2026:HHC:29066 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 461 of 2026 Reserved on: 24.06.2026 Date of Decision: 16.07.2026. Deepak, through his father Rajender Singh ...Petitioner Versus Bishan Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner : Mr Praveen Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent : Nemo Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting aside the issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest against Deepak- Respondent no. 3 in a private complaint pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court No. 1, Paonta Sahib District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court). 2. It has been asserted that the respondent had filed a private complaint before the learned Trial Court against the petitioner and other persons for the commission of offences 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29066 punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 447, 451, 506 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). Learned Trial Court issued the summons to the parties on 12.03.2025, 17.06.2025 and 25.10.2025. Respondent no. 3 is working on a ship. The summons was issued on the permanent home address, but the respondent number 3 was not aware of the pendency of the proceeding. The learned Trial Court issued a non-bailable warrant of arrest for securing the presence of respondent no.3. The learned Trial Court had never issued any summons to respondent no. 3, and the non- bailable warrant of arrest should not be issued unless the Court is satisfied that the person was deliberately avoiding the service of the summons. It was specifically mentioned in the report to the summons that the respondent no. 3 was not present at home and was working abroad. The Court had issued the non-bailable warrants of arrest despite such a report. The respondent no. 3 was working on a naval ship with effect from 01.03.2025 till 28.12.2025, which period was extended till February 2026. Respondent no. 3 is in a naval ship with effect from 01.05.2026 till 31.06.2027. The complainant had not provided the correct workplace address. Therefore, it was prayed that the present 3 2026:HHC:29066 petition be allowed and the non-bailable warrants of arrest be recalled unexecuted. 3. Mr Praveen Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in issuing the non-bailable warrants of arrest without serving summons upon the respondent no. 3. The non-bailable warrants of arrest cannot be issued unless the summons is served upon a person. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: ➢ Inder Mohan Goswami & another vs State of Uttranchal & others AIR2008 Supreme Court 251; ➢ Mangal Dass Gautam & another vs. State of Haryana and another CRM No. 6890 of 2013 decided on 29.09.2019; ➢ Vikas vs State of Rajasthan (2014) 3 SCC 321; and ➢ Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin vs State of Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 791. 4. I have given a considerate thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 4 2026:HHC:29066 5. The present petition has not been filed by the respondent no. 3, himself, but by his father, Rajinder Singh. It is undisputed that respondent no.3 is a major person capable of suing and being sued. The petition is silent regarding any disability suffered by respondent No. 3, Deepak. Therefore, respondent no.3 Deepak was to file the petition in his own name, and the petition filed by him through his father is not maintainable. 6. It was submitted that the father has an interest in protecting the liberty of his son. Therefore, the petition is fully maintainable. This submission cannot be accepted. It was held in Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 653, that ordinarily an aggrieved party who is affected by an order has a right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order unless such party is a minor and insane person or suffering from any other disability. It was observed: - “7. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf. If a guardian or a next friend initiates proceedings for and on behalf of such a disabled aggrieved 5 2026:HHC:29066 party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party aggrieved and not by a total stranger who has no direct personal stake in the outcome thereof….” 7. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, (1970) 2 SCC 484 that a person aggrieved is a person who has suffered some detriment, pecuniary or otherwise, to cause him some prejudice. It was observed at page 503: “9. Generally speaking, a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. A person who is not a party to litigation has no right to appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him. But it has been held in a number of cases that a person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court, and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We find ourselves unable to take the view that, because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions, he should, without more, have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions. An appeal is a creature of statute, and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to appeal, the matter rests there. 10. Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to “a person aggrieved” by an order made, and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person preferring an appeal falls within that expression. As was observed in Robinson v. Curey [7 QBD 465], the words “person aggrieved” are “ordinary English words which 6 2026:HHC:29066 are to have the ordinary meaning put upon them. According to Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 25), p. 293, footnote “h”: “The expression is nowhere defined and must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances”. Attempts have, however, from time to time been made to define the expression in various cases. In Ex parte Sidebotham In re Sidebotham [14 Ch D 458 at 465] it was observed by James, L.J.: “But the words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 11. The above definition of James, L.J., was described by Esher, M.R., in Ex parte Official Receiver In re Reed, Bowen & Co. [19 QBD 174 at 178] as not “an exhaustive definition”. His Lordship added: “It is an affirmative definition of a person who may appeal, and at all events, it includes a person who has asked for a decision for which he had a right to ask, and has been wrongfully refused.” 12. Queen v. Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London [25 QBD 357, 361] was a case of an appeal by an informant against the judgment of a justice of the peace upon the hearing of an information or complaint by the vestry of the parish against a person for unlawfully and wilfully obstructing the free passage of a certain highway. The relevant section provided: “If any person shall think himself aggrieved by ... any order, conviction, judgment, or determination made, or by any matter or thing done by any justice or other 7 2026:HHC:29066 person in pursuance of this Act ... such person may appeal to quarter sessions.” In holding that an informant had no right of appeal, Lord Coleridge, C.J., said: “Is a person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another a person aggrieved? He may be annoyed at finding that what he thought was a breach of law is not a breach of law, but is he ‘aggrieved’ because someone is held not to have done wrong? It is difficult to see that the section meant anything of that kind.” In Rex v. London Quarter Sessions Ex parte Westminister Corporation [1951 (2) KB 508] a borough council whose cancellation of the registration of a street trader had been reversed by a Magistrate on appeal by the trader concerned under Section 25 of the London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1947, was held not to be a person aggrieved by an order of a Court of summary jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 64 of the Act. The argument advanced on behalf of the corporation was that it had a public administrative duty to perform in the regulation of the streets, and having been interfered with in the execution of that duty by the decision of the Magistrate, they were persons aggrieved by his order. One of the grounds for refusal of the application by Lord Goddard, C.J., was that the order made did not directly affect the borough council in such a way as to make them “a person aggrieved” within the meaning of the section. According to the learned Chief Justice, what the statute did was “to substitute the opinion of the Magistrate for the opinion of a borough council”. It was said that the Court of summary jurisdiction had to take into account the same matters as the borough council had to take into account, and if the court thinks that the cancellation of the licence is not justified, it can restore the licence to the street trader. If the Court of summary jurisdiction refuses to grant a licence, then the street trader is a person aggrieved, 8 2026:HHC:29066 because his livelihood is affected, or an order is made directly affecting him. 13. The case of Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam [1929 (2) KB 440 at 444] was relied upon by counsel appearing for the Advocate-General of Maharashtra to support his argument that even a person who had no proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the litigation might be a person aggrieved so as to give him a right to appeal. The statute in this case was, however, worded very differently from the statutes which came up for consideration in the cases noted earlier. Section 68(1) of the Public Health Act, 1925, laid down that: “Where, for the purpose of relieving or preventing congestion of traffic, it appears to the local authority to be necessary to provide within their district suitable parking places for vehicles.” Then that authority may, subject to certain conditions, provide those parking places and might acquire land suitable for use as a parking place. The proviso to the section however laid down that no such order shall authorise the use of any part of a street so as unreasonably to prevent access to any premises adjoining the street, or the use of the street by any person entitled to the use thereof, or so as to be a nuisance, or be made in respect of any part of a street without the consent of the authority or person responsible for the maintenance of the street. Sub- section (2) of the section provided that where a local authority proposes to acquire land for the purpose of using it as a parking place, they are to give notice of the proposal specifying the land and notify the date within which any objection is to be sent to them, and the notice is to state that a right of appeal was conferred by the section. Sub- section (3) provided that before carrying into effect any proposal of which notice was required to be given, the local authority shall consider any objection which was sent to them in writing. There was no limit there as to the kind of person making the objection or the kind of objection 9 2026:HHC:29066 that might be raised. The respondent, a ratepayer, duly gave notice under sub-section (3) on various grounds, but he did not allege the infringement of any personal legal right, and he objected in his capacity as a ratepayer and as a member of the public on grounds common to them all. The urban council considered the objection and informed him of their decision to proceed with the scheme. The respondent appealed to the petty sessions, which allowed his objection. The appellant appealed to quarter sessions and took the preliminary objection that the respondent was not a person aggrieved because he had alleged no infringement of any legal right personal to him. 14. Referring to the dicta of James, L.J., Esher, M.R. and Lopes, L.J., in the above cases, Lord Hewart, C.J., observed: “I think this respondent did ask for a decision for which he had a right to ask. He did give notice of an objection of which he was entitled to give notice, ... but the person making the objection is not to have an appeal unless he satisfies two conditions: (1) that he is the author of the objection, and (2) that he is aggrieved by the refusal in the sense that he has a special and individual right infringed. It seems to me that upon the fair construction of this sub-section, which is by no means a common kind of statutory provision, what is meant is that a person may make an objection and is entitled to a decision upon it, and if the decision is adverse to him, he may, if he thinks fit and subject to the usual consequences, appeal from it to a petty sessional court, and so appealing, may, in consequence of other statutory provisions, appeal, if need be, to the Court of quarter sessions. According to Avory, J.: “There is no limit there [in sub-section (3)] of the kind of person or the kind of objection which may be made. It proceeds that after so considering the objection, they are to give notice of their decision to the person by whom the objection was made, and any person who is 10 2026:HHC:29066 aggrieved by such decision may appeal. I cannot help thinking that on the plain words of that statute, it was intended to give a right of appeal to any person who has made an objection to the proposal and has received notices that that objection has been overruled.” 15. In Ealing Corporation v. Jones [1959 (1) QB 384 at 390] Lord Parker, C.J., remarked that it was easier to say what would not constitute a person aggrieved than it was to say what “person aggrieved” included. He observed that a person was not aggrieved when, being a public body, it had been frustrated in the performance of one of its public duties. He amplified this by saying that: “If costs have been awarded in a case against a local authority, it is clear that the local authority would be an aggrieved person. Equally, if the result of the decision has been to put some legal burden on the public body concerned, that has been held to make it a person aggrieved.” According to Donovan, J., in the same case: “The word ‘aggrieved’ connotes some legal grievance, for example, a deprivation of something, an adverse effect on the title to something, and so on, and I cannot see that this is so here. The local planning authority has simply been told that it cannot enforce the discontinuance of the present use of this land by the appellant by means of an enforcement notice under Section 23.” 8. It was held in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702, that only an affected person can approach the Court. It was observed at page 711: 28. Where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the 11 2026:HHC:29066 words “a person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one “a person aggrieved”. Again, a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes that provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes that do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. 9. A similar view was taken in Shobha Suresh Jumani v. Appellate Tribunal, Forfeited Property, (2001) 5 SCC 755: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1334: (2001) 249 ITR 405: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 750, wherein it was observed at page 758: “5. First, we would reiterate that the words “any aggrieved person” are found in several statutes. However, the meaning of the expression “aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances. In Sidebotham, Re, ex p Sidebotham [(1880) 14 Ch D 458 : (1874-80) All ER Rep 588 (CA)] (Ch D at p. 465), it was observed by James, L.J.: “But the words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 12 2026:HHC:29066 6. The said passage was referred to and relied upon by this Court in Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy [(1980) 4 SCC 62] and Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. [(1997) 4 SCC 452] 10. Orissa High Court held in Sulochana Devi vs. District Magistrate (13.11.1992 - ORIHC): MANU/OR/0156/1992 that only a person whose legal right is invaded can approach the Court under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed: 9….Who has locus standi to do so? The concept of locus standi has undergone a sea change. It is needless to emphasise that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation, whether in private or public action, in relation to any specific remedy sought, has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold. The traditional syntax of law in regard to locus standi for a specific judicial redress, sought by an individual person, or determinate class or identifiable group of persons, is available only to that person or class or group of persons who has or have suffered a legal injury by reasons of violation of his or their legal right or a right legally protected, the invasion of which gives rise to actionability within the categories of law. In a private action, the litigation is bipolar; two opposed parties are involved in a confrontational controversy that pertains to the determination of the legal consequences of past events, unlike in a public action. The character of such litigation is essentially that of vindicating private rights, proceedings being brought by the persons in whom the right personally inheres or their legally constituted representatives who are thus obviously most competent to commence the litigation. In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed as a broad rule is evolved 13 2026:HHC:29066 which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of Public Interest Litigation (in short, 'PIL')is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration, but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict. This has been expressed by the apex Court in several cases, including the Janata Dal's case (supra). 10. Even if there are a million questions of law to be deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case registered against the specified accused person(s), it is for him/them to raise all such questions and challenge the proceeding initiated at an appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties either individually or under the garb of Public Interest Litigation. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which law recognises as sufficient to permit another person e.g. next friend, to move the Court in his behalf Similar view was expressed in the Janta Dal's case(supra), and Simarjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and Anr. : 1992 II SLR 231 11. It has not been proved as to how any legal right or right legally protected has been invaded so as to give a cause of action for the petitioner to move this Court for interference. It is not disputed that the property in respect of which action has been taken belongs to Om Prakash. It is the assertion of the petitioner that, being his wife, she 14 2026:HHC:29066 has an interest in the property. That even if correct per se does not clothe the petitioner with locus standi to seek exercise of power under Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 11. In the present case, respondent No.3, Deepak, has not appeared before this Court, and the present petition cannot be held to be maintainable at the instance of his father. 12. A heavy reliance was placed upon the photocopy of an authority letter written by the respondent. 3 in favour of his father authorising him to engage an Advocate to proceed with CrMMO No.461 of 2026 and proceed with the matter. This is not even a regular power of attorney and has no value in the eyes of the law to confer any authority upon the father of the respondent. 3 to institute the proceedings before the Court. 13. The present petition has been filed on the premise that the respondent No. 3 was not aware of the pendency of the proceedings. It is not explained in the petition that if the respondent no. 3 was not aware of the proceedings, as to how he could have filed the presnet petition through his father. The filing of the petition clearly shows that respondent no.3 knew of the proceeding, yet he is not appearing before the Court. Therefore, the learned Trial Court cannot be faulted for issuing the non-bailable warrants of arrest. 15 2026:HHC:29066 14. Para-7 (iv) of the petition mentions that respondent no.3 was working in a naval ship with effect from 01.03.2025 till February 2026 and again with effect from 01.05.2026 till 31.01.2027. Thus, as per the averments made in the petition, respondent no. 3 was not serving on the naval ship between February 2026 and April, 2026. He could have very well appeared before the learned Trial Court and sought bail and exemption during this period. However, he failed to do so, and the petition cannot be said to be bona fide. 15. The photocopies of the summons and the bailable warrants show that the sister of the respondent. 3 had made the report on the back of the summons and bailable warrants that respondent no. 3 was serving in the merchant navy and was abroad. He would be informed of the pendency of the proceeding on his return. Thus, the sister of respondent no.3 had undertaken to inform him after his return. It is undisputed that respondent no.3 was not serving in the merchant navy between February 2026 and April, 2026. Thus, he would have gained the knowledge of the proceedings. This fact is also evident from the fact that he has filed the petition through his father. 16 2026:HHC:29066 16. The judgment cited on behalf of the petitioner deal with the issuance of the non-bailable warrants of arrest, which is fairly well settled and does not require any repetition. However, in the present case, the respondent no. 3 is aware of the proceedings and is keeping out of the process of the Court. Therefore, the cited judgments do not apply to the facts of the present case. 17. No other point was urged. 18. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th , July, 2026. (ravinder)