1 2026:CGHC:3838 The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 18-11-2025 22-01-2026 - 22-01-2026 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Judgment reserved on : 18-11-2025 Judgment delivered on : 22-01-2026 CRA No. 163 of 2008 Kritnarayan Ram S/o Lughruramsarthi, aged about 49 years, occupation Dy. Director, Agriculture (Govt. Employee) R/o Ambikapur, Distt. Sarguja (CG) ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh, Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur, Through Special Police Branch, Lokayukt, Branch, Lokayukt, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar (CG) … Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rahul Jha, Advocate. For Respondent : Ms. Sunita Sahu, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey C A V Judgment Challenge in the present appeal is to the legality and validity of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.1.2008 passed by Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Kanker, Distt. North 2 Bastar Kanker in Special Case No.15/2006 whereby the appellant stands convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. RI for one year, pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for three months. Under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. RI for two years, pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for three months. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 02. Case of the prosecution in brief is that complainant, R.K. Patel, along with his brother Hemsagar Patel, appeared in person at the office of the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Bastar Range, Jagdalpur, and submitted a written complaint on 10.3.2003 to the effect that his brother, Hemsagar Patel, runs a shop for seeds and pesticides under the name of Krishi Seva Kendra and Sagar Enterprises at village Kapsi, police station Pakhanjur. His brother, Hemsagar Patel, had obtained a licence from the office of the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Kanker, to sell seeds and pesticides. On 17.1.2003 accused, Shri Ram, Deputy Director of Agriculture, inspected the shop of Hemsagar Patel, brother of the complainant, at village Kapsi, and seized the original licence certificate, a bill book, and a carbon copy of the bill book related to seeds and pesticides. The accused, Shri Ram, issued a "show cause notice" to the proprietor, Hemsagar Patel, vide letter no. 4074, dated January 22, 2003, and another notice vide letter no. 4088, dated January 23, 2003, citing serious irregularities under the seeds and pesticide business and seeking explanation for cancellation of the license. Hemsagar Patel submitted a reply to the notices on February 13, 2003, which 3 was received by the office of the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Kanker, on February 17, 2003. Further case of the prosecution is that when Hemsagar Patel contacted the accused Shri Ram regarding the case, he demanded a bribe of Rs.25,000 for settling the matter and asked him to send the complainant, R.K. Patel. The complainant R.K. Patel met the accused Shri Ram at his residence on February 19, 2003, and he demanded a bribe of Rs.25,000 for settling the matter. The complainant expressed his inability to pay the amount, and the accused agreed to accept the amount in installments of Rs.5,000. The complainant paid Rs.2,000 to the accused on that day and another Rs.5,000 on February 24, 2003. On March 3, 2003, the accused demanded the next installment of Rs.5,000, and the complainant agreed to pay it on March 10, 2003. However, on March 10, 2003 the complainant RK Patel contacted the Special Police Establishment, Jagdalpur and gave them Rs.5000/- for conducting trap proceedings against the accused Shri Ram. 03. After registration of offence under Section 7 of the Act of 1988, a trap team was constituted, and the complainant, R.K. Patel, along with his brother Hemsagar Patel, panch witness N.D. Tripathi, and other members of the trap team, went to the residence of the accused, K.N. Ram, in Kanker. The accused, Shri Ram, was watching TV in his bedroom and asked the complainant to sit on a chair. Meanwhile, the co-accused, Rakesh Kumar Garg, a lower-division clerk, also arrived at the bedroom to watch a cricket match on TV and was asked to sit on a chair by the accused. When complainant R.K. Patel informed the accused Shri Ram that he brought the bribe amount of Rs.5,000, the accused asked him to hand it over to Rakesh Kumar Garg. The complainant handed over the bribe amount to Rakesh 4 Kumar Garg, who accepted it and kept it in his hand. The complainant then came out of the residence and informed the trap team about the transaction. The trap team along with the panch witness, entered the bedroom and identified themselves. The accused Shri Ram's hands were washed with sodium carbonate solution, but there was no change in the color of the solution. However, when the co-accused, Rakesh Kumar Garg's hands were washed with the same solution, the color turned slightly pink. When questioned, Rakesh Kumar Garg admitted to accepting the bribe amount from the complainant at the instance of accused Shri Ram and stated that he had hidden it under an iron almirah. A memorandum was prepared, and the bribe amount was recovered from the hiding place. The serial numbers of the recovered currency notes matched with the numbers recorded in the preliminary panchnama, confirming that they were the same notes given to the complainant as a bribe. After completing necessary formalities, panchanama of the entire proceedings on the spot was prepared, statements of the accused were recorded and they were arrested on March 11, 2003. During investigation, statements of the panch witnesses, trap team members and other witnesses were recorded and after obtaining due sanction from the State Government for prosecution of the accused persons, charge sheet was filed against them before the Special Court at Jagdalpur. 04. The learned trial court framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988, which were abjured by them and they prayed for trial. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 09 witnesses. Statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case 5 and pleaded innocence. However, no witness was examined by them in defence. 05. Learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the parties, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment while acquitting co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg of all charges, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 06. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is bad in law for being contrary to the material available on record. Learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence of PW-2 RK Patel and PW-4 Hemsagar Patel and further failed to consider that they had malafide intention to falsely implicate the appellant in the present crime. Their evidence suffers from the vice of omission and contradiction rendering it not worth reliance at all. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate that as per second proviso to Section 17 of the Act of 1988, investigating officer could enter into investigation of alleged crime on written authorization of Superintendent of Police but the same is lacking in this case. The investigating officer PW-7 RS Dhruv failed to examine the authenticity of the complaint Ex.P/1 in proper perspective. He also failed to find out authenticity of Ex.P/1 which bears signature of PW-1 while the victim PW-4 was also present whose signature could be obtained on Ex.P/1. Learned counsel further submitted that as per para 33 of statement of PW-7, the shadow witnesses PW-3 ND Tripathi and Dr. Deo were instructed to be near the room of the accused to hear the conversation between the complainant and the accused regarding demand and acceptance but PW-3 failed to comply with the said instruction and Dr. Deo has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, basic ingredients 6 constituting the offence i.e. demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused, are missing in this case. 07. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there is no cogent and reliable evidence to prove demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused/appellant. There is no mens rea on the part of the accused/appellant as earlier on the complaint of one Manik Lal against PW-2 RK Patel for irregularities in duties, an enquiry was conducted which was later dropped by the appellant holding the complaint to be false. Had there being any criminal mens rea, he would have demanded bribe from PW-2 for dropping the said enquiry also. Thus, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the basic requirements for holding the appellant guilty under the aforesaid sections beyond all reasonable doubt and as such, he deserves to be acquitted of the charges by giving him benefit of doubt. Reliance is placed on the decisions in the matters of Dashrath Singh Chauhan Vs. CBI, AIR 2018 SC 4720; Reena Hazarika Vs. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289; Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 251 and judgment dated 19.9.2025 of this Court in CRA No.649/2003 in the matter of Ramratan Yadav Vs. State of Chhattisgarh. 08. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/State supporting the impugned judgment submits that the trial Court on proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record, has rightly convicted and sentence the accused/appellant by the impugned judgment and as such, the instant appeal being without substance is liable to be dismissed. 7 09. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and the material available on record. 10. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the accused/appellant along with co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg was charged under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988 and after appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court while acquitting co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg of all charges, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 11. It is not disputed before the learned trial Court that at the time of incident, the accused/appellant was posted as Dy. Director, Agriculture, Kanker and co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg was Assistant Grade-III in the said Agriculture Office, Kanker. 12. PW-2 PK Patel, complainant, states that on 17.1.2003 accused Kritnarayan Ram inspected the shop of his younger brother Hemsagar Patel at Kapsi and found some irregularities and shortcomings and sealed the shop. He also prepared panchanama and seized the licence and bill book and issued show cause notice dated 22.1.2003 and another notice on 23.1.2003. His brother prepared reply to both the notices on 13.2.2003 and gave it on 17.2.2003 to the accused KN Ram. On 17.2.2003 accused KN Ram demanded Rs.25,000/- from his brother for settling the matter and he informed about this to him. At that time, Ashok Chakravarti, who is manager of his firm/shop, was with his brother. The accused/appellant had asked his brother to send him (PW-2) for discussion, so he (PW-2) went to the house of the accused/appellant where he again demanded Rs.25,000/- for settling the 8 matter. He states that when he expressed his inability to pay this much amount, he offered for paying the amount in installments. Then he gave the accused/appellant Rs.2000/- and again on 24.2.2003 gave Rs.5000/-. When the accused again demanded Rs.5000/-, he assured that he would give this amount by 10th March. Then they decided to file a complaint against the accused. On 10.3.2003 they went to the office of Lokayukt, Jagdalpur and submitted their complaint. He states about the preliminary proceedings. In para 10 he states that on being demanded, while he was giving money to accused Ram, then the accused Ram asked co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg, who was already present there, to take this amount and keep in the almirah, and so he gave the amount to Rakesh Kumar Garg. Thereafter, he along with his brother came out and gave signal to the trap party. The trap party entered the house of the accused and they also followed them. When the hands of accused Ram were washed in the sodium carbonate solution, its color did not change but when the hands of co-accused Rakesh Garg were washed in another such solution, its color turned light pink. Both the solutions were separately sealed. On being asked about the money, co-accused Rakesh Garg disclosed that at the instance of accused Ram he kept the money in almirah. Thereafter, the money was recovered from the indicated place by panch witness DN Tripathi and it was found to be the same amount mentioned in the preliminary panchanama. He states that his written complaint is Ex.P/1, based on which FIR (Ex.P/23) was registered against accused Ram; the preliminary panchanama is Ex.P/24, the panchanama of entire proceedings prepared by Inspector RS Dhruv is Ex.P/21; panchanama prepared by the revenue inspector is Ex.P/3; spot map is Ex.P/25 and 9 inspection report of his brother’s shop is Ex.P/26. He admitted his signature on all these documents. 13. In cross-examination he admits that Hemsagar Patel is his younger brother and shop Sagar Enterprises, Kapsi is run in the name of his younger brother. He denied the suggestion that he run the shop in the name of his brother and one Maniklal made a complaint against him to the Chief Minister on 29.7.2002. He admitted the suggestion of defence that there is one Agriculture Service Center at Kapsi in the name of his wife Vrindavan Patel but expressed ignorance about the complaint made by Maniklal against him and the enquiry conducted by accused Ram. In para 24 he admits that he admitted his mistake in reply to notice of Ex.D/1. He also admits that he is working as Agriculture Extension Officer (Rural) and accused Ram gave him warning and stopped his one increment vide Ex.D/3. He states that as penalty (Ex.D/3) was imposed on him by accused Ram despite his tendering apology, it caused him trouble and since then he nourished ill-will against accused Ram. In para 26 he admits that accused Ram had issued him a show cause notice on 14.2.2003 for negligence in construction of a pool. 14. When the Court asked this witness as to why the present case is being prosecuted by him against accused Ram and not the main victim Hemsagar, he replied as under: उ्ቈर- क्ोሱकि हे मसा गर पटे ल दे नदे र बढ़ गई थी, जिसा  रण वहे हेतोउ्ቈसा किहेतो हे गोሱ थी जिसा  रण इसा शि! ोሱतो  म र ቛኋ र आर$भ किोሱ गोሱ । म'न अपन शि! ोሱतो प. । म' ऐसा ई उल्ल ख रन उशि,तो नहे- सामझा कि ,/$कि म र भ ई हे मसा गर पटे ल पर दे नदे र बढ़ गई थी, जिसासा वहे हेतोउ्ቈसा किहेतो हे गोሱ थी , जिसा  रण म0झा शि! ोሱतो रन प़ቡ । In para 29 he volunteers that on account of sealing the shop, the liability increased. 10 15. PW-4 Hemsagar Patel states that his shop of seeds and pesticides is situated at Kapsi and its manager is Ashok Chakravarti. He states that accused KN Ram conducted inspection of his shop and sealed it on the ground of there being some irregularities and issued him show cause notices of Ex.P/27 & P/28. He states that accused Ram demanded Rs.25,000/- for settling the matter. His elder brother RK Patel talked to the accused Ram on 19.2.2003 and the accused again raised a demand of Rs.25,000/-. On the same day, his elder brother gave Rs.2000/- to accused Ram and Rs.5000/- on 24.2.2003 to accused Ram. He states that on 10.3.2003 he along with his elder brother RK Patel went to Lokayukt Office, Jagdalpur and made a complaint against accused Ram vide Ex.P/1. He made similar statement as has been made by PW-2 RK Patel and stated that his brother RK Patel gave the bribe amount of Rs.5000/- to the accused Ram but he asked him to give it to co-accused Rakesh Garg and then Rakesh Garg took the amount and kept the same in almirah. 16. Panch witness ND Tripathi (PW-1) stated about preliminary proceedings and admitted his signature on all the documents concerning preliminary proceedings. He states that he went with the complainant and trap party and after receiving signal from the complainant, entered the house of accused Ram, washed his hands in the sodium carbonate solution but its colour did not change, however, when hands of co-accused Rakesh Garg were washed in the solution, its color turned light pink. He admits the suggestion of defence that on being enquired about bribe amount, accused Ram replied that he did not receive any amount and expressed ignorance about the same. He states that thereafter when enquired from co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg who was watching TV, he told that he accepted money 11 at the instance of accused Ram, kept in the almirah and hence got implicated in this case and started crying. 17. PW-7 RS Dhruv, investigating officer, states about the entire proceedings and that tainted money was recovered from co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg who disclosed that he took the amount at the behest of accused KN Ram and kept in the almirah. The other members of trap party namely PW-3 Ghanshyam Sahu (Constable) and PW-9 Ramlal Gangesh (Head Constable) state that money was recovered from co-accused Rakesh Garg. The investigating officer prepared memorandum of co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg vide Ex.P/4 in which he disclosed that he accepted the bribe amount from RK Patel at the instance of KN Ram and seeing the trap party, threw the said bribe amount under the small almirah. This memorandum was prepared on 10.3.2003 at 21:35 hours and there is overwriting, and seizure memo Ex.P/7 whereby the bribe amount was seized, was prepared on 10.3.2003 at 22:00 hours. In cross-examination of PW-7 RS Dhruv, it was asked by the defence when he had come to know from complainant RK Patel and his brother that bribe amount has not been given to Ram but to Garg, then how and why he recorded memorandum of co-accused Garg. To this, PW-7 replied that when they entered the room where incident took place, at that time the bribe amount was not in the hands of co-accused Garg, therefore, it was necessary to record his memorandum. 18. Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that in this case there is no witness of demand of bribe by the accused/appellant. The complainant states that his firm manager Ashok Chakravarty is a witness of demand but the prosecution did not examine him before learned trial court for the reasons best known to it. It is also clear that recovery of tainted amount was made 12 from co-accused Rakesh Kumar Garg and no recovery was effected from the appellant. On the same set of evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted co- accused Rakesh Kumar Garg but convicted the appellant. The complainant admitted that the appellant is his senior officer, who gave him notice and imposed penalty on him, hence he had grudge and ill-will against him. The accused/appellant in his defence statement under Section 313 of CrPC stated that eSa funksZ’k gwa] izdj.k ds izkFkhZ iVsy }kjk esjs fo#} fo}s’k j[krs >wBh dk;Zokgh dh xbZ gSA eSus fu;ekuqlkj mlds QeZ dh tkap fd;k Fkk] tkap ds nkSjku vfu;ferrk ds laca/k esa esjs }kjk dk;Zokgh dh xbZ FkhA ftlls og esjs ls fo}s’k j[krk FkkA 19. In the matter of Dashrath Singh Chauhan (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paras 29, 30 & 32 as under: “29. It is for the reason that in order to prove a case against the appellant, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the twin requirement of "demand and the acceptance of the bribe amount by the appellant". As mentioned above, it was the case of the prosecution in the charge that the appellant did not accept the bribe money but the money was accepted and recovered from the possession of Rajinder Kumar-coaccused (A-1). 30. In such circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that the appellant directly accepted the money from the Complainant. Since the plea of conspiracy against the appellant and Rajinder Kumar failed, it cannot be held that money (Rs.4000/-) recovered from the possession of Rajinder Kumar was as a fact the bribe money meant for the appellant for holding him guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. It is more so when the benefit of such acquittal from the charge of conspiracy was given to Rajinder Kumar but was not given to the appellant. 13 32. Since in order to attract the rigors of Sections 7, 13(2) read 13(1)(d) of PC Act, the prosecution was under a legal obligation to prove the twin requirements of "demand and acceptance of bribe money by the accused", the proving of one alone but not the other was not sufficient. The appellant is, therefore, entitled for acquittal from the charges framed against him under the PC Act too. (See para 8 of M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala, (1996) 11 SCC 720): (AIR 1995 SC 2178). 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Reena Hazarika (supra) held in paras 19, 20 & 21 of its judgment as under: “19. Section 313 CrPC cannot be seen simply as a part of audi alteram partem. It confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, even if it is not to be considered as a piece of substantive evidence, not being on oath under Section 313(2) CrPC. The importance of this right has been considered time and again by this Court, but it yet remains to be applied in practice as we shall see presently in the discussion to follow. If the accused takes a defence after the prosecution evidence is closed, under Section 313(1)(b) CrPC the Court is duty-bound under Section 313(4) CrPC to consider the same. The mere use of the word "may" cannot be held to confer a discretionary power on the court to consider or not to consider such defence, since it constitutes a valuable right of an accused for access to justice, and the likelihood of the prejudice that may be caused thereby. Whether the defence is acceptable or not and whether it is compatible or incompatible with the evidence available, is an entirely different matter. If there has been no consideration at all of the defence taken under Section 313 CrPC, in the given facts of a case, the conviction may well stand vitiated. To our mind, a solemn duty is cast on the court in dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of the accused taken under Section 313 CrPC and to either accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing. 14 20. Unfortunately neither the trial court nor the High Court considered it necessary to take notice of, much less discuss or observe with regard to the aforesaid defence by the appellant under Section 313 CrPC to either accept or reject it. The defence taken cannot be said to be irrelevant, illogical or fanciful in the entirety of the facts and the nature of other evidence available as discussed hereinbefore. The complete non-consideration thereof has clearly caused prejudice to the appellant. Unlike the prosecution, the accused is not required to establish the defence beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused has only to raise doubts on a preponderance of probability as observed in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1953 SC 468 observing as follows: (AIR p. 471, para 26) "26. We have examined the evidence at length in this case, not because it is our desire to depart from our usual practice of declining to re-assess the evidence in an appeal here, but because there has been in this case a departure from the rule that when an accused person puts forward a reasonable defence which is likely to be true.... then the burden on the other side becomes all the heavier because a reasonable and probable story likely to be true when pitted against a weak and vacillating case is bound to raise reasonable doubts of which the accused must get the benefit.…" 21. A similar view is expressed in M. Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103 as follows: (SCC p. 108, para 10) "10.... On the other hand, the explanation given by the appellant both during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and in his own statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC is quite plausible. Where an accused sets up a defence or offers an explanation, it is well settled that he is not required to prove his defence beyond a reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of probabilities….” 21. In the matter of Neeraj Dutta (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paras 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 & 21 of its judgment as under: 15 “15. In para 9 of the decision in B. Jayaraj, (2014) 13 SCC 55, this Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In para 9, this Court held thus: (SCC p. 59) "9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent." (emphasis supplied)) 16. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are "demand" and "acceptance" of gratification. The presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are proved, the court will have to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the presumption. 17. In N. Vijayakumar (2021) 3 SCC 687, another Bench of three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. In para 26. the Bench held thus: (SCC p. 699) "26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the 16 accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court." (emphasis supplied) Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 18. Section 7, as existed prior to 26-7-2018, was different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to "any gratification". The substituted Section 7 does not use the word "gratification", but it uses a wider term "undue advantage", When the allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. 20. In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench {Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731: (2023) 2 SCC (Cn) 352}, in a given case, the demand and acceptance, of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct, oral or documentary evidence. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of 17 culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. 21. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct, oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand.” 22. Upon a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, and in the light of the settled legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the foundational facts necessary to sustain the conviction of the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the present case, there is no independent or reliable evidence of demand by the appellant at the time of the alleged trap. The alleged demand is sought to 18 be proved solely through the testimonies of PW-2 (complainant RK Patel) and PW-4 (his brother Hemsagar Patel), both of whom are interested witnesses and admittedly bore prior animosity and grievance against the appellant due to departmental proceedings, penalty and adverse official action taken by him. The prosecution itself admits that Ashok Chakravarti, the alleged independent witness to the initial demand, was available but deliberately not examined, attracting an adverse inference against the prosecution. Thus, the evidence of demand is neither independent nor free from doubt and fails to meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the point of acceptance of bribe amount, it is an admitted position that no tainted money was recovered from the appellant; phenolphthalein test on the hands of the appellant was negative and the tainted amount was recovered from co- accused Rakesh Kumar Garg, who was acquitted by the trial Court on the very same evidence. Once the co-accused, from whose possession the money was recovered, stands acquitted, and the alleged conspiracy between him and the appellant is not proved, the appellant cannot be convicted indirectly on the basis of the same recovery. The explanation offered by the appellant under Section 313 CrPC that the case is a result of vendetta due to official action taken by him, has not been considered or dislodged by cogent reasons by learned trial court. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the charges leveled against the accused/appellant either through direct or circumstantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges by extending him benefit of doubt. 23. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment convicting the accused/appellant under Sections 7 and 19 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of all these charges by giving him benefit of doubt. He is reported to be on bail, therefore, his bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six months from today in view of provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023. Let the original record with copy of this judgment be forwarded to the learned trial Court immediately for necessary information and compliance. A copy of this judgment be also sent to the concerned jail authority where the appellant was undergoing the sentence. Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) Judge Khan MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Digitally signed by MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Date: 2026.01.22 15:14:51 +0530