2026:JHHC:16935-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No.3434 of 2026 --------- Dhirendra Kumar Singh, aged about 66 yrs. Son of Late Mathura Prasad Singh, resident of Bisanpur Ashram Road, Old Krishna Niketan Lane, Near Railway Line, Ward No. 1, Post Jhumri Tilaiya, Police Station Jhumri Tilaiya, District Koderma. … … Petitioner Versus 1. The Director General, Directorate of Mines and Safety (in short DGMS), Hirapur, Post and Police Station Hirapur, District Dhanbad-826001. 2. The Director of Mines Safety, DGMS, Hirapur, Post and Police Station Hirapur, District Dhanbad-826001. 3. The Deputy Director General, Mines Safety Zone, Eastern Zone, Sitarampur, Burdhwan, P.O., P.S. & Dist. Burdhwan, West Bengal. 4. The Accounts Officer (Pay & Accounts) DGMS, Hirapur, Post and Police Station Hirapur, District Dhanbad- 826001. … … Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY ---------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Ravi Kumar Singh, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Prashant Vidyarthy, Advocate : Mr. Romit Kumar, Advocate ----------- C.A.V. on 08.05.2026 Pronounced on 11/06/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad J Prayer: 1. The writ petition is directed against the order dated 19.01.2026 passed in O.A. No.051/00211/2023 by Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench at Ranchi whereby and whereunder the learned Tribunal has declined to interfere with the calculation so made by the respondents saddling the writ petitioner with the liability of Rs.9,66,380/- by way of penal rent. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 2 Factual Matrix: 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated herein, are as under: The applicant was appointed as LDC in the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) on 18.08.1984 and his service was confirmed w.e.f. 1986. He was transferred from Koderma to Sitarampur, DGMS in the year 1984 itself. A Criminal case bearing Tilaiya PS Case No. 165/1994 dated 18.07.1994 for offences under Section 353, 427 and 504 of IPC was lodged against the applicant in which though he was acquitted from the charges under Section 427 of IPC but convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year for offences under Sections 353 and 504 of Indian Penal Code vide judicial order dated 30.01.1996. Upon his Criminal Appeal against the order dated 30.01.1996 the said sentence was modified to the extent of executing a bond of Rs. 5000/- with surety of like amount vide order dated 27.01.1998. The Criminal Revision filed by the applicant was dismissed by order dated 17.03.1998. In the meantime, the Director of Mines Safety vide letter dated 16.01.1997 proposed for termination of the applicant on the basis of conviction in criminal case. The petitioner has submitted his explanation on 15.05.1997 but without considering the same he was retired 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 3 compulsorily vide order dated 30.06.1997. The appeal of the petitioner was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 20.10.1997. Thereafter, the applicant moved the Central Administrative Tribunal in OA No. 732 of 1999 which was dismissed vide order dated 17.12.1999. The writ petition preferred against the said order vide W.P.(S) No. 1368 of 2005 was also dismissed vide order dated 05.01.2006 with an observation that since the petitioner had been convicted for the offence under Section 353 and 504 of Indian Penal Code, no interference could be made with the punishment of compulsory retirement. The petitioner has further submitted that thereafter when nothing was done on his representations, he again approached the learned Tribunal in OA No. 12/2015 which was disposed of vide order dated 04.11.2015 with direction to the Director General Mines and Safety (SD) to consider and dispose of the representation of the petitioner. However, the respondents rejected the representation of the petitioner vide order dated 23.05.2016. The petitioner then kept on making representations before the respondents as well as before the Department of Personnel and Training which had recommended the case of the petitioner to the respondents for review of the punishment but to no avail. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 4 The petitioner again moved before the learned Tribunal Vide OA No. 166/2018 which was also dismissed vide order dated 15.03.2019. The Writ Petition preferred against this order in W.P.(S) No. 4729 of 2019 was also dismissed vide order dated 02.03.2020. The further case of the petitioner is that much before the order of compulsory retirement, i.e. 30.06.1997, the respondents had instituted a PPE Case in the Court of Estate Officer, DGMS, Dhanbad under provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 which was disposed of vide order dated 06.09.2011 holding the petitioner unauthorized occupant of the premises and directed the petitioner to vacate the quarter. According to the petitioner, in the above order there is no mention about any damage charge to be realized from the petitioner. The petitioner then moved in appeal against the above order dated 06.09.2011 before the Principal District Judge, Koderma which was dismissed vide order dated 02.02.2017 and in that order also there is no direction for realization of any damage charges from the petitioner under Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 5 The petitioner vacated the official premises on 31.03.2021. It has been stated that after taking every effort against the punishment of compulsory retirement and after losing the same at every stage the petitioner applied for getting his retirement benefits, but to his utter surprise the respondents calculated damage rent payable by the petitioner and arrived at a figure of Rs. 9,66,380/- without any order issued by the Estate Officer under provisions of said Act and then Issued a certificate dated 10.06.2021 depicting the break- up of the calculation of the same amount to the petitioner. It is further case of the petitioner that in pursuance of his representation a letter dated 15.03.2022 was issued to the Director (SD), Ministry of Labour and Employment, DGMS, Dhanbad to calculate the life time pension arrear bill till February, 2022. The gratuity amount was fixed at Rs. 28,782/- but the same was fully adjusted towards amount of damage rent against unauthorized retention of the official premises by the petitioner as would be apparent from letter no. 1829 dated 28.03.2022. Further, vide letter no. 1831 dated 28.02.2022 an amount of Rs. 9,95,880/- was deducted towards unauthorized retention of the official premises by the petitioner out of the life time pension arrear payable amount of Rs. 22,25,966/-. It is the case of the petitioner that although the respondents had calculated Rs. 9,66,380/- towards damage rent but they have deducted altogether Rs. 9,84,072/- from 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 6 the amounts of pension and gratuity of the petitioner which is absolutely illegal. The petitioner has further stated that he has been issued his Pension Payment Order (PPO) dated 18.05.2022 wherein the pension of the petitioner has been fixed at Rs.13,150/- w.e.f. 01.03.2022. The petitioner has stated that though he is entitled for medical allowances for the period from 30.06.1997 to 16.11.2019, he was allowed medical allowance only from 16.11.2019 and not from 30.06.1997 vide letter dated 27.09.2022 which shows arbitrariness on the part of the respondents. The petitioner has also alleged non-payment of interest on the amount of his pension. With the aforesaid grievances, the petitioner approached the learned Tribunal by filing O.A. No.211 of 2023 but the same has been dismissed vide order dated 19.01.2026 against which the present writ petition has been filed. 3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the petitioner was appointed as LDC in the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) on 18.08.1984 and his service was confirmed w.e.f. 1986. He was transferred from Koderma to Sitarampur, DGMS in the year 1984 itself. 4. The petitioner was convicted in a Criminal case bearing Tilaiya PS Case No. 165/1994 dated 18.07.1994 for offences 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 7 under Section 353 and 504 of IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year for offences under Section 353 and 504 of Indian Penal Code vide order dated 30.01.1996. 5. The Director of Mines Safety vide letter dated 16.01.1997 proposed for termination of the applicant on the basis of conviction in criminal case. 6. The petitioner has submitted his explanation but without considering the same he was retired compulsorily vide order dated 30.06.1997. The appeal of the petitioner was also rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 20.10.1997. 7. The respondents had instituted a PPE Case in the Court of Estate Officer, DGMS, Dhanbad under provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 which was disposed of vide order dated 06.09.2011 holding the petitioner unauthorized occupant of the premises and directed the petitioner to vacate the quarter. 8. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order by which a damage rent of Rs.9,66,380/- has been saddled, has approached to the learned Tribunal raising the grievance that such amount ought not to have been directed to be paid by the petitioner reason being that such claim has not been made by the competent authority as per the competency conferred under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 8 Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, 1971). 9. 9. The respondents had appeared and the ground has been taken by referring Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 that the penal rent has been decided to be recovered from the petitioner since he has remained in the quarter unauthorizedly from the year 1997 and evicted sometime in the year 2021. 10. Learned Tribunal, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and after taking into consideration the material placed before it, has dismissed the original application against which the instant writ petition has been filed. Submission on behalf of the Petitioner: 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in challenging the impugned order: (i) It has been submitted that the order saddling the damage rent of Rs.9,66,380/- ought not to have been directed to be paid by the petitioner because the said order has not been passed by the competent authority as per the competency conferred under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, 1971). 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 9 (ii) The writ petitioner is not aggrieved with the calculation, rather, he is questioning the entire liability on the ground that the provision of the Act, 1971 is applicable. But, the learned Tribunal, on consideration of the applicability of the Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968, since has refused to interfere with the order passed by the administrative authority, the same having no error, as such the present writ petition is fit to be dismissed. (iii) The respondents have calculated damage rent payable by the applicant and arrived at a figure of Rs. 9,66,380/- without any order issued by the Estate Officer under provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,1971. (iv) It has been submitted that although the respondents had calculated Rs. 9,66,380/- towards damage rent but they have deducted altogether Rs. 9,84,072/- from the amounts of pension and gratuity of the applicant which is absolutely illegal. (v) It has further been submitted that there is no law for deduction of any amount from gratuity and pension of a retired employee without process of law. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 10 (vi) It has been submitted that although there are orders under provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,1971 but without any damage rent. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the order impugned herein is bad in the eyes of law and as such, is not sustainable and is fit to be quashed and set aside. Submission on behalf of the Respondents: 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has taken the following grounds in defending the impugned order: (i) It has been submitted that so far as the ground taken by the petitioner that the order saddling the liability has not been passed by the competent authority, i.e., Estate Officer, is concerned, the calculation of damage rent does not come under the purview of functions of Estate Officer. (ii) It is submitted that the petitioner was allotted Government Accommodation and although he has retired on 30.06.1997 but he vacated his allotted Government Accommodation only on 31.03.2021 and accordingly damage rent of Rs. 9,66,380/- has been charged for the period from 01.07.1997 to 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 11 31.03.2021 and the same has been deducted at prevailing rate declared by CPWD. (iii) It has further been submitted that as per Rule 18 of Directorate-General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 and FR 45-A where after an allotment has been cancelled or is deemed to be cancelled under any of the provisions of these rules, employee to whom it was allotted or of any person claiming through him, such employee shall be liable to pay damages for use and occupation of the residence, service, furniture and garden charges, equal to the market rent as may be determined by the competent authority from time to time. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the order impugned herein, therefore, may not be interfered with and the instant writ petition is fit to be dismissed. Analysis 15. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and has gone through the pleading made in the writ petition as also the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order. 16. This Court, before considering the legality and propriety of the order passed by learned Tribunal, needs to refer herein the jurisdiction which is being exercised by this Court which 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 12 is certainly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only in order to assess the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned Tribunal, by way of power of judicial review. 17. This Court is conscious that while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the power of judicial review is to be exercised as per the ratio laid down in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 at paragraph 99 wherein it has been held that the High Court is having power of judicial review to look into the legality and propriety of the order of the tribunal to the extent that if the order passed by the tribunal suffers from any perversity or the order is passed without following the principles of natural justice or there is error apparent on the face of order. For ready reference, paragraph 99 of the judgment is quoted as under:- "99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323- B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 13 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323- B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 18. The power of judicial review has also been deliberated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is to be considered while exercising the said power only to the extent that if any order is being passed found to be having error on the face of the order or without jurisdiction or suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of the order means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then only the power of judicial review is to be exercised. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised by the Court after determining that the impugned order is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 14 established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid judgment is being referred as under:- “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137]. --.” 20. It is evident that the power of judicial review is to be exercised only in two situations, i.e., if there is any error on the face of the order or the finding suffers from perversity. 21. The element of perversity has been raised. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:- 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 15 “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 16 Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 22. This Court is now proceeding to examine the propriety of the order passed by the learned Tribunal on the basis of the pleading as available in the paper book having been placed while arguing the case by learned counsel for both the parties. 23. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, it is the admitted fact herein that the writ petitioner was separated from service by an order of compulsory retirement vide order dated 30.06.1997. He has contested the case before one forum or the other and finally after losing from all forums, he has vacated the premises which was remained in his possession since the date of compulsory retirement till the date of vacation. 24. The respondent authorities, in consequence of the retention of the quarter for the period from 30.06.1997 to 31.03.2021, have come out with the calculation of 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 17 Rs.9,66,380/- directing the writ petitioner to make payment of the said demand and when it was not paid, the same was adjusted from the post retiral benefit which has been challenged before the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal since has refused to interfere with the same, therefore, the present writ petition. 25. The ground has been taken that the respondent authorities have initiated a proceeding under the Act, 1971 but no prayer was made on the issue of payment of the damage rent. As such, the calculation of the damage rent which has been assessed by the respondent authorities is without jurisdiction. 26. This Court, for the purpose of consideration of the said argument, needs to refer herein the issue of applicability of the Act, 1971 in a situation where the quarter in question which has remained in occupation of the writ petitioner fairly for a period of from 30.06.1997 to 31.03.2021 contrary to the allotment order which was allotted in pursuance to Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968. 27. The question, therefore, is that if the quarter has been allotted in pursuance to the Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 and if the calculation has been made on the basis of the applicability of the said Rule, whether the ground that no penal rent is to be recovered, as has been taken on behalf of the petitioner, can 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 18 be said to be justified one merely because the Estate Officer has not passed the order of damage rent? 28. There is no dispute that the Act, 1971 has been enacted and being a Parliamentary legislation, the same is to be dealt with for the purpose of declaration of first of unauthorized occupant and if declaration to the effect of unauthorized occupant is there, then the proceeding is to be initiated by the Estate Officer under the provision of Section 7 of the Act, 1971, for ready reference, Section 7 is being quoted hereunder as :- “7. Power to require payment of rent or damages in respect of public premises.—(1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, the estate officer may, by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. (2) Where any person is, or has at any time been, in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, the estate officer may, having regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be prescribed, assess the damages on account of the use and occupation of such premises and may, by order, require that person to pay the damages within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. (2A) While making an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the estate officer may direct that the arrears of rent or, as the case may be, damages shall be payable together with compound interest at such rate as may be prescribed, not being a rate exceeding the current rate of interest within the meaning of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978). (3) No order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be made against any person until after the issue of a notice in writing to the person calling upon him to show 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 19 cause within seven days from the date of issue thereof, why such order should not be made, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been considered by the estate officer. (3A) If the person in unauthorised occupation of residential accommodation challenges the eviction order passed by the estate officer under sub-section (2) of section 3B in any court, he shall pay damages for every month for the residential accommodation held by him. (4) Every order under this section shall be made by the estate officer as expeditiously as possible and all endeavour shall be made by him to issue the order within fifteen days of the date specified in the notice. 29. The party aggrieved against the proceeding under Section 7 of the Act, 1971 may prefer appeal under Section 9 of the Act, 1971. For ready reference, Section 9 is being quoted hereunder as :- “9. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under section 5 or section 5B or section 5C or section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred,— (a) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5, within twelve days from the date of publication of the order under sub-section (1) of that section; (b) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5B or section 7, within twelve days from the date on which the order is communicated to the appellant; and 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 20 (c) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5C, within twelve days from the date of such order: Provided that the appellate officer may entertain the appeal in exceptional cases after the expiry of the said period, if he is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that there was compelling reasons which prevented the person from filing the appeal in time. (3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the estate officer, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of that order for such period and on such conditions as he deems fit: Provided that where the construction or erection of any building or other structure or fixture or execution of any other work was not completed on the day on which an order was made under section 5B for the demolition or removal of such building or other structure or fixture, the appellate officer shall not make any order for the stay of enforcement of such order, unless such security, as may be sufficient in the opinion of the appellate officer, has been given by the appellant for not proceeding with such construction, erection or work pending the disposal of the appeal. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be disposed of by the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to dispose of the appeal finally within one month from the date of filing the appeal, after providing the parties an opportunity of being heard. (5) The costs of any appeal under this section shall be in the discretion of the appellate officer. (6) For the purposes of this section, a presidency-town shall be deemed to be a district and the chief judge or the principal judge of the city civil court therein shall be deemed to be the district judge of the district.” 30. The question which has been raised before this Court on behalf of the respondent that in a situation where the quarter was allotted under the provision of Directorate General of 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 21 Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 then the Act of 1971 will not be applicable. 31. This Court is of the view that the argument is having substance that if the quarter has been allotted in favour of the writ petitioner at the time when he was in service under the provision of Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 and if such Rule is having the provision to collect the damage rent, then the said Rule will be applicable. 32. This Court is further of the view that if the contention of the writ petitioner will be accepted then it will amount to approbate and reprobate since the benefit of the statute has been taken by getting the allotment and when the adverse decision has been taken by collection of the damage rent, then the ground is being taken that the aforesaid provision of law will not be applicable. 33. Law is well settled that the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to act by accepting one part of the order and declining to accept the other part which is contrary to the position of law to the effect that a person cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir reported in (1992) 4 SCC 683 wherein at paragraph 10 which reads hereunder: “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 22 which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that “a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage”. [See: Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd, Scrutton, L.J.] According to Halsbury’s order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside”. (para 1508)” 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Krishan Niwas reported in AIR 1997 SC 2349 wherein at paragraph 4 it has been laid down that once the employee has accepted the correctness of the order and then acted upon it, the same cannot be questioned by the concerned. 35. The issue of damages rent has already been decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ONGC v. V.U. Warrier, (2005) 5 SCC 245 wherein the respondent was an officer in ONGC and he, after attaining the age of superannuation, as per the policy of ONGC, was granted four months' time to vacate the quarters. However, the respondent failed to do so. His prayer for continuing in the quarters was rejected. He was informed that penal rent as per the ONGC policy would be recovered from him and ONGC deducted the penal rent from gratuity but the respondent vacated the quarters only after eviction proceedings were initiated against him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that ONGC had a right to withhold 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 23 gratuity by deducting the amount found due to it and payable by the employee towards penal charges for unauthorized occupation of the quarters. 36. By referring to Wazir Chand Vs. Union of India, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 596, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the action of the ONGC deducting penal rent from gratuity in terms of the Regulations was not arbitrary, unlawful and unreasonable. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under: “20. It is well settled that gratuity is earned by an employee for long and meritorious service rendered by him. Gratuity is not paid to the employee gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon. It is paid to him for the service rendered by him to the employer (vide Garment Cleaning Works v. Workmen [(1962) 1 SCR 711 : AIR 1962 SC 673] ). In Calcutta Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [(1967) 2 SCR 596 : AIR 1967 SC 1286] , after considering earlier decisions, this Court observed that “long and meritorious service” must mean long and unbroken period of service meritorious to the end. As the period of service must be unbroken, so must the continuity of meritorious service be a condition for entitling the workman to gratuity. If a workman commits such misconduct as causes financial loss to his employer, the employer would under the general law have a right of action against the employee for the loss caused and making a provision for withholding payment of gratuity where such loss caused to the employer does not seem to aid the harmonious employment of labourers or workmen. The Court proceeded to state that the misconduct may be such as to undermine the discipline in the workers — a case in which it would be extremely difficult to assess the financial loss to the employer. 21. In Jarnail Singh v. Secy., Ministry of Home Affairs [(1993) 1 SCC 47 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 119 : (1993) 23 ATC 642] this Court had occasion to consider the provisions of the Central Civil Services 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 24 (Pension) Rules, 1972. The definition of “pension” included gratuity under Rule 3. Rule 9 conferred on the President right to withhold or withdraw pension in certain circumstances. The order was passed against the appellant withholding pension and the entire amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity otherwise admissible to him. The direction was given on serious irregularities found to have been committed by the appellant. The appellant challenged that order unsuccessfully before the Central Administrative Tribunal. He, therefore, approached this Court. His contention was that an amount of gratuity could not have been withheld. Negativing the contention, the Court held that the power to withhold gratuity was conferred on the President under the relevant rules and hence, such action could not be said to be illegal. According to the Court, there could be adjustment of government dues against the amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity payable to government servant. 22. The ratio in R. Kapur [(1994) 6 SCC 589 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 13 : (1994) 28 ATC 516] , in our opinion, does not help the respondent as in that case, the claim for damages for unauthorised occupation against the appellant retired employee was “pending” and the proceedings were not finally disposed of. In the present case, the facts clearly reveal that the last day of lawful occupation of quarters by the respondent was 30-6-1990 and before that date, the appellant Commission had informed the respondent that his prayer for extension or retention of quarters had not been accepted and he should vacate by 30-6-1990. If he would not vacate the quarters, penal rent would be recovered from him. He did not challenge the action of not extending the period nor the recovery of penal rent. He, therefore, cannot make grievance against the action of the Commission. 23. Similar is the case of Gorakhpur University [(2001) 6 SCC 591 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1032] . There retiral benefits were withheld to adjust amount due from the employee but “disputed” by him. This Court noted that the employee was keeping the quarters allotted to him and continued to occupy after retirement. It was, inter alia, observed by this Court that after the employee retired, his request and application as per practice for allotment of quarters in the name of his son who was also an employee in the University remained pending and no orders were passed thereon. Moreover, there were resolutions of the University to waive penal rent and 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 25 such benefits were granted to other employees, but different treatment was shown to him which constituted “hostile discrimination” and the act was thus “unreasonable”. Though the employee retired in 1990 and continued to keep the quarters up to 1996, the University did not choose to take any action to evict him. On the contrary, it acquiesced in his occupation “by accepting regularly the normal rent”. Thus, there was lack of bona fides on the part of the University. 24. In Wazir Chand v. Union of India [(2001) 6 SCC 596 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1038] , a retired employee continuously kept the quarters occupied unauthorisedly. He was charged penal rent in accordance with rules and after adjustment of dues, balance amount of gratuity was paid to him. He contended that it was the bounden duty of the Government not to withhold the gratuity amount. The Court, however, dismissed the appeal observing that it was “unable to accept” the prayer of the appellant. The Court observed that the appellant having unauthorisedly kept the government quarters was liable to pay penal rent in accordance with rules and there was no illegality in adjusting those dues against death-cum-retirement benefits.” 37. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that anyone having unauthorisedly kept the government quarters was liable to pay penal rent in accordance with rules and there was no illegality in adjusting those dues against death-cum-retirement benefits. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that if a workman commits such misconduct as causes financial loss to his employer, the employer would under the general law have a right of action against the employee for the loss caused and making a provision for withholding payment of gratuity where such loss caused to the employer does not seem to aid the harmonious employment of labourers or workmen. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 26 38. It requires to refer herein that Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram reported in 1976 AIR (SC) 1637. 39. This Court has gone through the factual aspect of the said judgment wherefrom it is evident that it was the case where the shop was allotted to a vendor in Connaught Place, New Delhi and after the expiry of the allotment order, when it was not vacated, then a proceeding under Act, 1971 was initiated. 40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid pretext has observed that the Estate Officer has to determine upon hearing the objection the amount of rent in arrears which is 'payable.' The word 'payable' is somewhat indefinite in import and its meaning must be gathered from the context in which it occurs. 'Payable' generally means that which should be paid. If the person in arrears raises a dispute as to the amount, the Estate Officer in determining the amount payable cannot ignore the existing laws. If the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable. When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the arrears of rent, the determination must be in accordance with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 27 right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. The word "payable" in section 7, in the context in which it occurs, means "legally recoverable." Admittedly a suit to recover the arrears instituted on the day the order under section 7 was made would have been barred by limitation. The amount in question was therefore irrecoverable. 41. But the fact of the present case is quite different to that of the aforesaid case since here it is not a case of allotment of a place, rather, here is a case where the residential quarter was allotted in pursuance to the provision of Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 and the writ petitioner admittedly was compulsorily retired and retained the quarter fairly for a long period, then if the provision has been provided under the aforesaid Rule for collecting the damage rent then such calculation cannot be said to suffer from an error. 42. This Court, in view of the factual aspect involved in the present case, is of the view that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The law is well settled that any judgment or order passed by any court of law or forum has got no universal application, reference in this regard be made to the Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75, wherein at paragraph 47 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under :- 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 28 “47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 43. This Court, having discussed the legal and factual aspect and adverting to the order passed by the learned Tribunal wherein the learned Tribunal has also taken into consideration the applicability of Rule 18 of the Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968. 44. Further, the calculation has also been found to be not rebutted, as has been observed by the learned Tribunal in paragraph 7(b) of the order. 45. The learned Tribunal since has taken into consideration the applicability of Rule 18 of the Directorate General of Mines Safety (Allotment of Residences) Rules, 1968 and the admitted fact of the case is that the writ petitioner was remained in occupation of the quarter fairly for a long period and, as such, in that circumstances, the damage rent has been decided to be collected, it cannot be said to suffer from an error. 46. The learned Tribunal since has taken the same view, as such, this Court is of the view that it is not a case where the error is apparent on the face of the order or there is any element of perversity. 2026:JHHC:16935-DB 29 47. Considering the scope of power of judicial review, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned Tribunal needs no interference. 48. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. 49. The interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I agree (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Date : 11/06/2026 Birendra/- A.F.R. Uploaded on 12.06.2026