(2026: JHHC: 16972) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Arbitration Application No. 20 of 2026 Velji Ratna Sorathia Infra Pvt. Ltd. (formerly known as M/s Sorathia Velji Ratna & Company) a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, having registered office at A-701, Smeet Complex, Sarabhai Campus, Near Genda Circle, Baroda, Gujarat -390023, represented through its authorized representative, Mr. Sanjay Mishra s/o Sri Suresh Chandra Mishra, aged about 52 years r/o Bung. No. 40, Royal Enclave, Thaltej, Ahmedabad, Gujarat – 380059… … Petitioner Versus Jharkhand Urban Infrastructure Development Company Ltd. (JUIDCO), a Government of Jharkhand Undertaking established on November 19, 2013, under the Companies Act of 1956, it acts as an advisors and/or consultants and an implementing authority for urban development projects including water supply systems, through its Project Director (Technical), JUIDCO Ltd., JUIDCO Building, Line Tank Road, Kutchery Chowk, Ranchi, Jharkhand, 834001. … … ... Respondent --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE --------- For the Petitioner: Mr Prakhar Tiwari, Advocate Mr Aalok Tiwari, Advocate Mr Manoj Prasad, Advocate Ms Jyoti, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr Krishna Murari, Advocate Mr Ritesh Kumar Pathak, Advocate --------- 04/Dated: 12.06.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is an application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1916 (said Act) for the appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes that have allegedly arisen between the parties under the agreement dated 19th June, 2018. 3. The respondent has filed a counter affidavit in which they have not disputed the prima facie existence of an arbitration clause. However, it is (2026: JHHC: 16972) 2 contended that the State Government is a necessary party to this proceeding, and that without its impleadment, no arbitrator should be appointed. 4. Besides, in paragraphs 8, 17, and 18 of the counter affidavit, the respondent has pleaded as follows: “8. That the Petitioner has sought appointment of an Arbitrator despite the fact that the contract is still subsisting, the work remains incomplete, substantial obligations under the contract are yet to be performed, and several claims raised by the Petitioner are non- arbitrable, contingent, premature, expressly barred by the terms of the contract, and in any event are uncrystallized and based merely on tentative estimates. 17. That, in the course of execution, a Supplementary Agreement dated 05.02.2024 was executed between the parties in respect of certain additional and extra items required for completion of the project. Photocopy of the said Supplementary Agreement dated 05.02.2024 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R/5. It is further submitted that pursuant to the latest extension of time, the contract continues to remain valid and subsisting up to 31.03.2026, no order of termination has been passed by the Respondent, and the Petitioner remains fully bound under the contract to complete all remaining works in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 18. That the invocation of arbitration by the Petitioner vide notice dated 31.12.2025 is premature to the extent it seeks reference of claims which are contingent, tentative and not finally crystallized. It is submitted that several claims are stated by the Petitioner itself to be "under calculation" and subject to final assessment, while certain bills and price adjustment claims are still under process and have not been finally rejected by the Respondent. In these circumstances, such speculative and unascertained claims do not constitute live disputes capable of reference to arbitration under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” (2026: JHHC: 16972) 3 5. Mr Krishna Murari, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that this application should be dismissed for non-joinder of the necessary party. In any event, considering the facts pleaded in the counter affidavit, including in particular paragraphs 8, 17 and 18 upon which he laid considerable emphasis, this application should be dismissed. 6. Mr Tiwary, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that the scope of the proceedings under section 11(6) of the said Act is limited to examining the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement. He submitted that the defences now raised are frivolous, but in any event, all permissible defences, including defences now raised, can always be raised before the Arbitral Tribunal once it is constituted. 7. The decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of ‘Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899 In Re’1 and SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Krish Spinning2.. support the appointment of an arbitrator in the circumstances involved in the present case. These decisions hold that the scope of proceedings under section 11(6) of the said Act is extremely limited and confined only to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Further, when the Referral Court renders a prima facie opinion about the existence of the arbitration clause, neither the Arbitral Tribunal nor the Court enforcing the arbitral award will be bound by such a prima facie view. Despite such a prima facie 1 (2024) 6 SCC 1 2 (2024) 12 SCC 1 (2026: JHHC: 16972) 4 view, the Arbitral Tribunal will be at liberty to examine this issue in depth. This will protect the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdictional competence to decide on issues concerning the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. 8. Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid precedents to the facts and circumstances borne out from the record, a case is made out for the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate on the disputes arising between the parties out of the agreement dated 19th of June, 2018. 9. In this case, the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement cannot be seriously disputed. This is only a prima facie finding, and this finding, in no manner, will preclude the respondent from raising all their defences, including the defences relating to the existence of an arbitration clause or its scope and import. In any event, specific liberty is granted to the respondent in this regard. 10. Accordingly, Hon’ble Mr Justice Tapen Sen, former Judge of this Court, residing at Flat No. 3903, C-Block, 9th Floor, Sri Ram Gardens Apartment, opposite Reliance Smart, Kanke Road, Ranchi, is appointed as Arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the parties, arising out of or in relation to the Development Agreement dated 15.04.2024. 11. All contentions and objections on behalf of the respondents, including the contention regarding non-existence of the arbitration clause, its non-enforceability, etc., are left open for the decision of the Arbitrator now appointed. (2026: JHHC: 16972) 5 12. The learned Arbitrator is requested to forward the statutory statement of disclosure under section 11(8), read with section 12(1) of the said Act, to the parties within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the copy of this order. 13. All arbitration costs and fees of the learned Arbitrator shall be borne by the parties equally in the first instance, and shall be subject to any final Award that may be passed by the learned Arbitrator in relation to costs. The fees of the arbitrator will be governed by Fourth Schedule of the said Act. 14. This application is disposed of in the above terms, without any order for costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) June 12, 2026 Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp2 NAFR Uploaded on 16.06.2026