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2026 DAILYLAW 16495 (HP)

Devi Dass v. Ram Lal

2026-04-06

Romesh Verma

body2026
JUDGMENT : Romesh Verma, J. The present petition arises out of the order as passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur dated 28.05.2025, whereby the execution filed by the present petitioner under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C has been dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the present petitioner Devi Dass filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents/JDs in the Court of learned Civil Judge First Class Ghumarwin on 23.05.1988. The suit was decreed on 30.06.1994, whereby the defendants were restrained from making any interference over the suit land and decree for possession was also passed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants were further directed to dismantle the structure raised over the part of the land comprised in Khasra No. 252/1 and hand over the vacant possession of the suit land from the date of passing of the judgment. 3. Feeling dissatisfied the defendants preferred an appeal before the learned First Appellate Court and during the pendency of the appeal the parties entered into a compromise and the contents of the same are reproduced as follows: Hindi image 4. The said compromise was effected between the parties on 31.12.1998. 5. The present petitioner filed an application under Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C before the learned Executing Court on the ground that in the aforesaid compromise, it was specifically mentioned that the land measuring 5 biswancies, owned by respondent Ram Lal, comprised in khasra No. 1247/252 is left by him in favour of petitioner/ decree holder and it was further admitted that the petitioner will be deemed to be owner in possession over the same land which is in front of the house of the petitioner/decree holder. Further, it was agreed that the respondent Ram Lal will leave the land of the house of the petitioner/decree holder. 6. It was averred in the application that respondent No.1 has not broken the wall as mentioned above in the compromise in column No.4 dated 31.12.1998. The respondents have diverted the flow of rainy water towards the road as per the Clause No.6 in view of the undertaking given by respondent No.1, as per Ext.CA. 6. It was averred in the application that respondent No.1 has not broken the wall as mentioned above in the compromise in column No.4 dated 31.12.1998. The respondents have diverted the flow of rainy water towards the road as per the Clause No.6 in view of the undertaking given by respondent No.1, as per Ext.CA. It was stated that since the applicant is a poor person and unable to get the order/judgment and decree implemented, therefore, he filed an application for the enforcement of the compromise dated 31.12.1998 and the order as passed by the learned Presiding Judge, Lok Adalat on 25.05.2002. 7. The said application under Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C was duly contested by the respondents by raising various objections with regard to maintainability, locus standi, estoppel, and limitation etc. 8. It was stated in the reply that petition as filed by the present petitioner is hopelessly time barred. 9. The learned Executing Court directed both parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. After recording the evidence, the application filed by the petitioner was ordered to be dismissed on 28.05.2025, 10. Feeling dissatisfied, the petitioner/decree holder has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in this Court. 11. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order as passed by the learned Executing Court, is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set-aside. He further submits that the learned Executing Court has not appreciated the controversy at hand and has wrongly dismissed the execution petition. 12. The perusal of the record shows that judgment and decree, which was passed in favour of the plaintiff dated 30.06.1994 was modified by the learned First Appellate Court on the basis of compromise which was effected between the parties on 31.12.1998 before the learned Presiding Officer, Lok Adalat vide its order dated 25.5.2002. 13. Admittedly the execution petition was filed on 17.08.2015 i.e after more than 13 years of passing of the judgment as passed by the learned First Appellate Court. The learned Executing Court relying upon the Article 136 of the Limitation Act has rightly come to the conclusion that in order to execute the decree, the limitation for filing said application was 12 years and admittedly in the present case, the petition filed under Order 21 Rule 32 of C.P.C has been filed beyond the period of limitation. The learned Executing Court relying upon the Article 136 of the Limitation Act has rightly come to the conclusion that in order to execute the decree, the limitation for filing said application was 12 years and admittedly in the present case, the petition filed under Order 21 Rule 32 of C.P.C has been filed beyond the period of limitation. The compromise between the parties was effected in the year 1998 and the judgment was modified by the learned First Appellate Court on 25.5.2002. Therefore, the findings as returned by the learned First Appellate Court holding the petition to be barred by limitation does not call for any interference and the said order is legally valid and sustainable. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that his client has been able to establish that there is violation and defiance of the compromise, therefore, the limitation shall be applicable to the applicant/petitioner from the date of the interference since according to him the compromise is in the nature of permanent prohibitory , therefore, the limitation will start from the date of interference and not from passing of the judgment. 15. The said contention is not sustainable and from the perusal of the record it is clear that the judgment and decree as passed by the learned trial Court was modified by the learned First Appellate Court on the basis of compromise decree in the year 2002, therefore, prima facie and on the basis of the record, the application which has been filed by the present petitioner as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act is barred by period of limitation, therefore, there is no error in the impugned order. The compromise as affected between the parties cannot be read in isolation, rather it has to be read in its entirety as a whole. 16. Consequently, the present petition being devoid of any merit, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed off.