1 2026:CGHC:5748 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ORDER RESERVED ON 10.12.2025 ORDER DELIVERED ON 02.02.2026 ORDER UPLOADED ON 02.02.2026 CRMP No. 3615 of 2025 1 - Bablu @ Janardan Yadav S/o Radheshyam Yadav Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Sehdauli, Post- Farsad, P.S. Badhalganj, District- Gorakhpur (U.P.) Through- The Power Of Attorney Namely Bahal Singh Verma S/o Kapil Singh Aged About- 51 Years, R/o Village Oteband, Post- Bemetara, P.S. And District- Bemetara (C.G.) (As Per Correct Details/ Aadhar Card) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Station House Officer- Nandghat, District- Bemetara, Chhattisgarh, ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Shri Sachin Nidhi, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri Ajit Singh, GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma) C A V Order 2 This petition has been filed under Section 528 read with Section 503 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), calling in question the legality and validity of the order dated 01.11.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara, District Bemetara has been affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bemetara in Criminal Revision No. 59/2025, whereby the application filed by the petitioner for grant of interim custody (supurdnama) of the seized cattle has been rejected. 2. The petitioner claims to be the lawful owner of the seized cattle. It is alleged that on the basis of a written complaint lodged by the complainant Vivek Kumar Shukla at Police Station Nandghat, it was alleged that on 20.10.2025 at about 12:50 a.m., a Tata Eicher mini truck bearing registration No. CG-15-DZ-8001 was found transporting cattle in a cruel manner. It was alleged that a total of 16 cattle were found tied with ropes, overcrowded and crammed into the vehicle/mini-truck under deplorable conditions. The said cattle were seized and Crime No. 192/2025 was registered under Sections 4, 6 and 10 of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 against the accused persons. It is further alleged that the cattle were being transported in contravention of the provisions of the Act of 2004. 3. During investigation, the cattle were seized and kept in custody. The petitioner claimed ownership of the seized cattle and filed an 3 application before the Trial Court for grant of interim custody under Section 503 of the BNSS. The Trial Court rejected the application vide order dated 01.11.2025. The revision filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the Revisional Court, leading to the present petition before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the factual and legal aspects of the matter. It was argued that the petitioner had produced documentary evidence regarding purchase of cattle, including receipts issued by competent authorities and Panchayat records. It was further submitted that the seized cattle are milch cows and buffaloes, some of which are pregnant, and their prolonged detention without adequate care risks severe harm, including potential death of the animals. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that mere transportation of cattle does not attract Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004 unless it is proved that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. It was argued that there is no allegation or material on record to show that the cattle were being transported for slaughter. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the charge- sheet has been filed, there is no allegation or material on record to establish that the seized cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. 4 6. It was argued that Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004 would attract only when cattle are transported for slaughter or with the knowledge that they are likely to be slaughtered. In the absence of such allegation, the statutory bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted. He further submits that the Veterinary Examination Report dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure P/4) clearly indicates that the cattle were found in good and fit condition, with no signs of injury or cruelty. Therefore, the presumption of slaughter cannot be drawn. 7. It was further contended that continued detention of cattle in the custody of third parties is causing irreparable loss and is detrimental to the welfare of the animals. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283, Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil v. State of Mysore, AIR 1977 SC 1749, and General Insurance Council v. State of A.P., (2010) 6 SCC 768. 8. Therefore, the statutory bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai (supra) to submit that seized property should ordinarily be released on supurdnama to the rightful owner to avoid deterioration and loss. 9. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned orders and submitted that the cattle were seized in connection with serious offences and that release of the cattle at this stage may prejudice the prosecution case. It was argued that Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 5 puts a statutory embargo on release of seized cattle and therefore both the courts have rightly rejected the application for interim custody. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and also gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. Section 6(1) of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 prohibits transportation of cattle only when such transportation is for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that the cattle are likely to be slaughtered. The provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2004 reads as under: “6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural cattle for slaughter: (I) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to transport or cause to be transported any Agricultural cattle from any place within the state to any place within the state or outside the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the provision of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered. (2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be transported in contravention of provisions of sub-section (1) any agricultural cattle as specified in the Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance used in transporting such animal along with such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized by such authority or officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf. (3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-section (2) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before the expiry of six months from the 6 date of such seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier and such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation at the end of trial.” 12. It is a settled principle of law that penal statutes must be strictly construed. In W.H. King v. Republic of India, AIR 1952 SC 156, the Supreme Court held that penal provisions must receive strict interpretation. Where the legislature has consciously employed a specific expression, the provision cannot be interpreted by assigning a meaning different form that which is conveyed by the plain language of the statute. It has been observed that : “As the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. The Court is not concerned with what might possibly have been intended, but with what has been actually stated in the language employed by the legislature.” 13. Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561, the Supreme Court observed that criminal statutes must be construed strictly and no person can be brought within the scope of penal law unless the statute clearly applies. It has been reiterated as under: “15….when it is stated that penal statutes must be construed strictly, it implies that the Court must ascertain whether the act complained of clearly falls within the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language. The rule of strict construction mandates that the language of the statute must be so interpreted that no case is 7 brought within its ambit unless it squarely falls within the reasonable interpretation of the provision. In case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject must prevail. At the same time, the Court clarified that the rule of strict interpretation does not override the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, namely, that where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to the expressed intention of the legislature….” 14. In Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil v. State of Mysore, AIR 1977 SC 1749, the Supreme Court held that the object of granting interim custody is to ensure that the property does not suffer damage or decay during pendency of proceedings. In Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283, the Supreme Court categorically held that seized property should not be allowed to rot in custody and should ordinarily be released on appropriate conditions. Similarly, in General Insurance Council v. State of A.P., (2010) 6 SCC 768, the Supreme Court reiterated that courts should normally release seized property on supurdnama to the rightful owner subject to reasonable safeguards. 15. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section 6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Seglibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14545 wherein the Court, while dealing with an issue identical to the one involved in the present case, categorically held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only 8 in cases where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. The Gujarat High Court after interpreting Section 6(A), observed that the deeming provision under clause (1) would operate only when it is established that the animals were being transported for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. It was further held that clause (4) of Section 6(A), which imposes restrictions regarding the release of the vehicle for a period of six months, would be attracted only when such transportation is proved to be for the purpose of slaughter. 16. The Gujarat High Court, after interpreting Section 6(A), observed that the deeming provision under clause (1) would operate only when it is established that the animals were being transported for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. It was further held that clause (4) of Section 6(A), which imposes restrictions regarding the release of the vehicle for a period of six months, would be attracted only when such transportation is proved to be for the purpose of slaughter. It has been reiterated in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava (supra) as under : “10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause (1) would indicate that the same is applicable in a case where it is found that the animals were being transported from any place within the State to any other place within the State for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. There is a 9 proviso to Section 6(A) clause (1) which provides that a person shall be deemed to be transporting such animal for the purpose of slaughter unless contrary is proved thereto to the satisfaction of the concerned authority or officer by such person or he has obtained a permission under sub-section (2) for transporting the animal for bona fide agricultural or animal husbandry purpose. 11. Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a restriction so far as the release of the vehicle is concerned for a period of six months. 12. It is therefore manifest that section 6(A) clause (4) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. 13. It is not in dispute so far as the present case is concerned that no permit was obtained by the petitioner herein as the registered owner of the vehicle for the purpose of transport. However, at the same time, the prosecution has to, prima facie, show something that the transport of the cattle was for the purpose of slaughter. For such purpose, I inquired with Mr. Dabhi, the learned APP, regarding the materials collected by the police in the course of investigation. Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted that there is nothing to show that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It appears that there is no investigation in that direction. It it is the case of the prosecution that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter, then at least, it is expected from the investigating officer to investigate at which place they were being taken and were to be handed over to whom for the purpose of slaughter. There is nothing in that regard. In the absence of such material, in my view, the prosecution cannot straight way take recourse to the deeming 10 fiction as provided under Section 6(A)(1). In such circumstances, I am of the view that there should not be any legal impediment in releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the statutory time period ie. six months.” 17. The Court further clarified that mere transportation of agricultural cattle from one place to another for purposes other than slaughter does not constitute an offence under the Act. In such cases, where Section 6(1) of the Act is not attracted, the embargo contained in Section 6(3) would also not apply, and interim custody of the vehicle can be granted without waiting for the statutory period of six months. 18. It was also emphasized that the prosecution must, prima facie, establish that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. In the absence of any material or investigation indicating the destination, purpose, or intent of slaughter, the deeming fiction under Section 6(A)(1) cannot be invoked mechanically. Consequently, in such circumstances, there would be no legal impediment in releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the statutory period. 19. A plain reading of Section 6(A)(1) of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the provision is attracted only when the animals are transported from one place to another for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that they are likely to be slaughtered. Thus, the legislative intent is explicit that mere transportation of animals, without any material indicating the purpose of slaughter, would not fall within the mischief of the provision. 11 20. Clause (4) of Section 6(A) imposes a restriction on release only in cases where the foundational requirement of transportation for slaughter is satisfied. Therefore, it is manifest that the statutory bar under clause (4) would apply exclusively in cases where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter and not otherwise. 21. In the present case, though it is not in dispute that no permit was obtained by the petitioner for transportation of the cattle, the prosecution is nevertheless required to prima facie demonstrate that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. Upon perusal of the case diary and the material collected during investigation, it is evident that there allegation or evidence to indicate that the cattle were being taken to any place for slaughter or were intended to be delivered to any person for such purpose. 22. Even the learned State counsel, upon specific query by this Court, fairly conceded that the investigation does not reveal any material suggesting that the cattle were being transported for slaughter. There is no investigation in that direction, nor has the investigating agency identified the place or the intended recipient of the cattle for slaughter. In the absence of such material, the prosecution cannot mechanically invoke the deeming fiction under Section 6(A)(1) of the Act. 23. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that there exists no legal impediment in granting interim custody of the seized cattle to the petitioner before the expiry of the statutory period of 12 six months. Denial of interim custody in the absence of prima facie evidence of transportation for slaughter would amount to an unjustified curtailment of the petitioner’s rights and would also be detrimental to the welfare of the animals. 24. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal position and the principles flowing from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Seglibhai Vasava (supra), it is evident that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below suffer from a manifest error of law and failure to appreciate the true scope of Section 6 of the Act. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to interim custody of the seized cattle on appropriate conditions. 25. A careful perusal of the record reveals that there is no specific allegation that the seized cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. The prosecution case, in essence, is that the cattle were being transported in a vehicle. The case diary does not disclose any material indicating the destination of the cattle for slaughter or the identity of any person to whom the cattle were to be delivered for such purpose. The documents produced by the petitioner prima facie indicate that the cattle were purchased through lawful transactions. The receipts and Panchayat records, though disputed by the prosecution, cannot be brushed aside at this stage. The record further indicates that some of the seized cattle are milch cows and pregnant animals. Their prolonged detention in custody without proper care is likely to cause irreparable harm, frustrating the very purpose of animal welfare legislation. 13 26. In the absence of prima facie material to establish that the cattle were being transported for slaughter, the statutory embargo under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 cannot be invoked mechanically. The learned Trial Court and the Revisional Court failed to consider the settled legal position governing grant of interim custody of the seized cattle and rejected the application in a perfunctory manner. 27. This Court is of the considered view that denial of interim custody in the present case would constitute deprivation of property Ravidasbhai Seglibhai Vasava (supra),occasioning grave prejudice not only to the petitioner and serious detriment to the welfare of the seized animals. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted in the present case and the petitioner is entitled to interim custody of the seized cattle. Accordingly, the impugned orders passed by the learned Trial Court and the Revisional Court are set aside. The petition is allowed. 29. The learned Trial Court is directed to release the seized cattle in favour of the petitioner on interim custody (supurdnama), subject to the following conditions: (i) The petitioner shall furnish a supurdnama bond of appropriate value to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. (ii) The petitioner shall not sell, transfer or alienate the cattle during pendency of the trial without prior permission of the Trial Court. 14 (iii) The petitioner shall produce the cattle before the Trial Court or investigating agency as and when directed. (iv) The petitioner shall ensure proper care, maintenance and welfare of the cattle and shall get the cattle examined by the concerned Veterinary Officer at regular intervals. The medical and health status report of the cattle shall be submitted before the trial court once in every three months. (v) Photographs and identification details of the cattle shall be taken before release. (vi) In case of violation of any condition, the State shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of supurdnama. 30. The cattle shall be released within seven days from the date of compliance of the aforesaid conditions. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not influence the merits of the trial. (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.02.02 16:24:21 +0530