1 2026:CGHC:3841 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1563 of 2025 Om Prakash Kashyap S/o Late Devnarayan Kashyap Aged About 57 Years R/o Qtr. No.-E.W.S. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Phase-2, Korba, Police Chowki - Rampur, Korba, Tehsil And Distt. - Korba (C.G.), (Accuse No. 1) ... Petitioner versus 1 - Lata Gautam W/o M.S. Gautam Aged About 56 Years R/o Shahid Bhagat Singh Colony, Korba, Thana- Manikpur Chowki, Thana - Kotwali, Korba, Tehsil And Distt. - Korba (C.G.), (Since Died), Through Her Husband Mordhwaj Singh Gautam S/o Late Saheb Lal Gautam, Aged About 67 Years, R/o Sahid Bhagat Singh Colony, S.E.C.L. Korba, Chowki - Manikpur, Distt. - Korba (C.G.), (Learned Trial Court Allowed Mordhwaj To Prosecute The Case As Complainant), (Complainant) 2 - Vinod Upadhyay S/o Late B.P. Upadhyay Aged About 35 Years R/o Qtr. No.- E.W.S.-115, M.P. Nagar, Korba, Tehsil And Distt. - Korba (C.G.), (Accuse No.-2) 3 - Gajendra Mansar S/o Late Dev Kumar Mansar Aged About 34 Years R/o Rumgara, Balco Nagar, Thana- Balco Nagar, Tehsil And District - Korba (C.G.), (Accuse No. 3) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Sanjay Patel, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Advocate 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Order on Board 22.01.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sanjay Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following relief:- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside quash the order dated 10.02.2025 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba, Distt. Korba [C.G.] in criminal case no. 1970/2016, ΑΝNEXURE P/1, and allow the application for calling competent officer/servant of Nagar Nigam Korba as defence witness, in the interest of justice.” 3. Mr. Sanjay Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned trial Court has gravely erred in law and on facts in rejecting the petitioner’s application for summoning the competent officer/servant of Nagar Nigam, Korba, as a defence witness, merely on the bald ground that such evidence is “unnecessary”. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that the entire prosecution case itself is founded upon the allegation that forged documents were submitted before the Municipal Corporation for the purpose of mutation of the accused’s name, and therefore, the testimony of the concerned Nagar Nigam official, who is the 3 custodian of the relevant records, is not only relevant but crucial for a just and proper adjudication of the case. 4. Mr. Patel further submits that under sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is bound to issue process for compelling the attendance of a defence witness unless the Court records a specific finding, supported by reasons in writing, that the application has been moved for the purpose of vexation, delay, or for defeating the ends of justice. In the present case, no such finding has been recorded by the learned trial Court. The impugned order is conspicuously silent on any allegation of abuse of process, and thus, the refusal to summon the defence witness is contrary to the mandatory statutory scheme of Section 243 CrPC. 5. It is submitted by Mr. Patel that the right of the accused to enter upon his defence and to adduce evidence in support thereof is an inseparable facet of the right to a fair trial, which stands protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Denial of an opportunity to examine a material defence witness, without any legally sustainable reason, strikes at the very root of the principles of natural justice and renders the trial unfair and one-sided. He further submits that the learned trial Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law, inasmuch as it has substituted its own opinion on the “necessity” of defence evidence in place of the statutory mandate, which leaves little discretion to 4 the Court except in cases where the application is mala fide or intended to delay the proceedings. Such an approach amounts to a pre-judging of the defence of the accused, which is impermissible at the stage of defence evidence. 6. Mr. Patel lastly submits that the impugned order dated 10.02.2025, therefore, suffers from non-application of mind, arbitrariness, and material irregularity, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent and/or revisional jurisdiction, in order to secure the ends of justice and to ensure that the petitioner is afforded a fair and meaningful opportunity to defend himself in accordance with law. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the impugned order has been passed after due consideration of the material available on record and does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. It is contended that the learned trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion in rejecting the application, as the proposed defence witness is not necessary for the just decision of the case and the evidence sought to be adduced is irrelevant at this stage. No prejudice has been caused to the petitioner and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the present petition. 5 9. From perusal of the impugned order dated 10.02.2025, it transpires that the learned trial Court has rejected the application filed on behalf of the accused for summoning an officer/employee of the Municipal Corporation, Korba, mainly on the reasoning that since the complainant has not disputed the factum of submission of the documents before the Municipal Corporation, the testimony of any Municipal official would not assist the defence. The learned trial Court has further observed that the officials of the Municipal Corporation are not competent to opine upon the genuineness or forgery of the documents, and at best, could only state whether such documents were submitted before the Corporation, which fact, according to the learned trial Court, already stands admitted. On the said premise, the learned trial Court has held that it is not necessary to summon the Municipal Corporation officer/employee as a defence witness and accordingly rejected the application, while directing the accused to lead defence evidence on the next date, failing which the opportunity would stand closed. 10. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has duly considered the nature of allegations, the scope of the complaint, and the relevance of the evidence sought to be adduced by the accused. The prosecution case rests on the allegation of forgery of documents, and not on the factum of their submission before the Municipal Corporation, which aspect is admittedly not in dispute. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly held that summoning 6 an officer or employee of the Municipal Corporation would not advance the cause of justice, as such witness would neither be competent to opine on the genuineness or otherwise of the disputed documents nor would his testimony have any material bearing on the core issue involved in the trial. 11. It is well settled that while the accused has a valuable right to defend himself and to adduce evidence in support of his defence, such right is not absolute and is subject to judicial scrutiny to prevent abuse of the process of Court. The discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing to summon a witness, upon finding that such evidence is not necessary for the just decision of the case, cannot be termed as arbitrary or violative of the principles of fair trial, particularly when no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused. 12. This Court further observes that the impugned order reflects due application of mind and does not disclose any denial of opportunity to the accused to lead defence evidence. On the contrary, the learned trial Court has expressly granted liberty to the accused to adduce defence evidence in accordance with law, and has only declined a specific request which, in the considered opinion of the trial Court, was unnecessary. 13. In exercise of inherent and supervisory jurisdiction, this Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over interlocutory orders passed during the course of trial, unless the same result in manifest 7 injustice or abuse of process. No such exceptional circumstance is made out in the present case. 14. Accordingly, the present petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Akhil