2026:HHC:29059 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision Nos. 217 of 2026 and 97 of 2017 Reserved on : 03.07.2026 Date of Decision: 16.07.2026 1. Cr. Revision No. 217 of 2026 XYZ ...Petitioner Versus K K & others ...Respondents 2. Cr. Revision No. 97 of 2017 State of H.P. ….Petitioner Versus K K & another ….Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner(s) : Mr Raju Ram Rahi, Advocate, for the petitioner in Cr.Revision No. 217 of 2026. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for the petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 97 of 2017. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29059 For the Respondent(s) : Mr Anubhav Chopra, Advocate, for respondents No. 1 and 2 in Cr.Revision No. 217 of 2026 and respondents in criminal Revision No. 97 of 2017. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.3 in Criminal Revision No.217 of 2016 Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revisions are directed against the judgment dated 16.07.2016, passed by learned Sessions Judge (Forest), Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 01.05.2013 and order of sentence dated 06.05.2013, passed by the Principal Magistrate (Juvenile Justice Board), (PMJJB), Shimla, District Shimla, HP were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned PMJJB Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revisions are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act). The victim (name being withheld to 3 2026:HHC:29059 protect her identity) is the daughter of the accused K. Her father had married the co-accused after his divorce from the victim’s mother; however, the victim’s stepmother started torturing her mentally and physically. She would feed her the refuse from the toilet. Once, she was asked to eat the soap. She inserted a stick into the victim’s private part. She threatened to humiliate the victim by visiting her school in the presence of her friends. The victim did not want to reside with her parents. Hence, she prayed that action be taken against her parents. This complaint was forwarded by Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Urban) Shimla to the PMJJB, Shimla, who directed the medical examination of the victim. A Medical Board was constituted. Dr Arvind Sood (PW-1) and Dr Nishi Sood (PW-2) examined the victim and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. They issued reports (Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW1/B). Subsequently, the victim made a complaint to PMJJB that the accused had beaten her. The PMJJB handed over the custody of the juvenile to her uncle. The victim’s stepmother sent some Prasad (blessed food) through two girls with the direction to hand it over to the victim. The victim did not eat the Prasad. The accused threatened the victim and asked her to withdraw the complaint filed against them, or 4 2026:HHC:29059 she would be killed. The victim’s stepmother filed a false complaint of molestation against the victim’s uncle. Therefore, the victim prayed that action be taken against the accused to save her. 3. Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) put a notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 23 of the JJ Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Dr Arvind Sood (PW-1) and Dr Nishi Sood (PW-2) examined the victim. The victim (PW-3) narrated the incident. Narinder Sharma (PW-4) and Meenakshi (PW-5) are the members of the NGO to whom the victim had made the complaint. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. They claimed that the victim’s father had a dispute with his brother over a property, who instigated the victim to make a false complaint against 5 2026:HHC:29059 them (the accused). They examined Dhan Ram (DW-1) and themselves (DW-2 and DW-3) in their defence. 6. The PMJJB held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. Normally, a child will not make allegations against her parents unless there is some truth in them. The plea taken by the accused that the victim had made a false complaint against them at the instance of her uncle was not acceptable because her uncle had less influence upon the victim than her parents. The statements of Medical Officers corroborated the victim’s version as multiple injuries were found on the victim’s body; therefore, JJB convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Section 23 of the JJ Act and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment of five months each, and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned JJB, Shimla, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge (Forest), Shimla, District Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that the victim's testimony was unbelievable. She materially 6 2026:HHC:29059 improved upon her version. She admitted that she was residing away from the accused at the time of making the complaint. Therefore, the injuries sustained by her could not be attributed to the accused. The students of the school to whom Prasad (blessed food) was given were not examined. The victim stated that the complaint was not written by her, but it was dictated to her. The victim’s uncle was not called by any person, and he had voluntarily appeared before the Board to take the victim’s custody, which probabilised the defence taken by the accused that the victim was under her uncle’s influence. All these circumstances made the prosecution's case doubtful. Hence, the learned Appellate Court acquitted the accused. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the victim and the State have filed separate revisions. In a revision filed by the victim bearing revision No. 217 of 2017, it has been asserted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by JJB. The victim’s testimony was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the statements of the officials of the NGO. The victim was a child, and she could not be expected to make a statement like a mature person. Any discrepancy in her 7 2026:HHC:29059 testimony should not have been used to discard her statement. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the Learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. In the revision filed by the State bearing Criminal Revision No. 97 of 2017, it has been asserted that the learned Appellate Court wrongly brushed aside the statements of prosecution witnesses. The accused had neglected to maintain the victim and abused her. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were duly corroborated by the medical evidence, and the learned Appellate Court erred in discarding the prosecution’s version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr Raju Ram Rahi, learned counsel for the victim, Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the accused Nos. 1 & 2 and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the State. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehia, learned Additional Advocate General, for the State, submitted that the victim’s testimony 8 2026:HHC:29059 was credible and was duly corroborated by the medical evidence. The defence version was not believable. There was no reason for the victim to depose falsely against her parents. Learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence, but learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 12. Mr Raju Ram Rahi, learned counsel for the victim, adopted the submissions of Mr Lokender Kultheira, learned Additional Advocate General, and prayed that the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 13. Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the accused, submitted that the victim has not proved to be a juvenile as per Rule 12(3) of the J.J Rules, 2007. The victim was residing away from her parents at the time of the incident, and injuries were found to be fresh by the Medical Officers; therefore, the injuries could not have been connected to the accused. The victim had improved upon her version, which made her testimony highly doubtful. There was no corroboration of her testimony from any 9 2026:HHC:29059 independent witness, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly disbelieved her testimony. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court. Therefore, he prayed that the revision petitions be dismissed. 14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. The present revision has been filed against the judgment of acquittal passed by learned Appellate Court. It was laid down by the Gauhati High Court in Subhas Das v. State of Assam, 2016 SCC OnLine Gau 749, that the High Court can hear a revision against an order of acquittal; however, it cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction. It was observed: - 26. That being the position, it is no surprise that though section 52 of the Juvenile Justice Act provides for filing of an appeal against any order made by a competent authority as contemplated under section 15 thereof, there is a specific bar to filing an appeal against any order of acquittal made by the Juvenile Justice Board in respect of a juvenile alleged to have committed an offence. That leaves the provisions relating to revision as provided under section 53. Though this Section is quite broadly worded, inasmuch as, the High Court has been vested with the power to call for the record of any proceeding, in 10 2026:HHC:29059 which, any competent authority or Court of Session has passed an order, either on its own motion or on an application filed, to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order, and, thereafter to pass such an order as it thinks fit, the only limitation being that such order shall not be passed prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, can such a power be extended to examine an order of acquittal. Section 54 provides a clue, inasmuch as it says that the procedure to be followed in hearing appeals or revision proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act shall be, as far as practicable, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 27. While section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, generally provides for the powers of revision vested in the High Court or a Court of Session, section 401 specifically deals with the High Court's power of revision. Sub-section (3) of section 401 mentions that nothing under section 401 shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, there is a bar on the High Court while exercising the power of revision from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. When the aforesaid provision is extrapolated into the provisions contained in section 53 of the Juvenile Justice Act, it becomes evidently clear that the power of revision vested in the High Court cannot be extended to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This is perfectly in sync with the overall object of the Juvenile Justice Act.” 16. Rule 12 of J.J. Rules provides that in every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the Court, the Board or the Committee referred to in Rule 19 shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within 30 days from the date of making of the 11 2026:HHC:29059 application. Section 23 provides for punishment for cruelty to a juvenile or child. Therefore, it is essential that before a person can be punished under Section 23 of the JJ Act, it has to be proved that the accused had assaulted, abandoned or neglected the juvenile or the child, which can be done after following the procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the J.J Rules. 17. It was held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta versus State of U.P.& Ors (2019) 12 SCC 370 that Rule 12 (3)(a) provides that a matriculation certificate, if available, in its absence, the date of Birth certificate from the school first attended, and in their absence, the birth certificate given by the Corporation, Municipal Authority or Panchayat would be considered. These are in hierarchical order. Thus, where a matriculation certificate is available, the birth certificate from the school and the birth certificate given by the Corporation cannot be relied upon. It was observed: “12. Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) provides that for the purpose of seeking evidence in the enquiry, the following documents would have to be obtained: (i) matriculation or equivalent certificate if available; (ii) in the absence of (i), the date of birth certificate from the school first attended; and 12 2026:HHC:29059 (iii) in the absence of (i) and (ii), the birth certificate given by a corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) contains a hierarchical ordering, evident from the use of the language “in the absence whereof”. This indicates that where a matriculation or equivalent certificate is available, the documents adverted to in (ii) and (iii) cannot be relied upon. The matriculation certificate, in other words, is given precedence. It is in the absence of a matriculation certificate that the date of birth certificate of the school first attended can be relied upon. It is in the absence of both the matriculation and the birth certificates of the first school attended that a birth certificate issued by the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat could be obtained. This facet of Rule 12(3) was noticed in the two- judge Bench decision of this Court in Ashwani Kumar Saxena [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594]. 13. K.S.P. Radhakrishnan, J. while holding that the procedures laid down in CrPC cannot be imported while making an enquiry in regard to a claim of juvenility under the 2007 Rules observed: (Ashwani Kumar Saxena case [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594], SCC pp. 763-64, para 32) “32. “Age determination inquiry”, contemplated under Section 7-A of the Act, read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, enables the court to seek evidence, and in that process, the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, other than a play school. Only in the absence of a matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation, a municipal 13 2026:HHC:29059 authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining a medical opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are unavailable. In case an exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on the lower side within the margin of one year.” The Court took notice of the fact that there could be situations in which the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate, or, for that matter, in the other certificates referred to in Rule 12(3)(a), may not be correct. The Court held that it was only when those documents are found to be fabricated or manipulated could the date of birth as reflected could be discarded. The Court held: (Ashwani Kumar Saxena case [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594], SCC p. 764, para 34) “34. … There may be situations where the entry made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from the school first attended, and even the birth certificate given by a corporation, a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be correct. But the court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents kept during the normal course of business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to go for a medical report for age determination.” In the view of the Court, it was only if the above conditions were fulfilled that a medical report could be called. 14 2026:HHC:29059 14. The decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594] was rendered on 13-9-2012. Soon thereafter, a three-judge Bench of this Court considered the provisions of Section 7-A and Rule 12 in Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83]. R.M. Lodha, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for himself and Anil R. Dave, J. observed: (Abuzar Hossain case [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83], SCC pp. 509-10, para 39) “39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued, nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents, like the school-leaving certificate or the voters' list, etc., obtained after conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh [Akbar Sheikh v. State of W.B., (2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431] and Pawan [Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra Singh [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 13 SCC 523 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857] the documents viz. 15 2026:HHC:29059 school-leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of the appellant's age. If such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for the determination of the age of the delinquent.” 15. The above decision in Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] was rendered on 10-10-2012. Though the earlier decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594] was not cited before the Court, it appears from the above extract that the three-Judge Bench observed that the credibility and acceptability of the documents, including the school leaving certificate, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard-and-fast rule as such could be laid down. Concurring with the judgment of R.M. Lodha, J., T.S. Thakur, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that directing an inquiry is not the same thing as declaring the accused to be a juvenile. In the former, the court simply records a prima facie conclusion, while in the latter, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Hence, the approach at the stage of directing the inquiry has to be more liberal (Abuzar Hossain case [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83], SCC pp. 513-14, para 48) “48. If one were to adopt a wooden approach, one could say nothing short of a certificate, whether from the school or a municipal authority, which would satisfy the court's conscience before directing an enquiry. But then directing an enquiry is not the same thing as declaring the accused to be a juvenile. The standard of proof required is different for both. In the former, the court simply records a prima facie conclusion. In the latter, the court makes a declaration on evidence that it 16 2026:HHC:29059 scrutinises and accepts only if it is worthy of such acceptance. The approach at the stage of directing the enquiry has necessarily to be more liberal, lest there is an avoidable miscarriage of justice. Suffice it to say that while affidavits may not be generally accepted as a good enough basis for directing an enquiry, that they are not so accepted is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence. The Court would, therefore, in each case weigh the relevant factors, insist upon filing better affidavits if the need so arises, and even direct any additional information considered relevant, including the information regarding the age of the parents, the age of siblings and the like, to be furnished before it decides on a case-to-case basis whether or not an enquiry under Section 7-A ought to be conducted. It will eventually depend on how the court evaluates such material for a prima facie conclusion that the court may or may not direct an enquiry.” 16. Both these judgments have since been considered by a two-judge Bench of this Court in Parag Bhati [Parag Bhati v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 744 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 819], where it was observed : (SCC p. 758, para 36) “36. It is a settled position of law that if the matriculation or equivalent certificates are available and there is no other material to prove the correctness of the date of birth, the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate has to be treated as conclusive proof of the date of birth of the accused. However, if there is any doubt or a contradictory stand being taken by the accused which raises doubt on the correctness of the date of birth then as laid down by this Court in Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83], an enquiry for determination of the age of the accused is permissible which has been done in the present case.” 17 2026:HHC:29059 17. The 2015 Act came into force on 15-1-2016. Section 111 repeals the earlier 2000 Act but stipulates that, despite the repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the new legislation. Section 94 contains provisions in regard to the determination of age, is in the following terms: “94. Presumption and determination of age.—(1) Where it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence), that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the Examination Board concerned, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation, a municipal authority, or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided that such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be 18 2026:HHC:29059 completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of a person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” Clause (i) of Section 94(2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the Examination Board concerned in the same category [namely (i) above]. In the absence thereof, category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the 2007 Rules made under the 2000 Act. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i), the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence, and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i), both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 18 Thus, it was essential for the prosecution to prove the age of the victim by a matriculation or equivalent certificate, a date of birth certificate; however, in the present case, no certificate was produced on record to determine the age of the child victim. Hence, the PMJJB erred in proceeding further 19 2026:HHC:29059 without determining the fact whether the victim was a child or not. 19. Even otherwise, the prosecution was relying upon the sole testimony of the victim. The victim was stated to be a child witness. Learned PMJJB conducted a voir dire to determine her competence to depose and found that she could understand the questions put to her and answer them rationally. Therefore, the JJB had proceeded on the basis that the victim was a child. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 73: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 795: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 484: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 613, that the Court can act upon the testimony of a child witness if it is satisfied that he is not tutored and his testimony has a ring of truth. It was observed at page 78: 9. Several child witnesses have been relied upon in this case. The evidence of a child witness has to be subjected to the closest scrutiny and can be accepted only if the court comes to the conclusion that the child understands the question put to him and is capable of giving rational answers (see Section 118 of the Evidence Act). A child witness, by reason of his tender age, is a pliable witness. He can be tutored easily either by threat, coercion or inducement. Therefore, the court must be satisfied that the attendant circumstances do not show that the child was acting under the influence of someone or was under a 20 2026:HHC:29059 threat or coercion. Evidence of a child witness can be relied upon if the court, with its expertise and ability to evaluate the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the child is not tutored and his evidence has a ring of truth. It is safe and prudent to look for corroboration for the evidence of a child witness from the other evidence on record, because while giving evidence, a child may give scope to his imagination and exaggerate his version or may develop cold feet and not tell the truth or may repeat what he has been asked to say, not knowing the consequences of his deposition in the court. Careful evaluation of the evidence of a child witness in the background and context of other evidence on record is a must before the court decides to rely upon it. 21. It was held in Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 4 SCC 522: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 300: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 316 that the testimony of a child witness must be evaluated carefully because the child may be swayed by what was told to him, and he is an easy prey for tutoring. It was observed at page 528: “21. The case of the prosecution is mainly dependent on the testimony of Chandni, the child witness, who was examined as PW 8. Section 118 of the Evidence Act governs the competence of persons to testify, which also includes a child witness. Evidence of the child witness and its credibility could depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no rule of practice that in every case, the evidence of a child witness has to be corroborated by other evidence before a conviction can be allowed to stand, but as a matter of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to seek corroboration for such evidence from other reliable evidence placed on record. The only precaution that the court has to bear in mind 21 2026:HHC:29059 while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one. 22. This Court has consistently held that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated carefully, as the child may be swayed by what others tell him, and he is easy prey to tutoring. Therefore, the evidence of a child witness must find adequate corroboration before it can be relied upon. It is more a rule of practical wisdom than law. [See Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561], State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit [State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70: 2000 SCC (Cri) 579] and State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash [State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1210].] 23. In Alagupandi v. State of T.N. [Alagupandi v. State of T.N., (2012) 10 SCC 451: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1027], this Court has emphasised the need to accept the testimony of a child with caution after substantial corroboration before acting upon it. It was held that: (SCC p. 463, para 36) “36. It is a settled principle of law that a child witness can be a competent witness provided a statement of such a witness is reliable, truthful and corroborated by other prosecution evidence. The court, in such circumstances, can safely rely upon the statement of a child witness, and it can form the basis for a conviction as well. Further, the evidence of a child witness and the credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one, his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and that there exists no likelihood of being tutored. There is no rule or practice that in every case, the evidence of such a witness be corroborated by other evidence before a conviction can be allowed to stand, but as a rule of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to seek corroboration of such evidence from other reliable evidence placed on 22 2026:HHC:29059 record. Further, it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable.” 22. It was held in Hari Om v. State of U.P., (2021) 4 SCC 345: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 440: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 2 that the Court should evaluate the testimony of a child witness carefully and act upon it after being satisfied with its credibility and reliability. It was observed at page 368: “22. At the outset, we must note the perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered. The caution expressed by this Court in Suryanarayana [Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129: 2002 SCC (Cri) 413] that “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle. While applying said principle to the facts of that case, this Court in Suryanarayana [Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129: 2002 SCC (Cri) 413] observed : (SCC pp. 133-35, paras 5-9) “5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of the occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base a conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the grounds of her being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to 23 2026:HHC:29059 scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based on her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under normal circumstances, would like to mix up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence-inspiring testimony of such a witness for the purposes of holding the accused guilty or not. 6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561] held that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of M.P. [Prakash v. State of M.P., (1992) 4 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 853]; Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala [Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667: 1993 SCC (Cri) 1084]; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar [Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 287: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1004] and Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [Dattu Ramrao 24 2026:HHC:29059 Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341: 1997 SCC (Cri) 685] ). 7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit [State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70: 2000 SCC (Cri) 579].” 23. A similar view was taken in Pramila v. State of U.P., (2021) 12 SCC 550: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 223: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 711, wherein it was observed at page 552 “5. Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded. A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculties to see, absorb and appreciate. In a given case, the evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for a conviction. The mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness. But the courts have regularly held that where a child witness is to be considered, and more so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for of the evidence so that the court is satisfied with regard to the reliability and genuineness of the evidence of the child witness. PW 2 was examined nearly one year after the occurrence. The Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out, and what was deposed was nothing but the truth. 6. The evidence of a child witness and the manner of its consideration has been dealt with in State of M.P. v. Ramesh [State of M.P. v. Ramesh, (2011) 4 SCC 786: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 493], as follows : (SCC p. 792, para 14) “14. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the court and 25 2026:HHC:29059 there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been tutored, the court can reject his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether the child has been tutored or not can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.” 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777, that the child witness is susceptible to tutoring, and the Court should evaluate the same carefully. It was observed: “9. It is a well-settled principle that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring. However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness. The Court must make a careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness. The Court must apply its mind to the question whether there is a possibility of the child witness being tutored. Therefore, scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution.” 25. The PMJJB failed to consider the parameters for assessing the testimony of the minor. 26. The victim admitted in her cross-examination that she was residing in the house of her maternal uncle for 7-8 26 2026:HHC:29059 months, which shows that she was not residing with the accused at the time of the incident. 27. The reports (Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW-1/B) specifically mentioned that all injuries from 1 to 9 and 14 were simple with a duration of more than 21 days, injuries No. 10 to 13 and 15 were simple with a duration of more than 7 days. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that if the victim was residing with her maternal uncle, the accused could not have caused injuries to her during that period, and the medical evidence does not corroborate the victim's version that injuries were caused to her by the accused. 28. The victim further stated in her cross-examination that the complaint (Mark-X) was not written by her, but was dictated to her by the NGO. She had not written the portion ‘A to A’ of Mark X, but it was dictated to her. She wrote whatever was being dictated to her. She volunteered to say that she was told to inform the officials of the NGO and thereafter reduce it into writing. Meenakshi (PW-5) denied in her cross-examination that the contents of the complaint ‘mark X’ were dictated to the victim. She was not re-examined, which means that this part of 27 2026:HHC:29059 her testimony was accepted as correct. Thus, the testimony of Meenakshi (PW-5) contradicts the victim’s testimony. 29. The victim made vague statements regarding the cruelty meted out to her. She stated in her cross-examination that she could not tell the dates of the incidents. The JJB had rightly held that the victim was a minor and she cannot be expected to behave like a mature person; however, the accused cannot be convicted based on vague allegations, which cannot be verified by any independent evidence. 30. The victim stated in her cross-examination that her father had made many efforts to get her admitted to the present school. She was provisionally admitted, and thereafter her admission was regularised. She admitted in her cross- examination that she was taken to the hospital for her treatment. These admissions make her testimony doubtful that she was being neglected and beaten. No parent would have taken the child to the hospital after beating him. 31. The victim admitted in her cross-examination that the relationship between her father and her uncle was strained, and many cases were pending between them over the property. 28 2026:HHC:29059 She admitted that both parties filed complaints against each other before the Court and the police, which show that the relationship was highly strained. The victim was immediately residing with her uncle, and her testimony was required to be seen with due care and caution. 32. The victim stated in her cross-examination that she was kept properly by her maternal uncle when she resided with him; however, she had made a complaint to the Protection Officer stating that her maternal uncle had attempted to rape her. This shows that the victim cannot be trusted as a truthful witness, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in seeking the corroboration of her testimony. 33. Learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that there was no corroboration of the victim’s testimony. The names of the students to whom Prasad (blessed food) was given with a direction to hand it over to the victim were not mentioned. The victim claimed that she was caught near her school and was threatened. The place of the incident mentioned by her is a busy place, and many children and parents are present at that place to drop off their children. It is difficult to believe that the 29 2026:HHC:29059 prosecution would not have been able to get even a single witness to corroborate the victim's version. The victim said that she had narrated the incident to her friends; however, no friend was examined to establish this fact. 34. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view, while acquitting the accused, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court in the present revision 35 No other point was raised 36. In view of the above, the present revisions fail, and the same are dismissed. 37. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondents are directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety in the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this 30 2026:HHC:29059 judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 38 A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. 39. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) 16th July, 2026 (Ravinder)