2026:HHC:29055 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 173 of 2014 Reserved on: 06.07.2026 Date of Decision: 16.7.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Bimla Devi ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 yes For the Appellant : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the respondent : Mr Paras Ram, Advocate, vice Mr B.R. Kashyap, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 15.03.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge- II, Shimla, District Shimla (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 01.02.2012 and order of probation dated 07.05.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chopal, District Shimla, H.P. (learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29055 Trial Court) were set aside and the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 341, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Beena Devi (PW2), was going to collect the fuel wood on 05.08.2007. The accused Bimla Devi met her on the way. The accused picked up a quarrel with the informant and inflicted a blow by means of a Darat on the informant. The informant shouted for help. Balbir Singh (PW-6) reached the spot and rescued the informant from the accused. The informant reported the matter to the police. An F.I.R. (Ext.PW-10/L) was registered in the Police Station. HC Mohan Singh (PW-10) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-10/A). He found one Darat on the spot, prepared its sketch (Ext.PW-10/B), put it in a cloth parcel and 3 2026:HHC:29055 sealed the parcel with seal ‘T’. Seal impression (Ext.PW-10/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and Darat was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A). The informant produced one shirt and one undershirt, which were stained with blood. These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with a seal ‘T. Seal impression (Ext.PW-10/D) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the parcel was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Dr S.L. Chauhan (PW-11) examined the informant and found that she had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused by means of a sharp and blunt-edged weapon. He issued the MLC (Ext. PW11/A). The case property was sent to the SFSL, and a report (Ext.PW-7/C) was issued mentioning that human blood was found on the shirt, undershirt, and Darat, but blood grouping results were found inconclusive. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, she was charged with a commission of offences punishable under 4 2026:HHC:29055 Sections 324, 341, 323 and 506 of the IPC, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Mangat Ram (PW-1) did not support the prosecution's case. Beena Devi (PW-2) is the informant. Kamla Devi (PW-3) was told about the incident. Reena Devi (PW4) heard the cries and went to the spot. Sumitra Devi (PW-5) and Balbir Singh (PW-6) did not support the prosecution's case. HC Pritam Singh (PW-7) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Mangat Ram (PW-8) was told about the incident. Constable Bansi Lal (PW-9) carried the case property to FSL. HC Mohan Singh (PW-10) investigated the matter. Dr S.L. Chauhan (PW-11) medically examined the informant. 5. The accused, in her statement, recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedures (CrPC), stated that a false case was registered against her due to enmity. The witnesses also deposed falsely against her at the informant’s instance. Statement of Dev Dutt Sharma (DW-1) was recoded in defence. 5 2026:HHC:29055 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was fully corroborated by the medical evidence. The defence taken by the accused that she was falsely implicated was not believable. Minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 341 and 506 of the IPC. The report of the Probation Officer was called, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was granted to the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the granting of the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, the State filed an appeal, which was decided by Learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other. The relationship between the parties was strained. There was an inconsistency between ocular and medical evidence. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the respondent/accused was acquitted of the commission of the charged offences. 6 2026:HHC:29055 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The state was aggrieved by the grant of probation to the accused. The accused had not filed any appeal, and it was not permissible for the learned Appellate Court to set aside the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for the respondent appellant/State and Mr Paras Ram, learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. 10. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the State was aggrieved by the grant of probation to the respondent/accused. The respondent had not preferred any appeal. Learned Appellate Court was required to find out whether the learned Trial Court had rightly granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the respondent/accused or not. It had no jurisdiction to set 7 2026:HHC:29055 aside the order of conviction. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prithvi Raj and others vs. Kamlesh Kumar and another (2004) 8 SCC 303 in support of his submission. 11. Mr Paras Ram, learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/accused, submitted that the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to set aside the sentence and the conviction as per Section 386 of Cr.P.C. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that there were various contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. The relationship between the parties was strained, and the medical and ocular evidence was conflicting. There is no infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8 2026:HHC:29055 13. The State had filed an appeal under Section 11. (4) of the Probation of Offenders Act, which reads as under: - 11. Courts competent to make an order under the Act, appeal and revision and powers of courts in appeal and revision: (4) When an order has been made under section 3 or section 4 in respect of an offender, the Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of its power of revision may set aside such order and, in lieu thereof, pass sentence on such offender according to law: Provided that the Appellate Court or the High Court in revision shall not inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the court by which the offender was found guilty 14. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the provision that the Appellate Court may set aside such an order and, in lieu thereof, pass sentence on such offender according to law. Thus, a limited jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Appellate Court, and it can only set aside the order of probation and pass a sentence as per the law. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prithvi Raj (supra) that the Appellate Court cannot alter the nature of the offence or direct the accused to be convicted for another offence. It was observed: - 10. That brings us to the pivotal issue as to the scope and limit of interference in an appeal under Section 11(2) of the Act. Section 11(4) makes the position clear that only the propriety of the order passed under Section 3 or 4 in 9 2026:HHC:29055 respect of offenders can be dealt with by the appellate court or the High Court, as the case may be. The appellate court or the High Court exercising revisional power may set aside such an order, meaning passed either under Section 3 or Section 4 and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender. Obviously, the sentence can be imposed only in respect of the offence relating to which the order under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act has been passed. There is no scope for altering the nature of the offence and for directing that the accused shall be convicted for another offence. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in directing that the conviction of the appellants shall be under Section 326 IPC. We find that the trial court had given adequate reasons for passing the order under Section 4 of the Act. That being so, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the benefit extended by the trial court under the Act. 15. The accused/respondent had not filed any appeal against the order of conviction, which means that she had accepted the judgment of conviction as correct. The State was aggrieved by the order of the sentence, and had the appeal not been filed, the matter would have rested at the conviction of the respondent and her release on probation as per the order of the learned Trial Court. The Appellate Court made the position of the State worse by filing an appeal because it acquitted the accused. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 9 SCC 507: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 834 that the position of a party appealing from a judgment or order cannot 10 2026:HHC:29055 be made worse than it would have been had it not filed any appeal. It was observed at page 533: 62. However, under the scheme of Section 386 vis-à-vis an appeal for enhancement of sentence, there can also be an acquittal of the accused as per sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of Section 386. But, on the other hand, in an appeal from a conviction, it has been expressly stated that there cannot be an enhancement of the sentence. Therefore, while in an appeal for enhancement of sentence filed by the State, the accused can make out a case for acquittal or discharge or retrial, in the case of an appeal from conviction, the respondent in such an appeal, namely, the State or the victim or the complainant, cannot seek enhancement of the sentence beyond what has been awarded by the trial court. The above distinction can be explained by way of a Latin maxim which has been discussed by Ujjal Bhuyan, J., while in the Bombay High Court [Jyoti Plastic Works (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2021) 15 GSTR-OL 453: 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 2276], in the following words: (Jyoti Plastic Works case [Jyoti Plastic Works (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2021) 15 GSTR-OL 453: 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 2276], SCC OnLine Bom para 40) “40. In this connection, we may refer to the maxim reformatio in peius. It is a Latin phrase meaning a change towards the worse, i.e. a change for the worse. As a legal expression, it means that a lower court judgment is amended by a higher court into a worse one for those appealing it. In many jurisdictions, this practice is forbidden, ensuring that an appellant cannot be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. When the above phrase is prefixed by the words “no” or “prohibition”, which would render the maxim as no reformatio in peius or prohibition of reformatio in peius, it would denote a principle of procedure as per 11 2026:HHC:29055 which using a remedy available in law should not aggravate the situation of the person who avails the remedy. In other words, a person should not be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. No reformatio in peius or prohibition of reformatio in peius is a part of fair procedure and thus, by extension, can also be construed as part of natural justice. It is not only a procedural guarantee but is also a principle of equity.” (emphasis supplied) 63. The rationale of the above can be explained in simple language by stating that no appellant, by filing an appeal, can be worse off than what he was. That is exactly what we are seeking to reiterate in our judgment, having regard to the facts of the present case. 16. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned Appellate court cannot be sustained and is ordered to be set aside. Since the Learned Appellate Court has not decided the validity of the order granting the probation, which was the only question for determination, the matter is remitted to the Learned Appellate Court to decide the appeal as per the law. 17 It is expressly made clear that any observation made by this Court while deciding the present revision will not affect the decision of the Learned Appellate Court because this Court has said nothing about the validity of the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The parties through their respective 12 2026:HHC:29055 counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 05.08.2026. 18 The records of the learned Courts below be returned forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment, to reach the Court well before the next date of hearing. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th July, 2026 (ravinder)