1 2026:CGHC:5179-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 97 of 2026 Manju Lata Sahu W/o Shri Jitesh Kumar Sahu Aged About 36 Years R/o Village- Bareli, Tahsil- Tundra (Kasdol), Police Station- Girodhpuri, District- Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Department of Revenue And Disaster Management, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. The Commissioner Raipur Division, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3. Collector District- Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. 4. Additional Collector Baloda Bazar, District- Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. 5. Sub Divisional Officer (Rev), Baloda Bazar, District- Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. 6. Tahsildar Tahsil- Baloda Bazar, District- Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.01.30 17:35:45 +0530 2 For Appellant : Ms. Madhunishs Singh, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 30 .01.2026 1. Heard Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State on I.A. No. 1, which is an application for condonation of delay. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons mentioned in the application, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has been shown in the application. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1 is allowed and delay of 47 days in filing the appeal is condoned. 3. The present intra-Court appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 15.09.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 9831 of 2025 (Manju Lata Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner was disposed off. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the writ petition was filed seeking issuance of appropriate writs and directions to the respondent authorities for payment of a sum of Rs. 5,26,680/- along 3 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, as awarded by the competent authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (for short, ‘Act of 1936’), Labour Court, Baloda Bazar–Bhatapara, vide order dated 11.05.2016, and also for quashing of the dismissal order dated 21.05.2015 passed by respondent No. 3. 5. It is contended that the appellant was appointed as a Peon (Class-IV employee) in the office of respondent No. 3 vide appointment order dated 16.12.2011 and was thereafter posted at the Tahsil Office, Baloda Bazar (Up-Tahsil Bhatgaon) vide order dated 29.12.2011. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that on a complaint alleging that the appellant had obtained employment on the basis of a forged Class-V certificate, a departmental enquiry under Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, ‘Rules of 1966’) was initiated. The Enquiry Committee submitted its report on 08.05.2015 holding the appellant guilty, on the basis of which respondent No. 3 passed the dismissal order dated 21.05.2015. 7. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that being aggrieved by the dismissal, the appellant preferred an application under Section 15(2) of the Act of 1936 before the Labour Court, which was allowed vide order dated 11.05.2016 directing payment of Rs.5,26,680/- with interest. The appeal preferred by the respondents against the said order was dismissed by the Chhattisgarh State Industrial Tribunal on 15.05.2017, rendering the award final. Despite 4 this, the amount has not been paid to the appellant. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the delay in approaching the High Court to challenge the dismissal order was neither deliberate nor intentional and occurred due to bona fide reasons, including the appellant’s socio-economic condition, lack of legal assistance and continuous representations made before the authorities. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground of delay and laches without considering the continuing civil consequences of the dismissal. 9. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned order and submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition after due consideration of the material on record and that no interference is warranted in intra-Court appeal. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully examined the pleadings and documents placed on record. 11. It is not in dispute that the order of dismissal was passed on 21.05.2015 and the writ petition challenging the said order was filed in the year 2025, after an unexplained lapse of nearly ten years. Though no statutory limitation is prescribed for invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the doctrine of delay and laches is well-settled and Courts do not ordinarily entertain stale claims, particularly in service matters, unless exceptional circumstances are shown. 12. In the present case, the explanation offered by the appellant does 5 not satisfactorily justify the inordinate delay of ten years in challenging the dismissal order. Mere submission of representations or pursuit of other remedies cannot, by itself, extend or revive a cause of action that has otherwise become stale. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, justified in holding that the challenge to the dismissal order dated 21.05.2015 was barred by delay and laches. 13. So far as the order dated 11.05.2016 passed by the Authority under the Act of 1936 is concerned, the learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the appellant has an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy available for execution of the said award before the appropriate forum. 14. We find that the learned Single Judge has balanced the equities by granting liberty to the appellant to take recourse to execution proceedings for enforcement of the award under the Act of 1936, while declining to entertain the belated challenge to the dismissal order. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the writ appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 16. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan