( 2026:HHC:30092 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.614 of 2025 Reserved on : 29.06.2026 Decided on: 21.07.2026 Uploaded on :21.07.2026 M/s Hotel Himland & Anr. …Petitioners Versus National Insurance Company & Anr. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 _______________________________________________________________ For the petitioners : Mr. Balwant Kukreja and Ms. Drishti Sirswal, Advocates. For the respondents : Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Mamta, Advocate, for respondent No.1. None for respondent No.2. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioners have filed the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 26.08.2025, passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the learned trial Court), in Civil Suit Reg. No.900853 of 2014, titled as M/s Hotel Himland (West) & another versus National Insurance Company Limited and another. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 2 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court. 3. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition before this Court, as borne out from the documents, annexed with the petition, may be summed up, as under:- 3.1. The plaintiff-M/s Hotel Himland (West) and another have filed suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, against the defendants with a prayer to restrain them from parking car/cars/any vehicles or creating any hindrance, in front of Hotel Himland (West), which was constructed over the land, comprised in Khasra Nos.2163/1600, 2165/1601 (old Khasra No.1600 and new Khasra No.2163), Khata-Khatauni No.214/301, new Khata-Khatauni No.204/294, situated at Up Mohal Bemloi, Station Ward, Chhota Shimla, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. 3.2. The said suit has been filed, on the ground that plaintiff No.2, is landlord of old Khasra Nos.1597, 1598, 1600 and 1601, new Khasra Nos.2159, 2161, 2163 and ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 3 2165 along with the building constructed, over it and open space, in front of the Hotel. 3.3 It is the further case of the plaintiffs that Ved Prakash Akre, father of plaintiff No.2, along with his wife Braham Kumari Akre, Usha Ahluwalia plaintiff No.2, Uma Soni, (her sister and Umesh Akre/her brother) had purchased the land and raised building on the part of the land, comprising Khasra Nos.1597 to 1619. After the death of Ved Prakash Akre, a dispute has arisen with regard to the shares, in the said property and Uma Soni had filed Civil Suit No.87 of 1994, before the High Court, which was compromised later on. 3.4. According to the plaintiffs, another compromise had taken place between the parties on 17.01.2007 and as per Memorandum of partition, Khasra Nos.1597, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1601, new Khasra Nos.2159, 2161, 2163, 2165, have fallen in the share of plaintiff No.2 and thereafter, plaintiff No.2, leased out some portion of her built up structure, alongwith open area, in front of the Hotel Himland, bearing Khasra No.2163/1600. It has also been agreed upon between the parties to the Memorandum of family partition that “the parties to the deed shall not ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 4 raise any construction/obstruction, on the passages and stairs, as marked, in the plans attached and road (twelve feet width), as the same has been kept common for all the parties. 3.5. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that Smt. Uma Soni had leased out some portion of her share to the defendant-National Insurance Company Limited, in which, they are running their Divisional Office. 3.6. Asserting the fact that the defendant has no legal right or locus-standi to obstruct the passage or to park car/cars/any other vehicles, upon the land, bearing old Khasra Nos.1598, 1600 and 1601, new Khasra Nos.2159, 2163 and 2165, owned by plaintiff No.2 and in possession of plaintiff No.1, being lessee. 3.7. Despite request made by the plaintiff, the defendants are stated to be still adamant to park their vehicles, for which, they have no legal right to do so. 3.8. On the basis of the above facts, the following prayer has been made in the suit: “(a) A decree for permanent perpetual prohibitory injunction restraining the Officers, Employees, Agents, representatives etc. etc. of the defendant-Company from parking any vehicles or creating any hindrance in front of Hotel Himland (West) Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. on the land ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 5 comprising Khasra No.2163/1600, (Old Khasra Nos.1600 and new Khasra No.2163, Khata Khatauni No.214/301, new Khata Khatauni No.204/294, situated at Up Muhal Bamloe, Station Ward Chhota Shimla, Tehsil and District Shimla, may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.” 4. When, put to notice, the suit has been contested, by the defendant, by filing the written statement, in which, the preliminary objections have been taken qua the maintainability of the suit; suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party; plaintiffs have no locus- standi to file the present suit; suit is not valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. While, the factual position, qua the ownership, litigation and family settlement has been denied for want of knowledge, in para- 7, it has been denied that the defendant-company used to park their vehicles in front of Hotel Himland (West) over old Khasra No.1600, new Khasra No.2163. Para-7 of the written statement, is reproduced, as under:- “7. That the contents of para-7 of the suit are wrong hence denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Company is using to park their vehicles in front of the Hotel Himland (West) over the Khasra No.1600, New 2163. It is pertinent to mention here that on dated 4.11.2012 fresh lease deed was executed between Mrs. Uma Soni D/o Ved Prakash and Defendant Company for a further period up to 13th July, 2021 with terms and conditions. As ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 6 per the terms and condition of the lease deed “ The Lessee shall be entitled during the continuance of the lease to use the occupy exclusively and free of any extra or additional rent or charges sufficient space or accommodation for 3 No. sufficient space or accommodation for 2 No. parking cars and 2 No. two wheelers within the compound of area of the building in the said premises known as Himland Hotel (west). It is further clarified that Defendant is only parking their vehicle in the space provided as per the temrs and conditions of the lease deed, it is clarified that defendant only parked their vehicle in front of their office and never parked vehicle towards plaintiff hotel as per the terms and condition of lease deed with Smt. Usha Soni owner of rented premises.” 5. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the suit. 6. In the said suit, the plaintiffs moved an application, under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, read with Section 151 of CPC, to pass the judgment in their favour, on the basis of the admission, as contained, in the written statement and as such, a prayer has been made to decree the suit, as prayed for. 7. The said application has been filed, by the plaintiffs, on the ground, that along with the suit, they have filed the application, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC. In the said application, the learned trial Court has passed an ad-interim injunction, vide order dated ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 7 19.06.2015, which was challenged by the defendant, before the learned District Judge, Shimla, District Shimla and the order was affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Shimla, on 02.04.2016. Thereafter, the judgment was assailed, before the High Court, by way of CMPMO No.329 of 2016, which was allowed on 01.11.2016 and order passed by the learned trial Court dated 19.06.2015, as affirmed on 02.04.2016, were set-aside, keeping in view the defence, taken by the defendant. 8. On the basis of observations, so made, by this Court, while, deciding CMPMO No.329 of 2016, it has been prayed that the plaintiffs are entitled for the judgment and decree in their favour, under the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC. 9. The said application has been contested, by the defendant, by taking preliminary objections, that the application is not maintainable. The factual position has not been disputed. However, in reply to para-4, it has been asserted that the defendant-company is not using the front portion of Hotel Himland (west) situated over Khasra No.1600, new Khasra No.2163 to park their vehicles. According to them, a fresh lease deed was executed on ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 8 04.11.2012, between defendant company and Uma Soni for further period up to 13.07.2021. In the lease deed following conditions have been inserted: “The Lessee shall be entitled during the continuance of the lease to use the occupy exclusively and free of any extra or additional rent or charges sufficient space or accommodation for 3 No. sufficient space or accommodation for 2 No. parking cars and 2 No. two wheelers within the compound of area of the building in the said premises known as Himland Hotel (west).” 10. The defendant has further pleaded that they are parking their vehicles, on the space provided, as per the terms and conditions of the lease deed and they have never parked their vehicles towards the plaintiff hotel. Another objection has been taken that the plaintiffs have failed to identified the disputed property, upon which, they are claiming injunction. 11. The learned trial Court, after hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties dismissed the said application, vide order dated 26.08.2025. The said order has been assailed, by way of the present petition, mainly relying upon the admission, made by the defendant, as well as, the order passed by this Court in CMPMO No.329 of 2016. ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 9 12. The order under challenge has been assailed, on the ground that when, the case of the plaintiffs has been admitted, by the defendant, then, as per the mandate of Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, the suit ought to have been decreed, as nothing is to be left for adjudication, by the learned trial Court. 13. The order has also been assailed, on the ground that the admission made by the defendant has not been taken into consideration, while, dismissing the application under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC. 14. The prayer, as made, in the petition has been opposed by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Mamta Advocate, for respondent No.1, while arguing that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the stand, as taken, in the reply and despite framing the issues, way back on 20.12.2019, the plaintiffs could not adduce the evidence, despite availing eight effective opportunities. 15. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the petition. 16. The plaintiffs, are before this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The power under ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 10 Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature, as the same is not akin to the appellate powers. 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606” has elaborately discussed the scope of interference, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Relevant para 9 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.” 18. Even otherwise, in a recent decision in “Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference has again be explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:- “35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 11 that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 19. Being guided, by the above decision, this Court would proceed further, to determine, whether the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court, require any interference, by this Court, that too, while exercising jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. As per the order, which has been challenged, before this Court, by way of the present petition, the issues were framed on 20.12.2019 and thereafter, the plaintiffs have taken the fact that eight opportunities, if seen in the light of the decision of this Court, which was rendered on 01.11.2016 in CMPMO No.329 of 2016, this Court is of the view that the application, filed under Order 12, Rule 6, is nothing, but, to delay the proceedings. 21. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen, in the light of decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case titled as Pushpa and others versus Dayawati and others, reported in (2026) INSC ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 12 603, then, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the findings, recorded by the learned trial Court. Relevant paragraphs-33 to 35, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “33. A plain reading of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPCindicates that the provision confers a discretionary power upon the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of admission made either in pleadings or otherwise however the exercise of such power is conditioned upon the existence of a clear admission of fact. The object of the provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy relief where there is no substantial dispute requiring trial. At the same time, the provision cannot be invoked in a manner so as to deprive a party of adjudication where the controversy involves disputed questions of fact requiring evidence. 34. The term “admission” has been defined under Sections 17and 18of the Evidence Act, 1872, an admission is a statement which suggests any inference as to a fact in issue or relevant fact and is made by a party to the proceeding or by a person authorised by such party however every statement made by a party cannot automatically result in a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. Thus, the admission must be categorical, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal. 35. This Court in several decisions has consistently held that before passing a decree on admission, the Court must be fully satisfied that the admission relied upon leaves no room for controversy Page 12 and if the alleged admission requires interpretation, inferential reasoning or examination of surrounding circumstances, the matter ought to proceed to trial and it is similarly well settled that where substantial triable issues arise, the parties cannot be denied the opportunity to lead evidence. Recently, this Court in Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda(supra) reiterated the principles under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, the relevant paragraph reads as under: “40. In Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. [Himani Alloys Ltd.v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376] it is held that “Admissions” should be categorical and intentional, as Order 12 Rule ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 13 6CPCallows discretion rather than obligation. Admissions result in judgments without trial which permanently deny any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous, and unconditional, the discretion of the court is not exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. Hence, discretion should be used only where there is a clear and unequivocal admission. The relevant paragraphs read thus: (SCC pp. 276-77, para 11) “11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an “admission” contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used Page 13 only when there is a clear “admission” which can be acted upon. There is no such admission in this case.” 22. No doubt, this Court has disposed of CMPMO No.329 of 2016, on the basis of admission, as made, in para-7 of the written statement, but, the said findings, were recorded, by this Court, while, deciding the CMPMO, which has been filed by the defendant-Insurance Company, against the order dated 02.04.2016, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Shimla, when, the ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 14 learned Appellate Court, has affirmed the findings of the learned trial Court, in an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of CPC. 23. Moreover, mere admission is not sufficient to grant relief, under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, if the said admission requires interpretation. 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Balraj Taneja and another versus Sunil Madan and another, reported in 1999 (suppl) Civil Court Cases 1, has elaborately discussed the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, and held that in spite of admission of fact, made by a party to the suit, the Court may still require the plaintiffs to prove the fact, which has been admitted, by the defendant. Relevant paragraph-20 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:- “20. In Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors.AIR 1958 SC 886 = 1959 SCR 1111, it was held that Order 12 Rule 6 has to be read along with Proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. That is to say, notwithstanding the admission made by the defendant in his pleading, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in the plaint. Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made by a party to the suit, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the fact which has been admitted by the defendant. This is also in consonance with the provisions of Section 58 of the Evidence Act which provides as under : 58. Facts admitted need not be proved - No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 15 their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions." The Proviso to this Section specifically gives a discretion to the Court to require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. The Proviso corresponds to the Proviso to Rule 5(1) Order 8 CPC.” 25. If the facts and circumstances of the present case, are seen in the light of the above observations, then, the learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the application and the said findings cannot be interfered with by this Court, that too, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it cannot be said that the learned trial Court has unwarrantedly assumed the jurisdiction not vested in it, or the order has been passed, in gross abuse of the jurisdiction. 26. At the cost of repetition, despite availing number of opportunities to lead evidence, the petitioners- plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence, rather, opted to move the application under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, which has rightly been dismissed, by the learned trial Court. 27. Hence, the present petition is devoid of merits, and the same is accordingly dismissed. ( 2026:HHC:30092 ) 16 28. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of. (Virender Singh) July 21, 2026 Judge (subhash sharma)