1 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CRMP No. 87 of 2026 Dumeshwar Ajgale S/o Mansharam Aged About 35 Years R/o Vill Mudagaon, P.S. Tendukona, District Mahasamund C.G. --- Petitioner versus State of Chhattisgarh through the Station House Officer, Police Station Pithora, District Mahasamund C.G. --- Respondent CRMP No. 89 of 2026 Litesh Tandon S/o Hemlal Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Mudagaon, P.S. Tendukona, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner Versus State of Chhattisgarh through the Station House Officer, Police Station Pithora, District Mahasamund (C.G.) --- Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sahu, counsel for the For Respondent/State : Mr. Aman Tamboli, Panel Lawyer ALLENA ANNAJEE RAO Digitally signed by ALLENA ANNAJEE RAO Date: 2026.02.05 09:52:08 +0530 2 (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Order on Board 29.01.2026 1. CRMP No. 87/2026 and CRMP No. 89/2026 have been preferred under Sections 528 of BNS, 2023, being aggrieved by the order dated 27.11.2025 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Mahasamund, District - Mahasamund (C.G.), dismissing the Criminal Revision Nos.H-72/2025 & H-73/2025 respectively and affirming order dated 29.09.2025 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pithora, District - Mahasamund, C.G. in Misc. Criminal Case Nos. 126/2025 & 127/2025 respectively, whereby the Supurdnama applications filed by the petitioners have been dismissed. 2. As per the charge sheet, the brief facts of the case are that on 14.09.2025, the Police received secret information from an informer that 2 persons were cruelly beating and driving 4 cattle (buffaloes) on foot towards a slaughter house with the intention of slaughtering them. On such information, 4 buffaloes were seized from co-accused Dilip Miri and on enquiry, he named the present petitioners as owners of the cattle. As such, Crime No. 177/2025 was registered in police station Pithoura District – Mahasamund, for commission of offence under Sections 4, 6 & 10 of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 has been registered against the accused persons. 3 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are the owners of the seized buffaloes, and they have valid and effective documents required for the said cattle; therefore, they are entitled for the Supurdnama. He next submits that the foundational requirement of Section 6(1) of the Act that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter or were likely to be slaughtered, is completely absent in the case. Mere movement of animals by foot, without more, does not attract Section 6 of the Act. Consequently, the statutory embargo under Section 6(3) and the consequential custody mandate under Section 7 do not operate. He further submits that the petitioners have placed substantial documentary evidence of lawful ownership i.e. purchase receipts issued by Maveshi Bazar, Gidhouri, Gram Panchayat Gidhouri, District – Balodabazar-Bhatapara. These documents establish bona fide purchase and ownership and remain undisputed by the prosecution. According to the MLC, one buffalo is healthy and 3 buffaloes sustained weak minor scratches. The petitioners are small agriculturists and dairy owners, and the seized buffaloes constitute their main source of income. The buffaloes have been in continued custody of the authorities since 14.09.2025, and such prolonged detention of living cattle, despite the absence of slaughter intention and despite proof of ownership has aggravated cruelty, deterioration of health and has caused recurring and irreparable financial loss to the petitioners. He placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the 4 matter of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2002)10 SCC 283 and the decision of this Court in the matter of Mohammed mateen Ahamed vs. State of Chhattisgarh, passed in CRMP No. 1247/2025 on 11.07.2025. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner(s) and supports the impugned order, submitting that there are no valid documents with regard to the purchase or sale of the cattle. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the order impugned with utmost circumspection. 6. The Act of 2004 has been enacted in the interest of the general public and to maintain communal harmony and peace, for prohibition of slaughter of agricultural cattle. Section 6 of the Act of 2004 provides prohibition on transport of agricultural cattle for slaughter. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2004 which reads as under: - “6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural cattle for slaughter:— (1) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to transport or cause to be transported any Agricultural cattle from any place within the state to any place within the state or outside the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the provision of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered. (2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be transported in contravention of provisions of sub-section (1) any agricultural 5 cattle as specified in the Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance used in transporting such animal along with such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized by such authority or officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf. (3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-section (2) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before the expiry of six months from the date of such seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier and such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation at the end of the trial.” 7. A focused perusal of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004, would show that the provision bars transport, possession and sale of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that the same may be slaughtered. Mere transport of cattle from one place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is not barred under the Act and in that case the provision under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not be applicable. 8. It is well settled law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. When a specific word has been inserted by the legislature, the provision cannot be given a different meaning. In the matter of W. H. King v. Republic of India and another1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently observed as under:- “10. As the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed.” 1 AIR 1952 SC 156 6 9. Similarly, in the matter of State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others2, the Supreme Court held as under: - “15. … when it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, what is meant is that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and it must not strain the words : “To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute”, and that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But I do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied is the language used in the Act and, therefore, when the words are clear and plain, the court must accept the expressed intention of the legislature. …” 10. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section 6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 14545 in which the Gujarat High Court considering the issue identical as involved in the present case held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. 11. A careful perusal of the order impugned and other documents annexed with the petition would show that the prosecution or the investigating agency at no place has alleged that the petitioners instructed the co-accused to drive the cattle for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act, specifically Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. Case of the 2 (1982) 1 SCC 561 7 prosecution in sum and substance, is that the co-accused Dilip Miri and another were carrying the cattle (buffaloes) on foot from one place to another, and it was not in contravention of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. In the entire prosecution case, no specific place has been mentioned where the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. 12. In the MLC, it has been shown that 1 buffalo is in healthy condition and the other 3 buffaloes sustained weak minor scratches . Therefore, it cannot be said that the agricultural cattle were in badly injured condition to attract the definition of “slaughter” so as to apply the bar contained in Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004. 13. In the instant case, it is pertinent to mention the most important fact of the case that the buffaloes had been seized on 14.09.2025 from co-accused Dilip Miri and the present petitioners are the owners of the buffaloes; therefore, they have been arrayed as co-accused persons. Petitioners have produced the purchase receipts dated 10.09.2025 of Maveshi Bazar, Gidhouri, Gram Panchayat Gidhouri, District – Balodabazar- Bhatapara, with regard to the ownership of the seized buffaloes (Litesh Tandon – 2 buffaloes, Dumeshwer Ajgale – 2 buffaloes). There is no objection to their ownership and they have the right to raise any other grounds and also reserve the right to submit all relevant documents. It is also necessary to note that no useful purpose would be served if the said buffaloes are allowed to get custody in the cowshed; rather, the said buffaloes can be 8 released to the petitioners, who claim to be the owners of the cattle, so that they can use them for agriculture. 14. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the trial Court and affirmed by learned revisional Court are hereby set aside. Hence, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283 and Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai (supra) the petitioners would be entitled for the custody of the buffaloes till the conclusion of trial. Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to give the interim custody of the said buffaloes to the petitioners by imposing reasonable conditions. The buffaloes shall be released within seven days from the date of complying with the conditions imposed by the trial Court. 15. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Rao