$~20 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010304572026 + BAIL APPLN. 2724/2026bh & CRL.M.A. 20676/2026 SURAJ .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Jai Gaur and Mr. Vijay Pandey, Advs. versus STATE OF NCT DELHI .....Respondent Through: Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar, APP for the State. Mr. Naveen, Adv. for complainant with complainant in person. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV O R D E R % 17.08.2026 1. The applicant seeks anticipatory bail in connection with FIR No.277/2026 for the offence punishable under Sections 69/351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) registered at PS Adarsh Nagar, Delhi. 2. Mr. Jai Gaur, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The parties were in a consensual romantic relationship and that the allegations have arisen out of a subsequent dispute between them. It was argued that the material on record, including their conversations, does not disclose any unequivocal promise of marriage or inducement on the part of the applicant, and that the allegation of forcible physical relations is false and contrary to the surrounding This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/08/2026 at 11:48:54 circumstances. It was further submitted that the applicant has clean antecedents, is willing to join the investigation, and that custodial interrogation is unwarranted as the relevant evidence is primarily electronic and already within the possession of the investigating agency. On these grounds, learned counsel prayed for grant of anticipatory bail. 3. Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar, the learned APP opposes the present petition primarily on the ground that the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature and are supported, at this stage, by the statement of the prosecutrix and the material collected during investigation. It is therefore submitted that the petitioner’s custodial protection at this stage is not warranted and the application deserves to be dismissed. 4. The victim, along with learned counsel, is present before the Court and submits that the matter has been amicably settled and that she has no objection to the applicant being enlarged on anticipatory bail. It is further submitted that, even otherwise, the allegations essentially relate to the alleged establishment of physical relations on the pretext of marriage, and both the applicant and the complainant are major. 5. I have the learned counsels appearing for parties and perused the record. 6. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the prosecutrix and the petitioner were known to each other and were in a relationship. According to the prosecutrix, the petitioner had assured her of marriage and, on that assurance, allegedly established physical relations with her on multiple occasions, resulting in her pregnancy, whereafter she was allegedly administered abortion medication. It is further alleged that when the prosecutrix subsequently insisted upon marriage, the petitioner refused and This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/08/2026 at 11:48:54 threatened her with harm and with circulation of her private photographs and videos. The prosecutrix also attributed threats to co-accused Parvez, who allegedly assisted in procuring the abortion medication. Although the prosecutrix had initially approached the police stating that the relationship was consensual and expressing her desire to marry the petitioner, she subsequently made a detailed complaint alleging forcible sexual relations, threats and intimidation, pursuant to which the present FIR came to be registered under Sections 69 and 351(2) BNS. 7. The aforesaid factual backdrop, including the parties having been in a consensual relationship for a considerable period, the prosecutrix’s initial statement expressing her desire to marry the applicant and seeking no legal action against him, coupled with the subsequent allegations arising after differences between the parties, prima facie indicates that the relationship between them was not founded merely on a false promise of marriage. 8. It was held by the Supreme Court in Prithvirajan v. The State Rep by the Inspector of Police & Anr.,1 that merely because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following two conditions need to be met: i. The accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations with her without having any intention to fulfil his promise to marry from the very first instance; ii. The prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. 1 SLP(Crl.) No. 12663 of 2022 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/08/2026 at 11:48:54 9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra &Anr.,2 the Supreme Court laid down a clear distinction between a breach of promise and a false promise. The breach of a promise cannot be equated to a false promise, and it may not constitute an offence of rape. Para 16 of the judgment reads thus:- “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 682- 84, paras 21 & 24) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise.Thus, the Court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to doso. Such cases must be treated differently.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Likewise, in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra3, the Supreme Court observed as under: “34. In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a 2 (2019) 9 SCC 608 3 (2024) 11 SCC 398 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/08/2026 at 11:48:54 consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.” 11. Bearing in mind the overall facts and circumstances and the fact that the prosecutrix was in the company of the applicant and they seem to have consensual relationship. The question whether the petitioner made a false promise of marriage to the prosecutrix, thereby deceiving her into consenting, or whether the case merely involves a breach of promise to marry, is a matter that can only be determined during trial on the basis of the evidence adduced. 12. The principles governing the grant of anticipatory bail have been succinctly and authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab,.4 It was held that the power under Section 438 CrPC is an extraordinary discretionary remedy intended to protect personal liberty and is to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Constitution Bench further held that while exercising such discretion, the Court must strike a balance between the individual's right to personal liberty and the investigational powers of the police. It was also observed that anticipatory bail cannot be granted on vague or general apprehensions and that no inflexible restrictions or conditions, not envisaged by the statute, can be imposed while considering an application under Section 438 CrPC. 13. The aforesaid principles were further elucidated in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra,5 wherein the Supreme Court emphasized that the power under Section 438 CrPC is intrinsically 4 (1980) 2 SCC 565 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/08/2026 at 11:48:54 connected with the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and must be exercised bearing in mind the presumption of innocence. The Court observed that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” and held that denial of anticipatory bail would be justified only where the facts disclose a genuine necessity, such as the requirement of custodial interrogation or the likelihood of the applicant absconding, tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. 14. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the nature of the allegations, the prolonged consensual relationship between the parties, and the fact that the question whether there was a false promise of marriage or a subsequent breach thereof is a matter to be determined at trial, coupled with the fact that the prosecutrix, who is present before the Court, has no objection to the grant of anticipatory bail to the applicant, this Court is of the view that the applicant deserves the protection of anticipatory bail. 15. Accordingly, the present application is allowed and the applicant is directed to be released on anticipatory bail in the event of his arrest, subject to the terms and conditions to be imposed by the concerned Investigating Officer. 16. Petition stands disposed of. PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J AUGUST 17, 2026/P/SA 5 (2011) 1 SCC 694 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/08/2026 at 11:48:54