2026:HHC:29730 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 200 of 2023 Reserved on: 13.07.2026 Date of decision:20.07.2026 Beli Ram ...Appellant Versus Rachna & another ...Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Mr. Suneet Goel, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vivek Negi, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. R.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arun Kumar, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Romesh Verma, Judge: The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree as passed by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, dated 30.08.2022, whereby the appeal filed by the defendants was dismissed and the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1, Hamirpur, dated 25.09.2021, was affirmed, whereby the suit instituted by the plaintiff for permanent prohibitory injunction and possession of the suit land came to be decreed. 2. The facts as emerge in the present case are that Shri Rattan Chand, the plaintiff, filed a suit for permanent prohibitory 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- 2026:HHC:29730 injunction restraining the defendants, their family members, servants, agents, and assignees from interfering in any manner whatsoever over the land comprised in Khata No. 22 min, Khatauni No. 22 min, Khasra No. 58, measuring 14 marlas, and Khata No. 13 min, Khatauni No. 13 min, Khasra No. 63 measuring 19 marlas, situated at Village Loharda, Mauja Bajuri, Tehsil and District Hamirpur, H.P. Further, it was prayed that if the defendants were found in possession of any part of the suit land, a decree for possession be passed. 3. It was averred in the plaint that the suit land is owned and possessed by the plaintiff. The defendants are headstrong persons who have a tendency to encroach upon the suit land, and in furtherance of these intentions, they always try to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land and claim the same by removing the boundary marks existing on the spot. They did not even care for the boundary marks fixed by the revenue agency time and again. In the year 2007, the defendants did not adhere to the old boundary. The plaintiff was constrained to file an application for the demarcation of Khasra No. 58, which was conducted for the first time on 06.05.2008. However, when the same was not accepted, police help was also sought, and ultimately, it was conducted again on 24thFebruary 2010, and some of the portion of the suit land was found to be under the illegal possession of the defendants. Again, the defendants disagreed with the demarcation and encroached upon more land on the spot in -3- 2026:HHC:29730 the month of July 2011. The act and conduct of the defendants are highly illegal, and they are still trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants, their family members, servants, agents, and assignees from interfering in any manner with the suit land, and if the defendants were found in possession of any part of the same, a decree for possession was sought from the learned trial court. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing separate written statements. Defendant No. 1, Beli Ram, raised preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, etc. On merits, all the averments made in the plaint were refuted and denied. It was stated that the defendant has no concern with the suit land and that all the allegations leveled in the plaint are false and baseless. It was stated that the defendant has not encroached upon any part of the suit land. The demarcation, if any, is totally wrong and illegal. It was further stated that the defendant did not interfere in the suit land and that all the allegations are incorrect. 5. A separate written statement was filed by defendant No. 2. It was stated in the written statement that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and the same deserves to be dismissed with heavy and special costs. It was stated that the defendant is not doing anything on the suit land and that no boundary marks have been -4- 2026:HHC:29730 removed as alleged by the plaintiff. No demarcation was carried out in the presence of the defendant; thus, the alleged demarcation, if any, is not binding on the rights of the defendant. 6. The plaintiff filed a replication to the written statements filed by the defendants and reiterated all the averments made in the plaint. 7. The learned trial court framed the issues on 18.06.2012 in the following manner: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree for possession, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form, as alleged? OPD-1& 2 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit by his own act and conduct, as alleged? OPD-1 5. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and he has suppressed the material facts, as alleged? OPD-1 6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with special costs U/S 35-A CPC, as alleged? OPD-1 & 2 7. Relief. 8. The learned trial court directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions, and vide its judgment and decree dated 25.09.2021, the suit filed by the plaintiff was ordered to be decreed. Consequently, a decree of possession of the suit land to the extent of 2 marlas, shown as Khasra Number 58/1 in the Tatima -5- 2026:HHC:29730 Ext. OW-3/F annexed with the Local Commissioner's report Ext. OW- 1/E, was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Further, the defendants were restrained by way of a permanent prohibitory injunction from interfering in any manner whatsoever in the suit land comprising Khata No. 22 min, Khatauni 22 min, bearing Khasra No. 58 measuring 0K-14 marlas, and the land comprising Khata No. 13 min, Khatauni No. 13 min, bearing Khasra No. 63 measuring 0K-19 marlas, situated in Village Loharda, Mauja Bajuri, Tehsil and District Hamirpur, H.P. 9. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendants preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the Court of the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, on 28.10.2021. The learned first appellate court, vide its judgment and decree dated 30.08.2022, dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants and affirmed the findings returned by the learned trial court. 10. Still feeling dissatisfied, the defendants have approached this court by filing the instant regular second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 11. It is contended by Mr. Suneet Goel, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by Mr. Vivek Negi, learned counsel for the defendant/appellant, that the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the learned Courts below -6- 2026:HHC:29730 have not appreciated the real point of controversy and have wrongly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff for possession by ignoring well- settled principles of law. He further submits that after accepting the present regular second appeal, the suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. 12. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by Shri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, has defended the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. He submits that this Court should not interfere in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees while invoking powers under Section 100 of the CPC, as the findings passed by the learned Courts below relate purely to questions of fact, and no question of law is involved in the present case. He submits that the present appeal, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be rejected. 13. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the case is finally heard at the admission stage on the following substantial question of law:. Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned First Appellate Court is result of misreading and misappreciation of facts of the case and evidence on record? 14. The plaintiff in the present case had approached the learned trial court seeking a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants, their family members, servants, agents, -7- 2026:HHC:29730 and assignees from interfering in any manner over the land comprising Khata No. 22 min, Khatauni No. 22 min, Khasra No. 58 measuring 14 marlas, and Khata No. 13 min, Khatauni No. 13 min, Khasra No. 63 measuring 19 marlas, situated at Village Loharda, Mauja Bajuri, Tehsil and District Hamirpur. It was further prayed that if the defendants were found in possession of any part of the suit land, a decree for possession be passed in his favour. 15. As per the case of the plaintiff, the defendants are strangers to the suit land and have no right, title, or interest over the same. Being headstrong persons, they have no regard for the law and always try to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land and claim the same by removing the boundary marks existing on the spot. Earlier, a demarcation was also conducted in 2010, and a portion of the suit land was found to be under the illegal possession of the defendants. However, at the relevant time, the defendants disagreed with the said demarcation. The plaintiff averred that the defendants are still trying to dispossess him from the suit land and that their interference in the same is an illegal act. 16. The case set up by the plaintiff has been specifically refuted by the defendants by filing separate written statements. The sum and substance of the written statements filed by the defendants are that they have no concern with the suit land and that the demarcation, if any, obtained by the plaintiff is totally wrong and illegal. -8- 2026:HHC:29730 The defendants have set up the plea that they never threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land in any manner. Therefore, they contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be rejected. 17. In order to substantiate his case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1. In his deposition, he stated that he filed the suit qua Khasra Nos. 58 and 63. He stated that he is the owner of the suit land and that the defendants have no right, title, or interest over the same. In the year 2007, the defendants tried to interfere with the land, prompting him to apply for a demarcation. In the year 2008, the spot was demarcated, but at the relevant time, the defendants did not agree to the permanent fixed points. Again, in 2010, demarcation was conducted, and even thereafter, the defendants did not agree to it. He stated that the defendants forcibly and illegally tried to dispossess him from the suit land. He stated that in the demarcation, some portion of the suit land was found to be in the possession of the defendants, the extent of which was 1–2 marlas. Thereafter, they encroached upon more land. 18. In his cross-examination, he stated that it is incorrect to suggest that there is a nalla between his land and the land of Beli Ram. He denied that Beli Ram had obtained a demarcation report in his presence. He denied that the suit land has been demarcated 5 to 6 times. He denied that during the demarcation, 1 marla of land owned -9- 2026:HHC:29730 by Beli Ram was found to have been encroached upon by him. He stated that the demarcation carried out in 2008 is in the case file. He denied that no encroachment was found to have been done by Mr. Ramesh Chand during the said demarcation. He stated that the points fixed in 2008 were uprooted by the defendants. When the demarcation was conducted in 2008, both defendants were present. One Ramesh Chand, son of Duni Chand was also present at the relevant time. He denied that no encroachment has been carried out by the defendants over the suit land. 19. PW-2 is the statement of Bihari Lal, who was working as a Reader to the Tehsildar, Hamirpur. He brought the requisitioned record. 20. In order to substantiate the plaintiff's case, PW-3 Purkhi Ram was examined. In his testimony, he stated that from 2007 to 2010, he was working as a Field Kanungo in Hamirpur. He stated that on the application of Rattan Chand, son of Tulsi Ram, he conducted demarcation on 06.05.2008, and thereafter, along with the Tehsildar on 24.02.2010, the suit land comprising Khasra Nos. 58 and 63, Tikka Loharda, was demarcated in accordance with the law. He stated that his demarcation report is Ext. PW-3/K and the tatima of the spot is Ext. PW-3/L. He stated that his report reflects the exact position on the spot. -10- 2026:HHC:29730 21. In his cross-examination, he stated that in the demarcation carried out by him, the illegal possession of the defendants was found 22. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiff, Beli Ram, defendant No. 1, entered the witness box as DW-1. In his testimony, he stated that he knew the plaintiff and that they are adjoining neighbors. He stated that the plaintiff had raised the construction of a latrine and bathroom over his land. He stated that the plaintiff is excavating land owned by him, and to that effect, he has instituted a suit against the plaintiff. He stated that the demarcation was conducted in the year 2008, wherein 2 marlas of his land were found to be possessed by the plaintiff, and thereafter, no demarcation was carried out. In his cross-examination, he stated that he has not annexed copy of demarcation conducted in 2008. He denied that the police had also demarcated the land inter se the parties. He stated that he recognized his signature on Ext. PW-3/D, encircled as 'A'. 23. OW-1 is the statement of Dhyan Chand, who was appointed as the Local Commissioner by order of the Court. In his deposition, he stated that he was appointed as the Local Commissioner in the suit. He stated that before visiting the spot, he informed the respective parties. A copy of the same is Ext. OW-1/A, which bears the signatures encircled as A, B, and C belonging to the plaintiff and the defendants. He stated that he recorded the statements -11- 2026:HHC:29730 of the parties on the spot, which are Ext. OW-1/B. The statement of the plaintiff with respect to the demarcation is Ext. OW-1/C, and the list of persons present is Ext. OW-1/D. He stated that his demarcation report is Ext. OW-1/E, which is correct, and the tatima of the field book is Ext. OW-1/F. The aks musabi of the year 1971 is Ext. OW-1/G. He stated that he carried out the demarcation on the spot correctly, and in the said demarcation, 2 marlas of land were found to be in the possession of the defendants. Land measuring 4 marlas was found to be in the possession of another individual, Santosh Kumari, which is incorporated in the Field Book. The possession of the defendants over Khasra No.58/1 has been duly shown. 24. OW-1 was cross-examined by the defendants at length. He stated that while fixing the points, the statements of the parties were recorded collectively. He stated that he was directed to carry out the demarcation of Khasra Nos. 58 and 63. He stated that the permanent point was started from Khasra No. 57. He stated that he prepared the aks musabi of Osiyana village. He stated that the permanent point was fixed where the land of two villages meets, and he had located the said point. He denied that the permanent point was fixed wrongly. He stated that he showed the possession of Rattan Chand and Beli Ram collectively. He stated that he does not know whether the land of Beli Ram and Ramesh Chand is joint or separate. He stated that he did not incorporate in the field book how much land -12- 2026:HHC:29730 had been encroached upon by Beli Ram and Ramesh Chand individually. He stated that it is correct that the Khasra number, which is found to be encroached upon, should fall within the triangular system, self-stated that it depends upon the spot. He denied that he is making a false statement at the behest of the plaintiff. He denied that he did not follow the Financial Commissioner’s rules while carrying out the demarcation. He denied that the defendants were informed on the spot that no encroachment was found. The copy of the demarcation report has been placed on record as Ext. OW-1/E, as per which the land of the plaintiff comprising Khasra No. 58/1, measuring 0.2 marlas, was found to have been encroached upon by the defendants in the form of a gair mumkin sehan. The copy of the tatima Ext. OW-1/F has been placed on record. To the similar effect is the copy of the nakal aks musabi istemal Ext. OW-1/G. 25. The case of the plaintiff has been duly proved by the demarcation report Ext. OW-1/E. The report categorically states that the land of the plaintiff has been encroached upon by the defendants over Khasra No. 58/1, measuring 0.2 marlas. The Tatima of the same has also been placed on record. Interestingly, in the present case, objections to the said report were filed only by Ramesh Chand, i.e., defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1, Beli Ram, did not file any objections, meaning thereby that he accepted the report of the Local Commissioner, namely, Shri Dhyan Chand. The objections preferred -13- 2026:HHC:29730 by defendant No. 2, Ramesh Chand, were duly considered by the learned trial Court and were dismissed as having no merit. 26. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the report of the Local Commissioner does not specify how much land of the plaintiff was encroached upon by the defendants individually. He further submits that since it is impossible to decipher which defendant occupied how much portion, therefore, the decree for possession passed in favor of the plaintiff is not legally sustainable in the absence of such clarification. 27. As rightly held by the learned Courts below, the case set up by the plaintiff against the defendants was on the premise that they had encroached upon the suit land bearing Khasra No. 58/1. The decree for possession has been passed qua 2 marlas of the suit land which was found to have been encroached upon by both defendants. Whether defendant No.1 has occupied more or less, or whether defendant No. 2 has occupied a greater or lesser portion, hardly makes no difference, as an encroachment always remains an encroachment. The decree for possession has to be executed in its entirety, and it cannot be segregated based on how much land was occupied by each defendant. The said submission made by the learned Senior Counsel is not tenable and does not hold good in the eyes of law. This submission was also raised before the learned -14- 2026:HHC:29730 Courts below, and it has been dealt with concurrently by the learned Courts below, by rightly rejecting the version of the appellant. 28. Further, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit was filed by Rattan Chand, and during the pendency of the suit, his legal heir, namely Rachna, was ordered to be brought on record, whereas the deceased plaintiff was also survived by other legal heirs. The record shows that the necessary application for bringing the legal heirs on record was filed on 29.06.2018. In paragraph 3 of the application, it was averred that as per the Will of late Shri Rattan Chand, the applicant Rachna, his daughter, is the legal heir of the deceased qua the suit land/property. It was mentioned that he had three other legal heirs, his mother Smt. Kailasho Devi, his wife Smt. Hema, and another daughter Smt. Ranjna, but they have not inherited the suit property, and the mutation on the basis of the Will is awaited. The application came up for consideration on 11.02.2019 and on that date, the learned counsel for defendant No. 1, Beli Ram, vide a separate statement on record, stated that he had no objection if the application under Order 22 Rule 3 of the CPC for impleading the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff Rattan Chand is allowed. Similarly, the learned counsel for defendant No. 2, vide a separate statement dated 30.08.2018, opted not to file any reply to the application. Therefore, the application was allowed on 11.02.2019. Once defendant No. 1 stated that he had no objection to the -15- 2026:HHC:29730 application being allowed, and defendant No. 2 chose not to contest it by filing the reply, the plea now raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant before this Court is without any merit. The application was allowed, and the said order was never assailed before competent court of law. Moreover, in the teeth of the no-objection by defendant No. 1 and in view of non-filing of reply by defendant No. 2, this plea is no longer available to the defendants/appellants at this stage. The learned courts below have concurrently held that the defendants encroached upon the suit land measuring 2 marlas, and the said finding is based upon the report of the Local Commissioner, Ext. OW- 1/E. 29. In the present case, defendant No. 2, Ramesh Chand, did not enter the witness box and the learned courts below have rightly drawn adverse inference against him for his non-appearance, and in order to substantiate his case, to lead the evidence by entering into the witness box. Similarly, defendant No. 1, Beli Ram, did not file any objections to the report of the Local Commissioner; it was only defendant No. 2 who filed objections, which have been dealt with in detail by the learned courts below. The Local Commissioner, Shri Dhyan Chand, while deposing in the witness box, explained in detail that how he conducted the demarcation. He categorically denied the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the defendants that he did not follow the Financial Commissioner’s rules. The plaintiff/respondent -16- 2026:HHC:29730 has been able to make out a case for the grant of a decree of possession, especially on the strength of the demarcation report placed on record. 30. Lastly, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that since demarcation report was already on record as Ext. PW-3/K, therefore, the subsequent report, Ext. OW-1/E, could not have been relied upon by the learned Courts below. 31. The record shows that the suit as instituted by the plaintiff for possession was dismissed on 27.01.2015. The plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the Court of the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, who, vide judgment and decree dated 24.08.2016, accepted the appeal and remitted the case back to the learned trial Court for fresh consideration after appointing a Local Commissioner to demarcate the suit land strictly in accordance with the law. 32. Both learned counsel for the parties have fairly conceded that neither party assailed the said remand judgment in a competent Court of law, meaning thereby the said judgment is binding on both parties as per which, an order was passed for the appointment of a Local Commissioner to demarcate the suit land. In light of the judgment passed by the learned District Judge dated 24th August 2016, the objection now raised by the defendant/appellant is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Once they have accepted the judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court whereby there was clear -17- 2026:HHC:29730 direction to demarcate the suit land afresh, the plea now raised by the defendants that the fresh demarcation report Ext. OW-1/E cannot be taken into consideration, does not hold good and deserves to be rejected. 33. In the present case, there are concurrent findings of fact rendered by the learned Courts below and the scope of interference in the concurrent finding of fact, as per the various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, is very narrow and limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in its various decisions that the High Court cannot re- appreciate the evidence to substitute its own view for a plausible finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. 34. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521, wherein it has been held as under: “10. This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciating the evidence just to replace the findings for the lower courts. 20. In our considered view the lower Appellate Court has fairly appreciated the evidence in the above background and has reached the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re-appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the First Appellate Court was based on no material.” -18- 2026:HHC:29730 35. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others (1997) 5 SCC 438 has held as under: “10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 C.P.C in formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline. 11. The guidelines to determine as to what is a "substantial question of law" within the meaning of Section 100 CPC, have been laid down by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd There is also a later decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India3. It is unnecessary to deal at length with that aspect any further.” -19- 2026:HHC:29730 36. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court, in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 37. In Naresh and others vs. Hemant and others, (2022) 18 SCC 802, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. The High Court invoked the presumption without proper consideration and appreciation of the facts considered and dealt with by two courts holding by reasoned conclusions why the presumption stood rebutted on the facts. The High Court also committed an error of record by holding that there was no evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole alone had constructed the house, a finding patently contrary -20- 2026:HHC:29730 to the admission of PW-1 in his evidence. The fact that mutation also was done in the name of Trimbakrao Ingole alone which remain unchallenged at any time was also not noticed. The conclusion of the High Court that improper appreciation of evidence amounted to perversity is completely unsustainable. No finding has been arrived at that any evidence had been admitted contrary to the law or that a finding was based on no evidence only in which circumstance the High Court could have interfered in the second appeal. 2. The High Court therefore manifestly erred by interfering with the concurrent findings on facts by two courts below in exercise of powers under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, a jurisdiction confined to substantial questions of law only. Merely because the High Court may have been of the opinion that the inferences and conclusions on the evidence were erroneous, and that another conclusion to its satisfaction could be drawn, cannot be justification for the High Court to have interfered. 12.In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, (1964) 2 SCR 673, this court with regard to the scope for interference in a second appeal with facts under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code observed as follows: “12. ….The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which courts of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the courts of fact to contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal. Sometimes, this position is expressed by saying that like all questions of fact, sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a case is -21- 2026:HHC:29730 also left to the jury for its verdict. This position has always been accepted without dissent and it can be stated without any doubt that it enunciates what can be properly characterised as an elementary proposition. Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by s. 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 13.Though precedents abound on this settled principle of law, we do not consider it necessary to burden our discussion unnecessarily except to rely further on Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546, holding as follows: “71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower -22- 2026:HHC:29730 appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law. xxxx 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. xxxx 81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallised by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.” 14.The order of the High Court interfering with concurrent findings of facts by two courts is, therefore, held to be -23- 2026:HHC:29730 unsustainable in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The order of the High Court is consequently set aside. The orders dated 06.03.1998 and 13.06.2002 of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are restored. The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. The present appeal is allowed.” 38. In Brij Narayan Shukla (dead) through legal representatives vs. Sudesh Kumar Alias Suresh Kumar (dead) through Legal Representatives and others, (2024) 2 SCC 590, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10.2 The High Court was hearing the Second Appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it having reappreciated the findings to disturb findings of fact, committed an error.” 39. In Civil Apepal No.5131 of 2025, titled as R. Nagaraj (dead) through LRs and another vs. Rajmani and others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “7. By the impugned judgment and order and without answering anything on the substantial questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely in a casual manner, the High Court has allowed the Second Appeal and has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and thereafter has remanded the matter to the learned trial Court permitting the original plaintiff to amend the plaint and pray for fixation of the boundary. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the -24- 2026:HHC:29730 Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is not appreciable at all. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has exercised the powers as if the High Court was deciding the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has not appreciated at all that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and that too against the concurrent findings of fact by both the courts below, which were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on record. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.11. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the High Court was dealing with the Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. Neither at the stage of deciding the suit nor even before the first Appellate Court even such a prayer was made to amend the plaint, which is now permitted by the High Court, despite the fact that earlier in the suit during the course of trial, the plaint was amended. Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.” 40. No other point urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 41. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 42. In view of the concurrent, specific findings returned by the learned courts below, which were arrived at after appreciating the entire oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, the suit filed by the plaintiff was rightly decreed and subsequently the said -25- 2026:HHC:29730 findings were affirmed by the learned first appellate Court. This Court finds no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the same. 43. Consequently, in view of the observations made hereinabove, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed along with any pending application(s). (Romesh Verma) Judge 20th July, 2026 (vt)