2026:HHC:29468 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No: 367 of 2026 Reserved on: 08.07.2026 Date of Decision: 20.07.2026 Ashish Sharma ..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and Ors ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Petitioner in person. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing and setting aside the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, CBI Court, Shimla, District, Shimla (learned Revisional Court) vide which the order dated 12.08.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 5, Shimla (learned Trial Court) was upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29468 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused, asserting that he was serving in Dayanand Public School, The Mall, Shimla, as a computer teacher from 05.03.2007. He raised objections to the recruitment for the post of PGT-IP. The school authorities did not take any action against the accused, but suspended the complainant on 07.12.2019. The accused signed the suspension letter. Only the Manager of the School can sign the suspension order on behalf of the management as per the CBSE affiliation by-laws. The complainant submitted a complaint to the Police Station Sadar and SP Shimla, but no FIR was registered. Hence, it was prayed that a direction be issued to register an FIR against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 319, 323, 406, 420, 120B, 463, 468-471, etc. 3. Learned Trial Court held that the emotional hurt does not constitute an offence under Section 319 of the IPC. The allegations in the FIR do not show that forgery or cheating had been committed. Hence, the complaint was dismissed. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision, which was decided by 3 2026:HHC:29468 the learned Additional Sessions Judge, CBI Court, Shimla, District Shimla (learned Revisional Court). Learned Revisional Court held that the accused had signed the suspension order as per the directions of the superior authority, and a copy of the order was endorsed to the Chairman, LMC, Director DAVCMC, the manager of the school and others. The petitioner also faced disciplinary enquiries, and his services were terminated. He challenged his termination order but remained unsuccessful. The suspension order has merged with the termination order, and the FIR could not have been registered in the present case. Hence, the complaint was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the complainant has filed the present petition asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly conduct the proceedings. They violated the principle of natural justice. The accused had committed a cognizable offence, and an affidavit was filed by the complainant in support of his complaint. Learned Revisional Court was not competent to give independent findings in the matter and was required to adjudicate the correctness of the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Emotional hurt is also a part of hurt as defined under Section 319 4 2026:HHC:29468 of the IPC. The complaint was not treated under Section 223 of BNSS. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari vs. State of H.P. was violated. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 6. Petitioner Ashish Sharma, in person, submitted that, as per the bylaws of the affiliation, only the Manager was competent to sign the letter for disciplinary action against the staff and termination, suspension, etc., on behalf of the Management Committee. In the present case, the order of suspension was passed by the principal in violation of the bye- laws. The order is a forged document, which was created to cause hurt to the complainant. The learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The complainant filed the complaint on the assumption that the accused, being a principal, was not 5 2026:HHC:29468 competent to sign the suspension letter as per the affiliation bylaws. Therefore, the suspension order was forged and non est. This assumption is not correct. Even if the respondent/accused had no authority to sign the suspension order, an order signed by her will not amount to a forgery as understood in law. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, that there is a distinction between a document containing false recitals and a false document as is understood in Section 464 of the IPC. It was observed:- 14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not, by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, 6 2026:HHC:29468 know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a “false document” if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered with a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of “false documents”. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. 16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the deed on the owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property, describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his, even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under the first category of “false documents”, it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by 7 2026:HHC:29468 whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such a document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code is attracted. 9. Therefore, even if the accused had signed the suspension order without any authority, the complainant may have other remedies available to him, but filing a criminal complaint was not one of them because signing a document without any authority will not constitute a forgery as is understood in law. 10. The complaint was filed under Section 319 read with Section 323 of the IPC. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that it deals with bodily pain, disease, or injuries and does not include the emotional pain caused to a person. The use of bodily pain by the legislature shows that the legislature never intended to include emotional pain because it would have used the word pain alone if it intended to include emotional pain. Therefore, the submission that the word hurt includes emotional pain cannot be 8 2026:HHC:29468 accepted, and the ingredients of the complaint did not satisfy the requirements of Section 319 read with Section 323 of the IPC. 11. The complainant also filed a complaint for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 406 of the IPC. However, it was not mentioned as to what kind of property was entrusted to the accused and how she had committed the breach of trust regarding the property entrusted to her. Therefore, the necessary ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 406 of the IPC were not satisfied. 12. The complainant also filed a complaint for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. However, the complaint does not mention that any person was induced to deliver any property by the signatures of the accused, and the essential ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC were not satisfied. 13. The complaint was filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC. However, the complainant had arrayed only one accused, and it is difficult to see 9 2026:HHC:29468 how a person can conspire with himself to attract the provision of Section 120B of the IPC. 14. It is undisputed that the suspension order has not been set aside by the competent authority. Therefore, the same would be binding upon the parties. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435, that a decision rendered between the parties cannot be said to be non-existent, and such an order has to be avoided by challenging it in a higher forum. It was observed: - 7….In our opinion, even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word ‘void’ is not determinative of its legal impact. The word ‘void’ has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise and in this case, the only complaint about the initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the Board was, that it was not initiated on intimation by the State Land Board about the non-filing of the statement as required by Section 85(7) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In our opinion, this is not a case where the infirmity is fundamental. It is unnecessary to consider the matter further. 10 2026:HHC:29468 8. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31, it is stated, thus: “If an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved.” In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1995 Edn., at pp. 259-60, the law is stated thus: “The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between void and voidable decisions. The courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction, to the extent that the situation today can be summarised as follows: (1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edn., 1994, have stated the law thus at pp. 341-342: “… every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truism that in most situations the only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage, Lord Radcliffe said: ‘An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ 11 2026:HHC:29468 This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects.” The above statement of the law supports our view that the order of the Board dated 28-6-1977, declining to implead Respondents 3 and 4 (which stood confirmed in revision), concludes the matter against Respondents 3 and 4.” 15. This position was reiterated in Nagar Parishad, Ratnagiri v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275, wherein it was observed: - “16. Arguendo, the plaint as filed by Respondents 1 to 19 also suffers from another fundamental deficiency. Indeed, it is a cleverly drafted plaint, so as to give an impression that the competent authority had not taken any decision in exercise of statutory powers until the filing of the suit. However, in the written statement, a clear assertion has been made by the defendants (appellant and Respondent 20) that the decision to allot suit land to the appellant and for setting up the Project was taken after due deliberation and consultation with the Expert Committee, including the exercise of statutory powers of the authority concerned in that regard. None of these decisions of the competent authority has been assailed by the plaintiffs, nor has any declaratory relief been sought in that regard. In such a case, it would not be enough to ask for a permanent injunction simpliciter, and the suit so filed ought to have been rejected at the threshold on that count alone. We may usefully advert to the exposition of this Court in Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj [Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj, (2013) 3 SCC 182: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 1]. In paras 26 to 31, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 193-95) 12 2026:HHC:29468 “26. Mr Ahmadi next argued that the termination of the lease being illegal and non est in law, the respondent-plaintiffs could ignore the same, and so long as they or any one of them remained in possession, a decree for injunction restraining the Port Trust from interfering with their possession could be passed by the court competent to do so. We are not impressed by that submission. 27. The termination of the lease deed was by an order which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by having the same set aside, or declared invalid for whatever reasons; it may be permissible to do so. No order bears a label of its being valid or invalid on its forehead. Anyone affected by any such order ought to seek redress against the same within the period permissible for doing so. We may, in this regard, refer to the following oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)]. The following are the observations regarding the necessity of recourse to the Court for establishing the invalidity of an order established: ‘… An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ [Smith case [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)], AC pp. 769-70] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects. [Ed.: Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn., 1994.] 13 2026:HHC:29468 28. The above case was approved by this Court in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group [Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2011) 3 SCC 363], wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 369-70, para 19) ‘19. Thus, from the above, it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such a declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds, including the standing of the petitioner, on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person.’ 29. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211] wherein this Court discussed the need for determination of invalidity of an order for public purposes : (SCC pp. 225-26, paras 36 & 38-39) ‘36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with law. As Prof. Wade states: “The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court.” [H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352]. He further states: “The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is 14 2026:HHC:29468 sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case, the “void” order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another.” [H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352-53] *** 38. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1: 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082]. … 39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for a declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. “If the statutory time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for.” ’ 30. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court [R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court, (1997) 1 SCC 9: 1997 SCC (L&S) 65], State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443], where this Court has held that an order will remain effective and lead to legal 15 2026:HHC:29468 consequences unless the same is declared to be invalid by a competent court.” 16. Thus, the order has to be treated as valid unless set aside and cannot be said to be forged. 17. In view of the above, the orders passed by the learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity, and there is no reason to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested with this Court in the present case. 18. This is not the first instance when the petitioner has approached the Courts by filing these kinds of petitions. Therefore, it is necessary to take effective steps to prevent the petitioner from wasting the precious time of the Courts; hence, the present petition is dismissed with the cost of ₹10,000/-, which shall be deposited in the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund within a period of four weeks, failing which steps will be taken to recover it as per the law. 19. The present petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th July, 2026 (Nikita)