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2026 DAILYLAW 1641 (AP)

Arikatla Kishore, v. The State of Andhra Pradesh,

WP/12930/2026 · 2026-05-04

Y Lakshmana Rao

body2026

Judgment text

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APHC010235722026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] TUESDAY,THE FIFTH DAY OF MAY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO WRIT PETITION NO: 12930/2026 Between: 1. ARIKATLA KISHORE,, S/O LATE ARIKATIA RAJA GOPALA KRISHNA AGED 46 YEARS, WORKED AS I.T.ADMINISTRATOR, R/O KUMBALANURU, 1ST CAMP VILLAGE, KOWTHALAM MANDAL, KURNOOL DISTRICT -518 333. 2. ARIKATLA NAGA JYOTHI,, W/O ARIKATLA KISHORE, AGED 45 YEARS, WORKED AS I.T.ADMINISTRATOR, R/O KUMBALANURU, 1ST CAMP VILLAGE, KOWTHALAM MANDAL, KURNOOL DISTRICT -518 333. ...PETITIONER(S) AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT. 2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT. 3. THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE CID/EOW, DGP HEAD QUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH - 522 503. 4. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT, S.P.OFFICE, KRISHNA PARK, TTD ROAD, SRIKAKULAM ANDHRA PRADESH - 532 001. 2 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 5. THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, KOTABOMMALI POLICE STATION KOTABOMMALI, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH - 532 195. 6. SAMALLA VIJAYA LAKSHMI, D/O.SAMALLA ABBAYI, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, PLOT NO.6 PRASANTH NAGAR COLONY, BALAGA, SRIKAKULAM, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT-532 001. 7. VAJJA RUSHIKUMAR, S/O. LATE ESWARARAO, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, R/O. KALINGA STREET, BORUBHADRA VILLAGE SANTHABOMMALI MANDAL, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT - 532 195. 8. MUDDAPU MANISHA, D/O. SAIBABU, AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS, R/O. PRASANTHINAGAR COLONY, BALAGA, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT - 532 001. 9. KAMMILA VEERANDHARA BABU, , S/O. SATYANARAYANA, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.31143/1, VENKATESWARAMETTA, ALLIPURAM, VISAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT - 530 004. 10. SAMALLA KRISHNA RAO, S/O. KAMESHWAR RAO, AGED NOT KNOWN, BORUBADHRA VILLAGE, JIYYANNA PETA, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT-532 195. 11. KORRIPALLI VARALAKSHMI, W/O. EESWAR RAO, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.2-3-36, DCCB COLONY, SANA STREET, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT - 532 001. 12. PINNINTI KARTEEK AND KRISHNAVENI, S/O. AND W/O PRABHAKAR, AGED ABOUT 37 AND 55 YEARS, R/O. KALINGA STREET, RAJAPURAM VILLAGE, KAVITI MANDAL, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT - 532 322. 13. DUVVARAPU RAMBABU, , C/O. SAMALLA VIJAYA LAXMI, AGED NOT KNOWN. PLOT NO.6, PRASANTH NAGAR COLONY BALAGA, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT - 532 001. 14. VIROTHI LAKSHMI, C/O. VIROTHI MAHESH, AGED NOT KNOWN, R/O. NO.52, KANAKALA STREET, NEAR SARSWATHI PARK DHABA GARDENS, VISHAKAPATNAM DISTRICT - 530 020. 15. VIROTHI LOKESH, , C/O. VIROTHI MAHESH, AGED NOT KNOWN, R/O. NO.52, KANAKALA STREET, NEAR SARSWATHI PARK, 3 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 DHABA GARDENS, VISHAKAPATNAM DISTRICT - 530 020. 16. VIROTHI MAHESH, , C/O. VIROTHI LOKESH, AGED NOT KNOWN, R/O. NO.52, KANAKALA STREET NEAR SARSWATHI PARK, DHABA GARDENS, VISHAKAPATNAM DISTRICT - 530 020. 17. SAMALLA ABBAYI, S/O. LATE RAMULU, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/O. HANUMAN STREET, BORUBHADRA VILLAGE, SANTHABOMMALIMANDAL SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT-532 195. 18. SAMALLA MANAMMA, W/O. SAMALLA ABBAI, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, R/O. HANUMAN STREET, BORUBHADRA VILLAGE, SANTHABOMMALI MANDAL SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT-532 195. 19. BOYINA NAGARAJU, S/O. NOT KNOWN. AGED NOT KNOWN, R/O. VYSYA STREET, KOTABOMMALI, SRIKAKULAM DISTRICT - 532 195. ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner(S): NARASIMHA RAO GUDISEVA Counsel for the Respondent(S): GP FOR HOME The Court made the following: ORDER: The Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:- “…to issue a Writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus by declaring the action things and Deeds of Respondents in not changing the investigation Agency with the Crime Investigation Department Economic Offences Wing or in conducting proper investigation or filing the Final Report in respect of F I R in Crime No 16/2023 dated 23.0102023 for the offences punishable 468, 471, 506 r/w 120b, 420 of IPC on the file of the 5th Respondent Police Station which is illegal irregular arbitrary against to the Principles of Natural Justice contrary to the provisions of Cr. P. C. /BNSS 2023 and in 4 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 violation of Articles 14 19 and 21 of Constitution of India consequently direct the Respondents to change the Investigation Agency with the Crime Investigation Department Economic Offences Wing thereby direct to proceed with further investigation and to file the Final Report in respect of F I R in Crime No 16/2023 dated 23.01.2023 for the offences punishable under Section 468, 471, 506 r/w 120b, 420 of I P C on the file of 5th Respondent Police Station and to pass…” 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Assistant Government Pleader. 3. Sri Narasimha Rao Gudiseva, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that although the complaint lodged by the petitioners was registered as a case against Accused in F.I.R.No.16 of 2023, dated 23.01.2023 on the file of Kotabommali Police Station, Srikakulam District, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 468, 471, 506 read with 120b, 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the IPC’), by Respondent No.5, he has failed to proceed with the investigation and has not taken any steps to file the charge sheet. 4. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader, on written instructions, submits that the investigation is at progressive stage, charge sheet would be filed after completion of the investigation. 5. Be that as it may, the Respondent No.5 is duty bound to conduct a thorough, fair, impartial and effective investigation and conduct the investigation to the logical end as per the procedure. 5 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 6. In this regard, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A. Shankar v. State1, wherein at paragraph Nos.15 and 20, it is held as under: 15. If the high court directs, at a stage prior to conclusion of investigation, that a charge-sheet has invariably to be fled upon closure of investigation in a particular case irrespective of what the materials are which have been collected during investigation and without allowing the investigating officer to form his own opinion as regards the next course of action, that would take away the discretion of such officer and he would be left with no other option but to proceed in the direction as required by the high court under pain of threat of contempt. Other than very extreme cases, the high courts ought to exercise restraint and not issue such directions which foreclose the discretion of the executive. 20. However, if the high court proceeds to make a direction that charge-sheets should be fled upon conclusion of investigation or that a trial should be concluded within a particular time-frame, without even attempting to ascertain the stage the trial has reached, the consequence of such an order could be far-reaching. The concept of a fair trial could be rendered a casualty. Directions of the nature made by the learned Judge amounts to improper exercise of writ jurisdiction and such an approach cannot but be disapproved by us. 7. Therefore, in A. Shankar supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court should not, at the stage of investigation, direct the filing of a charge-sheet, as it would curtail the discretion of the investigating officer and amount to an improper exercise of jurisdiction. It was further held that issuing directions to file charge-sheets or to conclude trials within a fixed timeframe, without considering the stage of the proceedings, may prejudice a fair trial and is liable to be disapproved. 1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 120 6 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 8. Further, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan2, wherein at paragraph Nos.9 to 11, it is held as under: 9. In exercise of these wide-ranging powers - was it justified to direct time bound completion of investigation? The investigation of an offence is a long, winding road. It is full of ups and downs and is not, possibly, even for a moment, predictable in the true sense. There can be delays in the investigation, witnesses who at one point in time appeared confident, may begin to hesitate or completely resile from their statement, documentary evidence on which much hope was pinned, may turn out to be unusable or so many other such possibilities may occur. Legal proceedings frequently intersect with the investigation and affect its pace and direction. Applications for anticipatory bail, regular bail, or the like can result in temporary pauses or changes in strategy. Courts may call for further investigation, ask for clarification on specific aspects or even direct a change of the investigating officer. Each such intervention requires the investigating agency to revisit its work and sometimes take a fresh path altogether. So, it can be seen that the investigative process is at times straight, at other times one of lots of twists, turn and recalibrations and in yet others, frustratingly round-about like, before it can come to a somewhat definitive conclusion to present the case for trial before the concerned, and sometimes, even at that time the definitive conclusion, at least from an investigator's standpoint, remains elusive. While all this may undoubtedly be true, it is also unquestionably so that it cannot be an excuse for avoidable delay. Speedy trial, which necessarily includes timely and diligent investigation, has been recognized as an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution and is essential to the fairness and credibility of the criminal justice system. Undue delay prejudices not only the accused, whose liberty and reputation remain under a cloud, but also the victim and society at large, for whom justice loses meaning when it is endlessly deferred. The challenge, therefore, lies in balancing the practical realities of investigation with the constitutional mandate that criminal proceedings, from investigation through trial, be conducted with reasonable promptitude and care. It is this balancing role that the judiciary plays. It is for those reasons that while on the one hand there is a statutorily laid down process in place which is generally followed, powers such as that of Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 197314 have been kept open in their widest sense possible- to secure the ends of justice. 10. Courts have consistently recognized that directing a time-bound investigation must remain the exception rather than the norm. Investigation is, as can be seen from the above discussion, a product of many factors and happenings apart from the crime itself, that lend 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2894 7 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 to it a sense of uncertainty and the law therefore accords investigating agencies a reasonable degree of latitude. At the same time, the Constitution does not permit investigations to remain open- ended. The Supreme Court has long held that the right to a speedy trial, which necessarily includes a timely and diligent investigation, forms an essential part of Article 21, as first recognized by a Constitution Bench in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar15, and later elaborated by another Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak16. It is in this constitutional setting that courts have, in appropriate cases, intervened where delay itself begins to cause prejudice. Where there is evident stagnation, unexplained inaction, or a pattern of delay that cannot be justified by the nature or complexity of the case, judicial directions fixing timelines have been considered warranted. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India17, the Court emphasized the need for prompt and effective investigation, particularly where delay risks allowing serious matters to drift without resolution. More recently, in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar18, the Court reaffirmed that investigations cannot be allowed to continue endlessly, and that prolonged and unexplained delay between the registration of an FIR and the filing of a chargesheet may itself infringe Article 21, especially where such delay keeps an individual under a continuing cloud of suspicion without meaningful progress. Courts have also been mindful of the impact of prolonged investigation on personal liberty, particularly where coercive measures or extended custody are involved. In such cases, fixing timelines is viewed not as an intrusion into the investigative domain, but as a safeguard against inertia and arbitrariness. At the same time, the Supreme Court has cautioned against routine or mechanical directions for time-bound investigation, reiterating in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja19, that the manner and pace of investigation ordinarily lie within the investigator's domain. What emerges, therefore, is a balanced approach: courts respect the practical realities of investigation, yet intervene where delay itself threatens fairness, liberty, or the integrity of the criminal justice process. 11. The necessary conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that timelines are not drawn by the Court to be followed by the investigators/the executive right from the beginning, for that would clearly amount to stepping on the toes of the latter. Timelines are therefore imposed at a point where not doing so would have adverse consequences i.e., there is material on record demonstrating undue delays, stagnation, or the like. In sum, timelines are imposed reactively and not prophylactically. As such, the timelines imposed by the High Court need to be interfered with and set aside. Ordered accordingly. 9. Similarly, in Mohd. Arshad Khan supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that time-bound investigation should be an exception, as the 8 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 process is inherently uncertain and influenced by multiple factors, though undue delay cannot be justified in view of the right to speedy trial under Article 21. Courts may intervene and fix timelines only where there is clear stagnation or unexplained delay causing prejudice, and not as a routine measure; hence such directions must be imposed sparingly and reactively. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent No.5 is directed to complete the investigation and take appropriate steps, either by filing a charge sheet or a final report before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate, within a reasonable time, in accordance with law, and submit about the results of the investigation to the respondent No.3. 11. With the above observations and directions, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 05.05.2026 RSI 9 Dr. YLR, J W.P.No.12930 of 2026 Dated 05.05.2026 95 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO WRIT PETITION No.12930 of 2026 Date: 05.05.2026 RSI