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2026 DAILYLAW 16208 (CHH)

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. RAMKISHUN @ MUNNA

ACQA/272/2018 · 2026-02-01

Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, Smt Rajani Dubey

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Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:5657-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No.272 of 2018 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Pali, Distt. Korba, Chhattisgarh Appellant (s) versus 1 - Ramkishun @ Munna S/o Chatur Singh Gond Aged About 25 Years R/o Duggupara Pulalikala, Police Station Pali, Distt. Korba Chhattisgarh 2 - Ramkumar S/o Chatur Singh Gond Aged About 34 Years R/o Duggupara Pulalikala, Police Station Pali, Distt. Korba Chhattisgarh Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. GA For Respondent(s) : None Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board Per Rajani Dubey J. 02/02/2026 1. Heard on admission. 2. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the State/appellant against the judgment of acquittal dated 13.04.2017 passed by the Digitally signed by R NIRALA 2 Court of Additional Judge to the Upper Session Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in ST No.08/2015, whereby the respondent Ramkumar has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 294, 506 Part-II, 323 & 451 of IPC, whereas the respondent Ramkishun has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 294, 506 Part-II, 323, 376 & 450 of IPC. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the prosecutrix lodged a complaint in the Police Station alleging that accused Ramkishun was teasing and threatening to kill her since 4 months and also the accused was threatening her family members, thus a complaint was filed on 01.06.2014. Thereafter, on 06.08.2014 when she was working in the field with her family members, then at about 11.30 AM Ramkishun, consuming liquor, came and again was teasing her, when her grand father objected the accused Ramkishun abused and beaten him. Thereafter, Grandfather left the prosecutrix in the house and return back to field for working. In the house the prosecutrix was alone and after bathing when she was changing cloth, accused Ramkishun entered into the house and forcibly committed rape with her, covering her mouth. When she tried to make noise, the accused threatened to kill her. After sometime her grandfather and father returned back house, then she informed the incident to them. Her Grandfather, after knowing the incident, slapped accused Ramkishun then Ramkishun assaulted him by stick due to which he sustained injuries. Thereafter, accused Ramkishun tried to flee away, but 3 other persons caught him and tied him. At that time accused Ramkumar came and started to abuse and assault, thereafter, he untied accused Ramkishun. On the basis of complaint made by the complainant, the police registered the offence against the accused respondents and they were arrested. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted before the Magistrate concerned. After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused respondents of the aforesaid charges. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is bad in law and facts, hence the same is liable to be set aside. The Learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence recorded in its true and correct prospective and the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the respondents. There were only minor omissions and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which should have been ignored by the learned Trial Court but the learned Trial Court has not considered the evidence in its true perspective and has wrongly acquitted the respondents of the aforesaid charges. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and finding of the learned Court below is perverse and is liable to be set aside. 5. No one appears on behalf of respondents, though the counsel on behalf of the respondents appeared on the last dates of hearing. 4 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 7. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges against the respondent Ramkumar under Sections 294, 506 Part-II, 323 & 451 of IPC, whereas the respondent Ramkishun has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 294, 506 Part-II, 323, 376 & 450 of IPC. After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondents of the aforesaid charges. 8. PW-1 prosecutrix stated that on the date of incident, the accused Ramkishun was trying to molest her when she was at field, then she tried to escape and ran towards her grandfather and her grandfather tried to stop the accused Ramkishun but he committed maarpeet with her grandfather, during which an unknown person came there and pacified the matter. Thereafter she went to her home and behind her back the accused Ramkishun also came there and nobody was at home and tried to commit rape with her, during which her father and grandfather and other family members also came there and stopped the accused and tied his hands. After some time the accused Ramkumar, who is elder brother of accused Ramkishun came there and took the accused Ramkishun with him and threatened them of their life. Thereafter they lodged FIR (Ex-P/1). In the 5 cross-examination, she admitted that in the FIR (Ex-P/1) dated 08.07.2014, the report was written by ink. In para 13, she admitted that she lived with accused Ramkishun at Village Jhabar and she lived with him as husband and wife for about 1 year but due to fear she did not lodge any report against him. In para 15, she again admitted that in 2014 regarding her and accused Ramkishun, a village panchayat was convened, wherein a decision was taken that marriage of both be performed. 9. PW-2 father of the prosecutrix stated that on the date of incident, when he came to his home, he saw that the accused Ramkishun was committing maarpeet with his father, thereafter they tied him and reported the matter to the police station. He further stated that he had taken away her daughter thats why he was quarreling and whenever he came he always threatened them of life. The prosecution declared him hostile and cross-examined him then he denied that her daughter had told him that the accused Ramkishun entered the house and committed rape with her. 10. PW-3 grandfather of the prosecutrix supported the statement of the prosecutrix that the accused was trying to molest her granddaughter but he did not state any rape as alleged against the respondent Ramkishun by the prosecutrix. The prosecution declared him hostile and cross-examined him then he admitted this suggestion of prosecution that her granddaughter had told him that Ramkishun had raped her. 6 11. PW-4 & PW-5, uncle and aunt of the prosecutrix stated that on the date of incident, the accused Ramkishun was trying to molest the prosecutrix at field. When the granddaughter of the prosecutrix tried to stop him, then he committed maarpeet with him and the prosecutrix. The prosecution declared them hostile and cross-examined them, then they admitted that the prosecutrix had told them that the accused Ramkishun committed rape with her. 12. PW-7 Dr. Smt. Sakuntala Bhagat examined the prosecutrix but she did not find any external or internal injuries and opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding recent sexual intercourse and gave her report (Ex-P/3). 13. The learned Trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and has rightly found that the statements of the prosecutrix are not reliable and the medical report also does not support the prosecution, as such the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondents. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs Kewal Krishan, reported in (2023) 13 SCC 695, held in paras 14 to 16 as under:- 14. Before we proceed further, it would be apposite to notice the law as to when it would be appropriate for this Court, exercising power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court while reversing an order of conviction recorded by the Trial Court. The law 7 in this regard is well settled. Normally, this Court is reluctant to interfere with an order of acquittal. But when it appears that the High Court has on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case and ignoring some of the most vital facts, acquitted the respondent and the order of acquittal passed by the High Court has resulted in a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice, extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India may rightfully be exercised (See : State of U.P. v. Sahai, (1982) 1 SCC 352). 15. In State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah, (2005) 3 SCC 169 reiterating the same view it was observed: “8……..This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the accused and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.” 16. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed: “190. ………..Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be “not guilty”.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values 8 of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all vidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforesaid cases, it is clear that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Even otherwise, the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or perversity and looking to the limited scope of interference in an acquittal appeal, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 9 17. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. Sd/- Sd/- Rajani Dubey Radhakishan Agrawal Judge Judge Nirala