ASHOK KUMAR SON OF RAMSWAROOP v. SEDURAM SON OF SRIYA ALIAS SRINARAYAN
CR/64/2026 · 2026-02-09
Maneesh Sharma
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 16255 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 16255 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
[2026:RJ-JP:5919] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 64/2026 Ashok Kumar Son of Ramswaroop, Resident of Shekhpura, Behrawanda, District Dausa Rajasthan ----Petitioner Versus
1. Seduram Son of Sriya Alias Srinarayan, Resident of Shekhpura, Behrawanda, District Dausa Rajasthan
2. Mukesh Kumar Saini Son of Heeralal Saini, Resident of Garh, Tehsil Behrawanda, District Dausa Rajasthan
3. Government Secondary School Shekhpura, Through Principal Gram Shekhpura Tehsil Behrawanda District Dausa
4. State of Rajasthan, Through Land Holder Through Tehsildar Behrawanda District Dausa
5. Sub-Registrar, Behrawanda Tehsil Behrawanda District Dausa ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Hari Krishana Sharma with Mr. Ramavtar Gupta For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA
Order 09/02/2026
1. The present revision petition has been filed, challenging the
order dated 02.01.2026 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikrai, District Dausa in Suit No.91/2025 titled as 'Seduram Vs. Ashok Kumar & Ors.', whereby the petitioner’s application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC was dismissed.
2.
Brief facts of the case giving rise to the present revision petition are that the plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of the sale deed dated 29.10.2025, while stating that the suit land was a joint Khatedari and an undivided land, wherein the plaintiff-respondent No.1 was residing
[2026:RJ-JP:5919] (2 of 4) [CR-64/2026] after an oral partition of the suit property. He further submits that the entire suit property was illegally alienated by the respondents by executing the sale deed dated 29.10.2025, whereas the plaintiff-respondent was only having a share in the suit property, and accordingly prayed for a declaration of the sale deed dated 20.10.2025 as void and cancellation of the same.
3. In the said suit, after service upon the present petitioner, the petitioner filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, stating therein that the suit has been filed with deficient court fees, as the DLC value of the suit property is on a higher side, whereas the suit has been valued at a meagre Rs.1,000/-.
4. The said application dated 28.11.2025 filed under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC was contested by the respondent by filing a written reply dated 01.12.2025, stating therein that the court fees paid was in terms of Section 7(2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 ('the Act of 1961'), and thus, prayed for rejection of the application.
5. After hearing arguments of learned counsel for both parties, the learned Trial Court dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC. The learned Trial Court, while examining the scope of Section 7(2) of the Act of 1961, placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Suhrid Singh Vs. Randhir Singh and Ors.1 and held that the court fees so deposited by the plaintiff/respondent cannot be said to be deficient. 1 AIR 2010 SC 2807
[2026:RJ-JP:5919] (3 of 4) [CR-64/2026]
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned court below has seriously erred in rejecting the application without appreciating the fact that the suit was filed on deficient court fees and prayed for rejection of the same. 7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record. 8. From the record of the case, it is evident that the plaintiff/respondent filed the suit No.91/2025 for declaration of the sale deed dated 20.10.2025 as void and cancellation of the same, executed by the defendant No.1/petitioner and defendant No.2/respondent. It is also revealed that the present plaintiff- respondent is not an executant of the sale deed; therefore, it would be apt to refer to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhrid Singh (supra), which has been reproduced as under:
"6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non- executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B' -- two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C'. Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if 'B', who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by 'A' is invalid/void and non- est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If 'B', who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act.
But if 'B', a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed
[2026:RJ-JP:5919] (4 of 4) [CR-64/2026] according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by Clause (v) of Section 7. 7. In this case, there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds. The prayer is for a declaration that the deeds do not bind the "co-parcenary" and for joint possession. The plaintiff in the suit was not the executant of the sale deeds. Therefore, the court fee was computable under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Act. The trial court and the High Court were therefore not justified in holding that the effect of the prayer was to seek cancellation of the sale deeds or that therefore court fee had to be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds."
9. Thus, in view of the above judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Court fees so deposited by the plaintiff/respondent cannot be said to be deficient, and the valuation of the suit cannot be said to be insufficient. 10.
Apart from the above, a bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the learned Trial Court has duly considered the pleas raised by the petitioner in detail and recorded a reasoned order, in consonance with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and Section 7(2) read with Section 24 of the Act of 1961. 11. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Court below has not committed any jurisdictional error, perversity, or legal infirmity in the impugned order, warranting any interference by this Court. 12. Accordingly, the present revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 13. All other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J SOURAV /21