JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. This order shall dispose of an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of seven years, three months and thirteen days in filing the present appeal. As per the applicant, delay in filing the appeal has occurred, as he was not aware about any proceedings against him in any Court due to the reason that his wife was suffering from cancer and for her better treatment, the applicant used to remain out of station. Therefore, the delay in filing the appeal in neither intentional nor willful, but was beyond the control of the applicant, as such, the same deserves to be condoned. 2. Reply to the application has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 5/Insurance Company, wherein, it has been submitted that the applicant was proceeded against ex parte before the learned Tribunal below, as despite valid and effective service, he did not file and reply. It has been further submitted that the applicant has not appended any documents in order to show that his wife was suffering from cancer and has not appended any document showing the period during which she remained under treatment. Further, the applicant was aware of the accident and also that both deceased as well driver of the car succumbed to the injuries suffered by them on account of rash and negligent driving of Gagan Kumar. The death certificate of the wife of applicant shows that she has expired on 15.10.2022, whereas, the present appeal has been filed in the year, 2024. Not only this, the applicant has also filed an application for setting aside the impugned award alongwith delay application on 10.02.2023, which was dismissed being time barred. It has been submitted that the applicant has not sufficiently mentioned in the application as to what prevented him from filing the present appeal for seven years, three months and thirteen days. Therefore, non-applicants/respondents prayed for dismissal of the application. 3. I have heard learned vice counsel for the applicant-appellant, learned counsel for non- applicants/respondents No. 3 & 4, learned counsel for non- applicant/respondent No. 5 and also gone through the material available on record. 4. Therefore, non-applicants/respondents prayed for dismissal of the application. 3. I have heard learned vice counsel for the applicant-appellant, learned counsel for non- applicants/respondents No. 3 & 4, learned counsel for non- applicant/respondent No. 5 and also gone through the material available on record. 4. Learned vice counsel for the applicant-appellant contended that the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful, but was beyond the control of the applicant, as such, the same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 5/Insurance Company contended that the no sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant for condonation of such a huge delay in filing the appeal, as such, the present application deserves dismissal. 6. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. In Basawaraj and Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 (14) SCC 81 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of Limitation Acts. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence". An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajendar Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project). 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 7. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 7. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, 2013 (12) SCC 649 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to some of its Judgments regarding Law of Limitation. It may be useful to extract relevant paragraphs which read as follows: "15. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, where a Two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that: (SCC p.465, para 14) “14. the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the Law of Limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.” Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court  has  justifiably  advocated  adoption  of  liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. 16. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others,, it has been held that: (SCC p. 789, para 16) “16. while considering an Application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves” 17. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, would be quite fruitful. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves” 17. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan, P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao and stated thus: (Balwant Singh case, SCC p.696, paras 25-26) “25. We may state that even if the term sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The Law of Limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the Applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 18. Recently in Maniben Devaraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two judges bench ruled thus: (Maniben Devraj Shah Case, SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) “23. Thereafter, the two judges bench ruled thus: (Maniben Devraj Shah Case, SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) “23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression ?sufficient cause? would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 8. Thus, the sum and substance of all above decisions make it clear that to decide the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to consider that whether there is sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of delay in filing any case beyond the prescribed period of limitation. There cannot be a straitjacket formula or rule either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation and that every case is to be decided considering the facts and circumstances of that case only. The only requirement for condonation of delay is that whether there is sufficient cause for the party not to initiate the litigation in prescribed period of limitation. It is settled law that length of delay is no matter and acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. 9. In the instant case, the applicant/appellant has not explained each and every day's delay. As per the applicant, his wife was suffering from cancer and for her better treatment, he was out of station. 9. In the instant case, the applicant/appellant has not explained each and every day's delay. As per the applicant, his wife was suffering from cancer and for her better treatment, he was out of station. However, no medical record pertaining to the illness of the wife of the applicant has been produced by him in order to substantiate his plea. Thus, the applicant has failed to explain as to what prevented him from filing the present appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The delay to be condoned is seven years, three months and thirteen days. It is not open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which law has prescribed period of limitation. From a reading of the averments in the application, it is seen that application seeking to condone the delay of seven years, three months and thirteen days was filed in a casual manner without giving proper reasons, much less acceptable reasons. As observed earlier, the applicant has not shown sufficient cause to condone the delay as contemplated in the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court supra. The application filed by the applicant is vague and bereft of particulars without any convincing explanation for condoning the delay. The inordinate delay of seven years, three months and thirteen days in filing the appeal has not been properly explained. 10. Applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions, supra, to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, I am of the view that the applicant has failed to explain each and every day's delay. Resultantly, the application is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. 11. The application is disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any. 12. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is also dismissed.