2026:HHC:29072 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 573 of 2026 Reserved on: 19.06.2026 Date of Decision: 16.07.2026. Harbans Chaudhary ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. For Respondents/State : : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1 & 2/State. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 255 of 2024, dated 29.08.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar Una, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376, 506(2) and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:29072 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant (name being withheld to protect her identity) came in contact with the petitioner when she was undergoing coaching for her NET exam. The petitioner employed her. The informant felt that the petitioner’s intention was not good, and she expressed her desire to leave the job. She returned to Una after the imposition of the lockdown in 2020. The petitioner contacted her several times and asked her to visit Gurgaon and start working again. However, the informant expressed her desire not to continue with her job. The petitioner persisted, and the informant agreed to start working in the Company. The petitioner hired an accommodation for the informant near his residence and increased her salary from ₹20,000 to ₹50,000. He also paid the rent for the informant’s accommodation. One day, the petitioner visited the informant’s room and raped her. He threatened to kill her if the incident was revealed to any person. He had also video recorded the incident and threatened the informant that he would upload the video recording on the internet. Thereafter, he repeatedly raped the informant. He took her to various hotels on the pretext of attending meetings and raped her in the hotels. The informant’s 3 2026:HHC:29072 marriage was fixed in the year 2023, and the petitioner told her not to get married, otherwise he would forward her indecent pictures to her future husband. The informant nevertheless married and shifted to Canada. But the petitioner continued to threaten the informant. She returned to India in August 2023, and the petitioner took her to an unknown flat in Gurgaon, where he raped her. He visited Una in November 2023 and took her to Peer Nigaha. He raped her in a lonely place. He threatened to upload her pictures on the internet and forward them to her husband if the incident was narrated to any person. He also purchased stamp papers in the informant's name and forged the informant's signature on various documents. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The informant declined to undergo a medical examination, and her medical examination could not be conducted. The call detail record of the petitioner was obtained, and it was found that the petitioner was in constant touch with the informant between 01.09.2022 and 08.01.2024. The petitioner's location was not found at Una in November 2023. The records from various hotels were seized. However, the recording in the CCTV footage was not available. The petitioner had other mobile phones, besides the 4 2026:HHC:29072 ones mentioned in the FIR. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the allegations in the FIR are false. They are not supported by the material collected by the police during the investigation. The informant refused to undergo her medical examination, and there is no material to corroborate her version. The analysis of the call detail record showed that the petitioner’s location was not found at Una in November 2023, which falsifies her version that the petitioner had raped her at Una in November 2023. The informant had herself purchased stamp papers, and the allegation made by her that the petitioner had purchased the stamp papers in her name and forged her signature is not proved. The landlord of the rented flat at Sector 45, Gurgaon, Haryana said that the informant used to stay in the flat along with her brother, mother and father, which falsifies the informant's version that she was residing alone. The petitioner had also lodged an FIR No. 255 of 2024 before the registration of the FIR by the informant, 5 2026:HHC:29072 and the present FIR has been lodged to create pressure upon the petitioner to withdraw the FIR lodged by him. Only one incident had taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of Una, and the police at Una had no jurisdiction to carry out the investigation. The allegations are vague and do not contain any details. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the investigation conducted by the police does not support the allegations made in the FIR. The petitioner had also lodged an FIR against the informant, and the present FIR was lodged as a counterblast to the petitioner’s FIR. The present case falls within the parameters of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he 6 2026:HHC:29072 prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate- General for the respondent, submitted that the allegations in the FIR show the commission of cognizable offences. This Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to evaluate the material and quash the FIR because some parts of it are not corroborated by the result of the investigation. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series 7 2026:HHC:29072 of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent 8 2026:HHC:29072 person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9 2026:HHC:29072 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10 The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner had taken a flat on rent where he repeatedly raped the informant. He had also taken the informant with her to various hotels on the 10 2026:HHC:29072 pretext of company meetings, and he raped her in those hotels. The police have collected the identity cards of the petitioner and the informant, showing that they had stayed together in various hotels. Therefore, the allegations in the FIR prima facie show the commission of cognizable offences. 12. It was submitted that the allegations are inherently improbable. The petitioner never protested before any employee of the hotel regarding her repeated rapes. This submission will not help the petitioner. The informant specifically asserted that the petitioner had video-recorded the first incident, and he threatened to upload the video recording on social media. Therefore, the informant was under a constant threat that her reputation would be tarnished if she did not consent to the petitioner’s activities. The informant was acting under coercion and could not have been expected to raise any hue and cry or make any complaint to any person. Hence, the FIR cannot be quashed because the informant had not complained to any person about the rape. 13, It was submitted that the landlord of the accommodation hired by the informant stated that the informant was staying with her family members, which falsifies her 11 2026:HHC:29072 allegation that she was residing alone and that the petitioner had raped her. This submission will also not help the petitioner. The complete statement of the landlord has not been placed on record to show that the informant never resided alone. The family members of the informant could reside with her on some occasions, and the petitioner could reside alone on another occasion, providing an opportunity for the petitioner to rape her. 14. It was submitted that the petitioner’s call detail record shows that his location was not found at Una in November 2023, which falsifies the informant’s allegation that the petitioner had raped her at Una in November 2023. This submission will not help the petitioner. The police had specifically stated that the petitioner was in possession of other mobile phones. Further, it is possible for the petitioner to keep his mobile phone somewhere else and visit Una without the mobile phone. All these possibilities have to be explored after the conclusion of the trial and not during the proceedings for quashing of the FIR. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner had lodged an FIR against the informant, and the present FIR is the result of a counterblast to compel the petitioner to withdraw the FIR lodged by him. This submission will not help the petitioner. The F.I.R. 12 2026:HHC:29072 lodged by the petitioner shows that there was some dispute related to the money between the parties. It is for the learned trial Court to determine which of the versions is correct, and this Court cannot assume that the FIR lodged by the petitioner is correct because it was lodged before the FIR of the informant. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from the registration of the FIR by the petitioner. 16. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction has to treat the allegations in the FIR as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 13 2026:HHC:29072 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the 14 2026:HHC:29072 pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 15 2026:HHC:29072 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 19. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage on the ground that the allegations of the FIR are false. This is a matter of trial and is to be determined by the learned Trial Court, where the matter is pending. 20. It was submitted that the police of police station Una had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter. This submission cannot be accepted. The FIR and the investigation show that a part of the incident had taken place at Peernigah within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station Una and the police had jurisdiction to investigate the matter. In any case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 that SHO has a statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence and the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:- “8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in 16 2026:HHC:29072 quashing the FIR on the ground that the Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that the learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable to criminal trials. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations made by the parties that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because: (1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged. (2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction. (3) After the investigation is over, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. 9. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under: “156. Police officer's power to investigate a cognizable case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction 17 2026:HHC:29072 over the local area within the limits of such station would have the power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called into question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above- mentioned.” 10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction is also prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can investigate any cognizable case in which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have the power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called into question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After the investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then the FIR can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which the crime was committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. 18 2026:HHC:29072 11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “jurisdiction of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials”. It is to be stated that under the said chapter, there are various provisions which empower the court for enquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, enquired or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178, which are as under: “177. Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.—Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of enquiry or trial.—(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for an “ordinary” place of enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime. 19 2026:HHC:29072 13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [AIR 1963 SC 447 : (1963) 2 SCR 52] dealt with a similar contention wherein the High Court had held that the statutory powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it was held thus: “The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with the investigation into such offences and under these sections the police have the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or the inherent power of the court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the judiciary in regard to the statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. KhwajaNazir Ahmad [(1944) 71 IA 203, 212: AIR 1945 PC 18] (IA at p. 212) observed as follows— ‘The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 20 2026:HHC:29072 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act.’ With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error, therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the officer in charge of the police station.” 14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit an investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561: 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180] 15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent 21 2026:HHC:29072 that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of the investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinised for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of the investigation that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi, was not having territorial jurisdiction is, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. 21. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1, that once an investigation is commenced under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on the ground that the Police Officer was not empowered. It was observed:- 24. From the aforesaid provisions, it is quite clear that a police officer in charge of a police station can, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence which a court having jurisdiction over such police station can inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Sub- section (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not 22 2026:HHC:29072 interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings clause” in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of Section 202 CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a complaint filed before him. 26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior to taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC and as it appears, a final report was submitted by the investigating agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since the alleged transactions had taken place within the territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action had arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the investigation should be transferred to the police agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been entrusted with the investigation, had, upon initial inquiries, recommended that the investigation be transferred to the police agency of Mumbai. 27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself from holding a proper and complete investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 156 CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to 23 2026:HHC:29072 conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC without taking cognizance on the complaint and where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the Magistrate, a police officer empowered under sub-section (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are unable to accept Mr Syed's submissions that the High Court had erred in upholding the order of the learned trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the submission that it was for the investigating officer in the course of the investigation to decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not. 30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the stage of taking cognisance was yet to arrive. The investigating agency was required to place the facts elicited during the investigation before the court in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the part of the investigating agency to forward its report with the observation that since the entire cause of action for the alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation should be transferred to the police station concerned in Mumbai. 31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the process should be based on the facts disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case, 24 2026:HHC:29072 there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his application for a loan with the Head Office of the Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the part of the investigating agency to make an observation that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, which was required to be transferred to the police station having jurisdiction to do so. 32. On the materials before him, the learned Magistrate was fully justified in rejecting the final report submitted by the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), and to order a fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any error in upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals with the court's powers to inquire into or try an offence of criminal misappropriation or a criminal breach of trust if the same has been committed or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the local jurisdiction of the said court. 33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [(1999) 8 SCC 728: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the investigating officer was entitled to transfer an investigation to a police station having jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to consider whether the investigating officer in respect of an investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen outside his jurisdiction despite there being material available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested 25 2026:HHC:29072 in the investigating authorities, under Section 156(1) CrPC, did not restrict the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike in other cases, it was for the court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were placed before it.” 22. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed because the police had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 23. It is undisputed that the police had completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the 26 2026:HHC:29072 materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 24. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. The pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 25. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th , July, 2026. (ravinder)