Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 16542 (HP)

Manjeet Kaur v. State of HP

2026-04-09

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 23 of 2023, dated 07.06.2023, registered at the Women Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Isha Chauhan, filed a complaint with the police, asserting that she was married to the accused Akhil Chauhan in 2018, according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. Her husband began demanding money six months after their marriage. She started a job in Chandigarh on 10.01.2020, and shifted to Chandigarh with her husband. She became pregnant in June 2020 but suffered a miscarriage due to harassment and abuse. Her stridhan, including jewellery, a fixed deposit of Rs. 2.00 lacs, and dowry articles, were retained by the accused. She was forced to pay Rs. 10 lakh and the registration charges for a car. She purchased a TVS Jupiter for herself with her own money, but was compelled to give it to her sister-in-law. The accused increasingly demanded money and land and subjected her to physical and mental torture. The informant filed a complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act at Una. She also submitted an application to the Women's Cell, Una, but the accused refused to appear before the Women’s Cell. Accordingly, it was prayed that action be taken against the accused. 3. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police made enquiries in the neighbourhood, but no house except the house of the uncle was located in the neighbourhood. The police seized the documents from the Gram Panchayat, recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version and filed the charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner Manjeet Kaur has filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court. It has been asserted that the marriage of the informant and the petitioner’s son was solemnised on 22.09.2018. The relationship between the petitioner’s son and the informant remained cordial till 2020. The petitioner’s husband is an employee of National Fertilisers Limited, Naya Nangal, District Ropar, Punjab. He was posted at National Fertilisers Limited, Panipat. It has been asserted that the marriage of the informant and the petitioner’s son was solemnised on 22.09.2018. The relationship between the petitioner’s son and the informant remained cordial till 2020. The petitioner’s husband is an employee of National Fertilisers Limited, Naya Nangal, District Ropar, Punjab. He was posted at National Fertilisers Limited, Panipat. The informant joined the company of the entire family at Panipat after her marriage and resided at Panipat till March, 2019. The informant got the employment and joined as a Data Entry Operator at Net Smartz Infotech, Chandigarh. She shifted to Chandigarh to live with her mother and younger brother with the consent of the entire family of the petitioner. The informant never had any association with the petitioner for more than 3 to 4 days at a time because the informant used to reside at Chandigarh, and the petitioner used to reside with her husband. The petitioner had gone on a family trip to Amritsar with the informant on 12.06.2022 and had shared a very good and affectionate bonding with her. This fact is evident from the photographs taken during the trip. The petitioner’s son got employed with M&M Swaraj Tractors at Mohali in January 2020 and started residing with the informant at Chandigarh. He and the informant shifted to Nangal thereafter. One daughter was born to the informant and her husband on 17.08.2021. The petitioner used to visit the informant’s house to meet her grand daughter. The petitioner found out in June 2022 that the relationship between her son and the informant had deteriorated, and the informant had left her matrimonial home without any reason. The informant filed a complaint, but no allegation was made against the petitioner in the complaint. The police also called the informant on many occasion, but she failed to participate. No specific allegations were made against the petitioner. She had averred in the complaint filed under the Domestic Violence Act that the petitioner was harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry and that she had demanded a gold bracelet and a car, which allegations are false. Such allegations were not made in the complaint made to the police, and these are clear improvements. The informant has filed a false complaint due to the strained relationship with her husband. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 5. Such allegations were not made in the complaint made to the police, and these are clear improvements. The informant has filed a false complaint due to the strained relationship with her husband. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 5. I have heard Mr Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State. 6. Mr Rajeev Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made by the informant against the petitioner are false, which is evident from the fact that no specific allegation was made against the petitioner in the initial complaint made to the police. The petitioner never resided with the informant for a long time and had not demanded any dowry from the informant. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 7. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the police found sufficient material to file the charge-sheet against the petitioner after the investigation. The informant specifically asserted that the petitioner had demanded the gold jewellery and had retained her stridhan. This Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any oflence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable oflence but constitute only a non-cognizable oflence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 11. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 12. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. The FIR specifically says that the informant’s stridhan, including her jewellery and fixed deposit of Rs. 2.00 lacs and dowry articles, are lying with the accused. The application filed by the informant under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act specifically mentions that the informant’s husband and his parents used to taunt the informant for not bringing sufficient dowry. Therefore, it is not correct to say that no allegations have been made against the petitioner. 14. It was submitted that the allegations made in the FIR are false. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 15. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 17. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised.” 18. It was submitted that no allegations were made against the petitioner in the complaint made to the police, and the comparison of the complaint made to the police and the FIR would show various improvements. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan (supra) that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R. based on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: - “17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. xxxx 19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned paragraphs it can be seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial. 19. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR simply because some incidents were not mentioned in the earlier complaint made by the informant. 20. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 23. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 24. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.