THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH THE SECRETARY REGISTRATION, LAND REFORMS AND REVENUE DEPTT v. HARSH PRAKASH ARYA
LPA/17/2026 · 2026-06-10
Rajesh Shankar
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 16339 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 16339 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 14731 of 2025 with I.A. No. 5254 of 2026
In
L.P.A. No. 17 of 2026
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Registration, Land Reforms and Revenue Department, having its office at Project Building, P.O & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 2. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, having its office at Collectorate Building, P.O & P.S. Ranchi, District Ranchi. 3. Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Ranchi, having its office at Collectorate Building, P.O. & P.S. Ranchi, District Ranchi. 4. The Circle Officer, Hehal, P.O. & P.S. Hehal, District Ranchi. … … … Appellants
Versus
1. Harsh Prakash Arya, aged about 52 years, son of late Dr. Dharma Prakash Arya, permanent resident of Awantika Tower, Hehal, P.O & P.S- Ratu, District -Ranchi. 2. Dr. Reema Chattree aged about 57 years, wife of Shailendra Chattree, and daughter of Dr. Dharma Prakash Arya resident of 48, Nehru Nagar (old), Bhilal, Motilal Nehru Nagar Bhilai, P.O., P.S. and District- Durg, Chhatisgarh. 3. Dr. Tushar Arya, aged about 52 years, son of late Dr. Dharma Prakash Arya, permanent resident of Awantika Tower, Hehal, P.O.& P.S. Ratu, District Ranchi. 4. Ruchi Gupta aged about 59 years, wife of Dr. Rajiv Gupta and daughter of Dr. Dharma Prakash Arya, presently resident of 1781 Longhill Drive, Zanesville, Ohio 43701, United States of America. … … … Respondents
--------- CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------- For the Appellants: Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I For the Respondents: Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate --------- 02/Dated: 10.06.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. I.A. No. 14731 of 2025 seeks condonation of the delay of 211 days in instituting this Letters Patent Appeal. 2026:JHHC:16751-DB
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3. We have perused the averments in the I.A. There is a vague statement in paragraph 5 that the copy of the order, which is now impugned in the appeal, was not communicated to the department by the Law Officer or the High Court, as is the practice. 4. We are not aware of any practice that requires the High Court to communicate its orders to the Government.
In any event, this is a matter where the impugned order was made after hearing the Advocate for the Government and, in fact, after relying upon the statement made in the Government’s counter-affidavit that the land in question was not included in the prohibited lease. 5. That apart, the 211-day delay cannot be condoned on the basis of a vague assertion that the order was not communicated. The application neither specifies when the order was communicated nor identifies the Law Officer responsible for communicating it. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the veracity of the unverifiable, self-serving and vague statement in paragraph 5 that the order was not communicated. 6. After that, there are averments about the routine movement of files from table to table. It is well settled that delay cannot be condoned based upon such routine reasons of the movement of files from one table to another. The legislature has prescribed the period of limitation, and that statutory prescription cannot be frustrated by the Government officials taking their own time to process the files. The files, as far as possible, must be processed with utmost dispatch so that the appeals can be filed within the prescribed limitation period. In cases of genuine difficulties, a Court can excuse the non-filing of appeals within the limitation period. 7. The application is essentially a “copy and paste” of several similar applications filed on behalf of the Government seeking condonation of delay. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court have
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deprecated the practice of filing such vague and casual applications citing routine bureaucratic procedures seeking condonation of delay. 8. In the case of Postmaster General and others Vs.
Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the law of limitation binds everybody equally, including the Government and the defence by the Government, impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. 9. Recently, in Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.”
10. In similar circumstances, this Court refused to condone delay of 306 days in instituting L.P.A. No. 752 of 2023 (The State of Jharkhand and others Vs. Chandan Kumar Prasad). 11. At this stage, the learned counsel for the respondents points out that the State has already filed a title suit, being Title Suit No. 754 of 2025, and therefore, it is not as if the rights of the State are not protected. He also points out that after the learned Single Judge made its order on
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27.11.2024, a Contempt Petition was filed by the respondents on 6th March 2025 and even a copy of the same was served upon the learned Advocate General’s office.
If that is so, it is inconceivable that there was no communication of the order dated 27.11.2024 to the Government, as was sought to be vaguely pleaded in the Interim Application. 12. Therefore, applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, we do not find that sufficient cause has been shown to condone this delay. 13. Accordingly, we dismiss this I.A. seeking condonation of the delay. 14. Consequently, the accompanying appeal, i.e. L.P.A. No. 17 of 2026 will not survive and is disposed of. I.A. No. 5254 of 2026 for early hearing of the appeal filed by the respondents is also disposed of. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 10, 2026
N.A.F.R. APK/VK
Uploaded on 12.06.2026