2026:HHC:29069 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 558 of 2026 Reserved on: 23.06.2026 Date of Decision: 16.07.2026 XYZ ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Chetan, Advocate, vice Mr Arun Sehgal, Advocate. For Respondents/State : : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional for respondent No.1. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 104 of 2025, dated 13.11.2025, registered in Police Station Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64 and 89 of Bharatiya 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29069 Nyaya Sanhita (BNS),2023 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. 2. Briefly stated that the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police had received a complaint regarding the marriage of the minor victim to the petitioner. It was asserted that the victim had stayed in the petitioner's house for about one month, after which she ran away. The victim's mother had taken the money from the petitioner's family. Hence, a request was made to take action against the petitioner. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim’s birth certificate was obtained from the school, and her date of birth was found to be 09.01.2009. She was a minor on the date of the incident. The police took the victim to the hospital, but she refused to undergo her medical examination. Subsequently, the victim stated that her marriage was arranged with the petitioner. However, the victim did not like the petitioner, and she refused to marry him. The minor was taken to a temple for engagement, where some ceremonies were held, and the minor was brought to the petitioner's home. She was told that she was married to the petitioner. The minor remained with the petitioner with effect from 01.10.2025, till 28.10.2025. She became pregnant, and when 3 2026:HHC:29069 she informed the petitioner about this fact, the petitioner administered some drugs to her. The minor left the petitioner's home on 28.10.2025. These allegations revealed the commission of offences punishable under Section 64 of BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The police filed the charge sheet after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the FIR contains exaggerations and false statements. The allegations are vague and lack specific particulars. No cognisable offence is made out from the contents of the FIR. The petitioner's name was not mentioned in the FIR, and his name was introduced after the police had registered the FIR. The victim's mother had executed an affidavit stating that the victim’s date of birth is 11.11.2006, and it was recorded incorrectly in the school record. There were contradictions in the statements of the victim, which made her testimony doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and the consequential proceeding arising out of F. I. R be quashed. 4 2026:HHC:29069 4. I have heard Mr Chetan, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State. 5. Mr Chetan, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognisable offence. The victim's mother has executed an affidavit stating that the victim was a major on the date of the incident and no offence under POCSO Act had been made out against the petitioner. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would be a futile exercise; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed. He relied upon the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta in Panchananda Jana vs The State of West Bengal and Anr 2025: CHC-AS:1589 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the material collected by the police during the investigation shows that the petitioner had raped the victim. Her date of birth was found to be 09.01.2009 as per the certificate issued by the school. Therefore, 5 2026:HHC:29069 she was a minor and incapable of giving any consent. The victim has made serious allegations against her mother, and the affidavit executed by her mother should not be accepted. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible 6 2026:HHC:29069 guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code 7 2026:HHC:29069 or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of 8 2026:HHC:29069 this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The Social Justice for the International Civil Rights Council made a complaint about the marriage of a minor girl to the petitioner, on the payment of money to the victim’s mother. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The F.I.R. specifically mentioned that the victim was married to the petitioner. The victim also confirmed in her statement that she was brought to the petitioner’s house after some ceremonies in the temple and was told that she was the petitioner’s wife. The petitioner maintained a sexual relationship with the victim, and 9 2026:HHC:29069 she became pregnant; therefore, prima facie, the contents of the F.I.R. and the victim’s statement make out a case for the commission of offences punishable under Section 64 of BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 12. A heavy reliance was placed upon the affidavit executed by the victim’s mother to submit that the victim was not a minor. This submission will not help the petitioner. The police collected the victim’s school certificate showing her date of birth as 09.01.2009. This Court held in V vs State of H.P. 2024:HHC 13464 that the certificate issued by the school will prevail over other documents showing the victim’s date of birth as per Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (J.J. Act). Therefore, the certificate issued by the school is to be preferred to any other document, and the submission that the victim is not proved to be minor cannot be accepted. 13. The police found after the investigation that no marriage had taken place between the petitioner and the victim. The petitioner had maintained a physical relationship with the victim, and he cannot take shelter behind the marriage. 10 2026:HHC:29069 14. It was submitted that the victim's testimony was contradictory and the FIR should be quashed because of the contradictions. The submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R. based on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: - “17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. xxxx 19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned paragraphs, it can be seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the 11 2026:HHC:29069 complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial. 15. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed because of some contradictions in the victim’s statements. These contradictions are to be considered at the time of the conclusion of the trial and not at this stage. 16. The Calcutta High Court in Panchananda Jana (supra) had quashed the FIR because of the contradiction in the statement of the victim and her mother, other witnesses and the FIR. It is difficult to follow the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in view of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 17. The Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R cannot be expected to conduct a mini-trial to determine the falsehood or the truthfulness of the contents of the complaint. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising 12 2026:HHC:29069 the inherent jurisdiction has to treat the allegations in the FIR as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 13 2026:HHC:29069 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: 14 2026:HHC:29069 “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 20. It is undisputed that the charge-sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We 15 2026:HHC:29069 say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. Pending application (s), if any, also stand disposed of. 22. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th, July, 2026. (ravinder)