1 2026:CGHC:5404-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 140 of 2022 • State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Korba, District Korba, Chhattigarh. ….Appellant versus 1. Durgesh Vishwakarma @ Sonu, S/o Ashok Vishwakarma, aged about 23 Years, 2. Ashok Vishwakarma, S/o Late Shri Sarju Vishwakarma, aged about 45 Years, 3. Smt. Sangita Devi Vishwakarma, W/o Shri Ashok Vishwakarma, aged about 40 Years, All are R/o Village Amraiyapara, Police Outpost Manikpur, Police Station Korba, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Appellant/State : Mr. Ram Narayan Sahu, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Anshul Tiwari, Advocate. Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board 31.01.2026 Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 1. This acquittal appeal preferred by the Appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 02.03.2021 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Korba, District Korba, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.09/2019, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.02.03 17:09:20 +0530 2 persons/respondents herein of the charges under Sections 498-A/34 and 304-B of Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') on the basis of benefit of doubt. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 19.08.2018, PW-1 Geeta De, mother of the deceased- Tripti De, lodged a merg intimation (Ex.P-2), stating that her daughter/deceased had been married to respondent No.1 Durgesh Vishwakarma @ Sonu about one and a half years prior to the incident. Due to an inter-caste marriage, in-laws of the deceased were not accepting her and for that reason, deceased and respondent No.1 were residing in a rented house. It was further stated that on account of domestic disputes, frequent quarrels used to take place between the deceased and respondent No.1. On the night of 18.08.2018 also, a quarrel took place between them for the same reason and respondent No.1 himself informed her over the mobile phone that the deceased had closed the door from inside the house and was not opening it despite repeated attempts. Thereafter, she went to the house of the deceased, broke the door of the house and found deceased committed suicide by hanging. On the basis of said merg intimation (Ex.P-2), FIR (Ex.P-12) was registered against the accused persons/respondents. Thereafter, inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-5 and dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination where PW-12 Dr. Krishna Kanvar conducted the postmortem examination and gave his report vide Ex.P-16. According to PW-12 Dr. Krishna Kanvar, cause of death of deceased was asphyxia and venous congestion due to hanging and the nature of death of deceased was suicidal. During investigation, spot map was 3 prepared vide Ex.P-1 and the statements of the witnesses were recorded. 3. After completing investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons/respondents before the concerned trial Court. Accused persons/respondents abjured their guilt and prayed for trial. 4. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons/respondents herein of said charge leveled against them. 5. Learned counsel for the Appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court is unjustified in acquitting the accused persons/respondents herein of said charges by recording perverse findings. He further submits that the evidence available on record clearly shows that after marriage and soon before her death, deceased- Tripti De was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry by the respondents, due to which, she committed suicide by hanging herself and the said fact is also as is evident from the statements of PW-1 Geeta De, mother of the deceased and PW-2 brother of the deceased and despite there being cogent and reliable evidence, the learned trial Court committed grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondents without appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused persons/respondents supports the impugned judgment and submits 4 that it is not proved by the prosecution that any demand of dowry was ever made by the respondents and even soon before her death. He further submits that prior to the incident, neither the deceased nor her relatives had lodged any report alleging demand of dowry or harassment by the accused persons. Therefore, the learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence available on record, rightly acquitted the accused persons, which needs no interference by this Court. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Anr. vs State of Madhya Pradesh1. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala2 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 9. In order to convict an accused for an offence under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the following essential ingredients must be satisfied: “304-B Dowry Death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise 1 (2024) 12 SCC 202 2 (2022) 8 SCC 440 5 than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).......” 10. To attract the provisions of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against the accused/respondent, the following ingredients, as provided under the Section, are required to be examined, which read as follows: “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "cruelty means"— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 11. In the light of the above enunciation of law, the facts of the present case are required to be examined minutely. 12. The fact that the death of deceased- Tripti De was unnatural is not in dispute. According to the medical evidence of Dr. Krishna Kanwar (PW-12) and the postmortem report (Ex.P-16), the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging and the nature of death was suicidal. No external or internal injuries suggestive of physical assault were found 6 on the body of the deceased. Thus, the medical evidence clearly establishes that the death of the deceased was suicidal in nature. 13. The primary issue before this Court is whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry, particularly soon before her death. 14. PW-1 mother of the deceased stated that on 18.08.2018 at about 7:30 p.m., deceased and accused/respondent No.1 left her house and went to their rented house at Krishna Nagar. She further deposed that the deceased had informed her that the parents of respondent No.1 were demanding a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- and that only upon payment of the said amount they would accept her. She also stated that she had sought time to arrange the said amount, yet the accused persons used to frequently quarrel with the deceased. However, in her cross- examination, she admitted that the deceased was in a love relationship with accused/respondent No.1- Durgesh, and that the deceased had voluntarily gone to Rourkela along with him, and that the parents of respondent No.1 were unhappy with their relationship. She also admitted that, on account of the said relationship, in an earlier criminal case, the parents of the accused- Durgesh, did not stand surety for him and that she herself arranged and furnished bail for the accused/respondent No.1. She also admitted that she had not lodged any complaint against the accused persons alleging demand of dowry. She also admitted that after the release of respondent No.1 from jail, he did not go to his parents’ house and instead came to her house along with the deceased. Thus, the evidence of PW-1 shows that the deceased and accused/respondent No.1 were living together by their own choice and that the allegation of demand of dowry is not 7 supported by any prior complaint or independent evidence. Her testimony, therefore, does not clearly establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry, particularly soon before her death. 15. PW-2 brother of the deceased also failed to give specific details regarding the alleged dowry demand and admitted that he had no personal knowledge of any such demand being made by accused persons soon before the death of deceased. 16. PW-3 Babita Chouhan, in whose house the deceased and respondent No.1 were staying, stated that on 18.08.2018, deceased came to her and said that accused- Durgesh was not allowing her to go to her parental home on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan. Thereafter, accused- Durgesh also came and stated that he had not restrained her. After that, she advised the deceased not to go as it was already late, after which the deceased returned to her room. She further stated that after about half an hour, accused- Durgesh informed her that the door of the room was not opening. She knocked the door but received no response. Accused- Durgesh then tried to open the door with the help of other tenants and subsequently went to call the police and the mother of the deceased. She later came to know that the police had broken the door and the deceased was found hanging. From the evidence of this witness, it is evident that there was a quarrel between the deceased and accused- Durgesh on that day, but there is no evidence to show that the accused/respondent No.1 had physically or mentally harassed the deceased or prevented her from going to her parental home. The witness’s testimony only shows a disagreement and the unfortunate 8 incident of suicide, without establishing any act of cruelty or dowry- related harassment by the accused persons. 17. Thus, from perusal of the above evidence, it is evident that there is nothing on record to show that the accused persons subjected the deceased to cruelty for the demand of dowry soon before her death and instigated her to commit suicide. The mother of the deceased (PW-1) herself admitted that prior to the incident, neither she nor the deceased had lodged any report against the accused persons regarding any demand of dowry. Further, in the merg intimation (Ex.P-2), mother of the deceased did not state that the accused persons demanded dowry; she only mentioned that there were ordinary quarrels between the deceased and respondent No.1. No specific demand, incident, date or continuous conduct of harassment constituting cruelty within the meaning of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC has been proved by the prosecution. The evidence led by the prosecution is general, vague, and omnibus in nature. In view of the same, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any dowry demand soon before her death by the accused persons. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC against the accused persons/respondents and the learned trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to them. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund (supra) has held in paras 12 & 13 which read as under:- 9 “12. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 13. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the appellate court is very well crystallised. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment¹, which are as reproduced below: (Ballu case3, SCC OnLine MP paras 13-14) “13. In Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court has held that: (SCC pp. 365-66, paras 20-21) '20…. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal…. 21….. has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded.’ 14. Similarly, in Harijan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarats4, the Supreme Court has held that: (SCC p. 668, para 12) 12. No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded 3 State of M.P. v. Ballu, 2018 SCC Online MP 1924 4 (2016) 12 SCC 665 10 acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight d of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open for the appellate court to express the right conclusion after reappreciating the evidence if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused.” 19. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen & Ballu (supra), the view taken by the learned trial Court appears to be a plausible and possible view. In the absence of any patent illegality or perversity, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 20. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the Appellant/State against the acquittal of accused persons/respondents is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh