JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. This order shall dispose of an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of one year, eleven months and four days in filing the present appeal. As per the applicants, Reference Petition was decided by the Reference Court on 11.08.2023 and copy whereof, was applied by the District Attorney on the same day, which was attested on 26.08.2023 and delivered on 28.08.2023. The District Attorney, Shimla forwarded the certified copy of the award alongwith the case file to Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Karsog vide letter dated 05.09.2023, which was received at the Office of Executive Engineer, Karsog on 14.09.2023, who sent the case file to Assistant Engineer, HPPWD, Sub-Division Churag, vide letter No. 5299, dated 15.09.2023, which was received on 30.09.2023.Thereafter, the file was marked to Sh. Padam Nabh, Junior Engineer, Churag/Tattapani Section vide endorsement No. 441, dated 04.10.2023. In the meanwhile, the area experienced severe flooding due to heavy rainfall. The situation was critical, with residents facing displacement and considerable hardship. The overflowing of rivers/khads caused extensive damage to infrastructure, including roads and bridges, severely affecting mobility and access to essential services. Faced with this situation, all field staff was deployed for road clearance and restoration work. Subsequently, Assistant Engineer was transferred from HPPWD Sub-Division, Churag and the dealing hand also joined another office upon his promotion. In these circumstances, no steps could be taken for processing the matter for appeal. The Office of appellant No. 2 was not made aware of the status of the case until it was listed before the learned Sessions Court Camp at Karsog on 08.04.2025 and at the time of scrutiny, it was found that legal opinion from the competent authority was required. Hence, Executive Engineer, Karsog forwarded the matter to the Legal Cell of the office of Engineer-in-Chief vide letter dated 19.04.2025, which was received on 26.04.2025. Thereafter, the matter was further forwarded to the Government for seeking opinion of Law Department vide letter No. 242-44, dated 26.04.2025. The Secretary (PW) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh conveyed the opinion vide letter dated 20.06.2025 to the Office of Engineer-in-Chief, which was received on 24.6.2025, who further conveyed the opinion alongwith relevant case file to the Office of Executive Engineer, Karsog vide letter No. 823-24, dated 24.06.2025, which was received in his office on 28.06.2025. The Secretary (PW) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh conveyed the opinion vide letter dated 20.06.2025 to the Office of Engineer-in-Chief, which was received on 24.6.2025, who further conveyed the opinion alongwith relevant case file to the Office of Executive Engineer, Karsog vide letter No. 823-24, dated 24.06.2025, which was received in his office on 28.06.2025. On receipt of the opinion of Government, the Executive Engineer, Karsog prepared and drafted the appeal and submitted the same to the Office of Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD, Shimla vide letter dated 27.06.2025, which was received in his office on 28.06.2025. Some record was sought from field office and on its receipt, the same was vetted in his office on 04.07.2025 and the said office forwarded the same to the office of learned Advocate General vide letter dated 04.7.2025, who vetted the same on 07.07.2025. Thereafter, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Karsog submitted the fair appeal to the Superintending Engineer 1st Circle, HPPWD Mandi vide letter dated 08.07.2025 for signatures, being authorized signatory, who further sent the fair appeal duly signed, to the Office of learned Advocate General vide letter No. PW-SEI-R-24-7-C.C./Karsog/25-5121-23 dated 11.07.2025. In this way, delay of one year, eleven months and four days in filing the present appeal has occurred, which is neither intentional nor willful, but was beyond the control of the applicants, as such, deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. 2. I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the applicant/State and have also gone through the material available on record. 3. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. In Basawaraj and Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 (14) SCC 81 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex"which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence". An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajendar Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project). 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak. 15. 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 4. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, 2013 (12) SCC 649 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to some of its Judgments regarding Law of Limitation. It may be useful to extract relevant paragraphs which read as follows: "15. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, where a Two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that: (SCC p.465, para 14) “14. the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the Law of Limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the Law of Limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.” Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. 16. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others,, it has been held that: (SCC p. 789, para 16) “16. while considering an Application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves” 17. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan, P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao and stated thus: (Balwant Singh case, SCC p.696, paras 25-26) “25. We may state that even if the term sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The Law of Limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the ri ght andobligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 26. The Law of Limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the ri ght andobligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the Applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 18. Recently in Maniben Devaraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two judges bench ruled thus: (Maniben Devraj Shah Case, SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) “23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression ?sufficient cause? would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. What colour the expression ?sufficient cause? would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 5. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , it has been held as under:- “31. It is true when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for Governmental authorities. Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 6. Thus the sum and substance of all above decisions make it clear that to decide the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to consider that whether there is sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of delay in filing any case beyond the prescribed period of limitation. There cannot be a straitjacket formula or rule either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation and that every case is to be decided considering the facts and circumstances of that case only. There cannot be a straitjacket formula or rule either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation and that every case is to be decided considering the facts and circumstances of that case only. The only requirement for condonation of delay is that whether there is sufficient cause for the party not to initiate the litigation in prescribed period of limitation. It is settled law that length of delay is no matter and acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. 7. In the instant case, the applicants/appellants have not explained each and every day's delay. Rather, it has been mentioned in the application as under: “Thereafter, the file was marked to Sh. Padam Nabh, Junior Engineer, Churag/Tattapani Section vide endorsement No. 441, dated 04.10.2023. In the meanwhile, the area experienced severe flooding due to heavy rainfall. The situation was critical, with residents facing displacement and considerable hardship. The overflowing of rivers/khads caused extensive damage to infrastructure, including roads and bridges, severely affecting mobility and access to essential services. Faced with this situation, all field staff was deployed for road clearance and restoration work. Subsequently, Assistant Engineer was transferred from HPPWD Sub-Division, Churag and the dealing hand also joined another office upon his promotion. In these circumstances, no steps could be taken for processing the matter for appeal. The Office of appellant No. 2 was not made aware of the status of the case until it was listed before the learned Sessions Court Camp at Karsog on 08.04.2025.” However, no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the applicants/appellants for the delay w.e.f. 04.10.2023 till 08.04.2025. The delay to be condoned is one year, eleven months and four days. It is not open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which law has prescribed period of limitation. From a reading of the averments in the application, it is seen that application seeking to condone the delay of one year, eleven months and four days was filed in a casual manner without giving proper reasons, much less acceptable reasons. From a reading of the averments in the application, it is seen that application seeking to condone the delay of one year, eleven months and four days was filed in a casual manner without giving proper reasons, much less acceptable reasons. As observed earlier, the applicants have not shown sufficient cause to condone the delay as contemplated in the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court supra. The application filed by the applicants is vague and bereft of particulars without any convincing explanation for condoning the delay. The inordinate delay of one year, eleven months and four days in filing the appeal has not been properly explained. 8. Applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions, supra, to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, I am of the view that the applicants have failed to explain each and every day's delay. Resultantly, the application is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. 9. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellants/State is also dismissed.