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High Court of Himachal Pradesh · body

2026 DAILYLAW 16175 (HP)

STATE OF HP v. RAJ KUMAR

CR.A/8/2014 · 2026-07-20

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:HHC:29467 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 8 of 2014 Reserved on: 07.07.2026 Date of Decision: 20.07.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Raj Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellant : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr Adarsh K. Vashista, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.08.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-1, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 21.10.2008 and order of sentence dated 22.10.2008, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29467 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 325 and 504, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Veena Devi (PW1), had gone to her fields to graze her cattle. Accused Raj Kumar was also grazing his cattle in the vicinity. Cattle of Raj Kumar went to the wheat fields of the informant. The informant objected and enquired as to why the accused had left his cattle in her field. Accused Raj Kumar became infuriated and started abusing the informant. He caught hold of the informant by her neck and started beating her with kicks and fist blows. The informant's husband, Parkash Chand (PW2), came to the spot after hearing the noise. He tried to rescue the informant from the accused, but the accused inflicted a blow by means of a darat to Parkash Chand, who sustained an injury on his left arm. Bishan Singh and his wife also quarrelled with the informant. Lucky and Deepu rescued the informant from the accused. The matter was reported to the police. An entry in the 3 2026:HHC:29467 Daily Diary (Ext.PW7/A) was recorded in the Police Station. An application (Ext.PW8/B) was filed for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr Sunita (PW5) examined the informant and found that she had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused within 6 hours of examination. She issued MLC (Ext.PW5/A). Dr Sunita (PW5) also examined Prakash Chand and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. She advised X-Ray. Dr Kalpana Mahajan (PW4) went through the X- Ray and found that there was a fracture of the lateral epicondyle of the left humerus bone. The nature of the injury was stated to be grievous. An MLC (Ext.PW5/B) was issued. FIR (Ext.PW9/A) was registered, and the investigation was handed over to Partap Singh (PW8), who visited the spot and prepared the spot map (Ext.PW8/A). Raj Kumar produced darat, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under 4 2026:HHC:29467 Sections 323, 325 and 504 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Informant Veena Devi (PW1) and her husband Parkash Chand (PW2) are the eyewitnesses/victims. Lokesh Kumar (PW3) and Sandeep Kumar (PW6) did not support the prosecution's case. Dr Kalpana Mahajan (PW4) is the radiologist who went through the X-ray and found a fracture. Dr Sunita (PW5) medically examined the victims. HHC Gulzar Chand (PW7) proved the entry in the diary. Partap Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. Smt. Sureshta Thakur (PW9) signed the FIR and prepared the challan. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. They claimed that Raj Kumar was grazing the cattle in his field. Prakash Chand came to the field and inflicted a blow to Raj Kumar with a darat. He also inflicted injury to Bishan Dass, whose two teeth were damaged. Prakash Chand ran with darat and fell on it. He sustained injury by way of a fall. They produced the documents in their defence. 5 2026:HHC:29467 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the informant and her husband corroborated each other. Medical evidence also proved that Prakash Chand had sustained an injury that could have been caused by means of a darat. The independent witnesses did not support the prosecution's case, but admitted that Raj Kumar was armed with a darat, which corroborated the prosecution's version that Raj Kumar had inflicted injury to Prakash Chand with a darat. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Sections Sentence Section 325 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for one year each, pay a fine of ₹1000/- each, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months each. Section 323 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months each, pay a fine of ₹500/- each, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each. Section 504 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for one month each, pay a fine of ₹200/- each, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days each. 6 2026:HHC:29467 All the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra, at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that civil litigation was pending between the parties, and the possibility of false implication could not be ruled out. Two FIRs were registered regarding the same incident, which should have been investigated by the same Investigating Officer. However, the same Investigating Officer had not investigated the matter. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, and independent witnesses also did not support the prosecution's case. All these aspects made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. Learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the prosecution's version. Hence, the learned Appellate Court accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The testimonies of the informant and her husband were 7 2026:HHC:29467 consistent, and these were corroborated by the medical evidence. The police had also seized darat which was identified by Prakash Chand. Learned Appellate Court relied upon minor contradictions to record the acquittal, which is impermissible. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Adarsh K. Vashista, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 10. Mr Jitender Kumar Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were duly corroborated by the medical evidence, and this aspect was ignored by the Learned Appellate Court. The accused could not have been acquitted because two FIRs were not investigated by the same Investigating Officer. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 8 2026:HHC:29467 11. Mr Adarsh K. Vashista, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The independent witnesses did not support the prosecution's case, and this made the prosecution's case highly suspect. The prosecution witnesses did not provide any explanation for the injuries sustained by Prakash Chand, which made the prosecution's case highly suspect. The learned Appellate Court has taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of 9 2026:HHC:29467 evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 10 2026:HHC:29467 15. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused 11 2026:HHC:29467 was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. Prakash Chand (PW2) stated that Raj Kumar inflicted a blow by the sharp side of a darat on his left arm. Dr Sunita (PW5) examined Prakash Chand and issued the MLC (Ext.PW5/B) in which CLW just above the left elbow joint was detected. She mentioned the kind of weapon used as a blunt object. She stated on oath that she could not say whether the injury on the person of Prakash Chand was possible with the sharp side of the darat, and she had given her opinion that the nature of the weapon was blunt because the darat was not shown to her. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 679, that when the accused had used sharp-edged weapons, but not a single incised wound was found, the prosecution's case that sharp-edged weapons were used would be doubtful, and this would introduce a serious defect in the prosecution's case sufficient to discredit the entire case. It was observed: 10….It has already been noticed that all the accused persons were armed with sharp weapons. It is the evidence 12 2026:HHC:29467 of PW 5 that Amar Singh, son of Bachan Singh, and Rattan Singh were each armed with a sua, Lakha Singh was armed with a barchi, Harbhajan Singh was armed with a kulhari, and Amar Singh, son of Isher Das, was armed with a kirpan. She said: “Then all the accused except Bachan Singh accused surrounded my son Piara Singh (deceased). Then Lakha Singh gave a barchi-blow on the left knee of my son. Then Piara Singh (deceased) fell down, and all the accused then gave injuries to him with their respective weapons.” In her cross-examination, she said that the accused persons gave quite a number of blows with their respective weapons after they had overpowered him, and that many of the blows fell on the ribs and abdomen of deceased Piara Singh. But, not a single incised wound was found on the body of the deceased by PW 2, Dr Verma. Moreover, the medical report shows that there was no injury to the ribs and abdomen of the deceased. We are unable to accept the evidence of PW 5 that although a number of blows were given by the accused with their weapons on the ribs and abdomen of the deceased, yet such blows did not produce any mark of injury. The medical report submitted by PW 2 shows that there were only contusions, abrasions and fractures, but there was no incised wound on the left knee of the deceased as alleged by PW 5. If her evidence that all the accused inflicted injuries on the deceased with their respective weapons has to be accepted, then there would be incised wounds all over the body of the deceased, but the medical report shows that not a single incised wound was found on the body of the deceased. Thus, the evidence of PW 5 is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence. This Court in Ram Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SCC 497: 1975 SCC (Cri) 571: AIR 1975 SC 1727] has laid down that if the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence, this is a most fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless reasonably explained, it is sufficient to discredit the entire case. There is no explanation for the apparent total 13 2026:HHC:29467 inconsistency between the evidence of PW 5 and the medical evidence. 18. A similar view was taken in Raj Pal v. State of Haryana, (2007) 13 SCC 554: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 600, wherein it was observed at page 557: 12. In this connection, it may be mentioned that in the FIR dated 5-8-1990, it has been stated that the accused Jai Pal gave a pharsi-blow on the head of Sohan Lal while Raj Pal gave a lathi-blow on his head. The same is the statements in court of the alleged eyewitnesses, PW 9 Hira Lal and PW 10 Zile Singh. A pharsi is a weapon that causes an incised wound like an axe. However, there is no incised wound on the body of Sohan Lal, as is evident from the post-mortem report. There are four injuries on the dead body of Sohan Lal as found by Dr Sushil Goyal's post-mortem report conducted on 5-8-1990 at 6.05 p.m. One of these wounds was a lacerated wound on the head, while the other wounds were contusions on the shoulder. There is no incised wound. Thus, there is a clear inconsistency between the ocular version and the medical version. 19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2003) 6 SCC 380: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 630 that where the medical evidence shows the total absence of the injuries that can be caused by a weapon described by the witnesses, an inference can be drawn that the testimonies of the witnesses are not truthful. It was observed at page 389: 16. The conflict between oral testimony and medical evidence can be of varied dimensions and shapes. There 14 2026:HHC:29467 may be a case where there is a total absence of injuries that are normally caused by a particular weapon. There is another category where though the injuries found on the victim are of the type that are possible by the weapon of assault, but the size and dimension of the injuries do not exactly tally with the size and dimension of the weapon. The third category can be where the injuries found on the victim are those that are normally caused by the weapon of assault, but they are not found on that portion of the body where they are deposed to have been caused by the eyewitnesses. The same kind of inference cannot be drawn in the three categories of apparent conflict in oral and medical evidence enumerated above. In the first category, it may legitimately be inferred that the oral evidence regarding assault having been made from a particular weapon is not truthful. However, in the second and third categories, no such inference can straight away be drawn. The manner and method of assault, the position of the victim, the resistance offered by him, the opportunity available to the witnesses to see the occurrence, such as their distance, presence of light and many other similar factors, will have to be taken into consideration in judging the reliability of ocular testimony. 20. In the present case also, the opinion of the Medical Officer that injury could have been caused by means of a blunt weapon and absence of the incised wound, which are likely to be caused by the sharp side of darat would make the prosecution's case highly suspect and the learned Appellate Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case. 21. Informant Veena Devi (PW1) denied in her cross- examination that Prakash Chand was armed with darat and that 15 2026:HHC:29467 he had inflicted an injury on the head of Raj Kumar. She denied that Prakash Chand had inflicted an injury on the face of Bishan Dass with the blunt side of the darat and his two teeth were broken. Prakash Chand (PW2) denied that he had inflicted injury by means of the darat on the head of Raj Kumar or had used the blunt side of the darat to inflict injury on the face of Bishan Dass. Lokesh Kumar (PW3) admitted in his cross-examination that Raj Kumar had a bleeding injury on his head, but he could not say how this injury was sustained by Raj Kumar. Sandeep Kumar (PW6) also admitted that Raj Kumar had sustained a bleeding injury on his head, but he could not say how this injury was sustained. Therefore, the fact that Raj Kumar had sustained a bleeding injury on his head was duly established on record. However, the prosecution witnesses have not provided any explanation for the injuries sustained by Raj Kumar. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parshuram v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1416, that the non-explanation of the injuries to the accused makes the prosecution’s case doubtful. It was observed: - “31. We do not find the said observation of the trial court correct. The injuries sustained by Ramrup @ Roopa are from a sharp weapon. It will be trite to refer to the 16 2026:HHC:29467 following observations of this Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394: 12. ……. It seems to us that in a murder case, the non- explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of the altercation is a very important circumstance from which the court can draw the following inferences: “(1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on the most material point, and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused, it is rendered probable to throw doubt on the prosecution’s case.” The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries to the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. In the instant case, when it is held, as it must be, that the appellant Dasrath Singh received serious injuries which have not been explained by the prosecution, then it will be difficult for the court to rely on the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and 6, more particularly, when some of these witnesses have lied by stating that they did not see any injuries on the person of the accused. Thus, neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court appears to have given due consideration to this important lacuna or infirmity appearing in the prosecution's case. We must hasten to add that, as held by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (1975) 2 SCC 7: 1975 SCC (Cri) 384, there may be cases where the non-explanation of the injuries by the 17 2026:HHC:29467 prosecution may not affect the prosecution's case. This principle would obviously apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. The present, however, is certainly not such a case, and the High Court was, therefore, in error in brushing aside this serious infirmity in the prosecution case on unconvincing premises.” 32. A similar view with regard to non-explanation of injuries has been taken by this Court in the cases of State of Rajasthan v. Madho 1991 Supp (2) SCC 396, State of M.P. v. Mishrilal (Dead) (2003) 9 SCC 426, Nagarathinam v. State Represented by Inspector of Police (2006) 9 SCC 57 and recently in the case of Nand Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 262 33. Undisputedly, in the present case also, the witnesses are interested. The injuries sustained by the three accused persons are not at all explained. The trial court and the High Court have not considered this aspect of the matter. 34. Non-explanation of injuries on the persons of the accused would create doubt as to whether the prosecution has brought on record the real genesis of the incident or not. Undisputedly, as observed hereinabove, a cross-case was also registered against the complainant party for the injuries sustained by the accused persons.” 23. Therefore, the non-explanation of the injuries would make the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses doubtful. 24. Prakash Chand (PW2) admitted in his cross- examination that one case was registered against him for beating Raj Kumar, in which the informant was also an accused. 18 2026:HHC:29467 Therefore, it is undisputed that a cross-case is arising out of the same incident. The informant and her husband would have a tendency to shift the blame towards the accused to save themselves from punishment. Therefore, their testimonies were required to be duly corroborated by independent witnesses. 25. Lokesh Kumar (PW3) and Sandeep Kumar (PW6) were stated to have reached the spot after hearing the cries and rescued the informant party from the accused. However, neither of them supported the prosecution's case. They denied that they had heard any noise, and they rescued the informant party from the accused. They were permitted to be cross-examined by learned APP, but they did not admit the prosecution's case that the accused had inflicted blows on the informant party, and they had rescued the informant party from the accused. Thus, there is no corroboration from the independent witnesses. 26. The medical evidence also does not support the prosecution's case because the weapon of offence was stated to be blunt, which contradicts the prosecution's case that the injury was caused by a darat, a sharp-edged weapon. Therefore, there was no corroboration from the medical evidence as well. 19 2026:HHC:29467 27. It is undisputed that the civil suits are pending between the parties. This fact was mentioned in the FIR. The informant Veena Devi (PW1) also admitted in her cross- examination that Raj Kumar has filed a civil suit regarding the validity of the Will. Prakash Chand (PW2) also admitted in his cross-examination that the case was pending between the parties in a Court at Palampur. Therefore, the relationship between the parties was strained. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the strained relationship would put the Court on guard regarding the possible false implication. 28. Therefore, the prosecution's version was full of discrepancies, and the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused unless there is some perversity. In the present case, there is no perversity, and no interference is required with the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court. 29. No other point was urged. 20 2026:HHC:29467 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 31. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 32. Records be sent back to the learned Courts below forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th July, 2026 (Nikita)