JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 04.07.2006, passed by learned District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P (hereinafter referred to as the First Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree 23.09.2005, passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. ( learned Trial Court) were upheld. (For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial court. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking declaration that the plaintiff No. 1 is owner of 3/5th shares each, and plaintiffs No. 2 to 5 are owners of 1/10th share in the suit land described in para 1 of the plaint by virtue of Will dated 13.03.1958 executed by late Padu, defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit land, the revenue entries to the contrary are not binding upon the plaintiffs, and the sale deed, executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 3 on 09.11.1998, is void, illegal and confers no right, title or interest upon the defendant no. 3. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from causing any interference in the possession of the plaintiffs was also sought. A decree of possession was also sought in case the plaintiffs were dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. It was pleaded that the suit land was owned and possessed by Padu, husband of defendant No.2 and father of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1. Padu expired in the year 1968. He had executed a conditional Will on 13.03.1958 in favour of Saju and plaintiff No.1 in equal shares. The beneficiaries were not aware of the existence of the Will. Plaintiff No.2 searched an old box of Padu containing the documents and found the Will lying in the box. Saju had married plaintiff No.1 as per the conditions of the Will. Plaintiffs No. 2 to 5 were born to them. Saju died on 22.02.1995. Plaintiffs, being class one heirs, succeeded to half share. Mutation No. 31, dated 26.08.1968, to the contrary, does not bind the rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs requested that defendants No. 1 and 2 to admit their claim, but they refused. Plaintiffs No. 2 to 5 were born to them. Saju died on 22.02.1995. Plaintiffs, being class one heirs, succeeded to half share. Mutation No. 31, dated 26.08.1968, to the contrary, does not bind the rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs requested that defendants No. 1 and 2 to admit their claim, but they refused. Defendant No. 1 executed a sham sale deed No. 608 dated 09.11.1998 of 81/2352 shares measuring 0-4-1 bigha in favour of defendant No. 3. The sale deed does not confer any right upon the defendant No.3. The defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ possession; hence, suit was filed for seeking the reliefs mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking a preliminary objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that the suit land is jointly owned and possessed by the parties, who had divided the suit land amongst themselves in a family arrangement. It was specifically denied that any Will was executed by Padu. Therefore, it was prayed that the present suit be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 5. The following issues were framed on 25.11.2000, and additional issues were framed on 3.12.2003. 1. Whether on 13.03.1958, deceased Padu executed a valid Will in favour of the plaintiffs as alleged? OPP. 1-A. Whether the defendants No.2 fraudulently concealed the Will in dispute from the plaintiff till 1998? If so, its effect? OPP 2. Whether the revenue entries showing the defendants to be the owners in possession of the suit land are wrong and illegal, as alleged? OPP. 2-A. Whether defendant No. 2 is colliding with the plaintiff? OPD 3. Whether the sale deed dated 09.11.1998, having been executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3, is void and illegal as alleged. OPP 4. Whether the defendants are nterfering in the possession of the plaintiffs qua the suit land in an illegal manner? OPP. 5. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiffs examined Hima Devi (PW-1), Tara Chand (PW-2), Narainu (PW-3) and Hima Devi (PW-4). The defendants examined defendant No. 1 (DW-1) and Ganga Ram (DW-2). 7. Learned Trial Court held that the person who had found the Will was not examined by the plaintiff. OPP. 5. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiffs examined Hima Devi (PW-1), Tara Chand (PW-2), Narainu (PW-3) and Hima Devi (PW-4). The defendants examined defendant No. 1 (DW-1) and Ganga Ram (DW-2). 7. Learned Trial Court held that the person who had found the Will was not examined by the plaintiff. The scribe Tara Chand (PW-2) made a contradictory statement regarding the execution of the Will. The due execution of the Will was not proved. Hima Devi (PW-1) admitted that she had filed the suit at the instance of her mother, which established collusion between the parties. Defendant No.1 had a right to sell the property as an owner. Defendants were co-owners and not entitled to change the nature of the suit land. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issues No.2A and 4 in the affirmative, the rest of the issues in the negative and partly decreed the suit. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned District Judge, Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that Tara Chand (PW-2) had made a contradictory statement. The Will mentioned the signature of Padu, but he had put a thumb mark, and no explanation was provided for it. All these circumstances made the execution of the Will doubtful. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below, the plaintiffs have filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial question of law on 18.07.2007: “Whether due execution of the Will Ex. PW-2/A has been proved in accordance with the law, and whether it confers indefeasible title on the appellants? 10. I have heard Mr Y. Paul, learned counsel for appellants No. 2 to 5, Mohan Singh, learned counsel for respondents No.1(a) to 1(e) and Mr Surender Verma, learned counsel for respondents No. 3 and 4. 11. Mr Y. Paul, learned counsel for appellant Nos. 2 to 5, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in holding that execution of the Will was not proved. The Will was executed in the year 1958 and carried a presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11. Mr Y. Paul, learned counsel for appellant Nos. 2 to 5, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in holding that execution of the Will was not proved. The Will was executed in the year 1958 and carried a presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act. The minor contradictions in the statement of the scribe were not sufficient to discard his testimony. The plaintiffs have also filed an application to lead additional evidence to examine Mani Ram and Jagat Singh. He prayed that the application for additional evidence and appeal be allowed, and judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Moturu Nalini Kanth vs. Gainedi Kaliprasad (dead, through LRs) 2023 INSC 1004 , in support of his submission. 12. Mr Mohan Singh, learned counsel for respondents No. 1(a) to 1(e), submitted that the learned Courts below have rightly appreciated the material on record and have concurrently held that execution of the Will was not proved. There is no perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Courts below. The witnesses could have been examined before the learned Courts below, and no explanation has been provided for their non-examination. The application for additional evidence is not maintainable. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal and application for additional evidence be dismissed. 13. Mr Surender Verma, learned counsel for respondents No. 3 and 4, adopted the submissions of Mr Mohan Singh, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 (a) to 1 (e). Additional Evidence: 14. Before adverting to the substantial question of law framed by this Court, it is necessary to dispose of the application (CMP No. 6699 of 2024) for leading additional evidence. It has been asserted that the attesting witnesses had died before the filing of the suit. Ghungar, one of the attesting witnesses, had executed a General Power of Attorney in the name of Punnu Ram. This fact was not in the applicants’ knowledge before March, 2024. The attesting witness to the power of attorney can identify Ghungar’s signature on the Will. Ghungar was also identified by Mr Jagat Singh Chandel, Advocate, who could identify the signature of Ghungar on the Will. This fact was not in the applicants’ knowledge before March, 2024. The attesting witness to the power of attorney can identify Ghungar’s signature on the Will. Ghungar was also identified by Mr Jagat Singh Chandel, Advocate, who could identify the signature of Ghungar on the Will. These witnesses could not be produced because the applicants were not aware of their existence; therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the witnesses be permitted to be examined. 15. The application is opposed by filing a reply, taking a preliminary objection regarding the lack of maintainability. It was asserted that allowi`ng the application for leading additional evidence will amount reopening of the matter. The appeal has been pending before this Court since 2006. The suit was instituted in the year 1998, and much time had lapsed since then. No cogent reason has been assigned for the nonexamination of the witnesses. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 16. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 17. Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC reads as under:- “27. Production of additional evidence in the Appellate Court (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, but if— (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 18. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 18. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the provision that the Appellate Court can permit a party to produce the evidence if the Court had refused to admit the evidence, the evidence could not be produced despite the exercise of due diligence, it was not within the knowledge of the parties or the Court requires the same to enable it to pronounce the judgment or for any other sufficient cause. 19. The application mentions that Prabh Dayal was asked to look for the person who was familiar with the signatures of Ghungar in the year 2020. Mani Ram informed Prabh Dayal that the land was inherited by him along with his brother Devi Ram, and this fact was revealed to the learned counsel. This explanation does not show any reason for not leading the evidence before the learned Trial Court. The applicants were aware of the fact that they had propounded a Will of Padu, and were required to prove the signatures of marginal witnesses. The application does not show why no enquiry was made regarding the person, who was familiar with the signatures of Ghungar, when the matter was pending before the learned Trial Court. It was held in Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood , (2019) 7 SCC 76 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 467 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 821 that where the evidence was not proved before the learned Courts below, and no explanation was provided for their non-production, the evidence be taken on record. It was observed at page 81: “13. At this stage, it would be pertinent to point out that the appellant-defendants, during the course of this appeal, have filed a number of applications to place on record certain documents which were not on the record of the trial court. No explanation has been given in any of these applications as to why these documents were not filed in the trial court. These documents cannot be looked into and entertained at this stage. The defendants did not file these documents before the trial court. No application was filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for leading additional evidence before the first appellate court or even before the High Court. These documents cannot be looked into and entertained at this stage. The defendants did not file these documents before the trial court. No application was filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for leading additional evidence before the first appellate court or even before the High Court. Even the applications filed before us do not set out any reasons for not filing these documents earlier, and do not meet the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, the applications are rejected, and the documents cannot be taken into consideration.” 20. It was held in Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath , (2019) 6 SCC 82 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 112: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 492 that the additional evidence can be led when the Trial Court had refused to admit the evidence, the evidence was not available despite the exercise of due diligence and the evidence is required by the Court to effectively adjudicate the dispute pending before it. It was observed at page 96: - “29. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the production of additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, is permitted only under three circumstances, which are: (I) where the trial court had refused to admit the evidence, though it ought to have been admitted; (II) the evidence was not available to the party despite the exercise of due diligence; and (III) the appellate court required the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. An application for the production of additional evidence cannot be allowed if the appellant was not diligent in producing the relevant documents in the lower court. However, in the interest of justice and when satisfactory reasons are given, the court can receive additional documents.” 21. It was laid down in North Eastern Railway Administration. vs. Bhagwan Das , (2008) 8 SCC 511 , that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 do not enable an unsuccessful litigant to patch up the weak parts of his case. It was observed:- “13. It was laid down in North Eastern Railway Administration. vs. Bhagwan Das , (2008) 8 SCC 511 , that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 do not enable an unsuccessful litigant to patch up the weak parts of his case. It was observed:- “13. Though the general rule is that ordinarily the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and additional evidence, whether oral or documentary is not admitted but Section 107 CPC, which carves out an exception to the general rule, enables an appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Nevertheless, the additional evidence can be admitted only when the circumstances as stipulated in the said Rule are found to exist. The circumstances under which additional evidence can be adduced are: (i) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted [clause (a) of sub-rule (1)], or (ii) the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within the knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed [clause (aa), inserted by Act 104 of 1976], or (iii) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause [clause (b) of sub-rule (1)]. 14. It is plain that under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 CPC, with which we are concerned in the instant case, evidence may be admitted by an appellate authority if it “requires” to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. The scope of the Rule, in particular of clause (b), was examined way back in 1931 by the Privy Council in Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur [ AIR 1931 PC 143 ]. The scope of the Rule, in particular of clause (b), was examined way back in 1931 by the Privy Council in Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur [ AIR 1931 PC 143 ]. While observing that the provisions of Section 107 as elucidated by Order 41 Rule 27 are clearly not intended to allow the litigant, who has been unsuccessful in the lower court, to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the court of appeal, it was observed as follows : (AIR p. 148) “… Under clause (1)(b), it is only where the appellate court ‘requires’ it (i.e. finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted. It may be required to enable the court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case, it must be the court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the subclause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but ‘when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent’.” 15. Again in K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy [ AIR 1963 SC 1526 : (1964) 2 SCR 35 ] a Constitution Bench of this Court while reiterating the aforenoted observations in Parsotim case [ AIR 1931 PC 143 ] pointed out that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause”. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment”, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Thus, the question whether looking into the documents, sought to be filed as additional evidence, would be necessary to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner, has to be considered by the Court at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits.” 22. Thus, the question whether looking into the documents, sought to be filed as additional evidence, would be necessary to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner, has to be considered by the Court at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits.” 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gobind Singh v. Union of India , 2026 SCC OnLine SC 339, that the parties can lead evidence before the appellate court after satisfying the conditions provided under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. It was observed: “11.2. In order to properly appreciate the controversy involved, it is necessary to first advert to the statutory provision applicable to the case at hand. Order XLI Rule 27 CPC reads as follows: "27. Production of additional evidence in the appellate court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if- (a) … (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) …the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or a witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” (emphasis supplied) 11.3. Rule 27, being couched in negative terms, makes it abundantly clear that parties to an appeal are not entitled to adduce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, save and except in the circumstances expressly enumerated therein. The provision contemplates only three eventualities in which additional evidence may be permitted: first, where the court which passed the decree has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; second, where the party seeking to adduce such evidence establishes that, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, the evidence was not within its knowledge or could not have been produced at the time when the decree under appeal was passed; and third, where the appellate court itself requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined in order to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. 11.4. 11.4. Accordingly, it is only upon satisfaction of any of the aforesaid three contingencies that an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC can be entertained. Sub-rule (2) of the said provision further mandates that where the appellate court forms an opinion that additional evidence is required to be admitted, it must record the reasons for such admission. While elucidating the scope and object of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, this Court, in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2012) 8 SCC 148 , undertook an exhaustive analysis of the provision. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinafter: “36. The general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The appellate court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, the provision does not apply when, on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the Rule itself. … 38. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage, where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. … 41. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. … 41. The words “for any other substantial cause” must be read with the word “requires” in the beginning of the sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate court requires additional evidence, that this Rule will apply e.g. when evidence has been taken by the lower court so imperfectly that the appellate court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment.” (emphasis supplied) Thus, a holistic reading of the aforesaid decision makes it clear that the appellate court's inquiry, while considering an application for leading additional evidence, is confined to examining whether such evidence is necessary to remove a lacuna in the case. More importantly, the appellate court may permit additional evidence only upon being satisfied that the conditions expressly stipulated under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are fulfilled. The parties do not possess any vested or automatic right to seek admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage. Consequently, the provision has no application where the appellate court is in a position to render a satisfactory and reasoned judgment on the basis of the evidence already available on record. 11.5. In State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya (2014) 13 SCC 468 , the appellants therein had moved an application before the appellate court under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking leave to produce a map of the area to establish that the disputed land constituted a public road. This Court, while affirming the High Court's decision to reject the said application, held as follows: "4. …On perusal of this provision, it is unambiguously clear that the party can seek liberty to produce additional evidence at the appellate stage, but the same can be permitted only if the evidence sought to be produced could not be produced at the stage of trial in spite of exercise of due diligence and that the evidence could not be produced as it was not within his knowledge and hence was fit to be produced by the appellant before the appellate forum. 5. 5. It is thus clear that there are conditions precedent before allowing a party to adduce additional evidence at the stage of appeal, which specifically incorporate conditions to the effect that the party, in spite of due diligence, could not produce the evidence, and the same cannot be allowed to be done at his leisure or sweet will.” (emphasis supplied) This Court thus categorically held that unless the requirements stipulated under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are strictly satisfied, a party cannot be permitted to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage. Such permission cannot be granted as a matter of course, nor can additional evidence be introduced at the whim or convenience of a litigating party. 11.6. Where the appellate court permits additional evidence to be adduced, Order XLI Rule 27(2) CPC casts a mandatory obligation upon the court to record the reasons for such admission. In Ibrahim Uddin (supra), this Court elucidated the rationale underlying the requirement of recording reasons in the following terms: “42. Whenever the appellate court admits additional evidence, it should record its reasons for doing so (sub-rule (2)). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against too easy a reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation, and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason for this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the court of further appeal to see if the discretion under this Rule has been properly exercised by the court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only Directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the Rule.” 11.7. The procedural framework under Order XLI of CPC makes it abundantly clear that an appeal is ordinarily to be decided on the evidence adduced before the trial court. The appellate court is not expected to embark upon a fresh fact-finding exercise or permit production of additional evidence as a matter of routine. Where the appellate court is satisfied that the material already available on record is sufficient to enable it to pronounce judgment, it is well within its jurisdiction to confine its consideration to the evidence forming part of the record of the courts below.” 23. Where the appellate court is satisfied that the material already available on record is sufficient to enable it to pronounce judgment, it is well within its jurisdiction to confine its consideration to the evidence forming part of the record of the courts below.” 23. In the present case, no cogent reason was assigned for non-examination of the witnesses before the learned Trial Court or the learned First Appellate Court; hence, the present application fails, and it is dismissed. Substantial question of law:- 24. The plaintiffs have set up a Will (Ext. PW-2/A). The law relating to the execution of the Will was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan , (2023) 9 SCC 734 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 449 as under: “10.1. The court has to consider two aspects: firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him. 10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied. 10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say: (a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and the said signature or affixation shall show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a will; (b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is necessary; (c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of such signatures; (d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator; however, the presence of all witnesses at the same time is not required. 10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined; 10.5. 10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined; 10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signatures but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator; 10.6. If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be dispensed with; 10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence; 10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator's last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier; 10.9. The test of judicial conscience has evolved for dealing with those cases where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It requires consideration of factors such as awareness of the testator as to the content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of the dispositions in the will; a sound, certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of execution; the testator executed the will while acting on his own free will; 10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence, etc., has to prove the same. However, even in the absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing explanation. 10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be “real, germane and valid” and not merely “the fantasy of the doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277 ] ]”. Whether a particular feature would qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising suspicion, legitimate in nature, would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc.” 25. Any circumstance raising suspicion, legitimate in nature, would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc.” 25. This position was reiterated in Gurdial Singh v. Jagir Kaur , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1466, wherein it was observed: “11. A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that is, examination of at least one of the attesting witnesses. However, unlike other documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the land of the living. This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain whether the Will propounded had been duly proved. Onus lies on the propounder not only to prove due execution but to dispel from the mind of the court all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the free disposing mind of the testator. Only when the propounder dispels the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as genuine. In Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur (1977) 1 SCC 369 , this Court, referring to H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426, enumerated the principles relating to proof of Will:— “10. ********* “1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator, and therefore, the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question, and by reason of suspicious circumstances, the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question, and by reason of suspicious circumstances, the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc., in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.” The Court further held:— “9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in such cases a matter of the court's conscience, and then the true question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the will.” 12. Similarly, in Ram Piari v. Bhagwant (1993) 3 SCC 364 , this Court held that when suspicious circumstance exists, Courts should not be swayed by the due execution of the Will alone: “3. ……………….Unfortunately, none of the courts paid any attention to these, probably because they were swayed with due execution even when this Court in Venkatachaliah case [ AIR 1959 SC 443 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426] had held that, proof of signature raises a presumption about knowledge, but the existence of suspicious circumstances rebuts it…………….” 13. There is no cavil when suspicious circumstances exist and have not been repelled to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court would not be justified in holding that the Will is genuine since the signatures have been duly proved and the Will is registered. ( AIR 1962 SC 567 ). 26. There is no cavil when suspicious circumstances exist and have not been repelled to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court would not be justified in holding that the Will is genuine since the signatures have been duly proved and the Will is registered. ( AIR 1962 SC 567 ). 26. A similar view was taken in Moturu Nalini Kanth (supra). 27. In the present case, the plaintiffs examined Tara Chand (PW-2) to prove the execution of the Will. He stated that Padu revealed that he would marry his daughter Hima to Saju, and Saju would look after Padu and his wife. Saju would hand over all the earnings to Padu. Padu would bequeath the property located at Behali to Hima and Saju if they fulfilled the conditions laid down by him. He (Tara Chand) wrote the document (Ext.PW-2/A) as per the wishes of Padu. It was read over and explained to Padu. Padu thumb marked the document, and thereafter Ghungar put his signature. Again stated that Ghungar had put his thumb mark. Dhani Ram also put his thumb mark. He also put his signature. He stated in his cross-examination that he is not a professional ‘Deed Writer’ and that he had only prepared one document. Padu came to him some days before writing the document and asked him to prepare the document. He (Tara Chand) advised Padu to bring two witnesses; however, he did not know the number of witnesses required in the Sale Deed or the Will. Padu and Ghungar had put their thumb marks. Ghungar had put his thumb mark with the help of the ink of the pen or Kalam. 28. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the testimony of this witness does not prove the due execution of the Will. He claimed that Ghungar had put his signature on the document (Ext.PW-2/A) and then, in the same breath, stated that Ghungar had put his thumb mark. He reiterated in his cross-examination that Ghungar had put his thumb mark. The document (Ext.PW-2/A) bears the signatures of Ghungar and not the thumb mark Thus, he has not proved the signatures of the attesting witness. Further, the learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that Will bears words signature of Padu but contains his thumb mark. This was not explained by any person. The document (Ext.PW-2/A) bears the signatures of Ghungar and not the thumb mark Thus, he has not proved the signatures of the attesting witness. Further, the learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that Will bears words signature of Padu but contains his thumb mark. This was not explained by any person. He claimed that he is not a professional ‘Deed Writer’, and did not know the number of witnesses required in a Will or Sale Deed. He has not explained how he could have asked Padu to bring two witnesses. Learned Courts below were justified in rejecting his testimony in these circumstances. 29. It was submitted that the Will was executed in the year 1958, and the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act applied to it. This submission will not help the appellants. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh , (2009) 3 SCC 687 : 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1867 that of the Indian Evidence Act does not dispense with the proof of the Will. It was observed at page 698: “19. The provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 keeping in view the nature of proof required for proving a will, have no application. A will must be proved in terms of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872. In the event the provisions thereof cannot be complied with, the other provisions contained therein, namely, Sections 69 and 70 of the Evidence Act providing for exceptions in relation thereto, would be attracted. Compliance with statutory requirements for proving an ordinary document is not sufficient, as of the Evidence Act postulates that execution must be proved by at least one of the attesting witnesses, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. (See B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh [(2006) 13 SCC 449], SCC p. 458, para 19.)” 30. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the execution of the Will. 31. Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the due execution of the Will was not proved. This is a pure findings of fact. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the execution of the Will. 31. Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the due execution of the Will was not proved. This is a pure findings of fact. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kashibai v. Parwatibai , (1995) 6 SCC 213 , that it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact related to the execution of the Will while hearing the second appeal. It was observed:- “11..…. In the present case, the trial court, after a close scrutiny and analysis of the evidence of Defendant 1, Smt. Parvati Bai, VirBhadra, Sheikh Nabi, Shivraj and GyanobaPatil who are witnesses to the Will, recorded the finding that none of them deposed that Lachiram had signed the said Will before them and they had attested it. None of them, except Sheikh Nabi, even deposed as to when the talk about the execution of Will was held. The witness, Sheikh Nabi, however, deposed that the talk about the Will also took place at the time of the talk about the adoption. But this witness too did not depose that deceased Lachiram had signed the alleged Will in his presence. In the absence of such evidence, it is difficult to accept that the execution of the alleged Will was proved in accordance with law as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be true, as observed by the High Court, that the law does not emphasise that the witness must use the language of the section to prove the requisite merits thereof, but it is also not permissible to assume something which is required by law to be specifically proved. The High Court simply assumed that Lachiram must have put his signature on the Will Deed in the presence of the attesting witness, Sheikh Nabi, simply because the Deed of Adoption is admitted by the witness to have been executed on the same day. The High Court simply assumed that Lachiram must have put his signature on the Will Deed in the presence of the attesting witness, Sheikh Nabi, simply because the Deed of Adoption is admitted by the witness to have been executed on the same day. The High Court committed a serious error in making the observations that broad parameters of Nabi's evidence would show that Lachiram executed the Will in his presence, that he signed the Will being part of the execution of the testament and this evidence in its correct background would go to show that what was required under Section 63 has been carried out in the execution of the Will. With respect to the High Court, we may say that these findings of the High Court are clearly based on assumptions and surmises and are totally against the weight of the evidence on record. The trial court on a close and thorough analysis of the entire evidence came to a proper conclusion that the Will has not been proved in accordance with the law which finding has been further affirmed by the lower appellate court after an independent reappraisal of the entire evidence with which we find ourselves in agreement as there was hardly any scope or a valid reason for the High Court to interfere with. 12. Further, it may not be out of place to mention that sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (4) of Section 100 provides that when the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. But surprisingly enough, the High Court seems to have ignored these provisions and proposed to reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact without even formulating any question of law. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. There is a catena of decisions in support of this view. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. There is a catena of decisions in support of this view. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the present case discussed above, we are satisfied that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the well-reasoned findings of the two courts below. Consequently, this appeal must succeed.” (Emphasis supplied). 32. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rur Singh v. Bachan Kaur , (2009) 11 SCC 1 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 387 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 320 that it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of the Will. It was observed: “13. The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, exercises a limited jurisdiction. It may interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court and/or the first appellate court only in the event that a substantial question of law arises for its consideration. 14. The High Court framed only one substantial question of law, viz., whether the will had been duly proved and/or was otherwise genuine. It is essentially a question of fact. The learned trial Judge as also the first appellate court in opining that the will was genuine and free from suspicious circumstances inter alia took into consideration the existing materials on record viz. the parties ordinarily do not want their agricultural land to go out from the family and in that view of the matter if Kehar Singh had bequeathed his agricultural land only in favour of his sons and excluding the daughters from inheritance, no exception thereto could be taken. 18. The High Court essentially entered into the arena of the appreciation of evidence. It interfered with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below.” 33. It was held in Lisamma Antony v. Karthiyayani , (2015) 11 SCC 782 , that it is impermissible to interfere with the findings of fact under Section 100 of CPC. It was held: “11. It interfered with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below.” 33. It was held in Lisamma Antony v. Karthiyayani , (2015) 11 SCC 782 , that it is impermissible to interfere with the findings of fact under Section 100 of CPC. It was held: “11. It is a settled principle of law that a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot be admitted unless there is a substantial question of law involved in it. As to what is a substantial question of law, in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 ], this Court has explained the position of law as under : (SCC pp. 725-26, para 6) “6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in a second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in the second appeal.” 12. In view of the above position of law, the question formulated by the High Court in the present case, as quoted above, cannot be termed a question of law, much less a substantial question of law. The above question formulated is nothing but a question of fact. In view of the above position of law, the question formulated by the High Court in the present case, as quoted above, cannot be termed a question of law, much less a substantial question of law. The above question formulated is nothing but a question of fact. Merely for the reason that, on appreciation of evidence, another view could have been taken, it cannot be said that the High Court can assume the jurisdiction by terming such a question as a substantial question of law. 13. Having gone through the impugned order challenged before us and after considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the High Court has simply re-appreciated the evidence on record and allowed the second appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court.” 34. A similar view was taken in Narendra v. Ajabrao , (2018) 11 SCC 564, wherein it was observed:- “17. In the first place, we find that the High Court decided the second appeal like a first appeal under Section 96 of the Code inasmuch as the High Court went on appreciating the entire oral evidence and reversed the findings of fact of the first appellate court on the question of adverse possession. Such an approach of the High Court, in our opinion, was not permissible in law. 18. Second, the High Court failed to see that a plea of adverse possession is essentially a plea based on facts, and once the two courts, on appreciating the evidence, recorded that a finding may be of reversal, such a finding is binding on the second appellate court. It is more so as it did not involve any question of law, much less a substantial question of law. This aspect of law was also overlooked by the High Court. 19. Third, the High Court has the jurisdiction, in appropriate cases, to interfere in the finding of fact provided such finding is found to be wholly perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such a finding or when it is found to be against any settled principle of law, pleadings or evidence. Such errors constitute a question of law and empower the High Court to interfere. However, we do not find any such error here.” 35. Such errors constitute a question of law and empower the High Court to interfere. However, we do not find any such error here.” 35. It was held in Ramathal v. Maruthathal , (2018) 18 SCC 303 , that it is not appropriate for the High Court to disturb the concurrent findings of facts by re-appreciating the evidence and its jurisdiction is confined to the substantial question of law. It was observed:- “13. It was not appropriate for the High Court to embark upon the task of reappreciation of evidence in the second appeal and disturb the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below, which are the fact-finding courts. At this juncture, for better appreciation, we deem it appropriate to extract Sections 100 and 103 CPC, which read as follows: “100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated, and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such a question: *** 103. Power of the High Court to determine issues of fact.— In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by the court of first instance, and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.” 14. A clear reading of Sections 100 and 103 CPC envisages that a burden is placed upon the appellant to state in the memorandum of grounds of appeal the substantial question of law that is involved in the appeal, then the High Court being satisfied that such a substantial question of law arises for its consideration has to formulate the questions of law and decide the appeal. Hence, a prerequisite for entertaining a second appeal is a substantial question of law involved in the case, which has to be adjudicated by the High Court. It is the intention of the legislature to limit the scope of a second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved, and the amendment made to Section 100 makes the legislative intent clearer that it never wanted the High Court to be a fact-finding court. However, it is not an absolute rule that the High Court cannot interfere in a second appeal on a question of fact. Section 103 CPC enables the High Court to consider the evidence when the same has been wrongly determined by the courts below, on which a substantial question of law arises, as referred to in Section 100. When the appreciation of evidence suffers from material irregularities, and when there is perversity in the findings of the court which are not based on any material, the court is empowered to interfere on a question of fact as well. Unless and until there is absolute perversity, it would not be appropriate for the High Courts to interfere in a question of fact just because two views are possible; in such circumstances, the High Courts should refrain from exercising the jurisdiction on a question of fact. 15. When the intention of the legislature is so clear, the courts have no power to enlarge the scope of Section 100 for whatsoever reasons. Justice has to be administered in accordance with the law. In the case at hand, the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the wellconsidered judgment of the courts below, which is based on cogent reasoning. The learned Judge ought not to have entered the arena of reappreciation of the evidence, hence the whole exercise done by the High Court is beyond the scope and jurisdiction conferred under Section 100 CPC.” 36. The learned Judge ought not to have entered the arena of reappreciation of the evidence, hence the whole exercise done by the High Court is beyond the scope and jurisdiction conferred under Section 100 CPC.” 36. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh , (2019) 7 SCC 641 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 709 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 374, that where the First Appellate Court had appreciated the facts regarding the execution of the Will, it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with this findings of fact in second appeal under Section 100 of CPC. It was observed: “15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in reappreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the first appellate court, which were on reappreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the first appellate court in the exercise of powers under Section 96 CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the first appellate court. The first appellate court dealt with, in detail, the so-called suspicious circumstances which weighed with the learned trial court, and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the will, which as such was a registered will, was genuine and did not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the first appellate court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order [Lehna Singh v. Gurnam Singh, Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 2191 of 1985, order dated 27-11-2007 (P&H)], the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC.” 37. Similarly, it was held in C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy , (2020) 4 SCC 659 , that the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact unless there is perversity or the same is de hors the evidence led before the Courts: “25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 ], it was held that findings of fact could not have been interfered with in the second appeal. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 12-15) “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to deciding a substantial question of law if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below, without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu [Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu, (1996) 3 SCC 392 ], this Court held : (SCC p. 393) ‘It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of the trial court and the first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE . The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did.’ 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty [Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC 166 ], this Court held : (SCC p. 166) ‘Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material.’ 15. And again in Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath MallisseriIllath M.N. [Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath MallisseriIllath M.N., (1997) 4 SCC 484 ], this Court held : (SCC p. 486, para 5) 5. And again in Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath MallisseriIllath M.N. [Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath MallisseriIllath M.N., (1997) 4 SCC 484 ], this Court held : (SCC p. 486, para 5) 5. … The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording a reverse finding of fact, which is impermissible.” 38. Thus, it is not permissible for this Court to reappreciate the evidence when no perversity has been shown. Since, in the present case, the learned Courts below have recorded their findings on the evidence, it is not permissible to interfere with the same. 39. The Will (Ext.PW-2/A) mentions that Saju was kept with the condition that if he would faithfully serve and hand over all the income to Padu during his lifetime, Padu would hand over his daughter, Hima, to Saju. In case no son was born to Padu, the property would be handed over to Hima and Saju after the death of Padu. 40. Tara Chand (PW-2) also stated that Padu had expressed a desire that Saju would serve Padu and his wife and would hand over the income to Padu; thus, it was a conditional will and would come into effect on the fulfilment of the condition. 41. Hima Devi (PW-1) stated that the land belonged to her father. She had married Saju. She and Saju used to look after the property. Her father had expressed a desire that the property would be owned by her, after his death. She remained in possession of the property. She has nowhere stated in her examination-in-chief that Saju had served Padu and his wife and handed the income over to him. Thus, her statement does not show that the conditions laid down in the Will were satisfied. 42. Narainu (PW-3) stated in his examination-in-chief that Saju used to cultivate the land of Padu. Saju and his wife, Hima, used to serve Padu and his wife. This witness has not stated that Sanju used to hand over the income of the property to Padu as desired by him in the Will; therefore, the Will propounded by the plaintiffs does not confer an indefensible right or title on the appellants as the necessary condition laid down in the Will was not fulfilled. 43. This witness has not stated that Sanju used to hand over the income of the property to Padu as desired by him in the Will; therefore, the Will propounded by the plaintiffs does not confer an indefensible right or title on the appellants as the necessary condition laid down in the Will was not fulfilled. 43. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. 44. The record of the learned Courts below be returned alongwith a copy of this judgment.