- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1060 OF 2025 (POS) BETWEEN: A RANGASWAMY AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS S/O. LATE AKAMBARAM RESIDING AT NO. 49/23, 9TH CROSS, MAGADI ROAD, BENGALURU - 560023 …APPELLANT (BY SRI. K B S MANIAN., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SHIVARAJ AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS RESIDENTS OF NO. 64/2, 2ND CROSS, MINAJ NAGAR, JP NAGAR, BENGALURU-560078 2. YASHODA N.C. W/O. SHIVARAJ, RESIDENTS OF NO. 64/2, 2ND CROSS, MINAJ NAGAR, JP NAGAR, BENGALURU-560078 3. MIRLE VARADARAJU NO. 544, 5TH MAIN, Digitally signed by NAGARAJA B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 KENGERI SATELLITE TOWN, BENGALURU - 560060 4. R. MANJUNATH NO. 1174, PADUVANA ROAD, 1ST CROSS, ROAD IV STAGE, TK LAYOUT, KUVEMPU NAGAR, MYSORE-570023 …RESPONDENTS [BY SRI. SHARATH S GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 & C/R2 (CP 6431/25)] THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC.96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 18.03.2025 PASSED IN OS NO.26160/2018 ON THE FILE OF LVII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, MAYO HALL UNIT, BENGALURU., DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR DICTATING ORDERS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM ORAL JUDGMENT The captioned appeal is by the unsuccessful plaintiff assailing the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.26160/2018 wherein the relief of mandatory injunction sought by the plaintiff is declined by the Court. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 3. The facts leading to the case are as under: The suit schedule property is bearing No.633 measuring 32 x 40 ft. Plaintiff claims to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule property, which according to the plaintiff, is situated in a private residential layout formed by the REMCO(BHEL) Housing Society. Plaintiff asserts that he was an employee of BHEL and that the suit site was allotted to him by the REMCO vide allotment letter dated 31.01.1992 pursuant to which registered sale deed came to be executed on 14.12.1992. Plaintiff further asserts that possession was delivered by the housing society under Possession Certificate dated 1.4.1993. The grievance of the plaintiff is that defendants encroached upon small corner portion of the suit schedule property measuring 7 ft. x 5 ft. and erected a temporary shed. Plaintiff also specifically pleaded that he had instituted a suit for injunction simpliciter in O.S.No.2029/2017 and the plaint was rejected by the trial Court by order dated 7.9.2018 holding that no cause of action was made out. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 The said order of rejection was also challenged in RFA.No.1602/2018, which was also dismissed by this Court. After dismissal of appeal, plaintiff has instituted the present suit seeking the relief of mandatory injunction. 4. Defendants upon receipt of summons tendered appearance, filed written statement and stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. The defendants in their written statement categorically contended that they are the lawful owners of the land in question, the sale deed relied on by the plaintiff executed by REMCO is void and unenforceable in view of quashing of acquisition proceedings. The defendants further elaborately have pleaded that the acquisition in favour of BHEL/REMCO has been declared as illegal and opposed to public policy by the writ Court in W.P.21920/2010 and this order is affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It is in this backdrop, the defendants claimed that present suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 short "CPC") and therefore, the earlier plaint having been rejected and affirmed by this Court in an appeal, the present suit is clear abuse of process of Court. 5. The Trial Court formulated appropriate issues and plaintiff and defendants have let in oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims. 6. The trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and also adverting to the judgments rendered in the earlier round of litigation answered issues 1 to 6 in the negative and 7 and 8 in the affirmative and dismissed the suit. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff reiterating the grounds would vehemently argue and contend that the nature of the relief sought in the earlier suit and the present suit are distinct and different and therefore, provisions of Order II Rule 2 of CPC are not all applicable. Though, plaintiff's counsel on a query raised - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 by this Court candidly acknowledged that the acquisition proceedings are quashed, dehors the quashing of the proceedings he would vehemently argue and contend that the plaintiff's title is intact and subsisting as the land owners have parallely entered into settlement with the Housing Society by paying the entire sale consideration to the owners and therefore, the sale deed obtained by the plaintiff through the housing board stands ratified by the actions of the original owners. Therefore, he would contend that the quashing of the acquisition proceedings will not take away the rights accrued by the plaintiff and therefore, the relief of mandatory injunction which is based on title is maintainable and trial Court misread the prayer sought in the plaint and also the evidence let in by the plaintiff in support of their contention. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the defendants adverting to the findings recorded by this Court in RFA.No.1602/2018 and also adverting to the admitted fact of quashing of the acquisition proceedings - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 submits that the present suit is hit by Order II Rule 2 of CPC and suit seeking the relief of mandatory injunction with a defecting schedule is not maintainable. 9. Having heard the learned counsel on record, this Court has independently examined the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence is also independently assessed by this Court. 10. The following points would arise for consideration: "(i) Whether plaintiff could have maintained the suit for mandatory injunction without seeking the relief of declaration of his title? (ii) Whether plaintiff is entitled to seek the relief of mandatory injunction when the lands in question though initially notified for acquisition, the said acquisition proceedings were quashed by this Court and affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court? - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 (iii) Whether rejection of plaint in O.S.No.2029/2017 and affirmed by this Court in RFA.No.1602/2018 operates as a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC? (iv) What Order?" Since point Nos.(i) to (iii) are correlated and intertwined, this Court is compelled to record its findings by taking the points together. Findings on point Nos.(i) to (iii): 11. The foundation of the plaintiff's claim rests entirely on the allotment letter, sale deed and possession certificate issued by the REMCO Housing Society. However, plaintiff himself admits that the acquisition proceedings in favour of REMCO stood quashed by this Court and affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Once the acquisition proceedings are set aside, REMCO ceases to have any statutory authority or legal competence to form layouts or convey title to its members. This crucial aspect is admitted in the plaint, therefore, this Court deems it fit - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 to extract para 9 of the plaint, which would clinch the core controversy and plaintiff's right to trace title through REMCO. Para 9 of the plaint reads as under: "9. The Plaintiff states that the Defendants 3 to 4 are part of a land mafia syndicate indulging in land grabbing. The Plaintiff has learnt from the REMCO Society and several of the allottees of the Layout, that the acquisition of lands by the REMCO Society by the State Government was set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India sometime in 1995, on account of certain irregularities in the manner in which the statutory power of acquisition was exercised by the Government of Karnataka in the matter of acquisition of lands for the formation of the residential layouts by several housing societies including the REMCO Society. The Supreme Court however reserved liberty to the Societies to enter into private negotiations and transactions with the land owners for acquisition of rights over the lands, notwithstanding the setting aside of the land acquisition, considering the fact that several layouts were already fully formed and several allottees had already constructed their houses. The Plaintiffs states that as the residential layout was fully formed and several allottees had already constructed their houses, the REMCO Society entered into private negotiations with the original land owners and after paying additional consideration got executed Declaration cum Ratification Deeds from the land owners in the year 2000 in terms of which the land owners - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 ratified the sale deeds executed in favour of the allottees including that of the Plaintiff by reference to the agreements of sale executed in favour of the REMCO Society privately in the 1980's even prior to the acquisition of lands was proposed by the Government and expressly confirmed possession and title of the lands in the REMCO Society and their allottees. The land owners also undertook not to interfere with the possession of the lands by the REMCO Society or their allottees. The Plaintiff is producing a copy of the Declaration Cum Ratification Deed executed by the land owners in which the suit schedule property is situated as Annexure F hereto. The Plaintiff further states that certain suits filed by the land owners against the Society also came to be compromised vide compromise decrees in similar terms wherein the land owners relinquished their rights over the lands and undertook not to disturb the possession of the REMCO Society and their allottees. A copy of the compromise decree is produced herewith as Annexure G." (Emphasis Supplied) On reading the extracted portion, the assertion of the plaintiff that the land owners have subsequently ratified the sale deeds by executing a declaration/ratification deeds is not substantiated by producing admissible documentary evidence. Though records reveal that liberty was reserved by the Hon'ble Apex Court to enter - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 into negotiations with the land owners such liberty only enabled the Housing Society to independently negotiate and acquire right over the land owners through legally recognized modes. 12. Though there are bald assertion in the plaint regarding housing society entering into agreements, the said assertion is not supported by documentary evidence indicating the REMCO entering into an agreement with the land owners, much less such agreement culminated in conveyance of valid title. 13. The plaintiff while being fully conscious of cloud cast on title has approached the Court by filing a suit seeking the relief of mandatory injunction. The records unequivocally disclose that the plaintiff earlier had instituted a suit for injunction simpliciter in O.S.No.2029/2017 seeking the same relief arising out of same alleged interference and encroachment. The cause of action pleaded therein and the cause of action pleaded - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 in the present suit emanate from the same alleged acts of the defendants. This Court therefore, deems it fit to advert to the findings recorded in RFA.1602/2018, which reads as under: "12. On over all meaningful and meticulous reading and understanding of the above said paragraphs, it is clearly stated by the plaintiff that the incident took place on 3.3.2017 in the evening; the defendants first time have attempted to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff's illegally and forcibly attempted to enter into the suit schedule property. But however, it appears that the plaintiff was successful in restraining the defendants from entering into the suit schedule property at that time. Again it is categorically stated by the plaintiff that 2nd attempt was made to trespass into the suit schedule property on the relevant date i.e., on 16.3.2017 and the jurisdictional police have not come to the aid of the plaintiff and have tacitly allowed the defendants no.1 to 3 to commit trespass into the suit schedule property. The plaintiff further stated that with the help of hoodlums, the defendants no. 1 to 3 have hurriedly with hollow blocks constructed an incomplete compound wall and a temporary shed with sheet roof and on the same day have hurriedly with the connivance of BESCOM officials electricity was drawn directly from the electric pole in an attempt to show possession. If this paragraph is read meticulously and meaningfully, it shows that it is alleged - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 that in order to show possession, the defendants have trespassed into the property of the plaintiff and constructed a compound wall and also a shed in the suit schedule property. Showing the possession is something different from actually entering the property and putting up construction. Therefore, it is clear from the averments of the plaint that the defendants are rightly or wrongly entered into the possession of the suit schedule property and done some alleged wrongful act on the suit schedule property, which is sought to be restrained by way of filing an injunction suit. 13. Para no.11 of the plaint shows that, the defendants have made attempts to interfere with the plaintiff's possession. If that would have been continued, the plaintiff was perfectly right in filing a suit for injunction. But, in furtherance of the same, the pleadings at para No.13, plaintiff goes one step forward to say that the defendants have not only attempted to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff's property but also actually trespassed into the suit schedule property and done some wrongful acts by putting up construction and shed over the suit schedule property. If the defendants had put up any construction in the suit schedule property, the plaintiff would have taken appropriate legal action for mandatory injunction and for other reliefs. Therefore, when all these facts are within the knowledge of the court, it has to see what exactly the situation or placement of the parties with reference to the property, particularly with reference to the prayer sought for in the - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 plaint. When the plaintiff himself has categorically stated that temporarily or for the transient period the plaintiff has been dispossessed from the suit schedule property, then as rightly held by the trial court it may be a suit for possession ought to have been filed by the plaintiff. 14. At the initial stage itself when the plaintiff has created a cloud with regard to the possession by himself by saying so in the plaint, in my opinion, the trial court has not committed any error in rejecting the plaint. If for any reason by proceeding with the matter, ultimately the court holds that the plaintiff is not in possession, it would cause prejudice to either of the parties, if no opportunity is granted to correct the pleadings by the plaintiff in particular. 15. Under the above said circumstances, even relying on the above said decisions, I do not find any strong reasons to interfere with the orders passed by the trial court. Hence, the appeal is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed." (Emphasis Supplied) Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions and on meticulous examination of the pleadings and material on record, this Court finds that the very substratum of the plaintiff’s claim stands irreparably - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 shaken. The plaintiff traces his title exclusively through the allotment made by the REMCO Housing Society. However, it is not in dispute and in fact stands admitted in the plaint itself that the acquisition proceedings undertaken by the State Government in favour of the said Society came to be quashed by this Court in the reported decision in Narayana Reddy .vs. State of Karnataka1, which judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, the legal consequence that inevitably flows is that the Society stood denuded of any statutory authority to deal with the land in question. 14. In this regard, it would be apposite to extract the relevant findings recorded by this Court in the aforesaid reported judgment, which go to the root of the matter, which reads thus: "49. To sum up, our conclusions on the main issues arising for consideration in these petitions, are as follow: 1 ILR 1991 KAR 2248 - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 "(1) As a result of the amendment to Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by the Amending Act 68 of 1984, Co-operative Societies stand classified into the following two categories: (A) Those co-operative societies which fall within the expression “Corporation owned or controlled by the State” as defined in Section 3(cc) of the Act. In other words, the co-operative societies which fall within the meaning of the word “State” as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. (B) All other co-operative societies, namely, which fall within the meaning of the word “company” as defined in Section 3(e) of the Act. (2) Acquisition of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or a slurp clearance scheme sponsored by a co-operative society, which is a company, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government constitutes a public purpose and therefore it is not necessary to follow the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1973. (3) It is not obligatory for the Government to give opportunity of hearing to the owners of land before according prior approval for acquisition of and in favour of a co-operative society, which is company, for carrying out a Housing Scheme sponsored by it as the Karnataka Land Acquisition - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 (Companies) Rules 1973, are not applicable, as such acquisition of land would be an acquisition for public purpose and not for a company and as no separate rules have been framed prescribing such requirement for granting prior approval. (4) In the absence of any Rules prescribing the requirements of a housing scheme to be approved by the Government, the question as to whether in a given case the particulars or information furnished by a co-operative society along with its application to the Government requesting it to acquire the land for a housing scheme, satisfies the requirement of a Housing Scheme, has to be decided having due regard to the particulars and information so furnished. (5) The acquisition of land in favour of the six respondent-House Building Societies, namely, Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society, H.M.T. Employees' Co-operative Society, Bank Officer's Co-operative Society, REMCO Employees' House Building Co-operative Society, Amarajyothi Co-operative Society and Bangalore Chickpet House Building Co-operative Society, though stated to be for carrying out Housing Schemes sponsored by the Societies for the allotment of sites to its members, the material placed before us clearly establish that in fact and in truth the acquisition of large extent of land sought by these Societies was not for the purpose of any bona fide housing scheme for the benefit of bona fide - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 members of the Co-operative Society concerned, but was substantially for the purpose of indulging in real estate business, namely, sale of sites in the guise of allotment in favour of either bogus members or in favour of intending purchasers by enrolling them as Associate Members for the purpose, and making money by those incharge of the Societies and their agents with whom the Societies had entered into Agreements, by exploiting the existence of the great demand for sites and the sky rocketing price for them in the City. The agents of each of these Societies had been paid heavy amounts in consideration of which they were required to influence the Government and to get the preliminary and the final notifications acquiring large extent of lands, from the Government. The decision of the Government to acquire the land was brought about by the influence of such agents appointed to be “go betweens” and “carryers” between the Government and the Society concerned and therefore such a decision is liable to be set aside on the ground that it is a case of colourable exercise of power and suffers from legal mala fides, in that, though the acquisition is stated to be for public purpose, in reality, the acquisition is substantially not for the purpose of bona fide housing schemes. (6) The Final Notification acquiring lands in favour of Jayanagar Co-operative Housing Society - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 in so far it relates to the lands belonging to the petitioners in W.P. No. 3189 of 1988 and connected Writ Petitions, are liable to be set aside on the ground that inquiry under Section 5A of the Act was not held in accordance with the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules and the Rules of Natural Justice, as the inquiry which had been stayed pursuant to an interim order granted by this Court was continued, after the interim order was vacated, without giving notice of date of hearing and as a result the petitioners were denied the opportunity of hearing on their objection to the acquisition. (7) There is considerable force in the contention of the petitioners that acquiring large extent of lands for formation of large number of Societies in the area for which the Bangalore Development Authority is constituted under an Act of Legislature and on whom the obligatory function of formation of layouts and distribution of sites to citizens is vested, has the effect of circumventing the provisions of the B.D.A. Act and rendering the Bangalore Development Authority workless and purposeless and therefore as a rule, the formation of layouts in the City should ordinarily be undertaken by the Bangalore Development Authority and only as an exception the work may be permitted to be undertaken by any Housing Co-operative Society after satisfying its suitability, merit and bona fides and therefore - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 requires serious consideration by the Government. 50. Before concluding, it is necessary to observe that as pointed out in the Report of G.V.K. Rao, it is on account of unlimited territorial jurisdiction and vague provisions as to who could become members and associate members and also as to what are the rights of associate members, it has been possible for many of the Societies to manipulate membership in such a way as to enroll all those who are desirous of purchasing sites as also those who do not possess the territorial or other qualification as members. As the matter is being examined by a Cabinet Sub-Committee, we are of the view that in order to avoid such a confusion and to prevent the abuse of provision for acquisition of land in favour of House Building Co-operative Societies, it is necessary to take a few corrective steps. Some of them are: (1) The territorial jurisdiction of each of the House Building Co-operative Societies should be specifically indicated in the bye-laws and no overlapping of the territorial jurisdiction by another House Building Co-operative Society should be allowed and only bona fide residents within the territorial jurisdiction alone should be allowed to become members. (2) In cases of House Building Societies formed in respect of employees of any - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 organisation or industry, the membership should be confined only to the employees who may continue as members even after retirement and the Societies should be prohibited from enrolling outsiders as members. (3) Even if a provision is made for enrolling nominal or associate members in the bye-laws of a Housing Society, they should also be bona fide residents within the territorial limits of the Society concerned and they should be rendered ineligible for allotment of sites. (4) Dual membership or a member of the family of a member of a society becoming member in another Housing Society should be prohibited and if it is found that such members were enrolled, their membership should be treated as void. (5) In the light of the above criteria and any other criteria considered necessary by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the bye-laws of all the House Building Co-operative Societies should be scrutinised by the Registrar and he should call upon each of the House Building Societies to make necessary amendments of the bye-laws in exercise of his powers under sub- section (5) of Section 12 of the Act and if any Society fails to do so within the time specified, he himself should proceed to amend the bye-law in exercise of his powers under sub-section (6) of Section 12 of the Act. - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 (6) It is also necessary that the Government should frame Rules for according previous approval for acquisition of any lands in favour of any of the House Building Societies inter alia prescribing the essential requirements of a Housing Scheme and also prescribing the procedure for Inquiry and Report, to aid the Government to come to the conclusion as to whether previous approval should be given for any Scheme prepared by any of the House Building Societies which requires the Government to acquire any land or carrying out any such Scheme." (Emphasis Supplied) The above extracted findings leave no manner of doubt that the very foundation on which the REMCO Society claimed to have acquired lands stood vitiated on account of fraud, illegality and colourable exercise of power. Once the acquisition notifications themselves are set aside, the Society cannot claim to have acquired any semblance of right, title or interest over the lands in question. The inevitable corollary is that any subsequent acts of the Society, including formation of layouts, allotment of sites, execution of sale deeds or issuance of possession - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 certificates, are rendered legally unsustainable and non est in the eye of law. 15. Though the plaintiff has attempted to salvage his claim by placing reliance on the alleged declaration- cum-ratification deeds said to have been executed by the original landowners, such plea is conspicuously unsupported by legally admissible and cogent evidence. Mere bald assertions in the plaint, without production of primary documents evidencing lawful conveyance of title from the landowners in favour of the Society or its allottees, cannot confer legitimacy upon an otherwise void transaction. The liberty reserved by the Hon’ble Apex Court to enter into private negotiations cannot be construed as a carte blanche validation of past illegalities; rather, it only enabled the Society to acquire title afresh strictly in accordance with law. 16. In the absence of any credible material demonstrating that the Society had, pursuant to such - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 liberty, entered into valid and enforceable agreements culminating in lawful conveyance of title, the plaintiff’s claim of ownership remains clouded and unsubstantiated. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has failed to establish a clear and marketable title to the suit schedule property. 17. Viewed from another angle, the plaintiff, being fully conscious of the serious cloud cast over his title, has nonetheless chosen to institute a suit for mandatory injunction, rather than seeking comprehensive declaratory relief. Coupled with the earlier round of litigation in O.S.No.2029/2017 and the findings recorded in RFA No.1602/2018, it becomes manifest that the dispute is not one of mere interference, but one involving serious questions of title and possession, which cannot be adjudicated in a truncated proceeding seeking injunction simpliciter or even mandatory injunction in the present form. - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 18. Accordingly, this Court holds that the plaintiff has not only failed to establish a lawful source of title through the REMCO Society, but has also adopted an impermissible course of litigation by seeking piecemeal reliefs in successive suits arising out of the same cause of action. The suit, therefore, is fundamentally misconceived and not maintainable in its present form. 19. It would be apposite for this Court to advert to the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings before this Court in the judgment reported in Narayana Reddy .vs. State of Karnataka(supra). The relevant Paragraph 49 is extracted supra. 20. On perusal of the above extracted portion more particularly Para 49, the acquisition proceedings were quashed not only relating to REMCO but also other Co- operative societies in batch of petitions. Against the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, the REMCO Housing Society and other Co-Operative - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 Societies preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed vide reported judgment in the case of H.M.T. House Buiding Co-Operative Society .vs. Syed Khader2. This Court deems it apposite to extract the findings relating to REMCO, the same are extracted as hereunder: "2. In the Appeal Nos. 3011-19/95 arising out of SLP(C)Nos. 11482-90 of 1991, after the dismissal of the Appeals a direction has been given that as a result of the quashing of the land acquisition proceedings including the Notifications in question, the possession of the land shall be restored to the respective land owners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands or not. A further direction has been given that on restoration of the possession to the land owners. they shall refund the amounts received by them as compensation or otherwise in respect of their lands. We issue a similar direction even in this case. The petitioner, the respondents and the State Government including all concerned authorities/persons shall implement the aforesaid directions at an early date." 2 ILR 1995 KAR 1962 - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 21. What is rather disturbing and cannot be lost sight of is that, notwithstanding the quashing of the entire acquisition proceedings by this Court in the decision reported in Narayanna Reddy's case (supra) which has attained finality upon affirmation by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the REMCO Housing Society continued to deal with the acquired lands as though it possessed lawful title. The records unmistakably reveal that the Society proceeded to execute sale deeds in favour of its alleged allottees even after it stood divested of any legal authority to do so. The plaintiff herein is one such allottee, who claims title under a registered sale deed dated 14.12.1992, marked as Ex.P2. 22. A careful scrutiny of the recitals contained in Ex.P2 assumes considerable significance. The covenants of the said sale deed unequivocally indicate that the Society predicates its title solely on the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State. In other words, the very foundation of the conveyance is the acquisition, which already stood - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 quashed by a judicial pronouncement. Therefore, the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff is not an independent conveyance based on a valid title, but is merely derivative of a source that has been declared non est in the eye of law. More importantly, the admitted position is that the said sale deed came to be executed subsequent to the judgment of this Court quashing the preliminary and final notifications. Consequently, the Society, having been stripped of its authority, could not have conveyed any better title than what it possessed, which in law was none. 23. The matter does not rest there. The subsequent developments culminating before the Hon’ble Supreme Court further fortify the conclusion that the Society had no subsisting right over the lands. The judgment of this Court having been carried in Special Leave Petition, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while affirming the findings recorded by this Court, issued consequential directions governing the rights of the parties. It is borne out from the record that the - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the original landowners to deposit the compensation amount received pursuant to the acquisition proceedings. 24. In compliance of the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the land owners deposited the compensation amount and the Land Acquisition Officer issued an endorsement dated 3.9.1997 acknowledging the redeposit of the compensation amount and restoration of possession to the land owners. It would be apposite for this Court to extract the relevant portion of this endorsement, which is marked as Ex.D2. The same is extracted as under: "¨sÁgÀvÀ ಸೕZÀÒ £ÁAiÀiÁå®AiÀÄzªÀÅ J¸ÉJ¯ïM £ÀA: 8011-19:95 ¢:21-2- 96 ರಂದು ೕದ ೕ ನಂೆ ೆªÉÆÌà . ೆ. ಇ.ಎೆ ೌಕರರ UÀȺÀ ಾಣ ಸಹಾರ ಸಂಘದ ಪರ"ಾ# ¨sÀÆ $ಾ%&ೕನೆ'ೊAರುವ *ೆಂಗ¼ÀÆರು ದQët ಾ®Æèಕು, ಪಟ.ಣUÉgÉ 'ಾ/ಮದ ¸À £ÀA 17:1gÀ°è 1J-15UÀÄ ಜ2ೕ ನ ಪ/3ೇಶವನು ಭೂಾ6ೕಕರದ 7/ೕಮ UÁ½ ಹನುಮಕ8 ೊA ಮುತ:ಯ< ಸ3ಾ7ವAiÀÄå =ನ 3ೋರಣ, ಬಸಪ? ಪಟ.ಣ'ೆೆ ರವರು r r £ÀA .: 599962 5600640185 18-8-97 gÀAzÀÄ gÀÆ.45,375-00 ( £À®ªÀvÉÊzÀÄ $ಾ@ರದ ªÀÄÄgÀÄ£ÀÆgÀ J¥ÀàvÉÊzÀÄ gÀÆUÀ¼ÀÄ ಾತ/) ಗಳ . ಯನು BಾವCರುವDದ Eಂದ ಸದEೕ ಜ2ೕನ£ÀÄß Fಾಾ6ೕಕE'ೆ GಂHರು#ಸಾ#3ೆ." - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 On reading the above extract, it evinces that in compliance with the said directions, the landowners deposited the compensation, and pursuant thereto, the Special Land Acquisition Officer issued an endorsement dated 03.09.1997, marked as Ex.D2. The said endorsement clearly records that upon such deposit, both possession and title of the lands stood restored to the original landowners. This document assumes decisive evidentiary value, as it conclusively demonstrates that the acquisition proceedings not only stood annulled, but the legal consequences thereof were fully worked out by restoring the status quo ante in favour of the landowners. 25. Further reinforcing this position is Ex.D1, namely the communication dated 09.10.2002 issued by the REMCO Housing Society itself to the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue. It would be apposite for this Court to extract the relevant portion of Ex.D1, which reads as under: - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 "@Jೇಷ ¨sÀÆ $ಾ%&ೕಾ&ಾEಗಳL £ÁAiÀiÁå®AiÀÄzÀ°è, 3ಾ"ೆ ºÀÆr®èzÀ ಎಾM ¨sÀÆಾ6ೕಕEUÀÆ ಸಹ ನಂ.ಎO.ಎ.C. 80:87-88, Hಾಂಕ:21-01-1997 ರಂದು ಳLವPೆ ಪತ/ವನುQ ೕ d«Ä£ÀನುQ $ಾ%&ೕನಪCೊARಾಗ ೆ'ೆದುೊಂzÀÝ ಹಣವ£ÀÄß ಭೂ ಾ6ೕಕEಂದ . ªÀÄÆಲಕ Gಂದೆ8 ಪRೆದು Fಾರತದ ಸೕZÀÒ £ÁAiÀiÁå®AiÀÄzÀ ೕ ನಂೆ ನಮT ಸಂಘದ ಪರ"ಾ# ಭೂ $ಾ%&ೕನ"ಾ#ರುವ ಜ2ೕನುಗಳನುQ ಸದEೕ ಭೂ ªÀiÁ6ೕಕರುಗP'ೆ GಂHರು#C ಜ2ೕ ನ ¥ÀÆಣ ಒRೆತನವನನುQ ಭೂ ಾ6ೕಕEಗP'ೆ ಈ'ಾಗೇ ೕರುತ:3ೆ. ಈ ಬ'ೆW ಸಂಬಂ&Cದ 3ಾಖಾಗಳನುQ ಈ ಪತ/3ೊಂH'ೆ ತಮT ಅವ'ಾಹೆ'ಾ# ಲಗ:ಸಾ#3ೆ:" On perusal of the above said extract, it is clearly evident that the Society has unequivocally acknowledged and implemented the directions flowing from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court by returning the lands to the original landowners. This conduct of the Society constitutes a clear admission that it did not retain any right, title or interest over the lands subsequent to the quashing of the acquisition proceedings. 26. When these material documents namely document No.2, Ex.D2 and Ex.D1 are read in juxtaposition, the inevitable conclusion that emerges is that the plaintiff’s claim of title is fundamentally flawed. - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 The Society, having lost its legal footing upon quashing of the acquisition, could not have conveyed valid title to the plaintiff under Document No.2. The subsequent restoration of title and possession to the landowners, coupled with the Society’s own act of returning the lands, completely extinguishes any derivative claim set up by the plaintiff. 27. Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that the plaintiff’s reliance on the sale deed dated 14.12.1992 is wholly misconceived and does not confer any enforceable right in respect of the suit schedule property. The chain of title set up by the plaintiff stands irretrievably broken, rendering the suit claim legally unsustainable. 28. Interestingly, the plaintiff, while candidly conceding that the acquisition proceedings initiated in favour of the REMCO Housing Society stood quashed by this Court and the said finding has attained finality upon affirmation by the Hon’ble Apex Court, has nonetheless sought to re-trace his title and possession through a - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 subsequent document styled as a “declaration-cum- ratification deed.” The said document is alleged to have been executed post the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the case of HMT House Building Co- Operative Society (supra). This attempt, in the considered opinion of this Court, is nothing but an endeavour to circumvent the legal consequences flowing from the quashing of the acquisition proceedings. 29. It is pertinent to note that the Society itself, in unequivocal terms, has acknowledged the implementation of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court and has admitted that the lands stood restored to the original landowners. This admission is fortified by Ex.D1, wherein the Society has addressed a communication to the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue, explicitly indicating that the lands have been reconveyed to the landowners. Once such a categorical stand is taken by the Society, it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff, who claims through the Society, to assert a derivative title in - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 the absence of any legally recognized conveyance independent of the acquisition proceedings. 30. If at all the Society intended to assert any right dehors the acquisition, it was incumbent upon it to establish an independent and lawful source of title by instituting appropriate proceedings and placing on record cogent material evidencing valid conveyance from the landowners. However, no such exercise is forthcoming. The so-called declaration-cum-ratification deed, even if assumed to exist, has neither been substantiated by admissible evidence nor has it been made the foundation of a substantive relief in the present suit. 31. This Court is therefore at a loss to comprehend as to how the plaintiff, who claims under a sale deed executed after the acquisition proceedings stood quashed, can maintain a bare suit for recovery of possession coupled with a prayer for mandatory injunction, without seeking a declaration of title based on the alleged - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 independent document. The law is well settled that where the title is seriously disputed and clouded, a suit for mere injunction or mandatory injunction, without seeking declaratory relief, is not maintainable. 32. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sabel vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others3 is wholly misplaced and does not advance the case of the plaintiff. The principle laid down therein, that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude presentation of a fresh plaint under Order VII Rule 13, cannot be applied in a mechanical manner divorced from the factual matrix of the case. 33. In the present case, the foundational defect is not merely procedural but goes to the very root of the plaintiff’s claim. The preliminary and final notifications issued by the State having been quashed, and the said 3 (2004) 3 SCC 137 - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 finding having been affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Society itself stood divested of title. Consequently, any derivative claim set up by the plaintiff through the Society is rendered legally untenable. The bar, therefore, is not one arising merely out of rejection of the earlier plaint, but stems from the absence of a valid and subsisting cause of action grounded in lawful title. 34. The contention of the plaintiff that the earlier rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC would not operate as a bar in view of Order VII Rule 13 of CPC, and that the present suit is maintainable, is therefore wholly misconceived. The plaintiff cannot, under the guise of a fresh plaint, seek to resurrect a claim which is inherently defective and unsupported by a legally sustainable title. The attempt to rely upon an unproven declaration-cum-ratification deed, without seeking appropriate declaratory relief, further compounds the infirmity. - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 35. In this backdrop, this Court is not inclined to accede to the submissions advanced on behalf of the plaintiff. The suit, as framed, is clearly not maintainable either in law or on facts, and the arguments predicated on Order VII Rule 13 of CPC are liable to be rejected as untenable. 36. Much emphasis is sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff on Order VII Rule 13 of CPC to contend that rejection of the earlier plaint would not preclude institution of a fresh suit. While the proposition, as a statement of law, is unexceptionable, its application to the present case is wholly misconceived. Order VII Rule 13 of CPC merely saves the right of a plaintiff to present a fresh plaint where the earlier plaint has been rejected on technical grounds; it does not, and cannot, cure a substantive and foundational defect in the very cause of action. In the present case, the infirmity goes to the root of the matter, inasmuch as the plaintiff traces title through the REMCO Housing Society, whose - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 very source of title stood extinguished upon quashing of the acquisition proceedings by this Court, as affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, the defect is not one of form or procedure, but one of absence of a legally enforceable right. In such circumstances, a fresh suit predicated on the very same defective and non-existent title cannot be maintained under the guise of Order VII Rule 13 of CPC. The said provision cannot be invoked as a tool to resurrect a claim which is inherently unsustainable in law. Hence, in the peculiar facts of the present case, Order VII Rule 13 of CPC does not come to the aid of the plaintiff. 37. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the persistent endeavour of the plaintiff to persuade this Court that they have successfully demonstrated a sustainable legal position, and that the Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the documentary evidence, cannot be countenanced. The reliance placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sukamma(dead) by legal - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 representatives .vs. R. Pushparaj(dead) by legal representatives4 is wholly misconceived and has no application to the peculiar facts of the present case. The said decision, rendered in an entirely different factual and legal context, does not lend any assistance to a case where the very root of title stands extinguished by virtue of quashing of acquisition proceedings. 38. This Court finds no infirmity in the approach adopted by the Trial Court in declining to place reliance on the alleged declaration-cum-ratification deed said to have been entered into between the landowners and the Society. The said document, apart from being unsubstantiated, suffers from serious legal infirmities, including want of registration, and therefore does not merit consideration. Even otherwise, the plaintiffs have not sought any declaratory relief founded upon the said document, thereby rendering the reliance placed on such a document wholly inconsequential. 4 (2018) 12 SCC 647 - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 39. Equally untenable is the plaintiffs’ contention that non-marking of the declaration-cum-ratification deed on the ground of want of registration is of no consequence. When the plaintiffs themselves seek to rely upon the said document as the foundation of their title, its admissibility and legal validity assume critical importance. The Trial Court was therefore justified in refusing to act upon an unregistered and legally inadmissible document. 40. The reliance placed on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short "TP Act") is also wholly misplaced. The doctrine of part performance embodied therein can be invoked only as a shield and not as a sword, and in any event, presupposes the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. In the present case, not only is there no cogent evidence of any such concluded contract between the landowners and the Society, but the very substratum of the Society’s claim stood obliterated upon quashing of the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 invocation of Section 53-A of T.P. Act, is clearly impermissible. 41. The plaintiff's assertion that the Society had executed a registered sale deed in his favour, marked as Ex.P2, and that he was put in lawful possession, stands thoroughly discredited by the rebuttal evidence placed on record by the defendants. The documentary evidence, particularly Ex.D1 and Ex.D2, unequivocally demonstrates that consequent upon the judgment of this Court, as affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, possession and title stood restored to the original landowners. Further, Ex.D6, namely the registered indemnity bond executed by the Society, clearly evidences that the Society had received back the amounts deposited towards acquisition costs, thereby acknowledging the reversal of the entire acquisition process. 42. These documents, when read conjointly, completely dilute and nullify the plaintiffs’ claim of lawful - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 title and possession. Once it is established that the Society itself has accepted restoration of lands to the original landowners and has acted upon such restoration, any claim set up by the plaintiffs as allottees of the Society becomes wholly untenable. 43. In that view of the matter, the reliance placed by the plaintiffs on the judgment in Sukamma's case (supra) as well as on the orders passed in writ proceedings relating to revocation of khatas, pales into insignificance. Such reliance cannot override the binding effect of the judgment rendered by this Court, affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, whereby the very acquisition proceedings, namely the preliminary and final notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, stood quashed. The subsequent or collateral proceedings cannot confer legitimacy upon a title that has already been declared void. - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 44. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the findings recorded by the Trial Court do not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting interference, and the contentions advanced by the plaintiffs, being devoid of merit, are liable to be rejected. 45. Upon a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, and having adverted to the exhibits discussed supra, this Court proceeds to record its conclusions on each of the material aspects arising for consideration: 46. The plaintiff’s claim of title rests on the registered sale deed dated 14.12.1992 (Ex.P2). A careful reading of its recitals clearly indicates that the Society predicates its title solely on the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State. In view of the admitted position that the preliminary and final notifications stood quashed by this Court in the decision reported in the case of Narayana Reddy (supra) and the same having been - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Society was divested of any right, title or interest in the lands. Consequently, Ex.P2 does not convey any valid title to the plaintiff. The principle nemo dat quod non habet squarely applies. The Trial Court has rightly appreciated this foundational defect. Re: Effect of Apex Court judgment and restoration of land(Ex.D2): 47. The endorsement dated 03.09.1997 issued by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (Ex.D2) unequivocally evidences that, pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the landowners deposited the compensation and, in consequence, both possession and title were restored to them. This document conclusively establishes restoration of status quo ante. The Trial Court has rightly relied on Ex.D2 to hold that the Society ceased to have any subsisting interest in the property. - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 Re: Admission by Society and reconveyance (Ex.D1): 48. Ex.D1, being the communication dated 09.10.2002 issued by the Society to the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue, constitutes a clear and unequivocal admission that the Society has implemented the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and returned the lands to the original landowners. This admission strikes at the very root of the plaintiff’s case. The Trial Court has rightly treated this document as a binding admission under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and has drawn an adverse inference against the plaintiff’s claim. Re: Indemnity bond and refund of acquisition cost (Ex.D6): 49. The registered indemnity bond (Ex.D6) executed by the Society further demonstrates that the Society received back the amounts deposited towards acquisition, thereby acknowledging reversal of the acquisition process. This document reinforces the position that the Society not only lost title but also acted upon such - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 loss. The Trial Court’s reliance on Ex.D6 is both proper and in consonance with settled principles governing admissions and conduct. Re: Declaration-cum-ratification deed: 50. The plaintiff’s attempt to rely on a purported declaration-cum-ratification deed is wholly unavailing. The said document has neither been proved in accordance with law nor duly registered. More importantly, the plaintiff has not sought declaratory relief based on the said document. In the absence of foundational pleadings and substantive relief, the document is of no evidentiary value. The Trial Court was therefore justified in declining to mark or rely upon the said document. Re: Applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act: 51. The invocation of Section 53-A of the TP Act, is misconceived. The doctrine of part performance cannot be pressed into service to perfect title, nor can it be invoked - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 in the absence of a valid and enforceable contract. In the present case, no such contract is established, and the Society itself had no subsisting title to transfer. The Trial Court has rightly rejected this contention. Re: Maintainability of suit for mandatory injunction: 52. The pleadings and earlier round of litigation, including findings in RFA No.1602/2018, clearly disclose a serious dispute as to title and possession. In such circumstances, a suit for mandatory injunction without seeking declaration of title is not maintainable. The Trial Court has correctly held that the plaintiff ought to have sought comprehensive relief, including declaration and recovery of possession based on a valid title. Re: Effect of earlier rejection of plaint and Order VII Rules 11 & 13 CPC: 53. The reliance placed on Order VII Rule 13 of CPC is wholly misplaced. The earlier rejection of plaint does not cure the substantive defect in the plaintiff’s case, namely - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 absence of lawful title. The present suit is founded on the very same defective cause of action. The Trial Court’s view that the suit is not maintainable is therefore justified. Re: Reliance on precedents: 54. The judgments relied upon by the plaintiff, including Sukamma's case, are distinguishable on facts and do not apply to a case where the root of title itself is extinguished. The Trial Court has rightly declined to apply the said precedents. Cumulative Effect and Final Conclusion: 55. When Ex.P2 is read in the light of Ex.D1, Ex.D2 and Ex.D6, the inescapable conclusion is that the plaintiff has failed to establish any lawful, valid and subsisting title to the suit schedule property. The documentary evidence overwhelmingly supports the defendants’ case that the lands stood restored to the original landowners and that the Society had no authority to convey title post-quashing of acquisition. - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:23194 RFA No. 1060 of 2025 56. This Court finds that the Trial Court has meticulously appreciated both oral and documentary evidence, has applied the correct principles of law, and has recorded findings which are neither perverse nor contrary to the material on record. No ground is made out to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. For the foregoing reasons, the point Nos.(i) and (ii) are answered in the negative and point No.(iii) is answered in the affirmative. Finding on Point No.(iv) 57. In view of the findings recorded on points (i) and (iii), this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER The appeal is devoid of merits, accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE ALB List No.: 1 Sl No.: 50