2026:HHC:29833 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 658 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.07.2026 Date of Decision: 21.07.2026. Dinesh Chander Sharma ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner : Petitioner in person For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition against the order dated 06.03.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, vide which his application for seeking recall of the prosecution witness Vinod Kumar Kapila for his further cross-examination was dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner is an accused before the learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29833 Trial Court. Prosecution has cited one Vinod Kumar Kapila as a witness. The petitioner cross-examined him for 3 days running into 35 pages, and the learned Trial Court closed the right of the cross-examination of the witness on 20.06.2025. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application seeking the recall of the witness, asserting that the cross-examination of the witness was necessary to substantiate the claim under Section 250 Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the Court. The witness belonged to an intellectual class, and it was not easy to extract the truth from such a witness. Therefore, it was essential to cross-examine him at length. The court is bound to arrive at the truth, and the petitioner was within his right to cross-examine the witness to demonstrate the truth. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be allowed and the witness be recalled for further cross-examination. 3. The application was opposed by the State. 4. Learned Trial Court held that the petitioner had examined the witness at length for 3 days, and the cross- examination ran into 35 pages. The cross-examination cannot be used to harass the witness. The Court had also closed the right of 3 2026:HHC:29833 cross-examination, and it could not review the order passed by it. Allowing the application would amount to a review of the order passed by the Court. Therefore, the application was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the order has been passed against the principles of administration of justice and without due application of the mind. Learned Trial Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in her under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner has the right to demonstrate his innocence and also to show that he was entitled to compensation under Section 250 of the Cr.P.C. He has brought on record sufficient material to claim an order of acquittal on the principle of the benefit of doubt, but he wants a clear acquittal and compensation. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6. I have heard the petitioner, who appeared in person and Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 4 2026:HHC:29833 7. The petitioner, who appeared in person submitted that the Court has ample power to recall any witness, if the evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. The petitioner has a right to cross-examine a witness. The Court could not have refused to permit the petitioner to cross-examine the witness on the ground that cross-examination continued for 3 days without recording a finding that the irrelevant questions were asked. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that allowing the application would amount to the review of the order passed by the learned Trial Court closing the evidence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the cross-examination of the witness had continued for 3 days running into 35 pages. The cross-examination cannot be used to harass a witness and waste the precious time of the Court. The petitioner has not mentioned the purpose of cross-examining the witness, and a vague averment that the cross-examination is necessary to seek compensation under Section 250 of the Cr.P.C. is not sufficient to 5 2026:HHC:29833 recall the witness. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The order passed by the learned Trial Court shows that the cross-examination of the witness continued for three days and filled 35 pages of the record of the learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P. Hyderabad v. Repalli Ramadoss, 1976 SCC OnLine AP 93: 1976 ALT 558 that the cross-examination running into 18 typed pages cannot be permitted. It was observed at page 563: “14. Before we proceed to examine the soundness of the conclusions of the Court below, we would pause to comment on one striking feature noticed by us while going through the evidence in the case. The record of evidence has been unduly swelled by repetitions and irrelevancies in the cross-examination of the direct witnesses. The Chief examination of P.W. 1 runs to four typed pages. But the cross-examination occupied 18 pages. Prolonged emphasis is laid on trivial matters. We could not evade the impression that the Additional Sessions Judge had permitted himself to be wearied by endless and pointless cross-examination. Sessions Judges and Magistrates have to be vigilant and should exercise effective control over the extent and manner of cross-examination of witnesses. They have the undoubted control and discretion to 6 2026:HHC:29833 determine the length of time and the extent to which the witnesses may be cross-examined. It is the duty of the Presiding Officers to protect the witnesses against irrelevant enquiries and overrule a question repeated after being several times substantially answered. It is no doubt true that cross-examination is one of the most important processes for the elucidation of facts and testing the veracity of a witness and the accuracy of the story unfolded by him. So all reasonable latitude must be shown. But the Judge has the discretion as to how far and how long the cross-examination can go. Prolix examination and cross-examination must be checked. Irrelevant topics sometimes pursued at great length and persistence shown in going over the same ground again and again in the hope of witnesses' discrepant must not be endured or permitted. Exercise vigilance and control over the Court proceedings by Judges and Magistrates will not only save waste of public time and money but also help clear the backlog of arrears. It would be quite opposite at this stage to recall what Viscount Sankey L.C. observed in Mechanical and General Inventions Company Limited and Lehwess v. Austin and the Austin Motor Company Limited [1935 Appeal Cases, 346]. At page 360, the Lord Chancellor observed. “………a protracted and irrelevant cross-examination not only adds to the cost of litigation but is a waste of public time.” 11. It was laid down by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Govind v. State of M.P., 2004 SCC OnLine MP 344: (2005) 1 MP LJ 549 that cross-examination cannot be used as a weapon of harassment and the cross-examination running into 30 pages and 60 paragraphs is an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 564: 7 2026:HHC:29833 “26. In this case, there was a lengthy cross-examination from P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, which runs in thirty pages and sixty paragraphs, out of which many paragraphs are without much relevance to the case. Here we would like to mention that in many cases we have seen that Shri V.R. Gupta, Advocate of Morena, is in the habit of making lengthy cross-examinations of the witnesses and many a time without their relevance. Shri J.P. Gupta, learned senior Advocate, while arguing the case, has agreed that lengthy and irrelevant cross-examination is never helpful to the accused persons. Many times, the defence lawyers themselves get clarified most of the discrepancies arising during the cross-examination in one paragraph, and they are getting them contradicted in the other paragraph. We have seen that in most of the cases, such a lengthy cross- examination is not helpful to the accused persons, but rather damages the case of the defence and leads to a conviction of the accused persons. It is true that the purpose of cross-examination is to bring the truth on record and to help the Court in knowing the truth of the case, but if the purpose of the cross-examination is to harass the witness and to ask irrelevant questions, the purpose of cross-examination is defeated and frustrated. Such a lengthy cross-examination neither helps the Court in finding the truth nor in evaluating the evidence, nor does it help the accused, but damages the defence case and compels the Court to record a conviction of the accused persons. In this case too, while arguing the case, learned senior Counsel Shri J.P. Gupta was unable to justify the lengthy cross-examination and to get any support from it in favour of the appellant Govind. 27. The main object of cross-examination is to find out the truth and the detection of falsehood in human testimony. It is designed either to destroy or weaken the force of evidence a witness has already given in person or elicit something in favour of the party which he has not stated, or to discredit him by showing from his history and present demeanour that he is unworthy of credit. It should 8 2026:HHC:29833 be remembered that cross-examination is a duty, a lawyer owes to his clients and is not a matter of great personal glory and fame. It should always be remembered that justice must not be defeated by improper cross- examination. A lawyer owes a duty to himself that it is the most difficult art. However, he may fail in the result, but fairness is one of the great elements of advocacy. Talents and genius are not aimed at self-glorification, but rather to establish truth, to detect falsehood, to uphold right and justice, and to expose the wrongdoings of a dishonest witness. It is the most efficacious test to discover the truth. Cross-examination exposes bias, detects falsehood and shows the mental and moral condition of the witnesses and whether a witness is actuated by proper motive or whether he is actuated by enmity towards his adversaries. Cross-examination is commonly esteemed the severest test of an advocate's skill, and perhaps it demands beyond any other of his duties the exercise of his ingenuity. There is a great difficulty in conducting cross- examination with credible skill. It is undoubtedly a great intellectual effort. Sometimes, cross-examination assumes unnecessary length; the Court has the power to control the cross-examination in such cases. (See Wrottescey on cross-examination of witnesses). The Court must also ensure that cross-examination is not made a means of harassment or causing humiliation to the victim of a crime [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 SCC (Cri) 316].” 12. A similar view was taken in Subal Ghorai v. State of W.B., (2013) 4 SCC 607 13. The only purpose of recalling the witness is to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to compensation under Section 250 of the Cr.P.C. It was laid down by the Madhya 9 2026:HHC:29833 Bharat High Court in Lt. Colonel V. Cambier v. Fr. E. Vanni Archbishop, 1950 SCC OnLine MP 34: AIR 1951 MB 86 that the cross-examination can relate to relevant facts only. It was observed at page 88: 6. In his learned commentary, Mr Monir states as follows: “As in English law, so under the Act, the cross- examination need not be confined to the matters to which the witness has testified in his examination-in- chief, but extends to the whole case. Therefore, if a party calls a witness to prove the simplest fact connected with his case, the other party is at liberty not only to cross-examine him on every issue but also to put leading questions to establish his own case.” 7. (Vide Monir's Law of Evidence, 3rd Edn. at p. 1107.) Woodroffe's Law of Evidence also supports this view. [Vide Woodroffe's Law of Evidence 9th Edn., p. 982). Taylor's Law of Evidence also contains similar remarks (Vide Taylor's Law of Evidence lath Edn. Vol. 2, para 1432, p. 913). This proposition has been fully expounded by their Lordships of the Calcutta H. Ct. in the case of Amritlal Hazara v. Emperor, Vide 42 Cal. 957 at p. 1022: (A.I.R. (3) 1916 Cal. 188: 16 Cr. L.J. 497). It is dear, therefore, that in the cross- examination a party can ask questions on every issue to establish its Base. There is no rule of procedure that deprives a party of its right to cross-examine a witness in respect of the whole case on the ground that evidence with regard to some issues has already been tendered. The questions, however, must relate to the relevant facts. 14. Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that the evidence may be given of the fact in issue or the relevant facts and no other. Therefore, it is essential to show that the facts 10 2026:HHC:29833 sought to be proved are in issue or relevant under some section of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Palakdhari Singh, 1889 SCC OnLine All 42: ID (18E88-1890) 6 All 751 that anything which is not included in the Indian Evidence Act cannot be admitted. It was observed at page 776: As to the first question, of course, as I have already indicated, there being no English common law of evidence antecedent to the Evidence Act, the only manner in which these judgments of 1874 could be excluded would be by reason of that Act itself. In s. Section 3 of that statute defines what relevant facts are and what are not, and in s. 5 of that enactment it is laid down that “evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non- existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others.” So that this last section renders exclusive everything which is not covered by the purview of some other section which follows in the statute. Here, the case rests not upon applying any principle which is to be found in the English common law of evidence, but upon knowing whether this statute in s. 5 ever contemplated the alteration of the law as it stood at the time when the statute was passed. For the reasons stated by Mr Justice Mitter in his dissenting judgment in the Full Bench case of Gujju Lall v. Fatteh Lall [6 C. 171], I hold that the law of the land before the passing of the statute (I of 1872) was that a judgment such as that of Mr Justice Turner and my brother Brodhurst of 1874 would be admitted in evidence. I do not wish to add anything to those reasons, because [44] I adopt them fully. This indeed is the conclusion at which, I understand, the learned Chief Justice and my brothers Straight and Tyrrell have also arrived. 11 2026:HHC:29833 15. It was held by Patna High Court in Mt. Khedia v. Mt. Turia, 1961 SCC OnLine Pat 105: AIR 1962 Pat 420 that the Judge cannot admit any evidence because he thinks that such evidence will help in deciding the matter. It was observed at page 422: 10. It is well settled that the Indian Evidence Act prohibits the employment of any kind of evidence not specifically authorised by the Act itself, and, therefore, it is unsound and not correct to say, as is attempted to be argued here, that the principle of exclusion adopted by the Indian Evidence Act shall not be applied to exclude matters which may be essential for the ascertainment of truth. On this subject, the observations of Lord Atkin, in Sris Chandra Nandy v. Rakhalananda, 68 Ind App 34: (AIR 1941 PC 16), are very apposite and may usefully be read here for guidance. The noble Lord, who delivered the judgment of the Board, at p. 45 (of Ind App): (at p. 20 of AIR), observed: “What matters should be given in evidence as essential for the ascertainment of truth, it is the purpose of the law of evidence, whether at common law or by statute, to define. Once a statute is passed that purports to contain the whole law, it is imperative. It is not open to any judge to exercise a dispensing power and admit evidence not admissible by the statute because to him it appears that the irregular evidence would throw light upon the issue. The rules of evidence, whether contained in a statute or not, are the result of long experience choosing, no doubt, to confine evidence to particular forms, and, therefore, eliminating others which it is conceivable might assist in arriving at truth. But that which has been eliminated has been considered to be of such doubtful value, as on the whole, to be more likely to disguise truth than discover it is therefore discarded for all purposes and in all circumstances. To allow a judge to introduce it at his 12 2026:HHC:29833 own discretion would be to destroy the whole object of the general rule.” 16. No section of the Indian Evidence Act was brought to the notice of this Court that permits asking the question for bringing the case under Section 250 of the CrPC; therefore, the witness could not have been recalled. There is a force in the submission of Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, that the application is vague and has been filed to harass the witness. 17. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, which is to be exercised sparingly to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P., (2008) 2 SCC 403: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 434: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1445 that the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or Revision while exercising inherent jurisdiction, but exercises jurisdiction to do real and substantial justice in extraordinary situations. It was observed at page 405: 7. “6. … [Section 482] does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to 13 2026:HHC:29833 an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section that merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the [report], the 14 2026:HHC:29833 court may examine the question of fact. When a [report] is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the [report] has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 8. In dealing with the last [category], it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to 15 2026:HHC:29833 short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) ‘102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 16 2026:HHC:29833 (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.’ 9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in the exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court, being the highest court of a State, should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court, and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.” [Ed.: State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, pp. 94-96, paras 6-9.] (See State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar [(2006) 4 SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: AIR 2006 SC 1937].) 17 2026:HHC:29833 18. The petitioner has stated in the petition that there is sufficient material on record to claim acquittal, but the petitioner wants to bring material to claim damages under Section 25o of the CrPC. Therefore, even if the order is allowed to stand, it will not amount to the abuse of the process of the Court because the petitioner can always file a suit for malicious prosecution, and the present case is not such a case in which the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is required to be exercised. 19. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 20. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st July, 2026 (Nikita)