JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 07 of 2025, dated 07.01.2025, registered at Police Station Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, H.P. for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act’) 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police were on patrolling duty on 07.01.2025. They received secret information at around 6:00 p.m. at near Koti Deedag that the accused was transporting Charas. A huge quantity of charas could be recovered by his search. The information was credible. It was reduced to writing and was sent to Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Rajgarh The police associated Dheeraj Kumar and found the petitioner on the roadside with a carry bag. The police recovered 1.119 kg of charas from the carry bag. The petitioner had ealrier filed Cr.MP(M) No. 281 of 2025, which was withdrawn on 22.09.2025, and Cr.MP(M) No.1323 of 2025, which was dismissed on 23.07.2025. The petitioner has been behind bars for more than one year, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. The petitioner’s Aadhar card was found in the bag from which recovery was made. This is suspicious because no person would keep his Aadhar Card with the contraband. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 07.01.2025. They received secret information at about 06:00 pm near Koti Deedag that the accused was transporting charas, and a huge quantity of charas could be recovered during his search. The information was credible, and it was reduced to writing. The information was sent to SDPO Rajgarh. The police associated Dheeraj Kunar and proceeded further. The police found the petitioner standing on the roadside with a carry bag and recovered 1.119 Kg of charas from the carry bag. The Police arrested the petitioner, seized the charas and sent it to the FSL for analysis. The analyst found it to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The police found the petitioner standing on the roadside with a carry bag and recovered 1.119 Kg of charas from the carry bag. The Police arrested the petitioner, seized the charas and sent it to the FSL for analysis. The analyst found it to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The charge sheet has been filed before the Court on 13.03.2025. Statements of seven witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is listed on 17.04.2024 for recording the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary and Panku Chaudhary, Advocates, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learend Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The petitioner’s Aadhar card was found in the carry bag containing the contraband, which is suspicious because no person would keep his identification document with the contraband. The police have failed to complete the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to speedy trial is being violated; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon Akshay Kuamr vs. State of H.P. 2021 HHC 15755, Ravinder Kumar vs. State of H.P., 2022 HHC 1519 and Ankit Ashok Nisar vs. State of H.P., 2022 HHC 5040 in support of his submissions. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by this Court. A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances, the petitioner has failed to show any change in the circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It has been specifically asserted in para 3 of the bail petition that the petitioner had earlier filed bail petitions, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1323 of 2025, and Cr.MP(M) No. 2281 of 2025, and were dismissed on 23.07.2025 and 22.09.2025 respectively. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, (1989) Supp. 8. It has been specifically asserted in para 3 of the bail petition that the petitioner had earlier filed bail petitions, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1323 of 2025, and Cr.MP(M) No. 2281 of 2025, and were dismissed on 23.07.2025 and 22.09.2025 respectively. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.” 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: “7. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: “7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. It was submitted that the prosecution's version is highly suspicious because no person would keep his identification document with the contraband. This submission is not acceptable because there can be no presumption that a person would not keep the identification document with the contraband, and the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because of this fact. 15. In any case, this Court does not sit in review over the order passed by this Court earlier while deciding the earlier bail petition; therefore, it is impermissible to hold that the prosecution's case is suspicious because the petitioner’s identification document was found with the contraband. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070 that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed on page 676: 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [ (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 16. Therefore, it is impermissible to review the earlier order passed by the Court. 17. It was submitted that the prosecution has not completed the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated; however, this submission cannot be accepted. 16. Therefore, it is impermissible to review the earlier order passed by the Court. 17. It was submitted that the prosecution has not completed the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated; however, this submission cannot be accepted. The status report shows that the statements of seven witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is now listed for the recording of statements of prosecution witnesses on 17.04.2026. The charge sheet was filed on 13.03.2025, and the recording of statements of seven witnesses within one year does not show any delay in the progress of the trial. The petitioner has not placed on record copies of order-sheets to demonstrate the delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail. 18. The petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case; therefore, he cannot be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The material on record, prima facie, shows the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of a crime, and there is no material to show that the petitioner would not commit the offence if released on bail; thus he has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of NDPS. 19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese, 2025 INSC 1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed:- “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance. 18. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance. 18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated 22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the present complaint, nor do they engage with the prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section 37(1)(b).” 20. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, SLP (Crl.) No. 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, wherein it was observed: “11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four months, and charges have not been framed, yet the allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband. 12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.” 21. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 22. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. This submission is not acceptable. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 22. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. This submission is not acceptable. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. This judgment was followed by a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in Kabir Khan vs. State, 2025 HHC 39246, wherein it was observed: “7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as previously there existed no consistent or binding requirements mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.” 24. This Court held in Arvind Kumar @ Chahna vs. State of H.P. Cr. MP (M) No. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar @ Chahna vs State of H.P. SLP (Criminal) No. 797 of 2026. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him. 25. In Ravinder Kumar (supra) and Akshay Kumar (supra), the recovery was not effected from the bail petitioner and these judgments do not apply to the present case. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him. 25. In Ravinder Kumar (supra) and Akshay Kumar (supra), the recovery was not effected from the bail petitioner and these judgments do not apply to the present case. In Ankit Ashok Nisar (supra), the prosecution's case was found to be suspect, which is a matter of trial in the present case. Therefore, this judgment does not apply to the present case. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail; hence, the present petition fails and it is dismissed. 28. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.