Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 16489 (HP)

Mangal Bahadur v. State of HP

2026-04-08

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 153 of 2023, dated 08.11.2023, registered at Police Station Chowari, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner’s mother, Maya Devi (since deceased), was found dead on 08.11.2023 in a house where she and the petitioner were residing together. Maya Devi had sustained injuries on her right arm by means of a sharp object. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner. The petitioner was sleeping in his room when the incident occurred. The petitioner had cordial relations with his mother, and he had no reason to murder his mother. The police have filed a charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner is a permanent resident of District Chamba, and there is no likelihood of his absconding. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Taragad, Sikandar Singh, informed the police about the death of Maya Devi. The police went to the spot and recorded the statement of the informant Kul Bahadur, who stated that Maya Devi is his wife and the petitioner Mangal Bahadur is his son. All of them resided together. The petitioner, Mangal Bahadur’s wife was residing separately because he used to quarrel with her. Mangal Bahadur was not doing any work and used to demand money from Maya Devi, which led to frequent quarrels. The informant used to sleep in a goat pen with his goats to protect them from wild animals. Mangal Bahadur and Maya Devi used to sleep in the house. Mangal Bahadur had consumed liquor and was quarrelling with his mother, Maya Devi, on the previous night of the incident. Maya Devi did not bring the tea as usual to the informant on the date of the incident. The informant went to the house and found that Maya Devi was lying near the door, and Mangal Bahadur was washing the floor. Maya Devi did not bring the tea as usual to the informant on the date of the incident. The informant went to the house and found that Maya Devi was lying near the door, and Mangal Bahadur was washing the floor. The right arm of Maya Devi was bleeding because of the injury caused by sharp edged weapon. The informant asked Mangal Bahadur as to what had happened, and Mangal Bahadur evaded the question. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner. The police seized the petitioner’s clothes and Khukhri lying on the spot. The post-mortem examination of the deceased was conducted, and as per the final report, the death occurred because of the injuries caused by Khukhari. The blood samples and other objects were sent to the FSL, and as per the report of analysis, the shirt, T- shirt, Khukhari and the shirt of the deceased contained the DNA of the deceased. The charge sheet was filed before the Court. The statements of 14 witnesses have been recorded, and the matter was listed on 25.11.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was last seen in the house with the deceased. He was quarrelling with her in a state of intoxication. The deceased was found dead, and the burden is upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances leading to her death. The petitioner has not provided any explanation. The statements of 14 witnesses have been recorded, and there is no delay in the progress of the trial. The offence is grave, and the penalty is severe. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The statements of 14 witnesses have been recorded, and there is no delay in the progress of the trial. The offence is grave, and the penalty is severe. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The status report specifically mentions that the petitioner and his mother, Maya Devi, were present in the room on 07.11.2023. The petitioner was quarrelling with his mother. The petitioner’s mother, Maya Devi, was found dead, and the petitioner was washing the floor with water. Maya Devi had sustained injury on her right arm with sharp edged weapon, and she was bleeding profusely. The petitioner was questioned about the circumstances leading to the death of Maya Devi, but he could not give any satisfactory explanation. The DNA taken from the petitioner’s clothes and the khukhari recovered from the spot contained the DNA of the deceased. Maya Devi had sustained injury on her right arm with sharp edged weapon, and she was bleeding profusely. The petitioner was questioned about the circumstances leading to the death of Maya Devi, but he could not give any satisfactory explanation. The DNA taken from the petitioner’s clothes and the khukhari recovered from the spot contained the DNA of the deceased. All these circumstances show that the petitioner and the deceased were last seen together inside the house, and the burden would shift upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased[ Jayantilal Verma v. State of M.P. , (2021) 12 SCC 71 ]. No explanation has been provided by the petitioner regarding the death, and an inference can be, prima facie, drawn that the petitioner is responsible for causing the death of the deceased. 12. It was submitted that an injury caused to the right arm with a sharp-edged weapon will not constitute an offence of murder. This submission cannot be prima facie accepted as correct. The learned Trial Court has framed the charges against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC , and the petitioner has not assailed the order framing charges. It is highly doubtful that the bail court can ignore the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court framing charges. Further, the profuse bleeding from the arm, prima facie, shows an intention of causing such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is also corroborated by the fact that no medical treatment was provided to the deceased. Thus, prima-facie the petitioner is involved in the commission of an offence punishable under of the . 13. It was submitted that some unknown person had injured Maya Devi while the petitioner was sleeping. The petitioner tried to save Maya Devi, and his clothes were stained with the blood of the deceased. This explanation is not supported by the petitioner’s conduct. The petitioner had not raised any hue and cry when he saw the deceased lying dead. He did not inform his father about the injury. He was seen washing the blood from the floor, which does not show the conduct of a person who had found another dead due to the serious injuries. The petitioner had not raised any hue and cry when he saw the deceased lying dead. He did not inform his father about the injury. He was seen washing the blood from the floor, which does not show the conduct of a person who had found another dead due to the serious injuries. He did not provide any immediate explanation for the injuries, even though he was asked to do so. Therefore, the submission that the injury was caused by some other person and the petitioner was merely trying to save the deceased is not acceptable. 14. The offence under Section 302 is punishable with the extreme penalty of death or life imprisonment. Thus, the punishment is severe. The deceased was the mother of the petitioner, and the nature of the offence is heinous. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 15. Thus, the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment would disentitle the petitioner from the concession of bail. 16. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report shows that the statements of 14 witnesses had been recorded till 25.11.2025. The petitioner had prayed for time to produce the copies of the order sheets to demonstrate the delay; however, no copies of the order sheets were filed, and the plea that the delay is attributable to the prosecution or the Court is not established. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141: “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 17. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 20. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.