2026:JHHC:16571-DB -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 9986 of 2022 In Civil Review No. 49 of 2020 Anil Kumar Singh, aged about 45 years, son of Late Bharat Raj Singh, resident of 72, Ananda Chowk, Budhwa Mahadev, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh. … … … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Divisional Forest Officer, East Forest Division, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand). 3. District Mining Officer, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand). 4. Union of India, through its Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forest, Paryavaran Bhawan, CGO Complex, Lodi Road, P.O. Lodi Road, & P.S. Lodi Road, New Delhi … … … Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Petitioner: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate For the State: Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III --------- 06/Dated: 09.06.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By filing I.A. No. 9986 of 2022, the review petitioner seeks leave to file a review against the judgment and order dated 20th May, 2020, dismissing the L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019. 3. Considering that the review petitioner is the son of the late Bharat Raj Singh, the appellant in L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019, and that the said Bharat Raj Singh had already expired when the judgment and order dated 20th May 2020 was passed, we grant the petitioner leave to file and pursue this review petition. I.A. No. 9986 of 2022 is disposed of. 4. Learned counsel for the review petitioner submitted that on the date when the judgment and order dated 20th May, 2020, was passed, the 2026:JHHC:16571-DB -2- appellant Bharat Raj Singh had already expired. He submitted that this fact was not known to the Advocate for the appellant, who argued the matter on the merits. He pointed out that at that time, the COVID pandemic was raging, and communication was difficult. 5. The learned counsel for the review petitioner submitted that the order dated 20th May 2020 was made in an appeal in which the appellant had already expired, and, in that sense, it is an order against a dead person. He submitted that such a judgment and order should be regarded as a nullity and be set aside on review. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is the appellant’s duty to report the demise of the appellant. Instead, the matter was argued on merits and a judgment and order were invited. He submitted that even otherwise on merits, there is no reason to fault the view taken in the judgment and order dated 20.05.2020. He submitted that on a technical plea, the review petitioner should not be granted a 2nd opportunity to argue the appeal. 7. We have considered the rival contentions. 8. Although a technical point has been raised by the review petitioner, it deserves to succeed. There is no dispute that Bharat Raj Singh, the appellant in L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019 had already expired as of 20th May 2020. Therefore, the L.P.A. would have been disposed of as abated, but not by passing a decision on the merits. 9. The Court was also not apprised of the demise of Bharat Raj Singh; in fact, the Advocates for Bharat Raj Singh argued the matter on the merits. Therefore, this is a case where, under a common mistake of fact, the judgment and order dated 20th May 2020 were rendered. 10. For the above reason and further, relying on the assurance of the learned counsel for the review petitioner that the L.P.A. would be argued 2026:JHHC:16571-DB -3- on merits forthwith, we recall/set aside the judgment and order dated 20th May, 2020, dismissing the L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019 on merits. Further, at the request of the learned counsel for the review petitioner, we permit the review petitioner to be substituted as appellant in L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019. Necessary amendment to be carried out forthwith. 11. The learned counsel for the review petitioner, who shall now be referred to as the appellant in L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019 submitted that the lease cancellation order dated 30.01.2015 was not correct. He submitted that the lease was granted after obtaining all statutory permissions. He submitted that, in any event, the LP.A. would not have been dismissed on the ground that, during its pendency, the lease period had expired. He submitted that the L.P.A. should have been allowed, and an extension should have been granted or directed by this Court because the lease cancellation order dated 30.01.2015 was not legal and valid. 12. Mr Ashutosh Anand, learned AAG-III for the State, submitted that the lease period expired on 05.09.2017. In terms of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, even the application for renewal was deemed to have been refused. This position was accepted on behalf of the appellant. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the appellant’s writ petition. 13. Mr Ashutosh Anand submitted that, on account of the amendments to the law, there was no question of granting any renewal, as the State would have to auction the leasehold rights. 14. On due consideration of the rival contentions and the materials on record, we are satisfied that the L.P.A. is required to be dismissed. The reasons for this conclusion are set out briefly hereafter. 15. Firstly, there was the issue of obtaining prior permission from the Central Government under the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 2026:JHHC:16571-DB -4- 1980. The record shows that, since no prior approval was granted, the State Government was directed, vide order dated 25.06.1997 in C.W.J.C. No. 1178 of 1997(R), to forward the application for prior approval. After that, the Central Government did accord permission vide order dated 20/21-11-2002, subject to almost 12 conditions. After that, a lease was granted to the appellant, which was to expire on 05.09.2017. 16. However, on certain grounds, the lease was cancelled vide order dated 30.01.2015. Therefore, the appellant challenged the lease cancellation order by instituting W.P.(C) No. 1563 of 2015. During the pendency of this petition and when the matter was actually taken up for hearing, the lease period had expired on 05.09.2017. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No. 1563 of 2015 was disposed of. However, upon the submission of the appellant that this order should not come in the way of considering the appellant’s application for renewal of the lease, the learned Single Judge clarified that the dismissal of W.P.(C) No. 1563 of 2015 would have no bearing on the appellant’s application for renewal of the original lease. 17. After securing the above clarification, we are a little surprised as to why the present L.P.A. was filed against the learned Single Judge’s order dated 11.12.2018. In any event, we do not find any infirmity in the learned Single Judge’s order dated 11.12.2018, declining the appellant any reliefs on the ground that the lease period had already expired on 05.09.2017. 18. The record shows that even the appellant’s application for renewal made under Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, was deemed to have been refused because no renewal was granted within a period of 90 days of the making of the renewal application. The record shows that the appellant accepted this position, which was otherwise undisputed. 2026:JHHC:16571-DB -5- 19. Given the above circumstances, there was no point considering the challenge to the lease cancellation order dated 30.01.2015. Even assuming that such an order were quashed in 2018, no relief could have been granted to the appellant because the lease period had already expired on 05.09.2017. No error can be found with the learned Single Judge’s reasoning, given the admitted facts and circumstances showing the expiry of the lease term on 05.09.2017. 20. As if this were not sufficient, even the appellant’s application for renewal was deemed to have been refused, given the provisions of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004. The issue of the validity of the lease cancellation order dated 30.01.2015 was thus rendered only academic. The learned Single Judge, therefore, correctly declined to grant the appellant any relief in W.P.(C) No. 1563 of 2015. 21. The record also shows that, as to the above factual aspects, there was really no contest on behalf of the appellant. Once the factual aspect as indicated above was admitted and not contested, we are at a loss to understand why the present L.P.A. was filed and pursued. At no stage was there any prayer or even an argument that the lease period should have been extended after setting aside the lease cancellation order dated 30.01.2015. 22. In any event, the relief of an extension of the lease period could not have been granted, given that the original lease expired on 05.09.2017 and the renewal application was also deemed refused. 23. There is substance in Mr Ashutosh Anand’s contention that any grant or renewal of leases would be governed by the amended law on the subject. The amended law, prima facie, contemplates the auction of leasehold rights. This is another reason to dismiss this L.P.A. 2026:JHHC:16571-DB -6- 24. For all the above reasons, we dismiss L.P.A. No. 347 of 2019 without any order for costs. Accordingly, the Civil Review is also disposed of. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 09, 2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 12.06.2026