1 2026:HHC:29330 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 607 of 2026 Reserved on: 8.7.2026 Date of Decision: 17.7.2026. Vinod Verma …. Petitioner Versus State of HP & ors. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr N.K. Bhalla, Advocate. For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Nemo. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition to quash the charge sheet/final report filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) corresponding to Section 193 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in FIR No. 105 of 2022, dated 30.04.2022, registered at Police Station, West Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 447, 504, and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29330 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant Vikas Thakur was getting his house repaired on 29.04.2022. Vinod Verma (present petitioner) and Tarun Verma went to the informant’s courtyard at about 9-10 p.m. and started abusing the labourers. The informant intervened, and the accused threatened to kill him. The accused also gave beatings to the informant. They caught hold of Rati Ram Verma and tried to strangulate him. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. Vikas Thakur was medically examined. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the Court, they were charged with a commission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3 2026:HHC:29330 4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet and framing of the charges, the petitioner/accused Vinod Verma has filed the present petition, asserting that the FIR was registered for the commission of non-cognizable offences under Sections 323, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC. The police subsequently introduced Section 447 of the IPC to make the offences cognizable. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other. The incident occurred in the informant’s courtyard existing on Khasra No. 512, which is an Abadi Deh and jointly owned by the parties. Therefore, the provisions of Section 447 of the IPC would not apply. The informant had attacked the accused and his family members. The accused and his family members had also sustained injuries. Learned Trial Court had no material to frame the charges and erred in framing the charges against the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5. Mr N.K. Bhalla, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the police had initially registered the FIR for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. All these offences are non- cognizable. The police subsequently introduced Section 447 to 4 2026:HHC:29330 make the offences cognizable. The incident had occurred in the informant’s courtyard located over Abadi Deh, which is jointly owned. There cannot be any trespass on joint land. The statements of the witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, and the prosecution’s case is doubtful. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the prosecution. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this 5 2026:HHC:29330 Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently 6 2026:HHC:29330 improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 7 2026:HHC:29330 8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 9. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only 8 2026:HHC:29330 empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court had framed the charges against the petitioner on 30.05.2025. An order framing charges is revisable and the period of limitation for filing the revision has expired. The Petitioner has also sought the quashing of the charges, but when it was enquired how a petition for quashing the charges would be maintainable when an alternative remedy of revision has become barred by limitation, learned counsel for the petitioner opted not to press the relief for questioning the charges, which means that the order framing charges has attained finality. 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the 9 2026:HHC:29330 person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add, even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. This Court also held in Reena Devi vs State of H.P. (2019) 3 Sml.LC 1773 that a petition for quashing the F.I.R. cannot be filed after the charges have been framed or notice of accusation has been put. It was observed: “9. Before arriving at any conclusion to ascertain the appropriate remedy for an accused, against whom a notice 10 2026:HHC:29330 of accusation has been issued, or the charge has been framed, and who wants to challenge the same, the tour of the following stages will give the required exposure. Stage-1 The most prominent and the earliest provision, which ignites the engine of criminal law and brings it into motion, is the registration of FIR, under Section 154 of the CrPC. Needless to say, this provision confines itself to cognizable offences. After the investigation, if in the opinion of the Station House Officer, a case for the prosecution is made out, then he files a report under Section 173 of the CrPC. Any person arraigned as an accused in such an FIR can seek its quashing from the High Court having jurisdiction, by filing a petition under section 482 CrPC. Stage-2 Section 190 of the CrPC, envisages three situations, upon which the Magistrate can take cognizance of offence, namely, (a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes such offence; (b) Upon a Police Report of such facts; (c) Upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer or upon his own knowledge that such an offence has been committed. Exercising powers under Section 204 of CrPC, the Magistrate taking cognisance of offences, may proceed against an accused, if he believes in the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. Any person who has been arraigned as an accused and is aggrieved either by registration of FIR, filing of charge-sheet, taking cognisance, or issuance of the process can seek adjudication under Section 482 of the CrPC. Order taking cognisance can also be challenged by filing a revision petition in the Sessions Court or High Court. There will be a situation where, after the filing of the petition for quashing of FIR, in the meantime, the charge-sheet is filed; the law is no more res Integra that in all those cases, FIR and all consequential proceedings can be quashed. An accused cannot approach a Sessions Court till this 11 2026:HHC:29330 stage because the only available statutory remedy is by invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. Stage-3 The next stage in criminal proceedings is similar to the transformation of a caterpillar emerging as a butterfly, and it begins on the framing of charges under Sections 211 and 228 of the CrPC or on the issuance of notice of accusation under Section 251 of the CrPC. If not challenged, it shall culminate under section 229, 241 or 248 of the CrPC only by a judgment of acquittal or conviction. Once charges stand framed or the notice of accusation stands issued, as the case may be, then the appropriate remedy to challenge the same is only by filing a Criminal Revision Petition in the Court where it lies and not by filing a petition under section 482 CrPC. Stage 4: The next stage is post-conviction or acquittal. A judgment of conviction can only be challenged under Chapter-29 of the CrPC (Sections 372 to 394). During the pendency of such an appeal, the parties may file an application for compounding of the offences, but such applications in appeal would be within and not without. A convict cannot bypass Chapter 29 and, instead of filing a statutory appeal before the First Appellate Court, cannot straightaway resort to Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the CrPC. Stage-5 The next stage is challenging the dismissal of the appeals of the convicts, and that can be done by approaching the Courts under its Revisionary Jurisdiction, under sections 397-401 CrPC. During the pendency of such Revision Petitions, if parties compound the offences, then the process is similar to that in the appeals. 10. The other stages, if any, would also tread a similar path and cross similar obstacles. 11. The above survey leads to an irresistible conclusion that once charges have been framed, then the remedy is 12 2026:HHC:29330 not to file a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC but to invoke the revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 & 401 CrPC. However, in the present petition, what is sought to be quashed is the FIR and all consequential proceedings, based upon the out-of-court compromise entered between the victim and the accused, and the challenge is not on the merits of charges or accusations.” 14. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2025 SCC Online HP 6561, wherein it was observed: 13. Note submitted by the petitioner mentions that out of forty witnesses, seventeen witnesses have been examined. The charge-sheet was filed on 22.12.2023, and the supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 30.08.2024. There is nothing in the petition as to why the petitioner has approached this Court after the lapse of two years from the date of filing of the charge-sheet. The petition is also silent as to why the order of framing charge was not challenged by the petitioner and why the prosecution was permitted to examine the prosecution's witnesses. The jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that the Court should not entertain the belated petitions for quashing the FIR. It was observed: “43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the Complainant that the present set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as also for the failure of the petitioners to avail of their alternate efficacious remedy in the form of Revision Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. 44. It need not be emphasised that powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.s are discretionary in nature, and though there may not be a total ban on the exercise of such power where the situation so 13 2026:HHC:29330 warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of self-restraint that are recognised and followed by the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation. Similarly, the Courts have refused to entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where it is filed with unexplained delay and laches and in the meantime, the trial has proceeded.” 14. In the present case, the petitioner has a remedy of challenging the order framing charge, but he did not do so within the limitation. He filed the present petition to circumvent the period of limitation prescribed for challenging the order of framing the charges. 15. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the aggrieved person may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145: — “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than 14 2026:HHC:29330 those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In the present case, the trial has sufficiently progressed. Statements of seventeen witnesses have been recorded. Since the petitioner has approached this Court belatedly, this Court declines to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and relegates the petitioner to avail the remedies in the ongoing trial. It is not necessary to discuss the judgments cited at Bar and to comment whether the F.I.R. and subsequent proceedings disclose the commission of an offence or not. 15. Therefore, the charges cannot be quashed by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction. 16. It was submitted that the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC are non-cognizable, and the police introduced Section 447 of the IPC subsequently to make the offences cognizable. This submission cannot be accepted. The State of Himachal Pradesh has amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and made the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC cognizable and non-bailable. This 15 2026:HHC:29330 position was recognised by this Court in the State of H.P. Vs. Brij Lal and others 2011 HHC 10063, wherein it was observed: - 7. On behalf of the petitioners, it has been submitted that as per the notification dated 9.3.1978, Section 506 IPC is cognizable within the territory of Himachal Pradesh. The notification dated 9.3.1978 is as follows: - “No.Home (C) F (8)1/77 – In exercise of powers vested in him under Section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to declare offences under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code committed within the territory of Himachal Pradesh as cognizable.” The notification dated 6.9.1980 issued by the State of Himachal Pradesh is clear to the effect that Section 506 IPC within the territorial limits of the State of Himachal Pradesh shall be non-bailable. The notification dated 6.9.1980 is as follows: “No. Home-II (E)5-10/80. – In exercise of the powers vested in him, under sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 (Act No. 23 of 1932) and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to declare that when any offence which is punishable under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), is committed within the territorial limits of the State of Himachal Pradesh shall be non-bailable.” 17. Thus, the submission that the offences were non- cognizable cannot be accepted. 18. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the FIR and the charge sheet. The witnesses improved upon their versions, and their testimonies cannot be relied upon. This 16 2026:HHC:29330 submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R. based on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: - “17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. xxxx 19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned paragraphs, it can be seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High 17 2026:HHC:29330 Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial. 19. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed simply because of some contradictions. It is for the learned Trial Court to evaluate the evidence after the trial and not this Court while exercising the inherent jurisdiction. 20. It was submitted that the land is located in Abadi Deh, which is jointly owned by the parties, and a joint owner cannot commit a trespass onto the land of another joint owner. This submission will also not help the petitioner. The offence of trespass is committed against the possession and has nothing to do with the ownership. It was held more than 100 years ago in Emperor v. Gopalrao Venkatesh, 1908 SCC OnLine Bom 65: (1908) 7 Cri LJ 309 that a joint owner may be entitled to the possession of the joint land, but if he takes law into his hands, he is liable for trespass. It was observed on page 310: 18 2026:HHC:29330 2….It may be that accused No. 5 has an interest in the property as a joint owner and that he is entitled to possession. 3. And it may be contended on the authority of Leigh v. Jack ([(1879) 49 L.J.Q.B. 220.]), that he is entitled to have that possession restored to him in a Civil Court. Nevertheless, a person with a right is not justified in taking the law into his own hands, and if he does, he becomes liable for criminal trespass…. 21. Allahabad High Court also took the same view in Emperor v. Ram Prasad, 1911 SCC OnLine All 141: ILR (1911) 33 All 773 and observed at page 773: “…The argument before us has taken the line that Ram Prasad, the petitioner (and Bhagwan Das, his servant), being a joint owner in this grove, had not even, on the facts proved, committed any trespass on the land in question. We have heard all that the learned Counsel could urge on behalf of the petitioners. No precedent was cited to us in support of the contention that a person who enters upon land belonging to himself with the intention of doing a wrongful act to a joint owner does not commit trespass. We know of no authority that carries the case so far as this. It appears to us that a joint owner of land who enters upon the land with the intention or knowledge that he was about to do an act which was wrongful to his fellow- owners, does commit trespass….” 22. It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Anil Kumar vs State of Kerala Cr. Appeal no. 1129 of 2018 decided on 15.03.2024 that possession and not ownership is relevant under Section 441 of IPC, and the property entered into by the offender must be in possession of another. The informant has specifically 19 2026:HHC:29330 stated that the accused trespassed into the courtyard of his house, clearly showing that he was in exclusive possession of the house as he had constructed a structure over a portion of Abadi Deh. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the fact that the land is jointly owned by the parties. 23. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false and no such incident had taken place. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 24. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent 20 2026:HHC:29330 jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) 21 2026:HHC:29330 “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed 22 2026:HHC:29330 further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 26. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 27. It was held in C.S. Prasad v. C. Satyakumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 50 that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction cannot go into the genuineness of the allegations or the reliability, sufficiency or the acceptability of the evidence. It was observed: “24. On these lines, it is clear that even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are very wide, their conferment requires the High Courts to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any FIR, the High Court, exercising its power under this provision, cannot embark upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The High 23 2026:HHC:29330 Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not, and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.” 28. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 29. It is undisputed that the charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The Court has also framed the charges against the accused. Thus, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet….” 24 2026:HHC:29330 30. Therefore, the present petition cannot be allowed on this consideration as well. 31. No other point was urged. 32. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 33. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th July, 2026 (Chander)