1 2026:CGHC:4896-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1719 of 2023 Vinod Singh Maravi S/o Shivbaran Singh Maravi Aged About 19 Years R/o Gopalpur Mohalla Bamhani, P.S.-Pali, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through- P.S.- Pali, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Syed Majid Ali, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J . 29.01.2026 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the judgment dated 04.03.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge – Special Court (Fast Track) (POCSO) Katghora, District- Korba (C.G.). in Special Case No. 44/2021, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant as under:- MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.01.30 11:27:29 +0530 2 Conviction under Section Sentence (Rigorous imprisonment) Fine In default of payment of fine add. R.I. Section 363 of the IPC 1 year Rs. 500/- 01 month Section 366 of the IPC 3 years Rs.500/- 01 month Section 506 of the IPC 1 year Rs.500/- 01 month Section 6 of the POCSO Act 20 years Rs. 1,000/- 02 months All sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 29.01.2021, the victim submitted a written application stating that she had known the accused, Vinod Singh Maravi, for approximately one year and that they had been communicating via mobile phone. Meanwhile, on Saturday, 4-09-2021, the accused came to her house and took her to his house that night, saying, "I love you," and raped her in his room against her will. He had established physical relations with her without her consent and after that he continued to have physical relations with her forcibly at different places for 2-3 times continuously and when the victim protested, the accused threatened to kill her if she told anyone, due to which she did not tell anyone about the incident, but on 19-09-2021, after telling her sister and her parents about the said incident, a written complaint was given to the Pali police station, after which the Pali police 3 station registered a crime against the accused and took the case into investigation. 3. During the investigation, with the consent of the victim, she was medically examined by a female doctor and her statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and by submitting a report to the Child Welfare Committee, Korba. To ascertain the correct age of the victim, an X-ray was conducted at the District Hospital, Korba. During the investigation, when evidence of crime was found against the accused, he was duly arrested and sent on judicial remand. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was prepared and presented before the court for trial. 4. Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(N), 506 Part-II of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 5 were registered against the accused. After the charges were framed, read, and explained to him, the accused denied the crime and claimed trial. Upon examination under Section 313 of the CrPC, the accused pleaded innocence and stated that he had been falsely implicated. 5. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment dated 04.03.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the facts, evidence and law 4 applicable to the present case and is therefore liable to be set aside. It is contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the prosecution case itself suffers from serious infirmities, contradictions and unexplained delay, inasmuch as the alleged incident is stated to have occurred on 19.09.2021, whereas the written complaint was lodged belatedly on 29.10.2021 without any satisfactory explanation either by the victim or the prosecution witnesses, which casts a serious doubt on the genuineness of the allegations. It is further submitted that the age of the victim, which is the foundational requirement for attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act, has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, as is evident from the radiologist’s report (Exhibit P-12), thereby rendering the conviction unsustainable. The learned Trial Court also failed to consider the surrounding circumstances of the incident dated 19.09.2021, which clearly indicate that the victim was a consenting party and that the FIR was lodged only as an afterthought following an accident that occurred while she was returning with the appellant. The appellant had categorically denied all allegations, yet the learned Trial Court convicted him without properly appreciating that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt, relying upon evidence which is doubtful in nature and riddled with material contradictions and omissions between the statements recorded before the Court and those recorded in the case diary. There are no independent or direct eyewitnesses to 5 the alleged incident, and even the statement of the victim could not be duly recorded by the Court of Sessions in accordance with law. The conviction, therefore, rests solely on unreliable and insufficient evidence, which could not have formed the basis for sustaining the guilt of the appellant. It is lastly submitted that the appellant has not committed any act of sexual intercourse with the victim and that the very object and spirit of the POCSO Act, which is a special legislation enacted to protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse, has been misapplied in the present case, resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, thus warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was minor on the date of commission of offence and the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 506 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC ? 6 10. The appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 363 of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.-Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 11. The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients:- (1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. 7 So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 12. The Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of the IPC in the matter of S.Varadarajan v. State of Madras1, took the view that if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under:- “It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 1 AIR 1965 SC 942 8 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of ingredients of offence under Section 361 of the IPC which is punishable under Section 363 of the IPC & as well as principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of S.Varadarajan (supra), it is evident that the essential ingredients of Section 363 IPC are not made out. The victim (PW-1) has stated that she knew the accused for some time prior to the alleged incidents and had been in communication with him over the phone. On 4-09-2021, she accompanied the accused to his house after informing her sister, and there is no evidence to suggest that she was forcibly taken against her will. Similarly, on 19-09-2021, she voluntarily sat on the accused’s motorcycle along with other friends, and only thereafter did the incident in the forest allegedly occur. The prosecution has not adduced any evidence to show that the accused had unlawfully taken or kidnapped the victim from lawful guardianship, which is the very foundation of an offence under Section 363 IPC. The fact that she knew the accused, maintained regular communication, and willingly left with him for the alleged incidents indicates absence of the element of “unlawful taking or detention” required under Section 363 IPC. Even though the victim alleges physical assault and threats, these acts do not in themselves establish kidnapping in the legal sense under Section 363 IPC. In cross-examination, the victim admitted to having prior love-related conversations with the accused, and there is no 9 independent evidence from any guardian or witness that she was forcibly taken or detained against her will. In view of the above, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 363 IPC, and the conviction under this section cannot be sustained. 14. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the act/omission of the appellant, if any, would not tantamount to “taking” within the meaning of Section 361 of the IPC in light of judgment of the Supreme Court in S.Varadarajan (supra). Similarly, there is no evidence of enticing the minor victim by the appellant. As such, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC. 15. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 366 of the IPC ? 16. Section 366 IPC requires proof that the accused kidnapped or induced a minor girl under eighteen years of age with intent that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or married against her will. On a close scrutiny of the evidence in the present case, it is clear that the prosecution has not proved these essential ingredients. The victim (PW-1) was previously acquainted with the appellant and had been communicating with him over mobile phone. On 4-09-2021, she accompanied the appellant to his house after informing her sister, and on 19-09- 10 2021, she voluntarily sat on the appellant’s motorcycle along with friends before the alleged incident in the forest of Bango. There is no independent evidence to suggest that she was taken by deceit, coercion, or inducement in the manner required under Section 366 IPC. The prosecution has also not produced any evidence from her lawful guardians or other witnesses to show that she was removed or enticed against her will. 17. While the victim has stated that sexual acts were committed by the appellant, her prior acquaintance with him, voluntary movement to meet him, and lack of corroboration regarding any inducement or kidnapping, render the charge under Section 366 IPC not established beyond reasonable doubt. The medical evidence confirms her minor status but does not provide independent proof of inducement or kidnapping by the appellant. Investigating officers confirmed proper recording of complaints and collection of evidence, yet no material demonstrates that the appellant acted with the intent or means specified in Section 366 IPC. 18. In these circumstances, the conviction under Section 366 IPC is legally unsustainable. The essential elements of the offence of kidnapping or inducing a minor girl with intent to force or seduce her remain unproved. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 366 IPC, and the conviction under this section cannot be sustained. 11 19. So far as the age of the victim is concerned, the prosecution has failed to establish her exact age beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court assumed her to be a minor under eighteen years, but the documents and evidence relied upon, including the written complaint (Exhibit P-01), the First Information Report (Exhibit P- 02), the medical examination report of the victim (Exhibit P-06), and the doctor’s certificate regarding the appellant’s capacity for sexual intercourse (Exhibit P-10), do not conclusively prove her exact date of birth or minor status. The victim’s own testimony (PW-1), although consistent regarding the alleged incidents, does not establish her age with certainty. In view of the settled legal position, as applied in similar cases, where the age of the victim is above sixteen years but under eighteen years, and exact proof is lacking, the benefit of doubt must go in favour of the accused. In the present case, in absence of definitive evidence regarding the victim’s age, the statutory presumption under the POCSO Act cannot be applied with full force. Hence, during this period, the age of the victim (PW-1) is proved to be around 16-18 years of age and if consent was given for sexual intercourse on the date of incident, it does not amount to an offence under the POCSO Act. 20. In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Supreme Court observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not 12 the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 13 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 21. In the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 14 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there 15 (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 22. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 506 of the IPC ? 23. Section 506 IPC deals with criminal intimidation, requiring proof that the accused threatened another with injury to their person, reputation, or property, intending to cause alarm. In the present case, the victim (PW-1) stated that the appellant allegedly threatened her, but the evidence shows that these statements were made in the context of prior acquaintance and voluntary interactions. There is no independent evidence from her, her family, or any other witness that substantiates the threat in a manner required to constitute criminal intimidation. While the victim’s sister (PW-2) corroborated some aspects of the incidents, she did not provide evidence of any specific threat intended to alarm the victim or others. 24. Further, the statements relied upon by the prosecution (Exhibit P- 01, P-02) and medical evidence (Exhibit P-06) do not contain any record of threats amounting to criminal intimidation. The investigating officers (PW-6, PW-7, PW-10, PW-11) confirmed proper procedures were followed in recording the complaint, but 17 the material does not establish any intentional threat to alarm or intimidate as contemplated under Section 506 IPC. In the absence of clear, corroborated evidence of such threats, the conviction under Section 506 IPC is not sustainable. 25. In view of the above, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed any act amounting to criminal intimidation. Therefore, the conviction under Section 506 IPC cannot be maintained, and the appellant is entitled to acquittal under this provision as well. 26. So far as conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is concerned, the victim (PW-1) has stated that she had known the appellant for approximately one year prior to the alleged incidents. The appellant had come to her village and established contact while working there, and she had been communicating with him over mobile phone. On 4-09-2021, during a conversation over phone, the appellant informed her that he would come to meet her. She told her sister about this, and she accompanied the appellant voluntarily on his motorcycle to his house. The victim described certain acts that occurred during this visit. However, the evidence indicates that she had prior acquaintance with the appellant and voluntarily went with him, and there is no independent evidence suggesting that she was taken by force, coercion, or inducement. 18 27. The vicvtim further stated that on 19-09-2021, she, along with her sister and a friend, was going to a factory. On the way near Chaitma, the appellant arrived on a motorcycle, and she voluntarily sat with him while her sister and friend traveled separately. She alleged that certain acts occurred in the forest of Bango, and during the return journey the appellant met with an accident, resulting in injuries to both. The victim was subsequently taken to Korba Hospital for treatment. Her sister (PW-2) corroborated that the victim informed her about these events after the accident. While the victim described the events, the evidence does not independently establish any act of kidnapping, force, or coercion, and her voluntary movement with the appellant weighs against the prosecution’s claim of commission of offences under the POCSO Act. 28. The victim stated that after the accident she was examined at Korba Hospital (Exhibit P-06), and her statement was recorded by the police with her consent (Exhibit P-05) and with the consent of her father (Exhibit P-08). Site maps were prepared by the authorities (Exhibits P-03 and P-04), and the investigating officers (PW-6, PW-7, PW-10, PW-11) confirmed proper recording of evidence and collection of medical samples. While she described incidents involving the appellant, the prosecution has not produced conclusive evidence of her exact age, and no independent evidence establishes that any act was committed against her will. Considering the totality of evidence, including the 19 victim’s prior acquaintance with the appellant, voluntary movement, and lack of independent corroboration for coercion or inducement, the essential elements of offences under the POCSO Act are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 29. On careful scrutiny of the entire evidence on record, it is clear that at no stage has the prosecution established that the appellant used any force, threat, inducement, or persuasion to make the victim leave her home or accompany him. The victim (PW-1) had known the appellant for approximately one year and had been communicating with him over mobile phone prior to the alleged incidents. On 4-09-2021, she informed her sister about the appellant coming to meet her and voluntarily accompanied him on his motorcycle to his house. Similarly, on 19-09-2021, she voluntarily sat on the appellant’s motorcycle along with him while traveling to Bango, and there is no independent evidence to suggest that she was taken against her will. The testimony of the prosecutrix is consistent in stating that she accompanied the appellant of her own accord, and her sister (PW-2) corroborated that she informed her of the events after the incident. 30. The medical evidence (PW-3, PW-5, Exhibits P-06, P-10) confirms the minor status of the victim and the appellant’s capacity for sexual intercourse but does not independently establish that the appellant induced or coerced the victim. Similarly, investigative officers (PW-6, PW-7, PW-10, PW-11) confirmed that the complaint (Exhibit P-01), FIR (Exhibit P-02), 20 and other procedural exhibits (Exhibits P-03, P-04, P-05, P-08) were properly recorded and collected, but none of these documents show that any act of coercion, inducement, or threat occurred. While the victim describes the events, the evidence demonstrates that her movements with the appellant were voluntary, and there is no proof that she was persuaded, compelled, or coerced in any manner that would satisfy the statutory requirements of an offence under the POCSO Act. 31. In view of the above, the prosecution has failed to establish any act of inducement, persuasion, or coercion necessary to sustain a conviction. The victim’s voluntary movement, prior acquaintance with the appellant, lack of independent corroboration of coercion or threats, and absence of proof regarding her exact age collectively weigh in favour of the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution has not proved any offence beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant is entitled to acquittal. 32. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid legal analysis, the criminal appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 04.03.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge – Special Court (Fast Track) (POCSO) Katghora, District- Korba (C.G.) in Special Case No. 44/2021 convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offences under Sections 363, 366, 506 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act is hereby set aside. The accused / appellant is acquitted of the said charges levelled 21 against him. The appellant is stated to be in jail. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if no longer required in any other criminal case. 33. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Proceure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet