2026:HHC:29326 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 394 of 2014 Reserved on: 29.5.2026 Date of Decision: 17.7.2026 Pampa Chering ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Jeevesh Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 03.05.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. II, Shimla H. P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.02.2008, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. II, Shimla H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29326 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Sher Singh (PW3), had visited Kufri on 16.10.2005. He was talking to Mani Ram (PW4), the driver of the Tata Sumo bearing registration No. HP-01-8057. A Mahindra Max bearing registration No. HP-01A- 3205 came from Shimla at high speed and hit the Tata Sumo. The informant also sustained injury on his right arm. The driver sped away from the spot. The right side of the Tata Sumo was damaged in the accident. Sher Singh was brought to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police. HC Yog Raj went to IGMC, where Sher Singh made a statement (Ex.PW3/A), which was sent to the Police Station. FIR (Ex.PW8/L) was registered in the police station. Dr Aman Madai (PW6) examined the victim, Sher Singh and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within 6 hours of the examination. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW6/A). He advised an X-ray. Dr Nitin Aggarwal (PW5) went through the X-ray and found a fracture of the radius of the ulnar bone of the right forearm. He issued the report 3 2026:HHC:29326 (Ex.PW5/A). The nature of the injury was stated to be grievous. HC Yog Raj went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW8/D). He seized the Mahindra Max bearing registration No. HP-01A-3205 along with documents vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). The accused, Pampa Chering, produced his driving licence (Ex.PW8/E), which was taken in possession. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 201 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Suminder Singh (PW1) and Hira Mani (PW2) witnessed the recoveries. Sher Singh (PW3) is the injured. Mani Ram (PW4) and Lachhi Ram (PW7) are the eyewitnesses. Dr Nitin Aggarwal (PW5) is the Radiologist who went through the X-ray and detected the fracture. Dr Aman Madai (PW6) examined the 4 2026:HHC:29326 informant. HC Yog Raj (PW8) investigated the matter. Daya Nand (PW9) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that witnesses had falsely deposed against him, and he was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The accused did not dispute during the cross-examination that he was driving a Mahindra Max, which had hit the vehicle of Mani Ram and the injured Sher Singh. The road was quite wide, and the accused had no reason to hit a stationary vehicle and a person standing beside it. The accused had also fled from the spot. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under:- Under Section 279 of the IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Under Section 337 of the IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Under Section 338 of the IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 5 2026:HHC:29326 Under Section 201 of the IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla, H.P. (the learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. The road was quite wide, and the accused had no occasion to drive the vehicle towards the side of the road and hit the person standing near the vehicle. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the prosecution had failed to prove its 6 2026:HHC:29326 case beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. The informant had reported the matter to the police after due deliberation. The statement of Mani Ram was recorded belatedly, which casts a doubt on his veracity. It was not proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the learned Courts below erred in assuming this fact. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the Learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Jeevesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Jeevesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution relied upon the statements of interested witnesses. There was no evidence of the rashness or negligence of the accused. Both the learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that the witnesses had used the term ‘high speed’ and this constituted negligence on the part of the accused. Mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to convict the accused. Therefore, he prayed that 7 2026:HHC:29326 the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the informant was talking to Mani Ram on the roadside. The road was 35 ft. wide, and the accused had no reason to drive the vehicle towards the side of the road. The learned courts below had rightly held that driving the vehicle towards the side of the road where a person was standing was sufficient to infer negligence. The accused was supposed to provide an explanation for his conduct. He failed to do so and learned Courts below had rightly held him guilty. The sentence was adequate, and no interference is required with the Judgments and order passed by the learned courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent 8 2026:HHC:29326 defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. DilipsinhKishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. 9 2026:HHC:29326 Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 10 2026:HHC:29326 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 11 2026:HHC:29326 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 12 2026:HHC:29326 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 13 2026:HHC:29326 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. Informant Sher Singh (PW3) stated that he was waiting for a bus on the roadside. A Tata Sumo of Mani Ram was also parked on the road. He was talking to Mani Ram. A Mahindra Max came from Shimla at high speed and hit him. He had sustained injuries to his arm and his head. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the Mahindra Max. He could not identify the driver because he had lost consciousness after the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that Mani Ram was related to him. There were 15-20 shops. The vehicle No. HP-01A-3205 was disclosed by Mani Ram. He had sustained injuries on the right side of his body. He denied that the place of the incident was narrow. 20. Mani Ram (PW4) stated that he had parked his Tata Sumo on the roadside. He was talking to Sher Singh. A Mahindra Max bearing registration No. HP-01A-3205 came from Shimla at high speed and hit the Tata Sumo, and Sher Singh, who sustained injury on his right arm. Sher Singh was taken to the hospital. The accused was driving the Mahindra Max on the date of the accident. The accident occurred because of the high speed of the 14 2026:HHC:29326 Mahindra Max and the negligence of the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that Sher Singh was related to him. He was sitting inside the Tata Sumo. His vehicle was not mechanically examined. He and the accused are taxi drivers, and they frequently meet each other. He admitted that Kufri was a tourist place and many vehicles cross Kufri. He admitted that there are many shops in Kufri Bazar. Tata Sumo was facing Fagu. The informant was standing outside the Tata Sumo. He denied that the vehicle being driven by the accused had not caused any accident. 21. Lachhi Ram (PW7) stated that he was sitting in the Tata Sumo of Mani Ram in Kufri Bazar. Sher Singh was talking to Mani Ram. A Mahindra Max bearing registration No. HP-01A- 3205 came from Shimla at high speed, amd hit the Tata Sumo and Sher Singh. The driver sped away from the spot. Injured was taken to the hospital. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver. The driver of the Mahindra Max looked like a Negi, and the accused also appeared to be a Negi. He stated in his examination that there were shops at the place of the accident. He admitted that Kufri was a tourist place. The Tata Sumo was parked towards the left side of the road. He was not 15 2026:HHC:29326 sure whether the accused was the person who was driving the Mahindra Max at the time of the accident. He denied that he was making a false statement, and the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01A-3205 was not involved in the accident. 22. It is an admitted version that the Mahindra Max bearing registration No. HP-01A-3205 came from Shimla and went towards Fagu. Tata Sumo was also parked with its face towards Fagu. Thus, the occupants of the Tata Sumo would have seen the rear of the Mahindra Max after the accident and would not have been in a position to identify the driver of the Mahindra Max. This is apparent from the statement of Lachhi Ram, who stated that the driver looked like a Negi and the accused also looked like a Negi. However, he was not sure that the accused was driving the Mahindra Max at the time of the accident. Even the informant could not see the driver at the time of the accident. Hence, in these circumstances, the testimony of Mani Ram (PW4) is to be seen with utmost care and caution, because he is the only person who had identified the accused. He stated that he knew the accused because he and the accused were the drivers of the taxis and they frequently met each other. However, he stated in his cross-examination that he came to know the name of the 16 2026:HHC:29326 accused on the next date of the incident. This makes his testimony suspect that he frequently met the accused. He had not named the accused at the time of reporting the matter to the police, even though he claimed to have known the accused. Further, he has not provided any satisfactory reason for how he could have seen the accused when the other occupant was unable to see him. All these circumstances make it difficult to rely upon his testimony regarding the identification of the accused. 23. It was submitted that Mani Ram had identified the accused in the Court, which is a proper identification. This submission will not help the prosecution. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed: "It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that, if there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be 17 2026:HHC:29326 inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain. People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light." 24. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is improper and the witness should be asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363: “A witness shouldn't be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.” 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed on page 605: “17. The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More 18 2026:HHC:29326 importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”! xxx 21.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismissed the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the appellant, i.e. Accused 2, was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper. xxxx 23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala, (2012) 13 SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406]). xxx 27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis of TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404. 28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: (Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, SCC p. 44, para 18) 19 2026:HHC:29326 “18. It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.” 26. Therefore, the identification of the accused by the witnesses for the first time in the Court without any corroboration from previous Test Identification Parades is meaningless, and cannot be relied upon to record the conviction. 27. Hira Mani (PW2) is the owner of the Mahindra Max. He would have been the best witness to depose who was employed by him as a driver. However, the prosecution did not ask any questions regarding the name of the driver of the Mahindra Max. Therefore, his testimony does not establish that the accused was driving the Mahindra Max at the time of the accident. 28. Strangely, the vehicles were not subjected to the mechanical examination, and there is no evidence that the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01A-3205 had suffered any damage after the accident. The prosecution has not provided any 20 2026:HHC:29326 explanation for the non-examination of the vehicle by the mechanic, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution for it. 29. The learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that the identity of the accused was not disputed. However, the accused had specifically denied in reply to question No.2 that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration number HP-01A- 3205. It was suggested to all the witnesses that the vehicle being driven by the accused was not involved in the accident. Thus, the prosecution's version was disputed in the cross-examination of the witnesses and the statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. 30. HC Yog Raj has not disclosed how he found that the accused was driving the Mahindra Max. He specifically stated in his cross-examination that the informant Mani Ram had accompanied Lachhi Ram and Pratap Singh to the Police Station, and informant had not disclosed the name of the driver, but only the identity. It was laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 702: 2002 SCC (Cri) 256: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that when the identity of the accused is not disclosed, the Investigating Officers should explain the steps 21 2026:HHC:29326 leading to the detection of the offender to exclude the likelihood of his innocence having been branded as a culprit. It was observed at 713: “26. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record an observation of ours, touching on an aspect of the case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a cognizable crime having been committed is known, but neither the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there any indication available of the witnesses who would be able to furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to the test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant investigating officer, well-versed with the techniques of the job, is in a position to collect the threads of evidence, finding out the path that leads to the culprit. The ends, which the administration of criminal justice serves, are not achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the offender and the collection of evidence against him. This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent person having been picked up and branded as a culprit, and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious circumstances, treating them as of “beyond doubt” evidentiary value. 31. HC Yog Raj stated that the witnesses had identified the accused as the driver; however, no Test Identification Parade was conducted, and it is not known where the witnesses had identified the accused. Even the witnesses have not stated before the Court that they had identified the accused as the driver of the 22 2026:HHC:29326 Mahindra Max. Thus, this part of his cross-examination does not prove the identity of the accused as the driver of the Mahindra Max. 32. Therefore, the learned Courts below erred in proceeding on the basis that the identity of the accused was not disputed, and this approach vitiated the judgments and order passed by them. 33. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.02.2008, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Shimla, H.P., as affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.II, Shimla H.P., are ordered to be set aside. The petitioner/accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The fine, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 34. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in 23 2026:HHC:29326 the like amount to the satisfactio n of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th July, 2026 (Chander)