under: - 10. This contention too has no substance for two reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal note indicates, deals with the "disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances". Under Sub-section (1), the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of proper storage space and such other relevant considerations, so that even if they are material objects seized in a criminal case, they could be disposed of after following the procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3). If the procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3) of Section 52A is complied with and upon an application, the Magistrate issues the certificate contemplated by Subsection (2), then Sub-section (4) provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples drawn under Sub-section (2) of Section 52A as certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as primary evidence in respect of the offence. Therefore, Section 52A(1) does not empower the Central Government to lay down the procedure for the search of an accused but only deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 11. Secondly, when the very same standing orders came up for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of India, 2002 (4) SCC 380 , this Court took the view that they were merely intended to guide the officers to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the Officer-in-Charge of the investigation. It was also held that they were not inexorable rules, as there could be circumstances in which it may not be possible for the seizing officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot if it is a chance recovery, where the officer may not have the facility to prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention.” 46. Thus, the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had not opened the parcel to certify the correctness of the inventory. 47. The report of the analysis shows that the seals were intact, which indicates that there was no tampering with the case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the case of the prosecution that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal was separately sent and tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 48. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 48. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557 , wherein it was held: “It has also come on evidence that till the date the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 49. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402 , the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 50. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held:- “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such, link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 51. Therefore, the prosecution’s version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at FSL, Junga. 52. It was submitted that the abstract of malkhana register mentions the colour of the carry bag as “moongia”, whereas the result of analysis (Ex. PX) mentions the green carry bag. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the colour. This submission will not help the accused, as the colour ‘moongia’ is also dark green, and there is no discrepancy in the colour. 53. PX) mentions the green carry bag. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the colour. This submission will not help the accused, as the colour ‘moongia’ is also dark green, and there is no discrepancy in the colour. 53. The report of analysis shows that the substance analysed was charas; hence, there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was found in possession of 800 grams of charas and he was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 29(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act. 54. The learned Trial Court has sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment of eight years, pay a fine of Rs.80,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. This is not excessive. A person possessing 1 Kg of charas can be punished to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years, and if the principle of proportionality is applied, the sentence of eight years for possessing 800 grams of charas is proportionate, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. 55. No other point was urged. 56. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed. 57. Records of the learned Trial Court be sent down forthwith along with copy of this judgment.