1 2026:CGHC:5400 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 720 of 2018 Sukhlal Sarkar S/o Raghunath Sarkar Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Pakhanjur Colony Tehsil Pakhanjoor District Uttar Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh … Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Kanker District Uttar Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh 2 - Tehsildar Pakhanjur District Uttar Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh ., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh 3 - President Nagar Pachayat Pakhanjur ,tehsil Pakhanjur District Uttar Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Shri Parag Kotecha, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate. SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.02.03 10:21:35 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board 31.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.04.2018 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, Bhanupratappur, Uttar Bastar Kanker (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 11A/2018 (Suklal Sarkar vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 03.02.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class- II, Pakhanjur Uttar Bastar Kanker (C.G.) in Civil Suit 51A/15 (Suklal Sarkar vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others) For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The present suit is filed for declaration of title, confirmation of lawful possession, and permanent injunction in respect of land situated at Village Pakhanjur Colony, P.H. No. 05, bearing Khasra No. 555/1, area 320 sq. meters. 3 3. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the plaintiff has been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the suit land for about 30 years, having constructed a residential house thereon and residing with his family. The plaintiff has, by spending substantial labour, time and money, constructed a pucca house, dug a well for drinking water, and developed the land for residential use. 4. The Defendant No. 2, the Tahsildar, Pakhanjur, acting under Defendant No. 1 (State of Chhattisgarh), on the basis of a report submitted by the Halka Patwari, initiated encroachment proceedings against the plaintiff in Case No. 28/A-68/2010-11, imposed a fine of Rs. 1,500/- and passed an order dated 07.01.2011 directing eviction of the plaintiff. Subsequently, on 28.01.2011, the plaintiff’s house was demolished by bulldozer. 5. The possession of the plaintiff over 320 sq. meters out of Khasra No. 555/1 is not an encroachment. The plaintiff has been in possession since prior to 23.01.1980, and the land is covered under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Village Abadi (Unoccupied Land) Special Provisions Act, 1970. On the 4 relevant date, the plaintiff was landless and in lawful occupation as contemplated under the said Act. 6. By virtue of long, continuous and lawful possession and the applicable statutory provisions, the plaintiff has acquired bhumiswami (ownership) rights over the suit land. The order passed by the Tahsildar is illegal, void and without jurisdiction. 7. As the defendants have remained ex parte, there are no admitted facts on their behalf. 8. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 03.02.2018 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff failed to prove any lawful right, title or ownership over the suit land. Although the plaintiff examined himself and two supporting witnesses, no document was produced to show that the plaintiff had acquired any legal title or bhumiswami rights over the suit land. The trial Court found that the documents relied upon by the plaintiff record him only as an encroacher. It was further noted that the Tahsildar, Pakhanjur, had initiated encroachment proceedings against the plaintiff, imposed a fine of Rs. 1,500/-, and passed an order of eviction, pursuant 5 to which the structure raised by the plaintiff was demolished. The Trial Court held that these proceedings do not confer any legal right or title upon the plaintiff. 9. The trial Court further held that mere long and continuous possession, even for several years, does not confer ownership or any legal right over Government land. Except for unauthorized occupation, the plaintiff could not establish any independent legal basis for his claim. The Trial Court also held that since the plaintiff is an encroacher, he is not entitled to restoration of possession or to any declaration of title in his favour. So far as the relief of permanent injunction is concerned, the Court held that such relief can be granted only when the plaintiff establishes a legal right over the property. As the plaintiff failed to prove any right, title or lawful possession over the suit land, he is not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court dismissed the suit 10. Aggrieved by the order dated 03.02.2018, passed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff/appellant preferred Civil Appeal No. 11A/2018 before the learned Additional District Judge, Bhanupratappur District Uttar Bastar Kanker (C.G.). The 6 First Appellate Court, by judgment dated 27.04.2018, afÏrmed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. Thus this appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that both the courts have erred in law and on facts in dismissing the suit despite clear evidence of the appellant’s long, continuous and peaceful possession over the suit property, which was open and within the knowledge of the Government. It is contended that the appellant had produced Khasra Panchshala and other revenue records evidencing such possession, but the same were not properly appreciated. Learned counsel would submit that under Order 8 Rule 3, 4 & 5 of the CPC a fact not specifically denied is ordinarily taken to be admitted. Both the courts wrongly denied the settled possession of the appellant and dismissed the suit merely on technical grounds, ignoring the settled principle that once the nature and continuity of possession are proved, such possession is protected in law and cannot be disturbed except in accordance with due process. The impugned judgments, therefore, suffer from serious errors of law and fact and are liable to be set aside. 7 12. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the material available on record. 13. This Court has considered the pleadings, the evidence on record, and the concurrent judgments passed by both the courts. It is found that the appellant has failed to establish any lawful right, title or interest over the suit property. The material on record clearly shows that the appellant’s possession, if any, was only that of an encroacher, and it is well settled that mere long or continuous possession over Government land does not confer ownership or any enforceable legal right. The documents relied upon by the appellant do not establish title and, on the contrary, indicate unauthorized occupation. It is also borne out from the record that the competent authority had initiated encroachment proceedings against the appellant, imposed a fine of Rs. 1,500/- and passed an order of eviction, pursuant to which the structure raised by the appellant was demolished. These actions were taken in accordance with law and do not create any right in favour of the appellant. 14. Under Order 8 Rule 3, 4 & 5 CPC, a fact not specifically denied is ordinarily taken to be admitted, however, this rule is not 8 absolute, especially in cases where the eviction order has been passed by the Revenue Authority by declaring the plaintiff as encroacher. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the Tehsildar Pakhanjur had initiated encroachment proceedings against the plaintiff and vide order dated 07.01.2011 imposed a fine of Rs. 1500/- and passed an order of eviction, pursuant to which the structure raised by the plaintiff was demolished. It is not in dispute that the said order remain unchallenged. 15. It is the trite law that an admission by non-denial cannot legalise an illegality. Once there is finding of Tehsildar regarding the encroachment of plaintiff and there is an order of removal of encroachment, the plaintiff cannot claim lawful right over the government property without questioning the order of Tehsildar. 16. Both the courts have rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and have recorded concurrent findings of fact against the appellant. No perversity, illegality or material irregularity has been shown in the impugned judgments warranting interference by this Court in second appeal. The appellant has also failed to make out any case for 9 grant of declaration or permanent injunction, as he could not establish any legal right or lawful possession over the suit property. The judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are afÏrmed. 17. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 18. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/plaintiff failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufÏcient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 19. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do 10 not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 21. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 22. 22. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the 11 Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 23. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib/Gowri