2026:HHC:28722 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMMO No.213 of 2021 Date of Decision: 14.7.2026 _____________________________________________________________________ Ram Lal ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. …....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Petitioner: Mr. Ajay Kumar Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the State. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dogra, Advocate, for respondent No.3. Respondent No.2 exparte. ___________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.PC, prayer has been made by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 64 of 2017 dated 16.3.2017, registered with Police Station Sadar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 167, 465, 466, 469, 471 and 201 of Indian Penal Code along with consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 2. In nutshell, case of the petitioner, who at the relevant time was working as ASI 1st IRB Bangrah, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, as has been projected in the grounds of the petition and further canvassed by 2026:HHC:28722 2 Mr.Ajay Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that afore FIR as well as criminal prosecution sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings is not sustainable in the eye of law on account of exoneration of the petitioner in disciplinary proceedings on an identical charge. In support of his aforesaid submissions, he placed reliance upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 575 of 2020 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5422 of 2015) titled as Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI and Anr., wherein it came to be ruled that in case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue. Reliance has also been placed upon judgment dated on 12.9.2023, passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No. 3220 of 2022, titled as Ram Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., whereby show cause notice dated 12.5.2022, issued on the basis of inquiry report returned against the petitioner for something for which he was not charged was quashed and set-aside. 3. Quintessential facts as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, necessary for adjudication of the case at hand, are that while petitioner was posted as Assistant Sub-Inspector, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh disciplinary 2026:HHC:28722 3 proceedings were initiated against him on receipt of preliminary inquiry report dated 16.03.2017. Charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 29.06.2018 containing following three charges: “i) Certificate was not annexed by the petitioner on the cover page of daily diary register (roznamcha) amounting to violation of Rule 22.50 of the Punjab Police Rules (PPR), as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh; ii) On 13.12.2016 on return from the office of the Inspector General of Police, Central Range Mandi, the petitioner recorded comments against his superior officer in his arrival report dated 13.12.2016. His acts amounted to violation of Rule 14.7 of the PPR; iii) Page No. 10 of the daily diary register of Police Post City Mandi, dated 13.12.2016 was illegally removed by the petitioner with the help of M.C. Pawan Kumar and it was replaced with a new page wherein comments were recorded against a superior officer. Such action of the petitioner was in violation of Rules 14.7 and 22.50 of PPR.” 4. It is only against the aforesaid third charge, FIR No. 64 of 2017, which is sought to be quashed in the instant proceeding, was registered against the petitioner on 16.03.2017 under Sections 167, 465, 466, 469, 471 and 201 of IPC. In Disciplinary Proceedings, Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 30.07.2018, wherein he held that charge No.1 has not been proved, whereas charge No. 2 was held as proved. Regarding charge No.3, which is the subject matter of the present case, Enquiry Officer held that charge was proved, but since FIR No. 64 of 2017 stood 2026:HHC:28722 4 registered at Police Station Sadar, District Mandi, under Sections 167, 465, 466, 469, 471 and 201 of IPC and matter was pending trial after presentation of challan, the Commandant, 1st IRBn Bangarh, on 10.05.2019 ordered to keep the departmental inquiry in abeyance till the conclusion of trial in FIR as detailed herein above. The Inspector General (AP&T), on 28.05.2019 set aside the order dated 10.05.2019 and directed to take the inquiry to its logical end. On 28.08.2019, the Commandant, 1st IRBn Bangarh, issued a show-cause notice to petitioner as to why he be not dismissed from service, however, on receipt of reply from petitioner, the Commandant, on 21.10.2019 imposed penalty of reduction in rank upon the petitioner from ASI to Head Constable. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid imposition of penalty, petitioner filed Civil Writ Petition No.3212 of 2019 and same was allowed on 06.08.2020. Show cause notice issued to petitioner on the basis of order dated 28.06.2019 was also held bad in law. Punishment imposed upon petitioner on 21.10.2019 was also held to be illegal. However, liberty was reserved to the authority to proceed with matter from the stage of passing order dated 10.05.2019, as a consequence of aforesaid order passed by this Court in Writ Petition detailed herein above, petitioner was reinstated as ASI on 13.10.2020. On 25.11.2020, the Commandant, 1st IRBn Bangarh, issued a show cause notice to petitioner as to why he 2026:HHC:28722 5 should not be punished with forfeiture of three years of regular service permanently. Petitioner replied to show cause notice on 04.12.2020 stating that inquiry could not proceed in view of decision rendered in CWP 3212 of 2019 and also for the reason that trial in criminal case was underway, however, inquiry proceeded further, and on 31.12.2020, Commandant exonerated the petitioner of charge No.2 as well. Qua charge No.3, the matter was ordered to be kept in abeyance till the decision of criminal case. On 19.02.2021, the Commandant recalled his earlier order of 31.12.2020 and fresh inquiry was ordered in charge No.3. Enquiry Officer submitted the inquiry report on 15.04.2022 qua charge No.3. This charge was held to be not proved. However, petitioner was held guilty of misconduct on the ground that replacement of page of Daily Diary Register stood proved and this fact established that petitioner, being In-charge of the Police Post, was negligent in supervision and vigilance. On the basis of this inquiry, a show cause notice was issued to petitioner on 12.05.2022 as to why four years of his regular service be not forfeited permanently. 6. Aggrieved with aforesaid show cause notice, petitioner approached this Court by way of CWP No. 3220 of 2020, titled Ram Lal vs. State of H.P. and Others, which came to be allowed vide judgment dated 12.09.2023. It would be apt to take note of para 5 of the afore judgment, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court, after having 2026:HHC:28722 6 discussed the matter at length, recorded its conclusion, which reads as below: 5. Conclusion 5(i) In view of discussion in para 4 above [in particular, paras 4(a) & 4(b)], what comes out is that this petition succeeds on first two contentions raised i.e. :- (a) Impugned show-cause notice dated 12.05.2022 (Annexure P-1) shows predetermined mind of the respondent authority to punish the petitioner. He has been deprived of the opportunity to represent against the findings recorded against him in the inquiry report. (b) Impugned show-cause notice dated 12.05.2022 (Annexure P-1) is based upon findings in the inquiry report returned against the petitioner for something, with which the petitioner was not charged. After exonerating the petitioner from the third charge, for which the fresh inquiry was undertaken, the inquiry officer could not hold the petitioner guilty of certain other aspects for which there was no charge levelled against him. In view of discussion in para 4(c) above, the petition, however, fails on the third contention. It is held that :- (c) There is no violation of Rule 16.38 (1) & (2) of the Punjab Police Rules as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh in the instant case. Judicial Prosecution was already underway against the petitioner, hence there was no need for the respondents to take prior concurrence of the District Magistrate before initiating departmental proceedings against him. Prior concurrence would have been necessitated had the respondent authorities decided to proceed ‘only’ departmentally against the petitioner and not otherwise. 2026:HHC:28722 7 5(ii) The net result is that the writ petition is allowed. Impugned show-cause notice dated 12.05.2022 (Annexure P-1) is quashed and set aside. Respondents are, however, at liberty to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 7. In the aforesaid judgment, Coordinate Bench of this Court categorically held that impugned show cause notice dated 12.05.2022 is based on finding in inquiry report returned against the petitioner for something with which he was not charged. After exonerating the petitioner from the third charge, for which the fresh inquiry was undertaken, Enquiry Officer could not hold the petitioner guilty of certain other aspects for which there was no charge leveled against him. Very crux and result of aforesaid judgment rendered by Coordinate Bench of this Court is that in disciplinary proceedings, petitioner stood exonerated against third charge, qua which criminal proceedings, which are sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, were instituted. 8. Pursuant to notice issued in instant proceeding, respondent- State has filed reply, wherein prayer as made in instant petition has been opposed on the ground that mere acquittal of petitioner in disciplinary proceedings qua charge No.3 cannot be ground to quash the criminal proceedings. 2026:HHC:28722 8 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 10. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process 2026:HHC:28722 9 of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the 59 inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 12. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s 2026:HHC:28722 10 inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings. 13. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the 2026:HHC:28722 11 accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 14. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259, has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC. 15. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law. 16. Now being guided by the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time, this court would make an endeavour to find 2026:HHC:28722 12 out whether offence, if any, punishable under the afore provisions of law and evidentiary material collected on record by the prosecution is sufficient to connect the accused with the alleged commission of offence or not? 17. The question which needs to be determined in the case at hand is whether criminal prosecution against the petitioner for the charge for which he has been otherwise exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings, can be permitted to sustain or not? Answer to the aforesaid question has been already given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case titled Ashoo Surenderanath Tewari (supra), wherein Hon'ble Apex Court, taking note of its earlier judgments, though observed that standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the adjudicating authority, but formulated a question for determination that in case the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating authority, whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or not and held as under. “7. It is apparent on the basis of fact that they have merged during the meeting that in this case the entire crime has been committed by Shri Muthukumar, who is still absconding and is yet to be brought to book by CBI. Therefore, in view of the above agreeing with the competent authority, prima facie charges do not seem established against Shri Ashoo Tiwari and Shri Karade and as such sanction for prosecution of Shri Ashoo Tiwari and Shri Shasheel Karade, Manager, SIDBI is not called for and the commission would advise accordingly and RDA would suffice against Shri Ashoo Tiwari, DGM 2026:HHC:28722 13 and Shri Shasheel karade, Manager, SIDBI for their procedural and supervisory lapses which have already been examined earlier by the Commission and minor pp had already been advised.” A reading of this Report shows that, at the highest, the appellant may be negligent without any criminal culpability. In fact, the positive finding of the CVC that the appellant appears to be a victim of Muthukumar’s plot is of some importance. 7. A number of judgments have held that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1, the question before the Court was posed as follows:- “3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.” This Court then went on to state: “17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.” This being the case, the Court then held: 2026:HHC:28722 14 “23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.” In Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (2011) 3 SCC 581, this Court held as follows:- “26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (AIR p. 27) “… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises 2026:HHC:28722 15 for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined.” xxx xxx xxx 29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. xxx xxx xxx 31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the adjudicating authority and in case the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating authority whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or not is the precise question which falls for determination in this case.” After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in paragraph 38 as follows:- “38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows: (i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously; (ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution; (iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other; (iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution; 2026:HHC:28722 16 (v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and (vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.” It finally concluded: “39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.” From our point of view, para 38(vii) is important and if the High Court had bothered to apply this parameter, then on a reading of the CVC report on the same facts, the appellant should have been exonerated. 8. Applying the aforesaid judgments to the facts of this case, it is clear that in view of the detailed CVC order dated 22.12.2011, the chances of conviction in a criminal trial involving the same facts appear to be bleak. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and that of the Special Judge and discharge the 2026:HHC:28722 17 appellant from the offences under the Penal Code. 9. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.” 18. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court though observed that standard of proof in criminal cases is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings, but once Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation, therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in adjudication proceeding can be said to be relevant in criminal case. Hon'ble Apex Court further held that in case of exoneration on merits, when the allegation found to be not sustainable at all and person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue. If it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of a person concerned shall be an abuse of process of court. Since in adjudication proceedings, Enquiry Officer has already recorded a finding qua charge No.3 and petitioner has been held innocent, which finding has been further upheld by coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No. 3220 of 2022, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that criminal prosecution lodged against the petitioner qua charge no.3 is not sustainable and continuation thereof would be abuse of process of law. 2026:HHC:28722 18 19. Having scanned the entire evidence, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that, no case much less under the aforesaid provisions of law can be said to have been made against the petitioner. Since for the discussion made herein above, case of the prosecution is likely to fail in any eventuality, this Court finds the case at hand to be a fit case for exercising power under Section 482 CrPC to quash FIR as well as consequent proceedings. If prayer made in the instant petition is not accepted, petitioner would be unnecessarily subjected to ordeal of the protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to culminate in acquittal of the accused. 20. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), present petition is allowed and FIR No. 64 of 2017 dated 16.3.2017, registered with Police Station Sadar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 167, 465, 466, 469, 471 and 201 of IPC along with consequent proceedings are quashed and set aside. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all pending applications. July 14, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge