(2026: JHHC:16414-DB) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(PIL) No. 7882 of 2025 Rakesh Kumar, aged about 38 years, son of Sri Laxmi Narayan Mehta, resident of Gram Lengrapipar, P.O.- Domchanch. P.S.- Domchanch, District- Koderma- 825407. ….. ….. Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Secretariat Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, Ranchi- 834001. 2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, Ranchi-834001. 3. The Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Government of Jharkhand, 2nd Floor, F.F.P. Building, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, District- Ranchi. 4. The Deputy Commissioner, D.C. Office, P.O. & P.S.- Koderma, Koderma, Jharkhand. 5. Domchanch Nagar Panchayat through its Chairman, Domchanch, P.O. & P.S.- Domchanch, Koderma, Jharkhand. 6. The State Election Commission, through its Secretary, Nirvachan Bhawan, New Market Chowk, P.O. & P.S.- Ratu SO, Ratu P.S., Ratu Road, Ranchi-834001. …. …. Respondents ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ------ For the Petitioner : Mr Alok Anand, Advocate For the Resp-State : Mr Piyush Chitresh, AC to AG For the Resp. No. 6 : Mr Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate Mr Ritesh Gupta, Advocate Ms Shruti Shekhar, Advocate Mr Sejal Agrawal, Advocate Mr Radha Krishan Gupta, CGC ----- 02 /Dated: 09.06.2026 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. By this purported Public Interest Litigation instituted only in November, 2025, the petitioner challenges the Notification / Memo dated 01.09.2017 whereby, by exercising the powers under the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, the State Government has constituted and declared the area of seven Revenue Villages, including Ward No. 5, adjoining the area of Domchanch in the District of Koderma as Domchanch Nagar Panchayat. (2026: JHHC:16414-DB) 2 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the above Notification has been issued without compliance with or fulfilment of the constitutional and statutory mandate as contained in Part-IX A of the Constitution, read with Part-II of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. Apart from this ground, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned notification is patently arbitrary, unreasonable, manifestly unjust and oppressive. 4. The petitioner, in the petition, has fairly disclosed that the Mukhiyas of the affected villages had instituted W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018 in this Court to challenge the very same notification dated 01.09.2017, and that the said petition was dismissed on 22.03.2018 by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Shankar). Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the grounds now raised in this petition had not been urged in the said petition and therefore the present petition should be entertained and the notification dated 01.09.2017 should be struck down. 5. To the Court’s query as to why this petition has been instituted in November 2025, when the impugned notification was issued on 01.09.2017, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present petitioner had put his faith in the Mukhiyas, who instituted W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018. He submitted that Mukhiyas were only interested in securing their own tenure and, therefore, the challenges at their behest failed. He submitted that this should be treated as a sufficient explanation for the delay in instituting this petition. 6. We have considered the submissions made by the petitioner in his petition and the learned counsel before us. However, we are satisfied that the issue now raised in this petition stands fully covered or answered by the (2026: JHHC:16414-DB) 3 judgment and order dated 22.03.2018 disposing of W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018 (Manju Devi & 3 others Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.). 7. The argument regarding non-compliance with constitutional or statutory provisions was indeed raised in W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018, and it has been addressed in extenso. In any event, we are not entirely sure whether the petitioner can re-agitate the challenge to the impugned Notification dated 01.09.2017 merely by urging allegedly different grounds or by submitting that this ground was not raised in the earlier petition. 8. This petition has been instituted after an inordinate delay and is therefore barred by laches. During the period between 01.09.2017 and the date of institution of this petition, much water has flowed under the bridge. In the meantime, there must have been elections to the newly constituted Nagar Panchayat. The Nagar Panchayat must have also taken several decisions. The explanation for the inordinate delay is far from convincing. 9. On the one hand, an attempt was made to argue that the scope of W.P. (C) No. 122 of 2018 is quite different. On the other hand, it is submitted that the present petitioner placed his faith in the petitioners (Mukhiyas), who instituted W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018, and therefore did not immediately rush to the Court. 10. Assuming that there is any substance in the above contentions, it cannot be disputed that W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018 was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 22.03.2018. Even the period between 2018 and 2025 is substantial. There is no explanation why this petition could not have been or was not instituted earlier. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, then, referred to W.P.(PIL) No. 3352 of 2023 to submit that this very notification was also challenged in the said writ (2026: JHHC:16414-DB) 4 petition. He placed on record the order dated 23.11.2023, which shows that this petition was dismissed because this Court found that the petitioner had lacked appropriate credentials to initiate a PIL. 12. The petitioner, it appears, is in the habit of sitting on the fence. There is no explanation for the inordinate delay and the consequent laches. The issue now raised by the petitioner had already been decided in the judgment and order dated 22.03.2018 disposing of W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018. 13. The petitioner cannot, at this belated juncture, repeat the challenge by urging that he has some different grounds. From perusal of the petition, we do not think that any substantially different grounds have been raised in this petition. The contentions, now raised, are quite similar to those that were raised and answered in W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018. 14. For all the above reasons, we dismiss this petition without any order for costs. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 09, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. NAFR Uploaded on 11.06.2026